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Abstract 
 
Conflict or battlefield archaeology has been steadily gaining traction within 
British archaeology since the 1990s. Methods of inquiry unique to conflict 
archaeology, allied to a growing body of theory, have enabled archaeologists to 
define and reconstruct events of past conflict, illuminating a distinctive 
component of the human experience. 
This thesis applies the theories and methods of conflict archaeology to 
investigate Anglo-Welsh conflict landscapes of the twelfth century. It aims to 
explore patterns of Welsh resistance to Anglo-Norman military campaigns 
through the analysis of documents, landscapes and archaeological sites. 
Events of armed conflict explored archaeologically using battlefield archaeology 
methods, present a unique opportunity to undo biases inherent in traditional 
military history approaches. Unfortunately the amorphous and at times 
ephemeral nature of medieval conflicts has generally discouraged their 
archaeological investigation. The study seeks to address this by the application 
of a holistic conflict archaeology methodology, refined for medieval conflicts. 
This research specifically focuses on the often overlooked conflicts 
associated with the reign of Owain ap Gruffudd, (better known as Owain 
Gwynedd) from 1137–1170, particularly the conflict events connected to King 
Henry II’s 1157 campaign along the North coast of Gwynedd, and the 1165 
campaign in the Berwyn Mountains. A significant part of this is accomplished by 
successfully utilizing devices of military terrain analysis, spatially represented 
via GIS (Geographical Information System) technology, to reconstruct 
archaeological landscapes of conflict. Using these approaches, the thesis 
presents new understandings of both specific events and the broader conflict 
landscapes associated with Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman conquest. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In 1095 William Rufus led an army into Wales; this royally sponsored campaign 
was preceded by earlier conflicts between the Anglo-Norman marcher barons 
and the Welsh, with the first documented incident taking place on the banks of 
the River Rhymi in 1070.  These Anglo-Norman incursions into native Wales 
marked the beginning of a legacy of conflict that would define medieval Wales 
until the conclusion of the Edwardian Conquest in 1283.  This prolonged era of 
conflict triggered elements of social change, the legacies of which endured to 
contribute to the conceptualization of modern identities. 
 The study of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales has traditionally been 
restricted to the realm of the historian and military historian alike, and has yet to 
be explored from a conflict archaeology perspective.  Anglo-Norman biases and 
over-simplifications of the Welsh experience in past scholarly literature, coupled 
with a dearth of archaeological investigation, have led to the absence of a 
Welsh narrative from the Anglo-Norman Conquest.  These deficiencies are 
addressed by this research, which at a fundamental level, aims to demonstrate 
the Welsh reaction to the attempted and failed Anglo-Norman conquest of the 
Welsh Principality of Gwynedd in the mid-twelfth century, through analysing the 
archaeological signatures of Welsh and Anglo-Norman battlefields, by 
contextualizing them within their broader conflict landscape.  This research will 
specifically focus on the often overlooked conflicts associated with the reigns of 
Owain ap Gruffudd, better known as Owain Gwynedd (1137-1170) and King 
Henry II (1154-1189) , concentrating on the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the 
1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  The goal of this research is to expand 
knowledge of these specific campaigns and the broader conflict landscapes 
associated with the Anglo-Norman conquest and Welsh resistance, and place 
them within a wider historical and cultural context. 
The ephemeral nature of most medieval conflicts in Great Britain and in 
particular, Wales, has generally discouraged their archaeological investigation.  
To date, the majority of battlefield surveys in Britain centre on the recovery and 
interpretation of portable military material culture, acquired through traditional 
archaeological survey methods and techniques.  However, this type of 
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investigation and survey is rarely practical or possible for these ephemeral 
medieval conflicts.  These conflicts need to be approached and understood 
from a larger and holistic conflict landscape methodology.  Currently no 
precedent exists in Great Britain for a methodological primer as a tool for 
deciphering medieval conflicts.  This study addresses this deficiency by refining 
traditional battlefield archaeology methods for medieval conflicts, placing an 
emphasis on the importance of the reconstruction of the wider archaeological 
landscape.  This results in a holistic analysis of discrete conflict events and the 
wider conflict landscape in which they took place.  This unique method of 
approach to medieval conflicts and the mid-twelfth-century campaigns of Owain 
Gwynedd and Henry II in particular, presents a unique opportunity to address 
biases and assess the veracity of historical accounts past and present, by 
contextualizing the Welsh experience within an archaeological conflict 
landscape paradigm, leading to the addition of a native Welsh narrative to the 
archaeological record.    
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Chapter One – Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What follows is a review of past and current scholarly literature in the 
archaeological and historical fields and topics of study intrinsic to the research 
presented in this thesis.  Specifically considered are: 1) an overview of conflict 
archaeology as an evolving discipline within a broader archaeological and 
heritage management dialogue; 2) the archaeology of castles in Great Britain, 
with particular emphasis on castles in the landscape agenda and the role of 
castles in the medieval marches of Wales; 3) Welsh early-medieval 
archaeology, giving consideration to the preceding archaeological periods to 
contextualize the research data presented, particularly in regards to 
archaeological evidence for contested and fortified landscapes; and 4) Anglo-
Norman and Welsh studies, as they apply to the archaeological context of the 
region and research period of focus.  The topic of landscape archaeology, 
essential to all of these research aspects, is considered within these areas, 
which is more appropriate than discussing it discretely, apart from a brief 
overview below.  What will not be included within the literature review are the 
medieval chronicles and manuscripts, as these are treated as written artefacts 
within the archaeological dataset.  Also, previous scholarly literature for the 
1157 and 1165 campaign case studies is presented separately within the 
historiography sections of the case study chapters.  Patterns of medieval Welsh 
and Anglo-Norman warfare are also considered separately in Chapter Three.  
This literature review will discuss the evolution and current state of knowledge 
within each field, while addressing any inadequacies or areas that could benefit 
from further academic enquiry and how the application of a conflict archaeology 
paradigm can address gaps within the archaeological and historical records.   
 
 
Landscape Archaeology and Conflict 
 
Landscape, in its most rudimentary form, can be defined as how people 
perceive the physical landscape, whether natural or built.  The advancement of 
landscape studies has been hampered by an underdevelopment of theoretical 
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criteria, resulting in varied attitudes and perceptions of landscape studies within 
the archaeological community (Johnson 2007: 2, 201).  In conflict landscapes 
there is an element of both the processual and post-processual classifications 
of landscape.  The post-processualist defines the archaeology of landscape as 
the study of how people thought about the landscape, rather than how the 
landscape determined where they settled or the natural resources it provided, 
the processual perspective (Adderley and Mills 2014).  The post-processual 
landscape epistemology has been undervalued in conflict archaeology, 
particularly in the archaeology of battlefields which rely heavily on the natural 
features and resources in their reconstruction of battlefield events and tend to 
dismiss landscape analysis that could highlight ‘the life history of place’ 
(Ashmore 2002:1179; Thomas 2001; Carman and Carman 2006).  For example, 
the term landscape can be defined and exemplified in a number of ways.  
Knapp and Ashmore (1999) in Archaeologies of Landscape: Contemporary 
Perspectives, underline the difficulties of defining exactly what landscape is in 
the archaeological setting.  Landscape has cultural implications and meaning as 
well as natural connotations.  There are also thematic concepts within 
landscape studies: ‘landscape as memory, landscape as identity, landscape as 
social order, and landscape as transformation’ (ibid: 13).  The application of 
these thematic concepts of landscape to conflict archaeology would 
undoubtedly enhance our understanding and interpretation of landscapes of 
conflict.   
 
 
Conflict Archaeology 
 
An overview 
The systematic archaeological investigation of armed conflict is a relatively 
recent development of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the last decade has 
witnessed its growth in popularity at an exponential rate (Scott, Babits and 
Haecker 2009:1).  Events of armed conflict explored archaeologically using 
battlefield archaeology methods, present a unique opportunity to undo biases 
inherent in traditional military history approaches.  According to Freeman and 
Pollard, champions of conflict archaeology in the UK, an archaeological 
approach to conflict can: ‘explain actions (individual and corporate) and 
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reactions to a range of experiences which, for better or worse, define us as 
humans: that is our propensity to use violence to resolve situations.  How 
humans behave when placed in those situations and how we interpret and 
preserve such experiences in [their] aftermath’ (Freeman and Pollard 2001: 1).  
The study of landscape, both cultural and physical is therefore essential to the 
pursuit of conflict archaeology (Freeman 2001: 7; Hill and Wileman 2002: 215; 
Foard 2009:136).    
Conflict archaeology provides archaeologists with the methodological 
tools with which to reconstruct the progress of a battle, assess the veracity of 
historical accounts and fill in gaps within the historical record.  An integral part 
of this process is to place the battlefield and related sites in a broader cultural 
and conflict landscape to better understand, interpret and identify events and 
sites. ‘This is particularly important with respect to areas of study where the 
historical record is often incomplete, confusing, and biased.  Battlefield 
archaeology seeks to move beyond a simple reconstruction of the battlefield 
events towards a more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield’ (McBride et al. 
2011: 77).  A key aspect of this analysis is the reconstruction of the historic 
landscape and battlefield terrain associated with the battle to identify natural 
and cultural features present in the battlefield space and determine how they 
were exploited by the combatants  (Carman and Carman 2009: 42; Loechl et al. 
2009; McBride et al. 2011: 77).  Such surveys also aim to address how the 
conflict events analysed contributed to social change, especially since ‘such 
conflicts are symptomatic of underlying societal stresses and their conclusions 
typically mark the beginning of significant processes of change’ (Geier et al. 
2011: vii).    
A note on terminology, while ‘conflict archaeology’ is the internationally 
accepted term to describe this field of study, given that both the leading 
conference and journal publication are titled ‘Fields of Conflict’, there exist other 
terms.  In the USA ‘battlefield archaeology’ is often used, and the terms ‘combat 
archaeology’, ‘military archaeology’ and ‘battle archaeology’ are also used 
although not as prevalent as ‘conflict’ or ‘battlefield’ (Carman 2014: 10-13).  In 
academic literature battlefield archaeology is often used in reference to method 
and survey specific pursuits of the field, while conflict archaeology is more 
holistic and covers all aspects of the field, including theoretical aims and 
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objectives (ibid: 42).  Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the term 
battlefield archaeology will only be used when discussing methodological 
issues, in all other instances the term conflict archaeology will be applied.    
         John Carman, one of the leading experts of conflict archaeology, 
particularly in regards to the impact of landscape phenomena in the selection of 
battlescapes, has lately turned his attention to defining a research agenda for 
conflict archaeology as it moves out of its infancy into an established field of 
study.   In his recent publication, Archaeologies of Conflict (2014), Carman has 
identified three temporal divisions within conflict archaeology, these are the 
study of prehistoric, historic and modern conflict; each of these contain 
distinctive qualities specific to their temporal period (Carman 2014).  Studies of 
prehistoric conflict are predominantly concerned with determining the origins of 
conflict and defining warfare in the prehistoric world.  Consequently, 
prehistorians engage in the philosophical debate surrounding the nature and 
capacity for human violence (ibid: 38-40).  The archaeology of modern conflict 
is primarily concerned with issues of preservation and heritage management, 
much of which is focused on the battlefields of the First and Second World Wars 
(ibid: 16, 63).   Historic conflict, what Carman terms ‘battlefield archaeology’ is 
concerned primarily with the identification and study of sites where conflict took 
place, and the archaeological signature of those events (ibid: 41-2).   
Carman and others, including Scott, Babits and Haecker, have criticized 
battlefield archaeology for being slow to expand beyond its methodological 
pursuits, with many investigations having little or no theoretical orientation 
(Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009: 1).  ‘In part, it is because both the underlying 
purpose of battlefield archaeology and the underlying theory go unquestioned’ 
(Carman 2014: 45).  Behaviourism is the predominant theoretical application for 
conflict archaeology, generally personified via group or individual actions on the 
battlefield and through social structural change resulting from warfare (Scott, 
Babits and Haecker 2009).  Other aspects such as phenomenological 
approaches to the ritualistic location of battles on the landscape have been 
explored by Carman and Carman (2006) in the ‘Bloody Meadows Project’, 
which involves systematically comparing the landscape setting of multiple 
battles, from varying periods and cultures.       
 
21 
 
History and development of conflict archaeology 
The development of conflict archaeology has by and large been a North 
American innovation.  The nineteenth-century Battle of Little Bighorn (also 
known as ‘Custer’s last stand’ 1876), (Scott et al. 1989) and the eighteenth-
century battlefields of Monmouth, New Jersey (American War of Independence, 
1778), (Sivilich 2007) are two classic examples that demonstrate the ability of 
battlefield archaeology to define cultural meaning from the spatial distribution of 
military material culture.  The battlefield survey method, pioneered by Scott, 
involved reconstructing the historic landscape and systematically surveying the 
battlefield using metal detectors to identify and record battle related artefacts in 
situ, leading to a dynamic-pattern analysis and reconstruction of battle events 
(Scott et al. 1989).    
The archaeological study of battlefields in Britain gained momentum in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, looking to the American model for guidance 
(Freeman 2001: 3; Carman 2014: 1; Foard 2012: 14).  However, as Freeman 
points out, there is plenty of room for growth and improvement in battlefield 
archaeology in Britain particularly considering ‘that archaeologists (in Europe) 
have been slow to appreciate the potential of studying battlefields’ (Freeman 
2001: 2).  Since the first Fields of Conflict conference (Glasgow 2000) this has 
slowly been changing.  These developments can be seen in the publication of 
journals such as the ‘Journal of Conflict Archaeology’ (founded in 2005), the 
addition of battlefield archaeology course concentrations in some British 
universities, the creation of the UK Battlefield Resource Centre (created by the 
Battlefields Trust) and the inception of a battlefield designation and preservation 
guide by Historic England and Historic Scotland.   
Despite these improvements there are still several challenges facing the 
continued study of conflict archaeology in Britain.  Most notably these include 
the discrepancy of preference for post-medieval battlefields, the lack of a multi-
disciplinary approach to conflict sites, the absence of a fully developed survey 
methodology, and limiting criteria for battlefield recognition and preservation as 
currently outlined by the British heritage community (Foard 2009: 134-154, 
Freeman 2001: 5). Compounding these problems for medieval conflicts is the 
focus on the recovery of portable military material culture, which is emphasized 
in the battlefield designation guides (English Heritage 2012). The ephemeral 
22 
 
nature of medieval conflict tends to yield an amorphous battle-related artefact 
scatter (Carman 2014: 50).  This is in direct contrast to the well-established 
artefact scatters and battlefield ‘signatures’ for the post-medieval period, for 
example, lead shot depositions from English Civil War sites leading to projectile 
and ballistics reconstructions of battlefield events (see for example the Battle of 
Edgehill in Foard 2012).  The value of the landscape, particularly in terms of 
how it was exploited in a military context, which requires a historic conflict 
landscape reconstruction, is often overlooked as a vital interpretative tool 
(Foard 2009).  This study seeks to address this by using the landscape as an 
artefact of conflict though the reconstruction of the historic conflict landscape 
and via the unique application of military terrain analysis to determine the 
locations of the sites of conflict, how the terrain was exploited by the 
combatants, how this determined the outcome of the battle and larger conflict 
event and how this is indicative of patterns of social change resulting from these 
conflicts.  In a broader sense this research will contribute to the understanding 
of the archaeological ‘signature’ of medieval British conflicts, something that is 
currently poorly understood (Deegan and Foard 2008: 267). 
  
 
The significance of the landscape in conflict archaeology 
Foard, a notable conflict archaeologist in Britain, has advocated the importance 
of the landscape in battlefield analysis, stating that the ‘investigation of the 
historic terrain is necessary not simply to place events in the landscape and to 
define the extent of the battlefield: it is also needed for better understanding of 
the battle itself’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 109).  Without its inclusion within a 
battlefield research agenda many events of conflict are often misinterpreted, as 
are the contextual inferences from any battle-related artefacts scatters.  This 
was perhaps best exemplified in the case of Bosworth (1485 in Leicestershire), 
a key battle event from the War of the Roses (1455-1487) which was incorrectly 
located on the modern landscape as the historic battle terrain had not been 
sufficiently considered (Foard 2009: 137, Foard and Morris 2012).   At the 
English Civil War (1642-1651) Battle of Edgehill (1642, Warwickshire), 
‘traditional military accounts placed troops in a particular relation to one another 
that made no sense of the material recovered by metal detector survey.  
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Historic terrain reconstruction allowed the identification of areas unsuited to 
particular types of troop formations typical for the period…and thus caused 
researchers to rethink the dispositions’ (Carman 2014: 50).  Similarly, at the 
Battle of Marston Moor (1644, Yorkshire) the misidentification of a sunken road 
as being contemporary with the battle altered the interpretation of the battle 
(Carman 2014: 44).  The recognition of these errors has increased awareness 
of the importance of historic military terrain reconstruction in British battlefield 
studies; however, these surveys tend focus only on the reconstruction of battle 
events and do not include a standardized or systematic method for military 
terrain analysis.   
The obstacle of how to systematically interpret the military significance of 
the terrain once reconstructed, has be surmounted by the American Battlefield 
Protection Program (herein ABPP).  The ABPP, a division of the federal agency 
of the National Park Service (herein NPS) was established in 1996 to 
encourage the documentation, preservation and public awareness of American 
battlefields.  The NPS ABPP has developed a multi-disciplinary methodological 
approach to research, document and map battlefields that has proven to be 
highly successful (this method is considered in detail in the Methodology 
chapter see page 50; ABPP 2007; McBride et al. 2011).  These methods, 
originally developed for American Civil War battlefields, were later applied to 
many American War of Independence battlefield sites.  Recently, they have also 
been successfully applied to the on-going project, ‘Battlefields of the Pequot 
War' – an early seventeenth century (1636-1638) conflict between the English 
settlers in the colony of Connecticut and the Pequot Native American tribe.  The 
seventeenth-century battlefields of the Pequot War presented a unique 
challenge for conflict archaeologists to research, survey, document, and 
delineate battlefield boundaries given the biased and fragmentary nature of 
seventeenth- century primary sources, the alteration of the historic landscape 
and the low density and low frequency of artefacts associated with seventeenth- 
century battlefields in North America.  Despite these challenges, the methods, 
which notably included the pioneer use of military terrain analysis to locate the 
sites of battles, were successful in documenting the Pequot War.  Furthermore, 
the results produced from the systematic application these battlefield 
archaeology methods and techniques, reshaped and challenged the accepted 
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interpretation of the Pequot War. The outcomes of this battlefield survey also 
reinstated the Pequot as powerful and competent adversaries – whose 
capabilities had previously been diminished by historic narratives and modern 
publications alike.  The ‘Battlefields of the Pequot War’ project offers unique 
parallels when compared to the twelfth-century campaigns of Owain Gwynedd 
and Henry II, given that in both instances the exact locations of the battles were 
not precisely known, the primary sources were fragmentary and that 
contemporary literature for both Pequots and Welsh diminished their capabilities 
as formidable military adversaries.  
 
 
Medieval conflict archaeology in Great Britain and the methodological 
conundrum 
 
          What seems to lie at the heart of the problem in battlefield studies in the    
          UK is the lack of sufficient critical mass to be able to build, enhance, and   
          sustain a coherent methodology and body of expertise.  The problem is  
          compounded by the fact that effective integration of the techniques of  
          different disciplines is essential to the battlefield studies, not just in the  
          reconstruction of the historic terrain but in all its other aspects.  This  
          remains the most important challenge for the current development of  
          battlefield studies in the UK.  What is required is a secure cross- 
          disciplinary base in both an academic and a professional context, and an  
          adequate level of work in battlefield research and conservation to sustain    
          it (Foard 2009: 137-138). 
 
The challenges cited in the above statement by Foard are resoundingly echoed 
in the absence of battlefield archaeology, as a methodological tool, from 
archaeological endeavours relating to the Anglo-Norman conquest of Britain, 
and particularly of Wales.  While this is unfortunate it is not surprising, as this 
absence is apparent throughout the medieval conflict archaeology of the British 
Isles.  There are some notable exceptions to this, namely the analysis of well 
documented large scale and pivotal events of conflict like the Battle of Fulford 
(1066; Jones 2006) and events or series of events dating to the later Middle 
Ages, such as the War of the Roses (1455-1487; Fiorato et al. 2000; Sutherland 
2009; Broadman 1994).  The challenge of studying medieval conflicts is 
compounded by the heritage communities’ application of a post-medieval 
definition of ‘battle’ (English Heritage 2012), which does not give sufficient 
consideration to other types of armed engagements such as skirmishes or 
25 
 
raids, unless these smaller actions were directly attached, temporally and 
spatially, to a larger battle event.     
In their noteworthy publication The Archaeology of English Battlefields, 
Conflict in the Pre-Industrial Landscape (2012), Foard and Morris critique the 
limitations of the heritage communities’ battlefield designations.  Currently, the 
heritage community (notably Historic England) defines a battle as ‘an action 
involving wholly or largely military forces, present on each side in numbers 
totalling c. 1000 or more, and normally deployed in formal battle array’ (Foard 
and Morris 2012: 6).  This constraining definition and intentional slight of so-
called lesser actions stands to negatively impact our holistic comprehension of 
wider landscapes of conflict.  Additionally, it does not take into consideration 
variations in cultural and temporal definitions of warfare or battle.  Inherent to 
these constraints are the foreseeable difficulties in raising awareness for the 
preservation of these unique landscapes (Foard 2009; Freeman 2001).  The 
particularism that exists in this approach to battlefields is not conducive to the 
consideration and inclusion of other cultural aspects of conflict that extend 
beyond the battle event to effect social structural change.   
These designations of battlefields further limit our understanding of 
conflict by placing the primary emphasis on the archaeological survey of military 
material culture.  Material culture has an important role to play in the 
documentation and interpretation of discrete battlefield events.  In fact military 
material culture documented in situ can lead to the temporal and spatial 
sequencing of discrete actions, producing a comprehensive order of battle that 
has been successful in documenting the actions of distinct individuals (Scott et 
al. 1989; McBride et al. 2011).  The ability of the battlefield archaeologist to 
document these events to this degree of detail is also dependent on the level of 
site preservation and the reliability and availability of accurate and multiple 
primary sources (Geier et al. 2011: 83). 
It is the potential for this degree of detail, possible with the archaeology 
of large-scale well preserved and documented battle events, which has 
understandably created a propensity for this type of battlefield survey while 
inadvertently diminishing the importance for the archaeological consideration of 
other types of armed conflict.   Though lacking in notoriety, the events 
associated with small-scale warfare – the sieges, ambushes and skirmishes 
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that are endemic to the Anglo-Norman and Welsh conflicts (Morillo 1994: 136) – 
have the potential to contribute to our understanding of past conflict particularly 
when examined via a landscape archaeology lens.  
The unique and versatile applications of battlefield archaeology, 
considered in the previous section and discussed at length in the Methodology 
Chapter, are employed in the following study to define the conflict landscapes of 
the Welsh and Anglo-Norman armed conflicts associated with the 1157 Coastal 
Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  This method of approach 
to Welsh archaeology, during the period of Anglo-Norman conquest, has the 
unique ability to document the physical and cultural reactions to the Anglo-
Norman incursion into Wales; without being subjected to the traditional biases 
that currently permeate this period of history.  For instance: the adaptation of 
military tactics is often evident in both the exploitation of the landscape and in 
the material culture distribution of battle-related artefacts.  Although military 
forces often had access to the same weapons technology, it was the tactics 
they employed that were unique as a result of compensating for the challenges 
presented by the opposing force.  The ability to trace these tactical adaptations 
and compensations can contribute to the current understanding of Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman battle tactics.  A conflict archaeology approach also provides a 
resolution to the current theoretical challenges being experienced in the 
applications of agency and landscape theory in medieval Welsh archaeology 
(see section on Welsh archaeology below).  Landscape –cultural and physical – 
is an inescapable attribute of conflict archaeology, while the ability to document 
individual or group actions in a battle restores individual agency to Welsh 
medieval archaeology.  
 
 
Castles in the Landscape Agenda 
 
Castles are the most enduring and visible evidence for the legacy of conflict in 
Wales and the marches during the Anglo-Norman Conquest.  These include the 
initial earth and timber motte and bailey or ringwork castles, which in many 
cases were later replaced by masonry castles.  In terms of the research 
presented in this thesis, castles are an important component for the historic 
conflict landscape reconstruction.  Castles served as spatial indicators for 
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territorial control in a contested landscape and defined the ever fluctuating 
frontier border. Additionally, the adoption of castle building technology by the 
Welsh, as early as 1116 at Cymer Castell (castell is the Welsh spelling of 
castle) in Merioneth, is indicative of the socio-political and military adaptations 
that occurred as a result of the Anglo-Norman Conquest (Kenyon 1996: 126).  
Although castles did not play a direct role in the 1157 and 1165 campaign case 
studies that are considered in this research (with the possible exception of Hen 
Blas Castle), their social and military functions and their presence on the 
landscape are important contextual components in the reconstruction of the 
landscape of conflict in twelfth-century Gwynedd.  McGuire and Villalpando, 
when contrasting the evolution in different styles of warfare of indigenous 
cultures in Sonora region of Mexico, concluded  that the presence or absence of 
fortifications and their functionality is indicative of the evolution of different ways 
of war that were responding to specific pressures, such as an increased 
intensity of warfare (McGuire and Villalpando 2015: 432).  This has important 
cross-cultural parallels for the adoption of built fortifications, such as castles, by 
the Welsh in response to the increased intensity of conflict instigated by the 
Anglo-Norman Conquest efforts.  
Academic research and development encompassing the history and 
archaeology of castles has been pursued since the nineteenth century 
(Armitage 1912; Higham and Barker 1992: 17).  Historically, medieval castles 
were regarded solely as architectural entities for military defence.  Until recently, 
archaeologists remained relatively unaware of how castles functioned on an 
economic, social or aesthetic level (Liddiard 2000b: 1).  However, this was not 
the only shortcoming of castle archaeology.  There was a trend in castle studies 
of description rather than explanation (Gerrard 2003), meaning that sites were 
only described in terms of their architectural features and their ability to serve as 
successful military structures.  Buildings, including castles, have also been 
interpreted for what is expected opposed to what is really there (Dixon and 
Marshall 1993: 431).  Compounding these issues were the types of excavations 
being carried out.  Many castle excavations were short term and done on a 
small scale.  Excavations were also carried out for reasons of renovation, 
emergency repairs, and public display.  The nature of these interventions does 
not provide the researcher with ample means or time to devote to quality 
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analysis.  While some excavations are surprisingly rich in their yield of 
information, many remain obscure and unpublished (Gerrard 2003: 119, 
Creighton and Higham 2004).  It was not until the 1990s with the advent of 
landscape studies that the castle came to be considered for its significance in 
the landscape setting.  This prompted a reconsideration of castles in terms of 
their social form and function.  This post-processual critique to the traditional 
analysis has proven to be a valuable means of interpretation, and has 
enhanced the way we study castles by creating a multi-dimensional framework 
within which they can be understood (Austin 1982; Creighton 2002; Liddiard 
2003). 
 
 
Evolution of Castle and Landscape Archaeology 
As stated above, the rejection of the one dimensional military interpretation of 
castles was the critique of landscape archaeologists.  Castles, like most areas 
of study in archaeology, have multi-faceted meanings and need to be 
approached accordingly.  In their critique, landscape archaeologists were not 
suggesting that castles did not serve any military purpose; only that this was not 
their sole reason for existence.  There were instances, before the application of 
landscape studies, in which castles were considered as entities distinct from 
defensive structures: this being when they were described as places of 
residence.  However, most of the evidence for this was based on courtly 
literature and art, which does not provide solid ground for the construction of 
theories or the development of methodology (Austin 1984: 72-3).  ‘Both aspects 
[(military and courtly life)] of [this] study, divorce the castle from its society, its 
economy and fundamentally from its landscape, both original and 
contemporary’ (ibid).  Austin encouraged medieval archaeologists to take farms, 
villages and castles out of their isolation and begin placing them in the 
landscape (ibid).  This has been done for the purposes of the research 
presented in this thesis, by placing castles within the wider conflict landscape. 
Although landscape archaeologists did not ignore the defensive aspects 
of castles, there was a tendency to diminish their military role.  The extreme of 
this viewpoint is best demonstrated by Liddiard, a prominent castle and 
landscape archaeologist.  Liddiard believed that his ‘recent studies have shown 
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that castles [during the eleventh though thirteenth centuries] were only of minor 
military importance, even in frontier areas that were exposed to invasion such 
as the English/Scottish border’ (Liddiard 2003: 8).  According to the data 
amassed, Liddiard concluded that castles were not laid siege to, or attacked 
often enough to justify their existence as predominantly military structures.  
However, there are castles included in his study area that did endure attack.  
Unfortunately, Liddiard did not provide the means for quantifying how few or 
how many attacks a castle would have had to been subjected to in order to 
make it militarily significant, or militarily null and void.  He also neglected to 
consider that the lack of assault does not equal the lack of intent to attack, and 
therefore, the necessity of the fortification, particularly in unstable and contested 
locations such as the marches of Wales and Scotland. 
Another approach Liddiard takes is to suggest that we can better 
understand the non-military form and function of castles if we take into account 
that the political organisation of medieval society was based on lordship, not 
nationalism.  Once this is accepted we can study castles as ‘manor houses’ and 
‘estate centres’ continuing from a pre-Norman conquest tradition (ibid: 5).  As 
further evidence for castles as non-military entities,  Liddiard points to the 
geographical location of castles highlighting the trend of Norman castles, such 
as Castle Acre in Norfolk, being located on false crests (Liddiard 2000b: 49-50).   
This location adds to the castle’s prominence in the landscape but would not 
provide a practical defensible location, bringing forward another point that ‘is 
easily overlooked, [which] is that ‘display’ is no less ‘functional’’ (ibid: 7). 
Therefore, a castle’s prominent location in the landscape can serve for 
representing power and prestige, and it adds an element of theatricality to how 
the castle would have been perceived and/or approached in the landscape. 
 This brings us to the next notable trend that emerged from castles in the 
landscape agenda, which is the consideration of how castles were connected to 
the landscape as visual emblems of status and lordship (Creighton and Higham 
2004: 5).  This development in castle archaeology focused on the social 
reasons for the defensible architectural features of castles.  In a case study 
Johnson reconsidered the accepted interpretation of Bodiam Castle, historically 
regarded as an epitomic example of a defensive structure, drawing on the 
pioneering work of Coulson (1991).  Johnson proposed that Bodiam would not 
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have been functional as a defence.  He believes that the militarily imposing 
appearance of the castle was a façade created for a psychological impact rather 
than out of a concern for defence (Johnson 2013).  Bodiam is located in a 
designed landscape, the ‘combined effect of landscape manipulation and 
architecture provide a visually stunning journey to the castle’ (Liddiard 2000a: 
169).  Therefore, if we consider castles as manorial houses, it then becomes 
possible to view them as icons of power and economic prosperity (Creighton 
2002: 88; Creighton 2000; Munby 1985; Lieberman 2010).   
Oliver Creighton recommends the idea of castles as centres of 
redistribution of agricultural surplus; these manorial centres would have had 
management over a wide range of agricultural resources (Creighton 2002: 177).  
To maximize the land and natural resources the ‘defensive’ landscape could be 
transformed for agricultural purposes ‘through levelling of ramparts and mottes’ 
an example of this can be seen at Sapcote in Leicestershire (ibid: 181).  These 
landscapes of lordship represent ‘a powerful medium with which to demonstrate 
command of resources – ultimately the basis of lordly authority’ (Liddiard 2000b: 
65).  These landscapes would have presented a ‘flamboyant’ display of the 
lord’s power involved in altering landscapes such as the addition of fish ponds, 
deer parks, and mills.  The importance of standing out in the landscape would 
have been achieved, according to Liddiard not only architecturally, but through 
the alteration of the landscape.  This is not to say that the castle would not 
stand out in the landscape as an architectural feature, only that this was not the 
only way in which it would have stood apart from its surroundings adding to the 
aesthetic value of the landscape.  (ibid: 64). 
The culmination of research on castles in the landscape agenda has 
demonstrated that valuable knowledge can be obtained from a socio-cultural 
landscape approach to castle archaeology.  This medium of approach has 
taken castles out of their static roles as defensive structures and given them a 
new depth and significance of meaning.  However, in doing so researchers 
should be vigilant not to dismiss the military and defensive nature of many 
castle complexes.  This is an especially important consideration for castles 
located in frontier and border regions, such as the Welsh Marches.  The next 
step forward for castles in their landscape context, particularly for those in 
frontier and border regions, is a careful and methodological consideration of 
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their impact on identity and a socialized approach to their military features.  
These impacts can be accounted for in a number of ways, including monument 
reuse, access to resources, control of mobility, alterations in patterns of land-
use, and specific to this thesis, evidence of conflict.   (Some of these concepts 
are discussed in the following timber castle section).  Archaeologists need to 
apply the thematic concepts within landscape studies: ‘landscape as memory, 
landscape as identity, landscape as social order, and landscape as 
transformation’ (Knapp and Ashmore 1999: 13) to the military uses of castles.  It 
can be argued that these concepts are incredibly apparent in areas classified as 
frontiers or borders, such as the Welsh Marches, areas where there are 
communities in conflict.   
 
 
Timber Castles in Wales 
Another significant development in castle archaeology has been the recognition 
of the importance of timber castles.  Previously, timber castles had been 
ignored in favour of their more visually apparent and impressive masonry 
descendants.   An example of this can be seen in the 1981 thesis by C.F. 
Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, 1066-1300, in 
which he fails to take timber motte and bailey and ringwork castles into 
consideration as the initial principal fortification type.  Compounding this lack of 
recognition is the problem of poor preservation (Higham and Barker 1992: 17, 
348).  Timber castles, numerous throughout the Welsh Marches, were the 
dominant form of castle constructed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and 
therefore merit consideration as they are the type of castle that was extant 
during the historical period considered by this thesis.  ‘In Wales we may ascribe 
to the period 1066-1200 some 242 mottes, 77 castle-ringworks […compared to] 
27 far less surely-established stone castles’ (Spurgeon 1991: 157).    
The uses of timber castles – according to Higham and Barker in their 
seminal publication Timber Castles – were varied.  ‘Timber castles could be 
permanent or occasional residences, long-term fortifications or temporary 
campaign and siege bases, and could also be the means by which territory was 
colonized’ (Higham and Barker 1992: 349).  Although more susceptible to fire 
than their stone brethren, timber castles could be erected at a faster and 
32 
 
cheaper rate.  However, the speed with which timber castle were constructed 
has often been exaggerated as an activity that could be completed in a matter 
of days or weeks, when the reality is they took months , if not longer to 
complete (ibid). 
There is a lack of consensus surrounding the effectiveness of timber 
castles, particularly in the Welsh Marches.  Spurgeon (‘Mottes and Moated 
Sites’ in The Archaeology of Clwyd) suggests that their ineffectiveness against 
the Welsh was responsible for their replacement with stone castles.  However, 
the progression to masonry castles is not necessarily a sign of failure in the 
timber design.  As previously stated by Higham and Barker, speed was a 
consideration when constructing castles in hostile territory.  In which case, the 
construction of masonry castles – either as new constructions or replacements 
of timber fortifications – can be viewed as the natural progression of 
colonization, occurring once a territory had been subdued.  After all, the 
marcher lords established ‘power by building castles, exacting tribute and 
hostages and encouraging settlement by English, French and Flemish migrants’ 
(Brown 2004: 100; Richardson 2001).  Lieberman believes that timber castles 
served as ‘ad hoc arrangements, to be abandoned once further conquests had 
been completed’ (Lieberman 2010:138).  Caution is needed here as early 
timber castles in the Welsh Marches are poorly understood as few have been 
excavated using modern archaeological methods.  To this point the evolution of 
castle use and the embodied symbolism in the lordly occupation of these sites 
is unclear, as the function of pre-Norman Welsh fortifications and lordly centres 
is poorly understood.  During the Anglo-Norman conquest of Ireland, native Irish 
fortifications were used ‘only in the context of feuding and succession disputes.  
They did not use them as strategic weapons in the defence of their territories 
against larger and more powerful aggressors’, mirroring earlier pre-Norman 
uses of defences (O’Conor 1998: 98).  The adoption to a more formal system of 
defence (castles), from a tribal and pastoral system (retreat into the mountains), 
is unique in the Welsh trajectory of a social military adaptation, when compared 
to other regions, such as the Irish response to the Anglo-Normans (see page 84 
in Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion on the Welsh adoption of castle 
technology). 
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Timber castles were accompanied by one of two forms of earthwork 
fortifications: the motte and bailey, and the ringwork.  ‘The steep mound, or 
motte, the centrepiece of a castle, could be up to ten metres high, and was 
normally surrounded by a cut ditch.  On top of the motte and itself surrounded 
by a palisade was generally a timber tower…’, a ringwork was a motte and 
bailey without the motte (Brown 2004: 101; Kenyon 1990: 5).  The bailey 
consisted of an outer defended enclosure adjacent to the base of the motte.  
Sometimes the natural terrain was used in the construction of the motte, for 
instance ‘the motte of Sycharth Castle, Denbighshire, stands on a glacial 
mound.  Excavation revealed that a cairn of stones had been collected, and 
then covered with the soil and turf removed when the limits of the motte ditch 
were marked out (Hague and Warhurst 1966; Kenyon 1990: 10).  Both types of 
timber fortifications were used in Wales, although some regions, such as Clwyd, 
do not have any known example of ringworks.  There is some debate amongst 
archaeologists as to the agency that led to the establishment of one type of 
fortification in favour of the other.  Kenyon postulates that the ringwork, which 
he describes as a ‘motte and bailey without the motte’ would have been a more 
economical option, which may have been used in areas that were already 
inhabited (Kenyon 1990: 5).  Jack Spurgeon argues that it was personal 
preference that explains the type of fortification used.  He puts forward the 
hypothesis that there were no ringworks in Clwyd because there were no 
ringworks in the adjacent marcher lordship of Chester, indicating a personal 
preference of the earls of Chester (Spurgeon 1991: 157).  
Whether temporary frontier fortifications or permanent administrative 
centres, the duality of castles is not to be underestimated.  Similarly, the 
architectural fabric of castles should not be a determinant of their value.  Timber 
castles played a decisive role in the conquest of the Welsh Marches (Brown 
2004: 101).  Anglo-Norman ‘[v]ictory was converted into conquest and 
domination by the construction of castles…the castle was infinitely adaptable.  It 
could be a centre of defence or attack, domination and colonization or retreat’, 
however this was ‘an equation which also worked in reverse.  ‘The destruction 
or occupation of Anglo-Norman castles by the Welsh, or the building of Welsh 
castles, ‘represented Anglo-Norman defeat and Welsh recovery’ (Davies 1987: 
89). 
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Timber castles provide a unique opportunity to consider the social 
implications of military structures, discussed at the conclusion of the previous 
section.  It can be argued that in Great Britain, timber castles were the 
personification of military structures as their construction was a consequence of 
the Norman Conquest.   For example, in discussing the importance of the castle 
as a tool of conquest, Gillingham states that ‘In William [the Conqueror’s] camp 
there were men who believed that, no matter how brave its soldiers, a land 
without castles was virtually indefensible’ (1999: 73). Yet, within these castles 
are the inherent socio-cultural implications connected with the necessity of their 
construction.  This duality of castles is explained in the following excerpt from 
Lieberman’s (2010) publication The Medieval March of Wales, the Creation and 
Perception of a Frontier where he discusses cultural perception of the boundary 
between Shropshire and Powys: 
 
          However short-lived the practical military purpose of castles may often  
          have been, there can be no doubt that on the level of perceptions, at  
          least, the evidence of the castles provides a very useful way of   
          determining the existence and extent of a distinctive area on the  
          Shropshire – Powys frontier… Castles always had a psychological impact  
          […] the military element of that impact was, at times, illusory.  Yet where  
          the making of a separate identity in the minds of contemporaries is 
          concerned castles, which were retained primarily as residence or as  
          administrative centres, and even ruined castles, could be just as    
          evocative of frontier warfare as occupied and garrisoned ones.  After all,  
          they stood as monuments to border conflicts which must have remained  
          in living memory, even when they were not directly experienced [...]  The  
          castle played a substantial role in creating and reaffirming the character  
          of the March as a land of war, both in practice  and, more persistently, in  
          perception. (Lieberman 2010:142).  
 
An example of this is brilliantly documented in Higham’s and Barker’s 
publication Hen Domen Montgomery, A Timber Castle on the English-Welsh 
Border.  In this field report, Higham and Barker specifically consider the 
importance the pre-existing Welsh cultural and physical landscape had in 
determining the location of the Anglo-Norman timber castles. For example at 
Hem Domen, Higham and Barker found evidence of a possible palisade or 
enclosure predating the construction of the Norman castle (Higham and Barker 
2000: 25).  This was not an isolated instance; the Anglo-Norman reuse of Welsh 
centres of power seems commonplace as it would have been a highly visible 
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form of social control and restructuring of power (Davies 1987: 255).  Degannwy 
and Rhuddlan Castles were superimposed on top of early medieval llysoedd 
(plural of llys), native Welsh lordly residences and administrative centres 
(Longley 1997: 41; Quinnell et. al. 1994: 213).  It has been argued that during 
the Anglo-Norman Conquest in Wales, ‘castles had a psychological function, 
and were a physical embodiment of subjugation’ (Brown 2004: 101).  There are 
parallels of this in Ireland as well, for example the reuse of a pre-existing 
promontory fort by the Anglo-Normans at Baginbun c. 1170 (Co. Wexford; 
O’Conor 2003: 30).  These castles were also strategically placed, for example, 
Hen Domen restricted mobility by controlling the access to an important ford on 
the River Severn at Rhydwhyman, effectively controlling ‘traffic’ between Wales 
and England (Higham and Barker 2000: 151).   
Several Welsh llysoedd had their defences enhanced with the addition of 
a motte, evidence for this can be seen at Castells/Llysoedd Edeirnion, Prysor 
and Crogan (NPRN 306598; 308964; 306558; Johnstone 1995).  However, it is 
unclear due to the lack of systematic excavation, whether the motte was added 
to a pre-existing llys site, or whether the motte and llys were contemporary 
constructions.  Furthermore it is difficult to determine whether these additions 
were Welsh in their construction.  It is equally possible that the mottes were of 
Anglo-Norman construction, which in the course of the shifting territorial control 
of the conquest were reposed by the Welsh and converted into llysoedd.  For 
further discussion on the llys see the Study Area Chapter (page 139). In terms 
of monument reuse, it was not uncommon for the Welsh to site their castles 
within earlier defensive structures, such as hillforts, or the already mentioned 
llysoedd.  For instance Dinas Bran and Dinas Emrys (both in Gwynedd) were 
Iron Age hillforts later reused for the Welsh built castles by the same names.  It 
is interesting then, that later Welsh masonry castles were often constructed on 
rocky summits, the layout of the castle shadowing the natural contours of the 
craggy terrain, such as at Castell y Bere constructed c. 1221 by Llywelyn the 
Great, in Merioneth (Butler 2010: 27, 31).   
In future research on timber castles in the Anglo-Norman and Welsh 
frontier, it would be interesting to further explore both Spurgeon’s hypothesis 
that motte and bailey versus ringwork was a sign of personal preference and 
Kenyon’s, that ringwork castles were constructed in areas of pre-existing 
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settlement.  Perhaps the best way forward being to consider the location of 
these timber fortifications in the natural landscape – defensible terrain – 
compared to the cultural landscape – native Welsh monument, settlement and 
even fortification reuse.  In addition it would be interesting to conduct a survey 
to ascertain why the Welsh are making decisions to capture and keep some 
castles, but burn and destroy others.  Were these decisions merely an 
unpredictable outcome of battle, or were there other factors at work. Moreover, 
were the Welsh only reusing Anglo-Norman castles that were located in similar 
geophysical conditions to their own fortifications.  A cultural response to the 
Anglo-Norman colonization attempts of Wales can be traced and understood by 
the methodological application of castle archaeology as translated through the 
lens of landscape studies.  Finally, how did this built frontier of timber and later, 
masonry castles, impact the Welsh response to the Anglo-Norman conquest.  
While the highly fortified frontier was meant to discourage conflict, strongly 
defended frontiers can also be seen to encourage conflict (Hill and Wileman 
2002: 98).    
 
 
The Archaeology of Early Medieval Wales, including a brief overview of 
Iron Age and Roman periods 
 
Early medieval Welsh archaeology and to some extent medieval archaeology in 
the period following the Anglo-Norman Conquest, is dominated by a lack of data 
(Rowley 2001; Edwards and Lane 1988; Edwards 1991; Bezant 2009; 
Grossman 1996).  Compounding this challenge is the non-native Welsh bias of 
both the history and archaeology of Wales, fostering a tendency towards the 
academic over-simplification of the Welsh experience.  Bezant, in her thesis 
Medieval Welsh Settlement and Territory, reviews the current scholastic 
perception of Wales: 
 
          We know all there is to know about Wales; we know where all the castles  
          and churches are, the rest was an ‘empty’, ‘tribal’ landscape, an attitude  
          that is perhaps supported by a lack of fresh approaches to existing data.   
          This thesis seeks to challenge these notions, to reject the limiting ‘celto- 
          nostalgic’ narrative that has driven Wales for so long and to introduce a  
          sophisticated medieval landscape that paralleled the trajectory of the rest  
          of medieval Europe (Bezant 2009: 8)         
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While Bezant does concede that this limiting perception and narrow 
academic dialogue are slowly evolving; native Wales is still suffering from a 
deficiency of archaeological data, which is needed to rectify the discrepancies 
and biases of past academic scholarship (Bezant 2009; Davies 1990: 4).  In 
some instances the prejudice in favour of an Anglo-Norman narrative is so 
striking, that it evokes parallels to the historical description and study of 
indigenous cultures in post-colonial countries such as the USA and Australia.  
This unsavoury parallel does unfortunately have merit, especially when the 
political climate, which was often a driving force of interpretation, is considered.  
‘Wales remains significantly invisible, obscured by historical and ongoing 
processes of cultural imperialism carried out by a highly centralized and 
dominant British (English) government’ (Grossman 1996:2).  Thus the Dark 
Ages of Wales remain dark, and while there is a relative abundance of 
academic enquiry following the Anglo-Norman Conquest, the majority of this 
research surrounds the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales, rarely giving 
consideration to the native Welsh elements.  Even the llysoedd, Welsh lordly 
residences and administrative centres, which in many cases are well 
documented on the landscape, are nevertheless poorly understood.   
The one exception to this is the study of Iron Age hillforts, which critics of the 
Anglo-Norman bias have explained as: unavoidable since hillforts are highly 
visible features on the Welsh landscape (Edwards 1991).  Yet, ‘[t]he ‘Anglo-
centricity’ of British cultural studies, particularly the exclusion of Welsh and 
Scottish perspectives, is often as [cultural studies scholar] Turner notes, 
‘without acknowledgement or apology’’ (in Grossman 1996: 2).  What follows is 
an analysis of the existing archaeological record covering the Iron Age, Roman 
occupation and early medieval period (the Dark Ages).  The Anglo-Norman 
conquest will be considered within the next section, Anglo-Norman and Welsh 
studies, as the majority of the evidence from this period is more historically than 
archaeologically based, the exception being castle studies, discussed in the 
previous section.  
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Iron Age and Roman Wales 
Although the Iron Age (c. 750 BC-43 AD) and the following Roman occupation 
of Wales (c.43 AD-410AD) are eras well outside this study’s period of focus, it is 
worth diverging into them briefly in order to add continuity and contextualization 
to the development of archaeology in Wales up to the period of Anglo-Norman 
conquest.  This period is also important to discuss as the location of hillforts and 
later, Roman settlements, are indicators for early boundaries between Wales 
and England, and individual Welsh kingdoms (Rowley 2001:9).    Additionally, 
these features were on occasion reused during the early medieval period and 
later, including the twelfth century, when two Iron Age hillforts were repurposed 
during the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  For these reasons Hillforts and 
Roman forts are included and spatially represented in the historic conflict 
landscape reconstruction within the 1157 and 1165 campaign core areas. 
Hillforts are the primary focus of archaeological inquiry during the Iron 
Age in Wales. Hillforts, not unlike the castles of the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries ‘enabled local potentates or communities to control access to territory, 
farmland, trade and natural resources, and to display their presence […] Power 
and control of the landscape were the watchwords of the day’ (Brown 2004: 68).  
Hillforts were not only created as emblems of display and control, they ‘also 
served an important defensive role […] evidence of burning and destruction 
during their history indicate that life in hillforts could be turbulent’ (Gale 1991: 
89).  We can assume that there must have been settlements outside of hillforts, 
in lowland areas that would have been more suitable to agriculture. ‘Much work 
remains to be done on the identification and investigations of early settlement’ 
(Rowley 2001: 37; Gale 1991).  Interestingly, Rowley has speculated that the 
location of the hillforts is indicative of a built frontier, suggesting that the march 
of Wales has been disputed territory since the Iron Age (2001: 9).  The 
Clwydian Mountains of Gwynedd have no less than six substantial Iron Age 
hillforts (Brown 2004: 68), whether these were constructed on tribal frontiers is 
difficult to establish, as further research is needed.  Nonetheless, this region 
encompasses the much later contested medieval frontier between Gwynedd 
and Anglo-Norman England. 
  The Roman conquest of Wales was a protracted event (Jenkins 2007: 
22).  Unlike in England and south-eastern Wales, the Roman influence in north 
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Wales was to a lesser extent, where the native population never truly became 
Romanised.  In north Wales the Roman presence was primarily regarded as an 
occupation.  This inferior influence, when compared to England and southern 
extremities of Wales, can be traced historically, archaeologically and 
linguistically – as evidenced by the preserved Welsh native language and 
absence of Roman place-names (Rowley 2001: 51, 63).  Roman towns and 
villas, when they did occur in Wales, were on the fringes of the Welsh borders 
and the majority of there were in southern Wales, where some areas achieved 
civitas (citizen) status (Brown 2004).  Northern Wales was never significantly 
developed during the Roman period, except for mining activities (i.e. lead and 
silver).  This may have been due in part to the inability of the land to yield ample 
sustenance (ibid: 88-9).    
However, the northern parts of Wales were subjected to military rule.  
The predominant buildings of Roman construction in this region were the forts 
or outposts associated with mining activities, as well as the Roman roads that 
transverse the region.  This should not be taken to mean that there were no 
Roman settlements, merely that they were more scattered, and poorly 
documented when compared to similar sites in southern Wales or England.  For 
example the hut enclosure site of Din Lligwy near Moelfre on Anglesey, was 
excavated in 1904 and was shown to be a Romano-British settlement (GAT 
2132).  In some instances the Romans reused earlier Welsh hillforts, such as 
Caer Drewyn near Corwen (which was also used as a Welsh encampment 
during the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign; Rowley 2001: 50; CPAT 101810).  
There were no documented instances of town building, or widespread Roman 
improvement to pre-existing native Welsh settlements.  However, Chester 
bordering the modern Welsh county of Flintshire was a major Roman town 
(Brown 2004: 88-89; Blockley 1991; Lloyd 1912: 89; Rowley 2001: 55).  It also 
seems likely that the Romans sought to subdue the Welsh populace in a pre-
emptive effort to protect the Romanized province of Britain, a trend that 
continues with the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales.  Furthermore, much of 
the archaeological evidence from this period focuses on determining Roman 
presence or absence, ignoring the Welsh reaction to the Roman occupation.   
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Early Medieval Wales (c. 410-1066) 
A problem within early medieval Welsh archaeology, historically and currently, 
is that distinctive settlement types and diagnostic artefacts dating to this period 
have yet to be positively identified (Edwards and Lane 1988: 3).  Instead, 
archaeologists have to rely on Carbon-14 or archaeomagnetic dating of hearths, 
as there are no diagnostic typologies with which to clearly distinguish prehistoric 
versus early medieval.  In addition, archaeologists are not actively looking for 
these settlements, which are usually discovered by accident via cultural 
resource management projects.  Furthermore, these settlements were 
constructed from perishable materials, leaving little to no visibility on the existing 
landscape.  For these reasons it was decided not to include settlements within 
the conflict landscape reconstruction, as it would have resulted in a skewed 
representation, particularly since settlements during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries are also poorly documented.    
Welsh early medieval settlement studies have been negatively impacted 
by the now antiquated and insufficient three-stage theory of social and 
economic development.  The three stages (originally validated by Darwinist 
theory) were hunting, pastoralism and cultivation.  Societies that did not 
advance to cultivation – Wales in the early medieval and medieval periods was 
a predominantly pastoral-based economy – were regarded to be in arrested 
development.  Despite the three stage theory’s inadequacies ‘the original bias 
imparted by [the three stage theory] to the study of early social organisation in 
Wales has been retained’ (Jones 1961: 112).  Thus, early scholarly literature on 
social and settlement systems of earlier medieval Wales defined the Welsh as 
tribal and scattered.  Glanville Jones has critiqued earlier views that ‘portrayed 
the tribal Welsh as living in ‘homesteads scattered about the countryside’’, it 
was thought that these homesteads were artificially grouped together for 
purposes of tribute or legal jurisdiction (Jones 1961: 111).  Jones’s work has 
shown that early medieval and medieval Wales comprised of a complex social 
landscape that was on parallel with European society in the Middle Ages, 
essentially that ‘of a servile majority tied to the land, performing labour service 
to support the noble minority’ (Davies 2004: 16; Jones 1961).  However, 
Jones’s work is not without issue; Seaman criticizes Jones’s model as being too 
static and overly reliant on medieval and late medieval Welsh texts, leading to 
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an inaccurate portrayal of early medieval Welsh social systems and settlement 
patterns.  Seaman replaces this with a framework that ‘emphasizes the 
limitations and transient nature of early medieval power structures’ (Seaman 
2012: 164).  Seaman also suggests that further archaeological investigation is 
needed to advance our understanding of this period of Welsh history. 
 In 1934 C.W. Phillips published an excavation report of work done at 
Pant y Saer on Anglesey.  In this report he identified what came to be known as 
VCP ware (very coarse pottery).  He believed that VCP ware was 
representative of early medieval pottery as it was found in the same hut 
structure as an early medieval penannular brooch.  This assumption, that VCP 
ware was diagnostic of early medieval sites went unquestioned until the 1960s.  
In 1985 E. Morris ‘identified VCP beyond reasonable doubt, as the crude clay 
containers into which salt was packed prior to transportation during the Iron 
Age’ (ibid: 2).  To date there has been no documentation of a conclusively 
diagnostic early medieval assemblage; Dinas Powys being the only site to come 
close (ibid). 
 Instead, the majority of evidence from this period comes from surviving 
early medieval texts.  However, even this medium of approach yields hazy 
results at best.  ‘It is only in the ecclesiastical archaeology that we are able to 
detect the native population with any feeling of confidence; their inscribed 
stones, their graves, their monasteries, and some of their religious sculpture’ 
(Edwards 1991: 141).  Evidence of early medieval Welsh secular settlement is 
even more obscure.  ‘Outside of [medieval] major urban sites, the few deserted 
villages and the atypical moated sites, the anticipated [early medieval] farm or 
hamlet has escaped recognition’ (Manley 1991: 97).  Textual evidence, such as 
The Law of Hywel Dda (Jenkins 2000), and the Llandaff Charters (Davies 1978) 
provide a clearer, though not complete, understanding of native Welsh society 
from the early medieval period, than any extant material cultural remains.   
 This fragmentary evidence is frustratingly even more ambiguous in north-
eastern Wales.  In fact, tangible evidence of settlements cannot be recognized 
prior to the arrival of early medieval English communities in this border region, 
this evidence being based on place-name analysis (Owen 1994).  However, at 
this point it is difficult to create a distinction between the two cultures.  In fact, 
sections Flintshire and Denbighshire are recorded within Domesday Book as 
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part of the English county of Cheshire, suggesting a dominant earlier medieval 
English presence.  However, Domesday Book also documents many vills 
(parishes) within this border region as being laid waste to by Welsh raids, 
meaning that although this landscape was influenced by the early medieval 
English, the Welsh within this border region were still culturally distinct, albeit 
less perceptible in the archaeological record (Edwards 1991: 129; Brown 2004).   
This territorial distinction between Wales and England is apparent in 
what are perhaps the most recognizable archaeological features from the early 
medieval marches: Offa’s and Wat’s Dykes.  These early English dykes, 
constructed by the Kingdom of Merica in the eighth century (although some 
debate surrounds the exact dates), represent the first formal and highly visible 
establishment of a boundary between England and Wales (Williams 2009: 34).  
The Brut y Tywysogyon claims that Offa’s Dyke was constructed in reaction to a 
particularly brutal attack the Mercians suffered at the hands of the Welsh in c. 
787 (Hill and Wileman 2002: 120).  Yet the actual function of the dyke is not 
entirely known, it has been debated that it was used as a boundary marker, to 
control trade, or as a military feature to defend the frontier (ibid: 120-2; Fox 
1955).  The significance of this boundary is not to be under-estimated.  
Although the border fluctuated, the dykes came to be used as a national and 
county boundary in the sixteenth century (Higham and Barker 2000: 148).  
Offa’s Dyke is still roughly the boundary between England and Wales today, 
and in some regions, particularly in its central stretches, it is the boundary 
exactly (Rowley 2001: 78).   It has been argued by Rowley that ‘at the time of 
the Norman Conquest there was no finite border between the Saxons and the 
Welsh [despite the existence of Wat’s and Offa's Dykes].  Before the Normans 
arrived the Borderland had been politically unsettled, local border skirmishes 
were common, and on a larger scale the region was coveted by both the Anglo-
Saxons and the Welsh’ (ibid: 89).  While endemic warfare may explain the 
absence of a ‘finite border’, it is important to consider that the Welsh perception 
of border was not a finite concept, but was more fluid and abstract in its 
definition (Turvey 2002: 3; Davies 1990: 17; also see further discussion on 
pages 76 and 86).   
 What remains to be seen is whether a systematic landscape-based 
approach to Welsh archaeology can have an impact on these obscure periods 
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of Welsh history.  The goal being to establish settlements and artefact 
typologies during these periods that are diagnostically Welsh and then 
evaluating them via a landscape archaeology agenda.  Perhaps this issue could 
be solved by the application of the current theoretical pursuit in historical 
archaeology, individual agency.  ‘There is a problem however.  This [theoretical 
approach] does not lend itself well to landscape analysis and change over time, 
and medieval landscapes in particular remain behind current new theoretical 
approaches’ (Bezant 2009:9).  Bezant is also sceptical of the ability to 
understand the evolution of social processes based on the actions of an 
individual, she suggests that human agency manifested by modifications to the 
landscape, is more visible when approached via family or community agency 
(ibid).  What is required is the application of an appropriate method that can 
contextualize the Welsh experience within landscape and agency theory.  The 
following research presented in this thesis overcomes this challenge with the 
adoption and application of a conflict archaeology methodology paradigm.   
 
 
Welsh and Anglo-Norman Studies c.1060-1277 
 
As previously stated, much of the documentary evidence for native Wales 
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries is corrupted by an Anglo-Norman bias, 
which is deeply rooted in the original narratives and histories from this period.  
‘[T]here is a tendency for most historical material to stem from the conquerors 
rather than the conquered, and of course there is the problem of assessing the 
veracity of documents, which may have been the result of propaganda, wishful-
thinking, or downright lying’ (Hill and Wileman 2002: 16).  This is unfortunate 
given that borderlands and frontiers represent unique areas of cultural inquiry 
(Grossman 1996:4; Hill and Wileman 2002).   
 The Anglo-Norman Conquest of Wales was a tumultuous event that took 
over two hundred years to accomplish, following the arrival of the Normans in 
Britain in 1066, until the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Prince of Wales) in 
1282 bringing a close to the tumultuous Edwardian conquest of Wales (1277-
1283).  In fact, it can be argued that the consolidation was not complete until the 
Acts of Union in 1536 (Rowley 2001: 73).  It is commonly accepted that Norman 
interest in Wales stemmed from a desire to stabilize the border region between 
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Wales and England, thus protecting their newly acquired English assets, while 
recognizing the ‘potential for further expansion beyond established borders’ 
(Richardson 2001: 9; Kenyon 1996; Brown 2004; Rowley 2001; Turvey 2002; 
Black 2000; Davies, 1987).  Furthermore, the Normans perceived that ‘a united 
Wales may have been able to threaten the whole of western England’ 
(Richardson 2001: 32-33).  However, the Welsh, perhaps motivated by the 
common cause of self-preservation, did unify for periods, during the eleventh, 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Turvey states that: ‘Wales was united less by 
idealism, much less the anachronism of nationalism, than by conquest and 
coercion from within’ (2002: 3; Rowley 2001).  However, this unification ‘never 
reached a national scale, since Norman kings could always find allies among 
Welsh princes’ (Dodd 1979: 22).  The resulting semi-unified front of Welsh 
resistance coupled with the physically challenging terrain, were directly 
responsible for the impairment of Anglo-Norman efforts over the course of two 
centuries.   
 Outside of the Welsh patterns of kinship and kingship documented by the 
contemporary historians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries we know very little 
of Welsh culture during this period.  There are few contemporaneous literary 
references to settlements (such as those found in Gerald of Wales’ Description 
of Wales, writing at the close of the twelfth century) but, ‘in the dearth of datable 
[archaeological] remains it is hard to be positive about housing…[and these few 
examples are] victims to the agricultural advance, and generally survive only 
where the land it too poor to be worth clearing’ (Dodd 1979: 21).  
Anglo-Norman castles remain the primary focus of archaeological 
investigation during this period (Dodd 1979).  There has been little academic 
consideration given to native Welsh fortifications and it is unknown whether 
fortified centres even existed (outside of a few examples of fortified farmsteads 
and llys), prior to the arrival of the Anglo-Normans when the Welsh adopted the 
Norman technology of castles (Edwards 1991: 141).  Apart from these 
fortifications the Welsh relied on the inaccessibility of their mountainous 
landscape for protection, often seeking refuge in the mountains of Snowdonia 
when threatened (Davies 2004).  
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Conclusion 
 
Previous Anglo-Norman and Welsh archaeological and historical studies have 
failed to provide a collective perspective of the Welsh experience during the 
twelfth century and earlier periods, stretching back to the Iron Age.  This short-
coming has been compounded by the lack of datable physical evidence, making 
it difficult for archaeologists to improve the current state of knowledge.  The 
pervasive Anglo-Norman biases have also effected the progression of native 
Welsh studies. The absence of Welsh agency from this period of history results 
from the elusive state of the Welsh archaeological record during the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries and from the Anglo-Norman biases of contemporary and 
historical scholars.  As previously stated the theoretical framework of some 
historical archaeologist – landscape and agency – has encountered difficulty in 
its deployment during this period, due to the fragmentary nature of the existing 
evidence.  Additionally, a large part of this difficulty results from the absence of 
a solid methodology with which to address and resolve these challenges.  The 
methods particular to conflict archaeology can integrate the theoretical 
objectives of landscape and agency in historical archaeology, generating a 
comprehensive cultural and societal native Welsh context.  These methods are 
outlined in the following Methodology Chapter.   
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Chapter Two – Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ephemeral nature of medieval conflicts in Britain and in particular, Wales, 
has generally discouraged archaeological investigation.  To date, the majority of 
battlefield surveys in Britain, are late medieval or post-medieval in date, and 
centre on the recovery and interpretation of portable military material culture, 
acquired through traditional archaeological survey methods and techniques 
(Foard 2009; Pollard and Banks 2007; Carman 2014).  However, this type of 
investigation and survey is rarely practical or possible for these ephemeral 
medieval conflicts.  These conflicts need to be approached and understood 
from a larger and holistic conflict landscape methodology.  Currently no 
precedent exists in Great Britain for a methodological primer as a tool for 
deciphering medieval conflicts.  This deficiency is addressed in the following 
research methodology which introduces and implements an original medieval 
conflict archaeology methodology, built upon and adapted from traditional 
battlefield archaeology methods.  This methodology stands to benefit not only 
general archaeological practices involved in medieval conflict investigation, but 
would be particularly important to the rescue archaeology and cultural resource 
management communities. The following chapter provides a detailed 
explanation of the medieval conflict archaeology method used in this research, 
as well as general research methodology including the strategy for data 
collection and analysis along with a detailed technological overview of the 
spatial analysis employed for the conflict landscape interpretation and 
reconstruction.   
 
 
Conflict archaeology, methods and goals   
 
The goal of conflict archaeology is to place individual events of conflict, such as 
battles, within a broader historical and cultural context resulting in a dynamic 
battlefield and conflict landscape reconstruction (McBride et al. 2011).  In doing 
so attributes of social change triggered by conflict can be understood by 
shedding new light on the complexity of cultures in conflict, such as the inter-
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Welsh and Welsh and Anglo-Norman colonial relationships.  Careful and 
consistent application of the following conflict archaeology methodology results 
in various new insights and interpretations that challenge long held notions 
about the political and military scope of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales, 
including the complexity of Welsh political, social and military institutions and 
the goals and objectives of the Welsh and Anglo-Normans during the period of 
conquest.  This predominantly consists of their respective abilities to adjust 
military tactics and technology to compensate for the opposing force and the 
sophistication involved in planning, preparation and execution of armed 
assaults, particularly the exploitation of the physical and cultural landscapes.  
The following methodology has been adopted and adapted from the 
battlefield archaeology guidelines of the National Park Service American 
Battlefield Protection Program, the Battlefields of the Pequot War – the first 
NPS ABPP project to successfully use reverse KOCOA (see discussion below) 
and the Battle of Little Bighorn – the project from which battlefield archaeology 
emerged as a legitimate field of inquiry (ABPP 2007, McBride et al. 2011, and 
Scott et al. 1989).  Although the conflict events considered in this research are 
European, not American in origin, the American guidelines are not culture 
specific; as such they can be applied cross-culturally.  Additionally, they are not 
bound by temporal restraints or by the size, force composition or subjective 
historical importance of the engagement. There are noteworthy examples of 
British battlefield methodology particularly that which has been outlined by 
Foard and Morris (2012: xiii), but as these are adopted from the American 
model, and since by Foard’s admission that there is ‘much to be learnt from the 
experience in the USA’ (2012a: 14), the original American methodology model 
has been used as the methodological primer for this research.   
The criteria for identification and recognition laid out in the Battlefields 
Designation Selection Guide by English Heritage (now Historic England; 2012)  
was not used as a methodological reference as it does not recognize smaller 
scale events of conflict, such as the siege, raid and skirmish.  Additionally, this 
guide is focused on battlefield preservation for sites of ‘national historic 
importance’ that changed the course of British history; an emphasis is also put 
on the recovery of portable military material culture, as such the guide does not 
give due consideration to the landscape as an artefact of conflict, further 
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complicating this is marked preference for post-medieval conflict (English 
Heritage 2012: 5; Carman 2014: 16; Foard 2009: 134).    As of yet there is no 
battlefield preservation component within Cadw (the Welsh heritage body), the 
inclusion of such a scheme was put forward in 2011 (see: 
http://gov.wales/consultations/cultureandsport/battlefields/?lang=en).  Based on 
proposed legislation it seems that the Welsh Government was prepared to 
adopt a more holistic interpretation of the battlefield which would have made the 
case studies considered in this research eligible for nomination to the register.  
Unfortunately, the proposal was scrapped as the preliminary archaeological 
survey was unable to sufficiently identify many of the battles nominated for 
investigation and preservation (personal communication with J. Berry at Cadw, 
April 2015).  The inability to successfully identify these battles was due to the 
lack of an appropriate research methodology.    A further discussion on heritage 
bodies and their role in battlefield identification and preservation can be found in 
Chapter Eleven (page 421).   
Some researchers, including Carman (2014) have astutely criticized the 
insularism of conflict archaeology, insofar as there is as yet no wide reaching 
international dialogue of conflict archaeologists.  Although the Fields of Conflict 
conference (initiated in 2000) encourages such a dialogue, ‘most studies tend to 
operate at the national level: Americans study sites where Americans fought, 
British study sites where British soldiers fought’, etc. (Carman 2014: 16).  This 
lack of communication between archaeologists is further impaired by the rigid 
insularism of the different types of conflict archaeology (prehistoric, historic and 
modern) and the presence/absence of a multi-disciplinary approach; heritage 
management criteria of battlefields which is different for Wales, England, 
Scotland; and professional sectors such as academic or cultural resource 
management.  ‘The consequence is a field dominated by historical 
considerations generally ignoring the potentiality of other fields’ (Carman 2014: 
16).  This research project seeks to respond to these critiques by drawing on 
knowledge from both the American and British experience in conflict 
archaeology pursuits; professional and academic experience; and experience 
with different conflicts (new world and medieval).  
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The Method 
 
The following section is a detailed description of the method used in this 
research.  Each of the five components (listed below) are considered at length, 
giving particular consideration to KOCOA, and the delineation of conflict terrain 
boundaries.  The data collection strategy, notably the GIS components, are 
considered discretely in the next chapter section (see page 57). 
 
The methodological components are as follows: 
1) An analysis of primary sources to construct a timeline of battlefield or 
conflict events with anticipated archaeological signatures. 
2) Conduct a desk and field-based archaeological landscape survey to 
locate, define and evaluate the integrity of conflict sites. 
3) Reconstruct the historic built landscape by conducting a desk-based 
archaeological landscape survey that locates, defines and evaluates the 
integrity of these sites.  This includes the incorporation of the results from 
step 2 (see above); these sites are then represented spatially using 
ArcGIS mapping technology. 
4) Evaluation of the military significance of the physical and cultural 
landscape by conducting a military terrain analysis survey using ‘reverse’ 
and regular KOCOA techniques and visibility analysis. 
5) Integration of conflict terrain (that incorporates the results of KOCOA and 
visibility analysis, step 4 above), as well as historical and archaeological 
data into ArcGIS software to reconstruct conflict events across time and 
space. 
 
Apart from the application of ‘reverse’ KOCOA, which will be explained below, 
the methodology outlined above is not unique as it is used by many conflict 
archaeologists working on battlefield sites, particularly ABPP sites in the USA.  
As stated above, much of this research methodology, including ‘reverse’ 
KOCOA was adopted by the author from her previous work with Dr. Kevin 
McBride on the ABPP grant (GA-2255-09-011) documenting the Battlefields of 
the Pequot War (1637; McBride et al. 2011).  What makes this thesis unique is 
the application of this methodology to a medieval conflict, the inclusion of an in-
depth reconstruction of the contemporary historic landscape, and a 
consideration of how cultural features impacted conflict decisions and 
outcomes.  Cultural landscape reconstruction is a challenge for medieval 
conflicts and medieval Welsh archaeology, as the historic cultural landscape is 
poorly documented.   
Inherent Military Probability (herein IMP) is a technique employed by 
military historians and conflict archaeologists alike.  IMP allows the researcher 
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‘with a detailed knowledge of the military practices of the period […to] explore a 
problem on a historic battlefield by considering what a modern soldier might do 
in the same context’ (Foard 2009: 141).  The military historian Burne (1955) was 
the first to be credited with using IMP, in this instance to better understand the 
Battle of Crecy (c. 1346).  Other military historians including Keegan were soon 
to adopt this technique (1976: 33-34).  However, there exists a great deal of 
subjectivity in this type of analysis, even with a detailed military knowledge 
base.  For this reason IMP should not be applied in isolation, but should only 
serve to provide further contextualization for more concrete evidence produced 
using tools such as KOCOA (see discussion below), which is in essence an 
objective toolset that can be used to further define aspects of IMP. 
The United States military has developed a process for evaluating the 
military significance of a battlefield denoted by the acronym KOCOA (Key and 
Decisive Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, 
Obstacles, Avenues of Approach and Retreat). This technique had been 
adopted by NPS ABPP and is a requirement for all ABPP projects. KOCOA 
analysis uses defining features – aspects of the landscape that are mentioned 
in battlefield accounts and present in the visible landscape (ABPP 2007). 
Defining features may be natural (streams, ravines, hills) or cultural (castles, 
route-ways, settlements) and are assessed and evaluated to determine their 
effect on the process and outcome of battles. Critical defining features are 
mapped using GPS and GIS technologies.  An explanation of these defining 
features is detailed in Table 1 below.   
 Generally KOCOA is used to better delineate and define features of a 
known battlefield to assist in the analysis and reconstruction of discrete 
battlefield events.  Reverse KOCOA uses the elements of KOCOA to identify 
potential battlefield locations, in events where the site of the engagement is not 
precisely known.  Once this is achieved, KOCOA is then applied in the 
traditional mode.  Essentially this is a landscape archaeology approach to 
defining conflicts.  This approach is unique in that it utilizes a military terrain 
analysis lens to reconstruct historic landscapes of conflict.  In the realm of 
medieval conflicts this methodology has promising implications, as it provides 
archaeologists with a tangible way forward for better defining and understanding 
medieval conflicts that is not dependent on the recovery of portable military 
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material culture.  ‘The key aspect of this analysis is the reconstruction of the 
historic landscape and battlefield terrain associated with the battle to identify 
natural and cultural features present in the battlefield space and determine how 
they were used by the combatants’ (McBride et al. 2011: 77; Carman and 
Carman 2009: 42).  Identity and group agency can be extrapolated and 
explained by the effect the variables presented in KOCOA had on the outcome 
of conflict events.  The potential of these insights and explanations is increased 
by considering the proximity of cultural landmarks and monuments within the 
key terrain element.      
 
Battlefield 
Element 
Definition Examples 
Key Terrain 
 
A portion of the battlefield, 
possession of which gives an 
advantage to the possessor. 
High ground, 
castle 
Observation & 
Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Points on the landscape that allow 
observation of enemy activity that is 
not necessarily key terrain; offers 
opportunity to observe an area, 
acquire targets; and allows for an 
affective line of fire. 
High ground, line 
of site  
Cover & 
Concealment 
Landforms or landscape elements 
that provide protection from assault 
and conceal troop positions from 
observation. 
Ravines, cliff-
face, walls, 
woodlands  
Obstacles Landscape elements that affect 
troop movements. 
Rivers, marshes, 
ravines 
Avenues of 
Approach & 
Retreat 
Corridors used to transport troops 
between the core battle area and 
outer logistical areas. 
Roads, paths, 
steam beds 
 
Table 1: KOCOA elements (after McBride et al. 2011:78) 
 
 
Establishing boundaries 
In order to reconstruct and interpret both individual battlefield events and 
broader landscapes of conflict, it is necessary to first establish conflict area 
boundaries.  The steps involved in determining and documenting boundaries 
include incorporating: physical features (such as terrain types, topography and 
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eco-facts), cultural features (such as roads, churches, earthworks and castles), 
and artefact distributions where applicable (such as arrow heads, armour 
fragments, and other military material culture) into a scaled base map using 
geographic information systems (GIS).   This process establishes the location 
and extent of the conflict area and the degree of site preservation.  There are 
three boundary types applied to conflict archaeology investigations.  These are 
the study area, the core area(s) and the area(s) of integrity (ABPP 2007).  
These boundaries are supported by historical and archaeological evidence such 
as: historical documents or narratives; military terrain analysis and 
archaeological survey.  This evidence must clearly demonstrate that the 
boundaries encompass and consist of legitimate historic resources 
contemporary with the conflict landscape (McBride et al. 2011: 11).   
As defined by the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection 
Program, a study area encompasses the tactical context, visual setting and 
historical extent of a conflict landscape often bounded by a series of connected 
events.  Core areas are where particular engagements or actions took place, as 
such there can be multiple core areas within a study area.  Finally, areas of 
integrity ‘delineate those portions of a historic [conflict] landscape that still 
convey a sense of the historic scene and contain material remains (artifacts and 
features) that were associated with the conflict’ (McBride et al. 2011: 18-19 after 
ABPP 2007).  The physical and built landscape, either associated with or 
directly involved in the conflict, can also be considered a material remain of a 
conflict event (Carman and Carman 2006; 2009).   
This consideration is part of what makes this research unique, as it does 
not rely on portable military material culture to produce a dynamic-pattern (see 
last section) conflict event interpretation.  Identifying the landscape as a military 
artefact is an innovative approach to medieval conflicts.  Others, such as 
Carman and Carman, have used landscapes as conflict artefacts, but they have 
not integrated or contextualized them within a holistic understanding of conflict 
events (Carman and Carman 2006; 2009).  The unique approach to conflicts 
presented by this research demonstrates that this is possible by the precise 
application of method, to access, define and contextualize ephemeral medieval 
conflicts.  The product of this analysis is an archaeological narrative that 
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illuminates the societal changes and behavioural patterns that resulted from the 
conflict events considered.          
 
 
Study Area Boundaries 
 
 
Figure 1: Study Area Boundaries 
 
For the purposes of this research the study area encompasses the historical 
extant of twelfth-century Gwynedd, as well as portions of the bordering marcher 
territories of Cheshire and Shropshire and northern Powys, a neighbouring 
Welsh principality (see Figure 1 above).  This large area represents the 
historical extent of the conflict landscape and is further contextualized and 
discussed in the Chronology and Study Area chapters.  Although this boundary 
exceeds the historically conceived borders of Gwynedd, the medieval frontiers 
between Gwynedd, the other Welsh principalities and the marcher territories 
was in a state of constant flux.  Additionally, the Welsh perceived borders as a 
fluid entity (Davies 1990); therefore a larger area was considered.    
 
 
55 
 
Core Area Boundaries 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Core Area Boundaries 
 
The core areas are the portions of the cultural landscape that were directly 
involved in the conflict event.  For the 1157 Coastal Campaign, core areas 
include the regions encompassing the Anglo-Norman route of march from 
Chester towards Basingwerk, the location of the Battle of Coleshill, and the 
Welsh encampment at Basingwerk.  Essentially this includes the entire modern 
Welsh county of Flintshire and northern portions of Denbighshire.  The other 
core area for the 1157 campaign is the Isle of Anglesey where the Anglo-
Normans pillaged several churches and where the battle of Moelfre took place.  
For the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign the core area encompass the vicinity 
of the Battle of Crogen, including the Anglo-Norman route of march from 
Oswestry to the modern day community of Chirk, and the region surrounding 
Chirk where the Battle of Crogen was fought.  This core area also includes the 
Anglo-Norman route of advance into the Berwyn Mountains.  The core area also 
encompasses the landscape surrounding the Welsh and Anglo-Norman 
encampments at Corwen and Cerrig Gwynion and the Ffordd y Saeson, the 
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route-way that connected the two encampments (see Figure 2 above).  These 
core areas are discussed in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters.  
 
 
Areas of integrity boundaries 
As battlefield excavation was beyond the scope of this research, areas of 
integrity are instead solely defined by portions of the preserved historic 
landscape and built features which can be assessed by military terrain analysis.  
These areas of integrity include the immediate landscape of a conflict event.  
The primary areas of integrity considered by this research are: the Battle of 
Coleshill for the 1157 campaign and the Battle of Crogen for the 1165 campaign 
(see Figures 3 and 4 below).  The conflict landscape analysis of the core areas 
and areas of integrity can be found in the 1157 and 1165 Campaign Case Study 
chapters and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter (chapters 6-10).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: 1157 Coastal Campaign, Battle of Coleshill, Area of Integrity 
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Figure 4: 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign, Battle of Crogen, Area of Integrity 
 
 
Data collection strategy 
 
The following section is a discussion of the data collection strategy employed 
for all the steps of the methodology outlined above.  This discussion serves only 
to provide an overview of the data types used and how the data was collected.  
A detailed discussion of this data can be found in the Chronology, Study Area 
and Case Study chapters (chapters 4-9). 
 
 
Chronology 
The first step in the creation of a conflict chronology and an event timeline for 
the case studies considered was a detailed analysis of all relevant medieval 
sources. These include the manuscripts, chronicles, and government records 
contemporary or near contemporary (within a century) to the conflict events 
considered.  The information in these sources was used to create a detailed 
conflict chronology which will later be augmented by other archaeological and 
historical entities contemporary with the 1157 and 1165 campaigns.  The 
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chronology produced contextualizes the written evidence for the conflict events 
considered by placing them within a wider conflict chronology. As such conflict 
events and events relating to conflict, including the signing of treaties, payment 
of homage, etc.; are also included within the chronology.    
The following is a list of the foremost sources consulted.  For 
ecclesiastical chronicles these most notably include: the three distinct versions 
of the Brut y Tywysogyon (or Chronicle of Princes, c. 682-1282), the Annales 
Cambriae (c. 1298), the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond (c. 1190) and the 
Annales Cestrienses: Chronicle of the Abbey of S. Werbug, at Chester (c.1132-
1297).  These ecclesiastical histories are invaluable documents as they provide 
contemporaneous details of events contextualized within a wider history.  The 
government documents consulted include: The Chronicles of the Reigns of 
Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, both the William of Newburgh and Robert of 
Torigni versions (c. 1198 and 1186 respectively) and the Pipe Rolls from the 
reign of Henry II.  There are no surviving Welsh government documents from 
this period that reference the campaigns apart from the letters from Owain 
Gwynedd to Louis VII of France, soliciting his assistance (in Pryce 2005)  Also 
of great import are the historical works of Gerald of Wales, The Journey 
Through Wales and The Description of Wales (c. 1188).   
The details of the events documented in these sources were then 
compared to create a working conflict chronology, the veracity of these 
accounts are later determined and enhanced by the incorporation of the 
archaeology and military history data, including the military terrain analysis.  
Another component of the literature analysis for both primary and secondary 
sources was a thorough historiographical investigation for each key source.  In 
some instances, due to the obscurity of the author(s) or place of publication this 
was not possible. A historiographical survey is an invaluable tool as it highlights 
any potential discrepancies or biases in the accounts, ancient or modern. 
  
 
Archaeological built environment survey 
The next step of the research involved carrying out a conflict landscape survey 
to reconstruct the historic built landscape within which the conflict events took 
place.  This entails steps two and three of the methodology listed above.  
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Following the establishment of the conflict boundaries, as detailed above, an 
archaeological field observation survey was conducted to identify contemporary 
built features on the historic conflict landscape.  This includes all cultural 
features present on the landscape that were either directly or indirectly involved 
in the conflict events considered, or communicated a sense of a broader conflict 
landscape.    
The site types included in the historic landscape reconstruction are: 
battle sites, castles (including features that could possibly be castles but are 
currently unverified), llysoedd, churches, route-ways, Iron Age hillforts, Roman 
forts, Wat’s Dyke and Offa’s Dyke.  Although not contemporary to the twelfth 
century, the Iron Age hillforts and Roman forts were included within the 
landscape reconstruction as they are indicative of a legacy of conflict and there 
is a tradition of medieval reuse.  For example, two hillforts were refortified to 
serve as Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments in the 1165 Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign.  Wat’s and Offa’s dykes, both early medieval features, were 
included for the same reasons.  Battle sites, identified as battle features on the 
GIS maps, include: actual sites of battle, supposed sites of battle – produced 
either by erroneous battlefield interpretations or by guesswork on the part of the 
Ordnance Survey – locations of battle suggested by place-name evidence and 
battle locations within areas of integrity that pre-date the campaign events, such 
as the 1150 Battle of Coleshill.  Also included are the sites of the Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman encampments. Settlements were not included as Welsh 
settlements from this period are poorly understood.  Recent research efforts are 
slowly improving our understandings of these settlements (Bezant 2009), but 
documentation of comprehensive settlement distributions are currently 
incomplete,  as such any attempt to represent known settlements would render  
an inaccurate portrayal.   
Conflict specific sites dating from 1066-1272 (the period of Anglo-
Norman Conquest up to but not including the Edwardian conquest), namely 
battles and sieges as illuminated in the conflict chronology, are considered in 
the Study Area chapter.  The archaeology and history of sites contemporary 
with the 1157 and 1165 campaigns are discussed in the individual 1157 and 
1165 Case Study chapters.  The primary data sources used for this analysis 
were: historic environment records, archaeological site reports and secondary 
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data from more general archaeological and historical volumes.  Historic 
environment records (HER) were compiled from the National Monument 
Records (NMR) listed by Historic England for sites located in the marcher 
counties of Cheshire and Shropshire.  HERs for Wales were assembled from 
the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of Wales 
(RCAHMW).  Also consulted were HERs from the Clwyd-Powys Archaeological 
Trust (CPAT) and the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust (GAT).  The data 
assessed from these sources was then represented spatially on GIS maps.  For 
the Study Area chapter, which does not include a spatial analysis component, 
these are displayed using Google Earth.  The data features for the Case Study 
and Military Terrain Analysis chapters were integrated into ArcGIS mapping 
technology.  Spatial analysis was not conducted for the siege and battle sites 
discussed in this the Study Area chapter as their inclusion in this research is to 
provide contextualization for the wider conflict landscape. 
 
 
Military terrain survey and incorporation into GIS 
Following the historical and archaeological analysis, in-field site surveys were 
carried out at the established areas of integrity.  The purpose of these visits was 
to conduct landscape surveys to better contextualize the KOCOA analysis 
instead of relying solely on GIS technology and desk-based survey.  A 
significant part of the field survey involved collecting georeferenced points on 
the landscape for use in visibility analysis.  The site locations used for the 
military terrain analysis quite simply relies on an accurate spatial location of the 
site itself (e.g. the motte of a caste) and all associated KOCOA elements.  Once 
the KOCOA elements have been established (step four of the methodology and 
discussed in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters as well as in the Military 
Terrain Analysis chapter) they are spatially integrated into GIS software where 
spatial analyses such as viewsheds can be accomplished.  These sites and 
their associated landscape components were entered into ArcGIS using either 
the geospatial coordinates provided by the HERs or from geospatial reference 
points collected by the author.    
Due to the difficult nature of the terrain and the large extent of the survey 
areas a traditional GPS unit was not used, instead and perhaps rather 
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unconventionally, a portable satellite navigation unit (Sat. Nav.) was used.  
Although generally used as an aid for vehicle or pedestrian navigation, Sat. 
Navs. can also provide coordinates for any given point on the physical 
landscape.  Accuracy was not an issue as in series of accuracy tests, 
conducted against known georeferenced points, the Sat. Nav. was in most case 
accurate within one metre.  Additionally when in the field collecting visibility 
analysis points, the points’ coordinates were routinely checked against known 
locations such as landmark features on Ordnance Survey maps.  As another 
means to safeguard against any inaccuracies, points were only chosen for 
which a variant radius of two metres would not impact the quality of the visibility 
analysis, for example points were never collected from the edge of a precipice.   
   
 
Spatial analysis method and mechanics 
 
The following section is a detailed discussion regarding the mechanics and 
method of visibility analysis as it is applied to a military terrain analysis 
paradigm.  Such an in-depth discussion is needed as visibility analysis is a large 
component of this research.  There exists no standardized methodology for the 
application of visibility analyses to archaeological research, the applications of 
such analyses are project dependent and determined.   The use of GIS 
software, particularly in regards to visibility analysis, was not a common practice 
in archaeology until the late 1990s early 2000s (Gillings and Wheatley 2001; 
Fisher 1992; 1996).  Therefore, this discussion of visibility analysis revolves 
around the capabilities and constraints present in its mechanics.   
ArcGIS (ArcMap) version 10.0 was the GIS software used in this 
analysis.  The DEM or digital elevation model used in the creation of a base-
map for this research was downloaded from the Digimap academic mapping 
database operated by the University of Edinburgh 
(http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/digimap/home).  Simply put, a base-map is a map 
that contains geospatially referenced topography to which other features, 
including topographic contours, sites and visibility analysis are later additions 
represented using ArcGIS technology.   
The results of any given visibility analysis can be altered and adjusted by 
a number of variables.  In particular these are: the location of the observer 
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point; the height above the surface of the observation point; the quantity and 
quality of observation points for any given site; the indeterminate types and 
extents of past vegetation; the limits of discernible human sight and the quality 
of the DEM.   In technological terms, ‘a viewshed identifies the cells in an input 
raster than can be seen from one or more observation locations’ (ArcGIS n.d.).  
Essentially in a DEM, represented within a GIS software program, a viewshed is 
created by calculating the visible terrain 360º from any given observer point 
location.  Each viewshed contains x, y and z coordinates.  The x axis is the 
horizon and the vertical y axis defines the surface elevations (ArcGIS n.d.).  The 
z-value is the observer height above the surface of the observation point, the 
default value of z is one metre above the surface.  The default z-value can be 
adjusted by adding an OFFSET A feature class to the observation point 
attribute table.  
 
 
Visibility Limits and Constraints 
The default vertical angle limit in a viewshed calculation is between 90º and -
90º, with the horizontal plane equal to 0º (ArcGIS n.d.).  This allows for a 
visibility analysis which affords the observational context of looking up and 
down, as well as straight ahead.  If not restricted, the field of view determined 
by the viewshed analysis extends until the curvature of the earth inhibits the line 
of sight.  In most cases this extends well beyond the range of human vision.  
The ability of the human eye to identify and perceive objects (trees, people, 
castles, etc.) decreases over distance, generally items that take up less than 
five percent of the central field of view horizontally and less than ten percent 
vertically are difficult to perceive.  The point at which this happens is dependent 
on the size of the object (Environmental Resources Management Australia 
2009: 1-7).  Additionally, the distance to the horizon is also a factor in 
determining the range of visibility.  The distance to the horizon increases in 
direct correlation to an increase in elevation, this distance can be determined 
using the following equation (NOAA online resource): 
Distance to horizon = 1.312 x √height in feet 
Therefore the distance to the horizon, on level terrain, for a person standing 1.6 
metres tall would be 4.8 kilometres.  At an elevation of 50 metres the horizon 
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would be at a distance of 27 kilometres.  Given the size of Henry II’s army 
particularly for the 1165 campaign, it is possible that they could have been 
perceived by the Welsh at great distance, particularly if they were being 
observed by look-outs posted at elevation.  The ability to recognize an object at 
distance is dependent upon a number of factors: the size of the object, the 
distance of the object from the observer, observation elevation, atmospheric 
conditions, quality and contrast of light, angle of observation and obstacles 
(such as trees and other natural or cultural features) preventing clear 
observation. 
 The parameters for determining recognizable visibility are vague at best.  
It is a topic that has been debated by architects, artists, urban-planners and 
more recently archaeologists (Fisher 1992; 1996; McManama-Kearin 2013; 
Higuchi 1983; Blumenfeld 1953).  Archaeologists are the late-comers to this 
debate and as such no equations exist for determining visibility limits.  For 
example, at various elevations what is the distance at which a person, a castle, 
or an army is perceptible and recognizable by the viewer?  Higuchi and 
Blumenfeld have provided equations for discernibility over distance, however, 
since their research was targeted at urban planning and perception (Blumenfeld 
1953) and the perception of landscape features, notably trees (Higuchi 1983), it 
can only be loosely applied to an archaeological context.  They suggest a group 
of qualitative values that separate short (immediate), middle and long distance 
views.    
Short distance is defined as being able to clearly recognize distinguishing 
traits of the object, therefore, this is the distance at which you can see and 
easily recognize an individual you know.  Middle distance is the distance at 
which you can still identify features of the individual, but not clearly.  Long 
distance is the point at which you can still perceive the object and recognize it 
for what it is (a person), but you cannot distinguish any features.  Higuchi 
defines the value that separates short from middle distance (on a horizontal 
plane with a steady gaze of one degree) as sixty times the size of the object.  
Therefore adopting the 1.6 m height parameter for people used in this study, the 
middle distance range would be 96 metres (1.6m x 60 = 96m).  The long 
distance visibility value is 1,100 times the size of the object, therefore, the 
furthest distance at which a person could be perceived on a flat surface is 1.76 
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kilometres (1.6m x 1100 = 1.76 km), (Higuchi 1983: 14-17).  Blumenfeld 
conducted similar visibility studies in urban environments and concluded that 
the maximum distance at which a person can be perceived is 1.25 kilometres, 
half a kilometre less than the distance estimated in Higuchi’s equation 
(Blumenfeld 1953: 36).  It should be noted that these equations only factor for 
the size of the object in terms of height not width, and they only factor values for 
object visibility on flat terrain.  This is why GIS generated viewshed models are 
invaluable as they can define terrain visibility for multiple angles and distances. 
 
 
Inherent challenges and solutions for DEMs and Viewsheds 
Viewsheds are determined by a calculated series of equations operating under 
the Boolean principle.  Essentially the software applies binary coding to DEMs; 
cells in view equal one and cells out of view equal zero.  The resultant binary 
viewshed is sensitive to the accuracy of the digital recordings of the DEM; any 
errors result in elevation inaccuracies and in turn, spatial representation errors 
(Fisher 1996: 1298; Wechsler online resource n.d.).  Simply put DEM errors 
occur in the process of converting the topography of the earth to a digital 
medium. Most DEM errors are reported using root-mean squared error.  The 
root-mean squared error (RMSE) calculates a statistical average by taking the 
square root of a data set.  To determine RMSE a set of known survey points on 
the Earth’s surface are compared to the corresponding set of points in the DEM.  
The degree of uncertainty for a given DEM is difficult to quantify and more 
research is needed before an equation can be adopted to systematically and 
universally rectify these errors (Wechsler online resource).  Essentially it is 
important to remember that digital elevation models are models, not truths.   
These elevation inaccuracies, present in most DEMs, will affect the 
accuracy of viewsheds.  Fisher, notable for his contributions to GIS technology 
and visibility studies, demonstrated that viewsheds are not a precise Boolean 
phenomenon (Fisher 1992: 351).  That is to say that there exists a degree of 
‘grey’ within the identification of DEM cells as positive or negative for visibility.  
Fisher compensated for this by developing a series of algorithms that could be 
inserted into the DEM and viewshed equations.  The resultant viewsheds 
produce what Fisher terms a ‘fuzzy viewshed’, which takes into consideration 
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the so-called grey zones which may or may not fall within the limits of visibility.  
The point of Fisher’s work was to create more accurate visibility models that 
compensated for the embedded errors within GIS software programs.   
DEMs and viewshed analysis are relevant and useful techniques for 
examining and understanding landscapes even with the caveat that they are not 
perfect systems.  While there are algorithms and equations that attempt to solve 
for these imperfections, these in themselves are not devoid of uncertainties.  
For this reason, the DEM and viewsheds presented in this research are retained 
in their original state and the possibility of inaccuracies is taken into account in 
the analysis of these models.  Additionally, the presence of these embedded 
errors contributes to the conservative visibility hypothesis outlined below.  
   
 
Visibility Analysis Research Methodology  
In order to conduct accurate military terrain analysis a series of viewsheds must 
first be calculated.  It is important that there are multiple viewsheds computed 
for each major terrain feature or key site, for example, for Hen Blas Castle from 
the 1157 Coastal Campaign, multiple viewsheds were calculated from the 
motte, the bailey and their immediate vicinities.  Visibility analysis is considered 
to be more accurate when ‘rather than reporting on whether many targets can 
be seen from a single viewshed point…the visibility of a single target or 
viewpoint from many viewing points is determined’ (Fisher 1996: 1298).  It is 
important to visit each of these sites and collect GPS reference points that can 
be entered into GIS software as observer points.  Collecting this data in the field 
is invaluable as it enables the researcher to select superior observer points 
compared to those selected by analysis using DEMs alone.  Multiple observer 
points are essential, particularly at larger sites where combatants were 
stationary, such as a castle or encampment.  Viewsheds calculated for the 
multiple points at one site can then be combined to produce a comprehensive 
viewshed of that area.  The exception is route-ways, where instead multiple 
points are collected on a linear trajectory.  Additionally, it is important to make 
field visits to cross-reference the national grid references provided by the 
RCAHMW and other heritage bodies against the actual location of the 
monument.  This is particularly vital for castles where the grid reference is 
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normally for the southwest corner of the bailey and not the motte.  In instances 
where this was found to be the case an observer point was collected for the 
motte. 
For the purposes of this study an OFFSET A value1 of 1.6 metres was 
used for the height of the observation points in calculating all viewsheds to 
represent the average height of a person.  This height was calibrated based on 
Gillings’ and Wheatley’s suggested optimum adult height between 1.6 and 1.75 
metres (2003: 13).  The lower end of the scale was favoured as this would 
produce obtainable visibility models for essentially any individual, not only those 
from the taller portion of the population.  Similarly a conservative five metres 
was added to the 1.6 metre human height when calculating a viewshed from a 
timber castle keep.   
No timber castle towers survive in Britain and it is difficult to estimate 
height from post-hole stains alone.  Beresford (1987), Higham and Barker 
(1992) have theorised that surviving timber bell towers from medieval churches 
may represent the best comparative examples for the height of timber keeps.  
Higham and Barker suggest that the only major difference between bell towers 
and castle keeps would have been in the roof construction, bell towers having 
an angled pyramid shaped roof while timber keeps would have been flat to 
allow for accessibility and visibility for defensive purposes (Higham and Barker 
1992: 245).  Most of these surviving church towers are in Scandinavia, the best 
example in Britain is that of Romney Marsh in Kent which is around 7.5 metres 
high (Beresford 1987: 105-6).  Given the sometimes hasty nature of the 
construction (such as at Hen Blas Castle) and the repeated destruction and 
reconstruction of many of the castles that fall within the study area, a 
conservative timber keep height was assigned.  It should be noted that the five 
metre tower height is in addition to the surviving height of the motte, which are 
in many cases eroded.   
Producing conservative viewsheds, which is particularly important in 
instances with unknown variables, serves three main purposes: first it serves to 
control the plausible limits of visibility.  Secondly, the establishment of the 
                                                 
1
 Note the default z value of one metre is negated by the addition of an OFFSET A 
value. 
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visibility limits assists in identifying probable key military terrain features with a 
higher degree of confidence than those identified by a more liberal application 
of viewshed constraint components.  Lastly, conservative viewshed models 
compensate for visibility constraints such as tree cover.  In effect by adopting 
conservative parameters for unknown variables such as observer and building 
height, other unknown variables that constrict visibility and cannot be controlled 
or predicted, such as past vegetation cover and atmospheric conditions, can be 
moderated by conservatively valuing other viewshed variables.   As will be 
reviewed in the following chapters, much of the terrain associated with both the 
1157 and 1165 campaigns was forested.   It should be noted that in medieval 
England a forest often referred to an area of protected royal land, woodlands 
could be a component of a forest, but a forest could also contain large areas of 
open land (Jørgensen 2010: 114).  For the purposes of this research the term 
forest should be read synonymous to woodland.   There were areas with sparse 
tree cover, such as the coastal plain in northeast Wales, which was immediately 
adjacent to the coastal Roman road of the 1157 campaign, the forest being 
restricted to the upland locations to the west.  Also, the vegetation on Henry’s 
route of march across the Berwyn Mountains in 1165 on the Ffordd y Saeson 
was mainly dominated by upland scrub, such as heather and gorse.   
There exist inherent difficulties in attempting to ascertain the exact 
location and density of past vegetation.  Recently McManama-Kearin (2013), in 
her viewshed research of Anglo-Norman castles in Ireland, concluded that data 
available from both LiDAR and paleobotanical records was still insufficient to 
reliably reconstruct historic vegetation patterns to use in visibility analysis (2013: 
10).  This is mainly because LiDAR only represents current vegetation, and 
palebotanical records cannot provide the level of detail required for dependable 
visibility analysis.  McManama-Kearin instead adopted the following technique: 
due to the hypothetical nature of attempting to reconstruct past vegetation ‘…it 
seemed the best course to remove the question of foliage completely.  While to 
some, this may be seen to represent a draw-back, in reality, dismissing the 
question of vegetation only enhances the maximum potential of visibility’ (2013: 
10).  This is a valuable method and it is certainly functional for defining 
maximum visibility.  Given the innate difficulties discussed above, the only 
realistic way forward for visibility analysis of archaeological landscapes is to 
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embrace McManama-Kearin’s technique.  Place-name evidence and historic 
landscape descriptions in contemporary literature such as The Journey through 
Wales (1188), Domesday Book (1086) and other chronicles, have been 
scrutinised to compensate for the vegetation variability.  For example, Gerald of 
Wales when recounting the 1157 Battle of Coleshill indicates that the area was 
wooded, for example: ‘on our right we passed the forest of Coleshill… [a] 
densely wooded pass’ (Journey Book II Ch.10: 196).  Information such as this 
will be taken into account by underestimating the degree of visibility presented 
by the viewshed data.  Essentially the full extent of visibility, indicated by the 
viewshed, will be interpreted with caution, given the potential for vegetation 
constraints.   In a military context these variables do not diminish the value of 
visibility analysis in defining key features of military terrain or site identification 
as they produce sound models for determining how the landscape was viewed 
by the combatants.  Additionally the reconstruction of these conflict events is 
not dependent on viewsheds alone which are only one aspect of the military 
terrain analysis employed; many elements of KOCOA are not dependent on 
viewsheds. 
 
 
Methodology results – conflict pattern analyses 
 
Following collection and analysis all of the data types discussed above the data 
are then synthesised to create a battlefield or conflict pattern analysis.  It is from 
these analyses that behaviour and significant patterns of social change can be 
accessed.  These patterns of social change have theoretical implications for 
conflict archaeology and are considered in further detail in the Medieval Warfare 
and Conclusion chapters (Chapters 3 and 12).   
There are two types of battlefield pattern analyses that can be used in 
battlefield surveys; these are gross-pattern analysis and dynamic-pattern 
analysis. Gross-pattern analysis is a more traditionalist approach to battlefield 
interpretation and reconstruction that relies primarily on historical narratives, 
which in some instances are enhanced by oral histories and random or 
unprovenienced collections of battle related material culture (McBride et al. 
2011) Essentially, gross-patterning is a military history approach to battlefield 
interpretation and reconstruction.  In this research this is derived from 
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considerations of the primary historical narratives presented in the Conflict 
Chronology chapter and the reconstruction of the broader conflict landscape 
presented in the Study Area and Case Study chapters.  Dynamic-pattern 
analysis (developed by Scott, Fox et al. 1989) builds upon the data resulting 
from gross-patterning and ‘interprets and reconstructs battlefields by integrating 
discrete battlefield events and their archaeological signatures into a cohesive 
spatial and temporal sequence’ (McBride et al. 2011: 79; Scott et al. 1989: 146-
147).  By using both of these analyses the spatial and temporal dimensions of a 
conflict event can then be more clearly defined.   
Traditionally, gross patterns ‘are defined as the spatial aspects of unit 
behaviour’ (McBride et al. 2011: 80) while dynamic patterns are defined by 
attributes of battlefield behaviour, such as portable military material culture.  In 
battlefield surveys for which a portable artifactual component was present, 
these provenienced battle-related artefacts were used to sequence individual 
behaviour patterns across time and space (Scott et al. 1989: 148).  
Conventionally this type of analysis has relied on analytical techniques 
surrounding firearm signature analysis (ibid).  It is reasonable to assume that a 
similar analytical technique could be developed for medieval projectiles.  This is 
something that would be considered in any future research. 
While the ability of the dynamic-pattern approach to assess the actions of 
individuals in a single moment of time is archaeologically significant and rare, it 
is not the only noteworthy product of this type of analysis.  In terms of this 
research, this is shown in the combined ability of the military terrain analysis 
and visibility analysis to highlight how the landscape, as a military artefact and 
unique archaeological signature, was perceived and exploited by the 
combatants. Through this group behaviours on the battlefield can be accessed 
as well as their broader implications for patterns of social change.  A gross-
pattern analysis is presented in the Case Study chapters whereas the dynamic-
pattern analysis is considered in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. 
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Remote Sensing 
 
Although beyond the scope of this study, the following is a brief review of the 
remote sensing techniques available and often used to inform the excavation of 
conflict sites.  These most notably include: metal detector survey; LiDAR; and 
electrical resistivity survey.  These techniques are not necessary to document 
the medieval conflicts considered by this study, however, it would be remiss to 
not devote a brief dialogue to their function within the wider realm of conflict 
archaeology pursuits.    
While a negative stigma is sometimes attached to metal detectors, 
particularly as the tool of the renegade collector, when employed responsibly, 
systematically and by a trained detectorist, they are in reality a superlative tool 
for locating military related material culture in an archaeological context.  ‘A 
metal detector is a remote sensing device designed to locate subsurface 
metallic items based on the differential electrical conductivity of metallic objects’ 
(McBride et al. 2011: 94).  Different manufactures of metal detector have 
varying discrimination capabilities for differentiating metals, such as iron, copper 
or lead, enabling archaeologist to target specific types of material culture such 
as lead musket balls or iron arrowheads.  Given that ferrous materials are 
susceptible to corrosion, access to the appropriate conservation tools is a 
necessity for both the identification and preservation of any ferrous material 
culture.  Often ferrous artefacts when excavated are in such a severe state of 
corrosion that radiography is necessary in order to positively identify the object.  
Cuprous and lead alloys (such as brass or pewter) tend to preserve well in situ, 
although the degree of preservation is affected by other factors such as soil 
chemistry and the degree of soil saturation (Foard and Morris 2012). 
 Traditional archaeological survey and excavation methods are often 
unsuccessful when used to explore a battle site, this is due to the unique 
artefact scatter pattern produced by armed engagements.  Preliminary 
excavation techniques, such as test pitting at regular intervals on a grid, has 
been shown to be ineffective at such sites as the majority of military related 
material culture will go undetected (McBride et al. 2011; Carman 2014).  
Additionally, traditional survey methods can be very intrusive, whereas the 
remote sensing capabilities of metal detectors are minimally invasive, an 
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important consideration particularly when surveying residential property 
(McBride et al. 2011; ABPP 2007).   
 In a traditional battlefield archaeology survey, metal detectors are used 
both to locate metallic military material culture and to delineate battlefield site 
boundaries (Foard and Morris 2012).  Once this inventory phase has been 
accomplished traditional archaeological excavation strategies can be employed.  
Test pits and trenches are often opened in areas with a high density of battle 
related metallic artefacts.  Other features, battle-related or otherwise, such as 
earthworks are also surveyed, any other archaeological features or sites 
identified during the initial survey are also recorded to document pre and post-
battlefield cultural activity.  The deposition of metallic artefacts that are not 
battle associated, such as nails, discarded farming equipment and domestic 
refuse, can impede metal detector sampling strategy, particularly if the 
landscape has been subjected to intensive modern cultivation.  Depending on 
the degree of non-battle-related activity and the resulting ‘background noise’ 
picked up by the metal detectors, the sampling strategy can be altered by 
adjusting the metal detectors to discriminate for non-ferrous objects.  In doing 
so battle-related material culture, such as brass lace chapes and buckles, or 
pewter horse accoutrements can be used to define areas of battle activity.  The 
use of experienced metal detectorists is also vital, as they can often 
discriminate between hand-wrought iron and machine made iron.  Although 
hand-wrought iron was certainly manufactured well beyond the medieval period, 
the ability to eliminate modern iron objects from the metal detector survey can 
be a useful tool (McBride et al. 2011).  Additionally, most quality metal detectors 
(and detectorists) can discriminate object depth, providing another effective 
means for discerning potential battle related material culture from more recent 
metallic deposits.  However, this method of discrimination is only effective at 
locations that have not been ploughed, given that both battlefields associated 
with this research are in agricultural fields that have been ploughed in the past, 
object depth would not be a useful discrimination factor in a sampling strategy, 
but could be useful consideration in a survey of the encampments. 
 There are other forms of remote sensing which can be useful in 
battlefield surveys, such as LiDAR and electrical resistivity.  The success of 
these types of surveys and the quality of the data retrieved is dependent on the 
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level of site preservation.  LiDAR (light detection and ranging) is a remote 
sensing system that uses lasers to create accurate three-dimensional 
representations of the Earth’s surface that penetrate vegetation (NOAA 2015: 
online resource).  In archaeology this has useful applications, particularly for 
delineating and locating earthworks.  LiDAR was consulted in the initial phase of 
this research, however, no additional earthwork features were identified than 
those already established either on Ordnance Survey maps or by previous 
archaeological surveys.  Areas where LiDAR data could have been of great 
use, the Welsh encampments at Basingwerk and Pen y Bryn y Castell, were too 
altered by modern development for any earthwork features to be detected via 
LiDAR.   
Another means of remote sensing, electrical resistivity metres, use an 
electrical current which is passed through conductors, the more conductive a 
soil is the lesser the electrical resistance. For example, features such as burned 
areas, filled ditches, or palisades and palisade trenches have a different soil 
composition from the surrounding soils and often contain more organic material 
particularly from rotting or burned posts.  These features retain more moisture 
making them more conductive and therefore, less resistant to electrical current 
(McBride et al. 2011: 99).  
 
 
Case study – the current state of conflict archaeology in Wales 
 
In 2009 Cadw undertook a pilot project to document Welsh Battlefields for future 
study, including archaeological excavation.  Border Archaeology was 
commissioned to conduct a preliminary site assessment of several battlefield 
sties including the 1157 Battle of Coleshill.  The objectives of this assessment 
were: to examine primary and secondary documentary sources, collate 
information of each site and the historic terrain and to produce an assessment 
of the historical significance of each site. (Border Archaeology 2009: 4) A report 
was provided in November 2009 for the work undertaken that ranked sites for 
archaeological feasibility, in terms of the potential for the recovery of battlefield 
related military material culture.  Coleshill was not favoured by the report’s 
authors for further archaeological inquiry, in part because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the actual location of the battlefield and the sites associated with 
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the battlefield.  They also concluded that the ‘potential for the survival of buried 
archaeological remains relating to the battlefield in this particular area appears 
to be limited’, given the intensive development that has occurred on the 
Coleshill Battlefield (ibid: 63).  The authors of this study were relying on the 
1960 Ordnance Survey Map location of the battle, which the research presented 
in this thesis, will show to be inaccurate.  Unfortunately, the authors, who used 
traditional archaeological survey methods, may have arrived at a different 
conclusion if they had applied a conflict archaeology methodology, such as the 
one presented in this chapter.   
Similar to the 2009 pilot project, a preliminary archaeological survey of 
historic Welsh battlefields was undertaken by Cadw between 2012 and 2014, to 
establish their viability for nomination to a proposed ‘Historic Register of Welsh 
Battlefields’ (Cadw 2011).  Again, due to the absence of conflict archaeology 
methods, the majority of these sites were consequently determined 
inappropriate for listing on a register, as they were thought not to have 
significant potential to yield portable military material culture.  Regrettably, the 
plan to instate a Welsh battlefield register was cancelled in the Spring of 2015 
(Cadw personal communication; April 2015).   
 
 
Conclusion 
The research presented in this study seeks to address the inadequacies in 
current archaeological surveys of medieval battlefields and provide a way 
forward for the study of Welsh battlefields.  This is accomplished by the 
adoption of the holistic conflict archaeology methodology outlined in this 
chapter, embracing what is essentially a landscape archaeology approach to 
conflict.  The consistent application of this methodology to medieval Welsh 
conflicts results in a gross and dynamic pattern battlefield analysis (presented in 
Chapters 6-10), that uses the conflict landscape as an artefact for the 
contextualization and reconstruction of medieval Welsh conflicts.  
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Chapter Three – Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare 
 
 
‘It is a truth universally acknowledged that warfare was central to medieval society.  The power 
and authority of kings rested largely on their ability to wage war successfully […] Yet exactly 
what medieval warfare was can be difficult to define’ (Nicholson 2004: 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Illustrations of Welsh soldiers from the Littere Wallie c. 1282-1292. Public Record 
Office ref. E36 / 274.  (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Welsh warfare, and to some extent Anglo-Norman warfare, have generally been 
studied in isolation of a larger medieval European context, leading to many 
misconceptions about the reality of warfare in these cultures.  This chapter 
addresses these misconceptions through the reassessment of earlier research 
to provide a holistic and realistic portrait of medieval warfare, as it pertained to 
twelfth-century Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflicts.  Understanding Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman military tactics and technology as well as the culture of warfare is 
vital in order to contextualize individual conflict events and actions within the 
wider conflict landscape.  For the past century historians have published 
countless volumes contrasting the differences between the Welsh and the 
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Anglo-Normans, most notably highlighting political, military and ecclesiastical 
variations (Lloyd 1912; King 1965; Edwards 1967; Dodd 1979; Turvey 2012; 
Kenyon 1996).  What are less common are discussions that also include the 
similarities between the Welsh and the Anglo-Normans, and contextualize both 
cultures in a wider Western European milieu, particularly in regards to warfare 
(Latimer 1989; Davies 1990; Davies 2004; Moore 2007).   
This chapter is divided into the following sections: an overview of Welsh 
and Anglo-Norman warfare and military tactics in their wider social context; a 
discussion of military culture regarding underlying political and military ethos; 
and an overview of twelfth-century military technology and military material 
culture.  This chapter does not consider the technological capabilities of the 
weapon types discussed, as this is beyond the scope of this research.  
However, future work, including battlefield excavation, would include an 
analysis of these capabilities in order to enhance the dynamic-pattern analysis 
(reviewed in Chapter Two), in which battlefield behaviours of individuals could 
be sequenced. Finally, by way of a conclusion, is the presentation of a 
theoretical framework for conflict archaeology as a means to synthesize the 
social aspects of warfare, particularly the effects of conflict on social structural 
change defined within a wider conflict archaeology and sociology of warfare 
milieu.   
 
 
Western European Warfare, Myth and Reality 
 
The mid-twelfth-century campaigns of Henry II against the Welsh have not been 
considered within the wider context of medieval warfare.  Past and present, 
historians have often dismissed Welsh military tactics and technology as tribal 
and primitive, in reference to their preference for raiding and guerrilla style 
warfare (Davies 2004: 2-3; Kenyon 1996: 126).  This conception was in no 
small part propagated by Gerald of Wales’ depiction of the Welshman as a 
‘noble savage.’  For example, he states that soldiers went barefoot (see Figure 
5 above) and that they did not employ a code of chivalry, which has led more 
often than not to the idea of Welshmen as barbarians (Description Book I Ch. 8: 
234; Expugnatio Hibernica in Verbruggen 1997: 204; Davies 2004: 4; Suppe 
1994: 209). In comparison, their Anglo-Norman opponents are often portrayed 
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as being on the cutting-edge of European military tactics and weapons 
technology (Nelson 1966: 12, 115).  At the forefront of this mistaken superiority 
was the Anglo-Normans’ supposed preference for the deployment of infantry 
and cavalry in formal battle array in set battles.  While it must be conceded that 
the Welsh had a penchant for raids and ambushes, and that the Anglo-Normans 
did on occasion give their opponents formal battle, these tactical preferences 
are nonetheless over-simplified and incorrect.  This misunderstanding of Welsh 
and Anglo-Norman warfare in the mid-twelfth-century results from the static 
approach through which these conflicts have been studied and explained.  The 
lack of a holistic approach is something that conflict archaeology seeks to 
address.  As has been iterated in the preceding Methodology chapter, conflict or 
battlefield archaeology embraces a multi-disciplinary approach that most 
commonly includes the fields of archaeology, history and military history.  
Depending on the conflict often cultural anthropology (including ethnography), 
forensics and osteology are included.  Unfortunately, such innovative multi-
disciplinary approaches are often absent from history and military history.    The 
inability to embrace this cross-disciplinary approach will frustrate and stunt the 
growth and ability of conflict studies.  Foard has addressed this problem in 
British conflict studies stating that: ‘the effective integration of the techniques of 
different disciplines is essential to battlefield studies, not just in the 
reconstruction of the historic terrain but in all its other aspects.  This remains the 
most important challenge for the current development of battlefield studies in 
the U.K.’ (Foard 2009:138).  
In his study, Welsh Military Institutions, S. Davies highlights that 
‘Perceptions of the differences between Welsh (and also Irish and Scottish) 
warfare and the practice of war in other parts of Europe, notably England and 
France, have been exaggerated, as has the impact of technological changes’ 
(2004: 85).  There exist several common misconceptions about Anglo-Norman 
and Welsh warfare, and more widely, medieval western European warfare 
practices.  These include: the preference for pitched battle, the superiority of the 
cavalry, and that battles were necessary to win a war.  Historians such as F. 
Suppe (1994), D.J.C. King (1965), J.E. Lloyd (1912), J.R. Kenyon (1996), 
Gerald of Wales and others have stated that the Welsh tended to avoid pitched 
battle whenever possible, insinuating that the Anglo-Normans preferred method 
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of warfare was the large-scale pitched battle.  The reality was quite the 
opposite, in medieval Europe the most common forms of war were the raid and 
the siege (Gillingham 1999: 67-8).  This is what the military historian Contamine 
refers to as the guerre guerroyante, essentially a warfare strategy dominated by 
raids, pillaging, ambushes and sieges (1984: 219).  This is not to say that 
pitched battle did not have an important role to play, but it was not the norm.  
The noted military historian Verbruggen states that aside from where battles 
were forced, in connection with a siege, or in the case of the 1157 and 1165 
campaigns, by an ambush, ‘battles were fought only when both sides wanted to, 
and thought they had a chance of winning.  Most campaigns took place without 
any battles at all…’ (1997: 329).  Indeed it is now widely accepted by the 
medieval military history community that the ‘principal strategy of medieval 
commanders was to lay waste to the countryside’ (Palmer 1998: 256; Strickland 
1996).  In a British context this can be easily evidenced in the more than 2,000 
wasted manors and the 1,000 square miles of ‘ruined’ countryside as recorded 
in Domesday Book (Palmer 1998: 257), a large proportion of this waste was 
located in the Welsh Marches.  However, it should be noted that wastes as 
recorded in Domesday were not always the result of military devastation; waste 
could also mean uninhabited or uncultivated areas, regions with minimal 
population and limited resources, or areas that did not contribute taxes (Palliser 
1993).   The military tactics of raids and pillaging used by the Anglo-Normans is 
further evidenced by Strickland in the pervasive looting of churches by soldiers, 
including knights, which is surprising given the code of chivalry they were 
thought to have upheld (1996: 81-3).  The Bruts and Gerald of Wales document 
that the Anglo-Norman army of Henry II pillaged churches in both the 1157 and 
1165 campaigns in north Wales. 
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Figure 6: Illuminated manuscript depicting a battle from the Second Baron’s War c. 1263-4 
possibly depicting the Battle of Lewes 14 May 1264. Artist: Mahiet, Master of the Cambrai 
Missal, early fourteenth century, from the French Manuscript Chroniques de France ou de St 
Denis.  ©The British Library Board, Royal 16 G VI f. 427v.  
 
 
Cavalry 
The mountainous and by turns marshy landscape of Wales made the use of the 
Anglo-Norman cavalry impractical.  Brown claims that the cavalry initially had 
the most success in coastal lowlands of Northeast Wales (2004: 101).  
However, this seems rather implausible given the swampy nature of these 
lowlands which are riddled with deep and narrow ravines.  Gerald of Wales in 
the Journey Through Wales writes that he was uneasy when passing through 
this region of Wales on horse because of the marshy nature of the terrain which 
was fraught with quicksands (Journey Book II Ch. 10: 196).  Many military 
historians overlook the fact that the Welsh were also skilled at fighting from 
horseback, and under the right circumstances engaged in mounted battle, 
although they preferred to dismount to fight.  This tradition evolved in Wales 
independent of the Normans and was present before the conquest (Davies 
2004: 145-176).  Some military historians also mistakenly assume that ‘it was 
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from the English and Normans that the Welsh learnt the use of arms and how to 
fight on horse’ (Kenyon 1996: 126).  Despite the presence of mounted warriors 
on both sides, cavalry was generally absent from post-conquest Welsh 
campaigns.  It could be argued that the impracticality of the cavalry in Wales led 
the Anglo-Normans to increasingly put more stock in the infantry, which had 
always comprised the majority of Welsh forces (Davies 2004: 177).   
 
 
The Rise of the Infantry   
Although cavalry could be deployed with devastating effects at engagements 
such as the Battle of Hastings, the infantry also had an equally if not more 
important role to play in Norman armies (Bennet 1998: 311).  In fact some, 
including Bennet, Strickland and Hardy (2011), argue that it was the strategic 
use of missile weapons in certain contexts, such as the crossbow at Hastings (a 
weapon which seemingly was not prevalent in Britain prior to the Norman 
Conquest) that had the ultimate ability to determine campaign success (Bennet 
1998: 316, Strickland and Hardy 2011: 67).  As Bennet states: the ‘cavalry, no 
matter how well-equipped or motivated, could make no impression upon foot 
soldiers who kept their formation…without missile men to break it up, enabling 
the horsemen to force their way into the breaches’ (Bennet 1998: 311 and 316).  
According to Strickland and Hardy in The Great War Bow (2011), the Norman 
army of the eleventh-century adhered to the earlier Frankish custom of mounted 
warriors, whereas the Anglo-Scandinavians traditionally fought on foot.  Despite 
their victory at Hastings the Normans suffered heavy losses, largely due to the 
difficulty in breaking the Anglo-Saxon infantry lines using the Norman cavalry.  
The aftermath of this was the steady increase in the use of archers by the 
Anglo-Norman military; such archers were ubiquitous by the time of the Stephen 
I (c. 1135), particularly after they were used to great effect in the Battle of the 
Standard (1138).  Additionally mounted knights began to embrace the tactic of 
dismounting for battle (Strickland and Hardy 2011: 70-73).   
The reign of Henry II saw an increased emphasis on the importance and 
use of the infantry (Morillo 1994: 181), no small part of which was due to the 
proliferation of siege warfare, in which infantry played an integral role.  The 
manpower limits of the knightly feudal classes meant that commanders had to 
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increasingly turn to mercenaries (Mallet 1999: 213; Beeler 1966: see Chapter 
Ten).  A large part of Henry II’s army for the 1165 Berwyn Mountain campaign 
was comprised of mercenaries both from the British Isles and the Continent.   It 
can also be argued that Henry II came to embrace the importance of the 
infantry from his military experiences in Wales, particularly the use of lightly 
armoured infantry which allowed for increased agility in the difficult Welsh 
terrain (Moore 2007: 76).  In doing so the Anglo-Normans were adapting their 
tactics to more successfully engage in a Welsh theatre of war.  
 
 
Battle Seeking, battle avoiding and the Vegetian art of war  
Perhaps the most surprising feature of medieval warfare was that large-scale 
pitched battles were the exception not the norm (Contamine 1984: 219).  Their 
prevalence in texts is the product of a cultural fascination, past and present, 
with this type of engagement, which seemingly attracts more attention than the 
small scale raids and sieges that defined so much of medieval warfare.  
Undoubtedly, this is why campaigns such at the ones included in this research, 
have so far failed to capture the imagination of scholars and the public alike.  To 
be fair, the lack of detailed accounts from battle absent campaigns in medieval 
literature does make reconstructing an accurate historical narrative of these 
events challenging for modern historians.  A challenge that this research shows 
can be surmounted by the precise application of a conflict archaeology 
methodology.    
Although most modern military historians now agree that pitched battles 
were rare in the Middle Ages, their theories differ as to why.  To this there are 
two main schools of thought: the Vegetian and the Non-Vegetian models.  De 
Re Militari (Concerning Military Matters) was a Roman treatise on the art of 
warfare written by Vegetius in the fourth century A.D.  One of the most copied 
texts of the Middle Ages, it was still being taught in military academies through 
the nineteenth century (Rogers 2002: 2).  According to Rogers in his article ‘The 
Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages’, Vegetius states that battle 
was an enterprise fraught with risk, many of which could be considered 
unnecessary as ‘more certain victories could be won by attacking an enemy’s 
logistics’ (2-3).  The implication here is that Vegetian strategy favoured pillaging, 
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raiding and sieges as the preferred warfare tactics (Morillo 2002: 24).  
According to Gillingham, pitched battles when fought were often decisive, 
particularly in frontier zones (1999: 70); however, campaigns that took place in 
frontiers, such as the Marches of Wales, Scotland and Saxony were relatively 
battle free (Verbruggen 1997: 329).  Gillingham and Strickland theorise that 
medieval commanders, including Henry II, trained in the Vegetian art of warfare, 
avoided battle as ‘victories provided only limited gains, [whereas] battlefield 
defeats could be utterly disastrous’ (Rogers 2002: 5).   
Rogers disagrees with this paradigm and instead suggests that the 
reason there were comparatively few battles in the Middle Ages was not 
because commanders were afraid of them, but because the circumstances of 
medieval warfare required both sides to ascent to battle in order for an 
engagement to take place.  The ability to successfully avoid large-scale pitched 
battles continued until the gunpowder revolution (late sixteenth/early 
seventeenth centuries), when the advent of firearm technology no longer 
required both factions to ‘agree’ to battle for battle to occur.  Prior to this if only 
one side sought battle, then a battle usually would not take place.  Often where 
a defender had sufficient defences whether built or natural they could 
successfully avoid battle and be victorious.  This was a particularly effective 
tactic in conflicts that centred on disputed control of territory, which accounts for 
the majority of Anglo-Norman and Welsh armed conflict in the twelfth century.  
Additionally, the lack of battle did not determine campaign or commander 
success, Henry II ‘never fought a single general action [(meaning great battle)] 
in his long reign, though he was described by the contemporary poet Jordan 
Fantosme as the greatest conqueror since Charlemagne’ (Rogers 2002: 2).  
The actions fought during the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen are 
clearly being dismissed as minor engagements, if anything it should instead be 
suggested that the only battles that Henry fought in, during his entire military 
career were during the 1157 and 1165 campaigns (Hosler 2004: 62).  To this 
point Rogers fails to note that an ambush could force battle and did not require 
both factions to ‘agree’ to a battle.   
Morillo challenges the assumption that all medieval warfare was 
Vegetian.  He points out that Vegetian strategy is a socially and culturally 
constructed system, and therefore only functions in societies that meet the pre-
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requisites for which Vegetian strategy was fashioned – namely, a system of built 
defences such as forts or castles and a sedentary agricultural society (2002: 23-
29): Wales it could be argued, prior to the construction of native Welsh built 
castles (the first documented instance of which was in c. 1116 with Cymer 
Castle in Merioneth (Kenyon 2009: 26)), lacked the necessary built strongholds 
from which to successfully defend its territory.  The traditional Welsh 
administrative centres, the llysoedd in use during the early medieval and 
medieval periods, were only lightly defended.  Llysoedd were elite settlements 
surrounded by a wooden palisade often built on top of a low earthen or stone 
embankment (Johnstone and Riley 1995; Earwood and Townsend n.d.).  
Sometimes these were built within earlier Iron Age hillforts or Roman forts, in 
these instances the defences of the earlier fortifications were modified to allow 
for a smaller enclosure (Earwood and Townsend n.d.).   A more detailed 
discussion on the llys is included in the Study Area chapter (see page 139).    
Morillo defines non-Vegetian strategy as armed conflict where the 
objective is not directly about control of territory; instead it is about ‘prestige, 
hierarchy, or elimination of rivals.  Indirectly, such norms and rules could make 
possession of territory contingent not upon occupation protected by fortification 
but upon legal or moral title conferred by some central authority’ (2002: 31).  
Vegetian strategy had no role to play in polities such as medieval Gwynedd, 
that had established rules and laws that governed armed conflict (Morillo 2002: 
31).  Additionally, Vegetian strategy requires a sedentary political elite that did 
not have the option of fleeing or seeking refuge from an invading force, Wales 
had no such geopolitical context in the mid-twelfth century, and the seeking of 
refuge in the mountains of Snowdonia was a common practice in both pre and 
post-conquest Gwynedd.  When threatened they would gather their herds and 
valuables and shelter in the mountains (Verbruggen 1997: 117; Davies 2004).  
Clarification is needed regarding fleeing or seeking refuge as non-Vegetian and 
using natural defenses to avoid battle, a Vegetian tactic.  The difference is that 
fleeing and seeking refuge did not prevent an enemy advance whereas natural 
defenses could be used to stop an enemy incursion.  This non-Vegetian tactic 
initially proved effective in defying Anglo-Norman conquest attempts, as in order 
to subdue or conquer a population, that population must first be present.  The 
Anglo-Normans compensated by building castles to stake a territorial claim, 
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something the Welsh were quick to adopt.  It can be argued that the 
establishment of the castle and in turn the onset of siege warfare forced the 
Welsh into adopting a more Vegetian style of waging war.  The non-Vegetian 
tactic of retreating to a place of refuge had proved an effective tactic against 
rival Welsh principalities, as they waged war with the same cultural and social 
principles.  By establishing castles, no matter how impermanent the actual 
structure might be, the Welsh had to adapt their philosophical and applied 
tactics to counter the Anglo-Norman aggression.   
By the mid-twelfth-century castle building had become a prolific 
enterprise in the Marches of Wales. Apart from a few notable excavations, 
including Hen Domen in Montgomeryshire (Higham and Barker 2000) and 
Rhuddlan in Denbighshire (Quinnell et al. 1994), many of these early earth and 
timber castles are still poorly understood.  Undoubtedly some of these castles, 
like Hen Domen, were prominent and permanent administrative and defensive 
centres, while others may have served a more impermanent function, 
constructed as campaign works and in use for only a short period of time 
(Higham and Barker 1992: 349).  Further archaeological investigation and 
excavation is needed to determine the design and function of the marcher 
constructions extant during the 1157 and 1165 campaigns.  It has been argued 
that castles in Wales did not have the ability to control the conflict landscape in 
totality until the construction of the large masonry castles by Edward I in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (Spurgeon 1991: 175).  Lieberman’s 
assertion was that earth and timber castles were temporary constructions, 
either to be abandoned or improved depending on the success of conquest 
(Lieberman 2010: 138).  In other words castles were used to stake a territorial 
claim on a contested landscape; these claims were not permanent and often 
fluctuated between opponents.  Only after a frontier-zone became more secure 
could a castle be capable of adopting more traditional roles with any 
permanence.  Given Lieberman’s premise of impermanence, for at least some 
of the pre-Edwardian marcher castles, it could be argued that warfare waged by 
early marcher lords (essentially before the construction of masonry castles) was 
non-Vegetian to an extent.  However, as the campaigns included in this 
research are royal not marcher, this concept will have to be a topic for future 
research.  What is certain, as stated above, is that the arrival of the castle 
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caused the Welsh to adopt a more Vegetian style of warfare.  Both the 1157 
and 1165 campaigns embraced Vegetian principles.  
 
 
Military Culture 
 
Much of Welsh culture and their social-political organisation remains an enigma, 
particularly when compared to the relative detail with which we have come to 
understand the Anglo-Saxon, Norman and Anglo-Norman societies.  As has 
been discussed in the literature review, often what little scholarly research there 
is of pre-Norman and Norman Wales has been distorted by a modern Anglo-
Norman bias.  Some scholars such as Bezant have sought to rectify this bias 
and ‘reject the limiting 'celto-nostalgic' narrative that [has] driven Wales for so 
long and to introduce a sophisticated medieval landscape that paralleled the 
trajectory of the rest of medieval Europe’ (Bezant 2009: 8).   Most of what we 
know, particularly of the pre-Norman era, is drawn from few surviving 
ecclesiastical and administrative doctrines as well as from Welsh poetry.  W. 
Davies has contributed extensively to our understanding of early medieval and 
medieval Welsh social systems by meticulously analysing all relevant medieval 
texts, particularly the Liber Landavensis which records transactions carried out 
in South Wales between the sixth and eleventh centuries (1978: 2-6).  However, 
she recognizes that there are innate discrepancies and corruptions in these 
texts and stresses the value of archaeology in furthering our understanding of 
medieval Wales (1990: 4).  Davies is one of the few historians who have sought 
to understand Welsh social systems within their own geo-political context, 
outside of the Anglo-Norman world.   It is important to view medieval Wales not 
as a kingdom torn apart by war into smaller principalities, but as a collection of 
independent principalities that were sometimes united by war.  In other words 
the concept of an undivided territorial Wales is modern and it should not be 
applied in a medieval context.  For example, many scholars seem to share 
Turvey’s outlook that: 
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            The rulers of these various kingdoms were selfishly engaged in their own,  
          almost endless political and military competition.  Rulers and kingdoms  
          vied with each other for supremacy, pursuing objectives that  
          were, for the most part, instinctual....Arguably, it is not until the thirteenth  
          century that there developed any real sense of a 'Wales', a Cymric nation  
          of linguistically and culturally like-minded people who shared a common  
          heritage (2002:3).   
 
Additionally, Gillingham claims that the Welsh and the Irish lost territory 
to the Normans because they were politically disunited and because the Anglo-
Normans could out-produce them in weapons because of their iron industry 
(1999: 84).  Turvey’s and Gillingham’s theory that the eventual Welsh downfall 
was caused by inter-Welsh disunity is in some respects a self-fulfilling prophecy 
that provides a convenient and simple explanation of the subjugation of the 
Celtic population at the hands of the Anglo-Normans.  One can pontificate 
endlessly on the virtues of unification, yet as this is solely hypothetical 
researchers should turn their attention to treating each individual principality or 
kingdom independently.  
W. Davies asserts that for the Welsh the sphere of rule or gwlad was an 
abstract concept which was not determined by set territorial boundaries or 
groups of people; rather it was ‘the changeable, expandable, contractible 
sphere of any ruler's power’ (Davies 1990: 17), an ideology that supports non-
Vegetian warfare in a pre-Norman context.  This variability was intensified by 
the absence of primogeniture in Wales.  This often meant that the death of a 
Welsh prince would lead to a period of political turmoil, hallmarked by the 
intense fighting between brothers.  ‘Consequently, the twin elements of 
territorial fluidity and political fragility predominated, so that political unity was 
invariable, transient and ephemeral, achieved by military might alone’  (Turvey 
2002: 3).  This explains the constant inter-Welsh warfare both within the same 
political dynasties and between opposing Welsh kingdoms, which more often 
than not had blood ties and therefore, an ancestral claim (Turvey 2002: 30).   
Wales lacked sovereignty, apart from a few exceptions including the 
reigns of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn (d. 1063) and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (d. 1282) 
both of whom successfully united and governed Wales.  Even the relative 
political security of prosperous principalities such as Gwynedd and Deheubarth 
could not necessarily be defined as sovereign entities, as the Welsh concept of 
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political power was fluid, leading to the wider distribution of this type of power 
(Davies 1990: 23).  Warren summarizes Welsh government succinctly stating 
that the Welsh principalities had no centralized government because their social 
systems did not require it, political security was instead derived from social 
institutions and tribal and kin-based relationships which allowed Welsh leaders 
to engage in political laissez-faire (Warren 1973: 151-2).  Interestingly, it was 
not until the early twelfth century that the cyfran, the custom of partible 
inheritance, which had traditionally been applied to lordship, was applied to land 
(Jones 1961: 128-9).  This adaptation may have been a direct result of the 
Anglo-Norman conquest which forced the Welsh to embrace an Anglo-Norman 
ideology of land ownership. 
A pointed contrast between Welsh and Anglo-Norman military culture 
was in how each perceived terms of peace, homage and fealty.   While the 
Welsh embraced a system of clientship, they did not have an institution of 
vassalage (Davies 1990: 23).  Clientship in Wales was based on a relationship 
of mutual support, however, client relationships were not permanent and 
arrangements were often ‘short-termed and flexible.’ Perhaps most important 
for the context of this research, was that client relationships were not 
territorialized and clients retained ‘freedom of action, presumably some legal 
capacity, and clearly some independent military power, clientship, then, was 
largely to do with the patterns of mutual support among a military aristocracy’ 
(Davies 1990: 22-24).  This explains why Owain and other Welsh princes 
willingly agreed to do homage to Henry II at the 1163 Council of Woodstock and 
also why they did not hesitate to dismiss the arrangement in 1165 (Moore 2007: 
77). 
The composition of Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces were very similar.  
For the Welsh this was comprised of the teulu and the llu.  The teulu were the 
household troops, a group of warrior elite that in times of conflict or battle would 
lead the llu, who were the general fighting forces made up of the lay population 
who were required to serve in the army when called upon, not dissimilar from 
the Anglo-Saxon fyrd (Davies 2004).  Similarly, the Anglo-Norman kings had 
their familia, their household military comprised of knights.  The familia was 
important to the Anglo-Norman military system as it gave a ‘professional 
disciplined core to their armies’ (Davies 2004: 15; Morillo 1994: 184), 
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particularly in instances when levies were raised and mercenaries were 
recruited.  Carr has argued that the Welsh llu evolved in response to the Anglo-
Norman threat for which a force larger than the teulu was needed to counter 
Anglo-Norman invasions.  However, as Davies points out Carr’s claim is 
unsubstantiated, and although there is little known about the use of the llu in a 
pre-Norman context the conclusion should not necessarily be made that it 
developed as a consequence of the Conquest (see Davies 2004: 52).  As has 
already been stated, Henry II came to realise the importance of the infantry, 
possibly as a product of his campaigns in Wales.  The increased importance of 
the infantry to the Anglo-Normans paralleled the increased reliance on 
mercenaries to supplement army size.  The Welsh were also known to have 
used mercenaries; Gruffudd ap Cynan largely relied on a mercenary Irish army 
when campaigning to reclaim Gwynedd (LGC).  Mercenaries were therefore 
probably included within the llu.  The Welsh llu is traditionally believed to have 
been comprised of freemen supported by bondmen who were obliged to provide 
supplies such as packhorses and food, although it is also possible that the 
bondmen did take part in the fighting, even though the Welsh law stipulated that 
they were only to serve on military campaigns in a support capacity (Davies 
2004: 74).  The prevalence and persistence of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman 
conflicts may have provided the appropriate environment for bondmen to gain 
status within Welsh society due to their military role.   
 
 
Arms and Armour Technology 
 
In an effort to provide material culture contextualization for the events of conflict 
considered by this research the following is an overview of the types of arms, 
armour and other military related equipment that was prevalent in the mid-
twelfth century.  Unfortunately, there is little in the way of datable artifactual 
evidence surviving from this period.  The examples that do exist are generally 
either lacking provenience or are ceremonial examples from the nobility on 
display at institutions such as the Tower of London or the Royal Armouries in 
Leeds.  Although these are fine specimens they are of little use in providing a 
comparable collection of the types of arms and equipment the common soldier 
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used, and thereby the type of portable military material culture that could be 
excavated from battle sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: example of other twelfth-century arms and accoutrements, all objects are from the 
Portable Antiquities Scheme’s online database http://finds.org.uk/database, clockwise from 
upper left:  
- Copper alloy sword scabbard chape, unique ID LVPL – 95A9D6 from Mollington, Cheshire. 
- Copper alloy dagger hilt/guard, unique ID LVPL-2A8C62 from Old Colwyn, Conwy. 
- Cast copper alloy flail, unique ID LVPL-8F1BE0, found in Flintshire, shape and decoration 
similar to those found in Denmark and the Baltic. 
- Iron axe head, unique ID CPAT-21C020 found near Ellesmere, Wrexham.  Not military in its 
manufacture it could have been used as a weapon by untrained soldiers, men who were levied 
to serve in the army.  (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons). 
 
Weapons from this period fall into two broad categories: hand-held and 
missile.  Hand-held weapons, quite simply weapons which are used at close 
quarters or on occasion could be thrown (daggers, spears) broadly include: 
swords, daggers, spears, maces, flails and axes (see Figure 7 above; 
Oakeshott 1960).  Missile weapons include bow and arrow technology as well 
as siege weapons such as traction trebuchets and ballista; these are not 
included here as none of the campaigns considered in this research included 
sieges.  The types of projectile weapons technology in use during the mid-
twelfth century includes: crossbows, long-bows, common bows and throwing 
spears or javelins.  Many of these weapons could also have had other utilities 
and are likely to have been used by the men who were levied into the armies, 
particularly in instances when soldiers lacked training or where weapon supply 
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was scare. For instance a wood-cutter may use his axe, a swine-heard his 
spear, a hunter his bow.  Interestingly bows proved such deadly weapons, 
particularly due to their ability to pierce armour, that they were banned by the 
1139 Lateran Council (a papal decree), although few if any took heed of this 
ban (Gillingham 1999: 72).  As has been discussed in the previous section, bow 
weapons were of particular importance in any Anglo-Norman army.  Therefore, 
it is extremely likely that Henry II’s forces in the Welsh campaigns contained a 
section of bowmen.  While the Anglo-Normans could have used any of these 
weapons the Welsh selection seems somewhat more limited.  The Welsh laws 
list three groups of weaponry suitable for war: the sword and knife, the spear 
and shield and the bow and arrow (Suppe 1994: 6).  Gerald of Wales also 
documents regional variations, stating that the men of Gwent preferred the bow 
and arrow while the North Welsh favoured the spear.  This should not be read 
as the south only used the bow while the north only used the spear, merely that 
these were preferences within a more diverse weapons assemblage  (Strickland 
and Hardy  2011: 40-44).  Gerald describes the spears used by the North Welsh 
as follows: 
          They use very long spears in this area.  Just as the bow is the chief   
          weapon in South Wales, so here in Gwynedd they prefer the spear  
          A cuirass of chain-mail offers no resistance to one of these lances  
          when it is thrown a short distance as a javelin (Journey Book II Ch. 6:  
          182).    
 
Interestingly the soldier on the right of the illustration shown in Figure 5 of 
the Welsh soldiers from the Littere Wallie seems to be holding a sax.  The sax 
was a popular weapon in use from the Iron Age through the Viking period, the 
scramasax used by the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks was similar to the sax in 
that only one side had an edge, but it was shorter in length, similar to a knife 
(Oakeshott 1960: 148).  Admittedly there are not a plethora of examples for 
Welsh medieval weaponry, yet manuscripts make no reference to the sax as a 
weapon used by the Welsh.  Its depiction in the Littere Wallie is all the more 
intriguing considering that it dates from c. 1282-1292, it is possible that the 
illustrator, most likely not Welsh, was attempted to demean the military 
capabilities of the Welsh, particularly given that the Wales fell to Edward I in 
1282, following the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.   
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Figure 8: Twelfth-century swords, from top to bottom: type XI c. 1130-70, type XI from the Battle 
of Fornham c. 1171, type XI found in Denmark c. 1150-1200, after Oakeshott  Plates 6 and 7, 
no scale provided (1960: 198-9, this image has been removed by the author of this thesis for 
copyright reasons). 
 
The sword of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was a cutting not a 
thrusting weapon and would not have been able to pierce chainmail, the armour 
of the period, by thrusting (Stickland 1996: 170).  Instead, weaknesses would 
have been looked for at the neckline and other places not protected by armour.  
Only the military elite would have been able to afford mail, the manufacture of 
which was extremely expensive and time consuming (Martin 1968: 27).  
Chainmail from this period most regularly consisted of a knee length mail shirt 
(see Figure 9 below), in rare cases this assemble was sometimes enhanced by 
mail leggings and mittens.  S. Davies claims that in Wales chainmail was only 
worn by an elite few, padded leather coats were the most prevalent type of 
armour (Davies 2004: 145).  This was probably true of the Anglo-Norman 
soldiers as well, although even this type of armour could be costly, particularly 
for the poor levied to serve in the army.  This probably meant that with the 
exception of the familia and the teulu the majority of the army, except perhaps 
for mercenaries, had little or no armour.   
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Figure 9: Chainmail coat, The Museum of London, Accession number: 35.52, URL: 
http://archive.museumoflondon.org.uk/medieval/objects/record.htm?type=object&id=36460 
(This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
  
 
A problem of identification and conservation: 
In 1996, Jessop published an updated medieval arrowhead typology, this 
typology addressed deficiencies in Perkins’ entries on arrowheads in the 
Museum of London’s medieval catalogue.  Perkin’s catalogue, published in 
1940 was the only reference for arrowheads prior to Jessop.  By his own 
admission, Perkins conceded that some of the arrowhead types included in his 
catalogue may not be medieval in date, this is due to the poor provenience of 
archaeological finds from the early twentieth century (Jessop 1996: 192)  
Jessop’s typology draws upon more recent archaeological evidence, and 
includes more typological divisions based on functionality.  An improvement on 
the Museum of London’s catalogue, Jessop’s typology is still limited by a lack of 
datable archaeology evidence.  This typology would benefit from the collection 
of additional samples with secure provenience.  The absence of material results 
from a preservation and conservation issue that is addressed below.  Figure ten 
below displays all of the known arrowhead categories that could have been 
used in the twelfth century.  In some instances different types had a long 
lifespan of use, sometimes spanning four centuries.  Others, such as MP 6, 
which had a military only purpose, were used more specifically in the mid-
twelfth century.    
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Figure 10: Twelfth-century arrowhead types after Jessop ‘Fig. 1 The new arrowhead typology’ 
(1996: 194, this image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
Oakshott in The Archaeology of Weapons (1960), states that there is a 
problem of finding swords with datable contexts.  Additionally, medieval sword 
typologies are difficult in themselves.  The absence of a datable typology is 
evident in objects listed by the Portable Antiquities Scheme, often dated within a 
400 year range.  A rendering of a mid-twelfth-century sword, a late twelfth- 
century sword associated with the Battle of Fornham (1171) and a twelfth- 
century sword from Denmark can be seen above in Figure 8.  The twelfth to 
fourteenth century saw a huge variation of detail, yet most of these different 
types were in use over two centuries, making dating difficult.  A solution to these 
challenges could be found in increased battlefield surveys, using the survey 
methods of battlefield archaeology as outlined in the Methodology chapter.  
Although as Halpin states, given the difficulty in dating, even swords found on 
the sites of documented battlefields cannot always be positively associated with 
the battle (1986: 185).   
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The absence of definitive typologies and archaeological examples is 
compounded by issues of poor in situ preservation.  Most of the assemblage of 
medieval arms and armour are made from ferrous materials that are subject to 
severe corrosion causing them to be unrecognizable for what they are when 
excavated.  This can lead to objects being discarded as ‘undistinguishable rust’, 
which is unfortunate, particularly since there are conservation methods that can 
overcome the poor preservation state of ferrous artefacts leading to positive 
identifications.  Unfortunately these methods, including radiography, air 
abrasion and treatment in tannic phosphorus solutions, are time consuming, 
costly and often beyond the research capabilities for many archaeological units.  
As the majority of artefacts excavated from battlefields are metallic, often 
ferrous, any research excavations would need access to appropriate 
conservation facilities to identify potential battle related material culture. 
 
 
Battlefield Burials 
Apart from the archaeological significant discovery of the mass grave at Towton 
(from the War of the Roses, Battle of Towton1461) in 1996, there are few other 
confirmed examples of battle dead from medieval battles in Britain (Knüsel 
2014: 264).  The difficulty in locating mass graves from battlefields has been 
noted by Foard who has stated that even though ‘such graves are notoriously 
difficult to locate and, although they can provide dramatic evidence of the nature 
of the action, may be relatively limited in what they can tell about the distribution 
of the action’ (Foard 2009: 143).  Military historian Burne, noted for popularizing 
the application of ‘inherent military probability’, has suggested that the main 
concentration of burials would be at the point where the main engagement 
began.  However, the Towton mass grave was located more than a mile from 
the main engagement location (ibid).  Interestingly, ‘archaeological investigation 
at Towton has shown that concentrations of medieval arrowheads can point to 
areas of body decomposition or burial’ (Sutherland and Richardson 2009: 170).  
In some cases mass graves have survived as earthworks, an example of this 
was visible at the 1138 battle at Northallerton prior to levelling cultivation in 
1839.  Another example is the mass grave (preserved as an earthen mound), 
from the 1361 Battle of Wisby in Sweden excavated in the early twentieth 
95 
 
century (Foard and Morris 2012: 32-3).  The earthen mound appearance and 
the use of arrowheads in locating burials have important implications for 
locating the battle dead from the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen.  
Both battle sites are associated with unidentified tumuli and place-name 
evidence at Crogen suggests that the mass grave was located on or near the 
site of the battle at Adwry’r Beddau, or the gap of the graves.  Further 
discussion of these features can be found in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study 
chapters.  Acknowledgment needs to be made here that the possibility of 
cremation following a battle was a possibility.  During the Crusades ‘William of 
Malmesbury reported that the Crusaders heaped up the bodies of the Turks and 
‘evaporated them by means of fire’ for the pragmatic reason that ‘putrefying the 
open air, they should pour contagion on the flagging atmosphere’’ (Daniell 
2005: 97).  Given that both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns took place in 
summer, cremation may have been favoured for similar reasons, although this 
would have been out of sync with medieval Christian burial practices.  
 
 
Battlefield locations – evidence for a ritual conflict landscape 
The following is a brief discussion of the rational or ritual of battle location.  
Carman and Carman have suggested the existence of a ritualized landscape of 
warfare, and although evidence of this may be present for other cultures and 
regions, there is not a large enough body of evidence to draw any similar 
conclusions for the conflicts of medieval Wales (Carman and Carman 2006).  
Nonetheless, in the process of assembling a conflict chronology for medieval 
Wales, certain patterns begin to emerge (see the following Conflict Chronology 
chapter).  Of particular note were the sheer amount of Welsh conflicts (both 
inter-Welsh, and Welsh and Anglo-Norman), that took place near rivers.  In 
some instances this seems to be because rivers often coincided with territorial 
boundaries.  In other cases sometimes a battle was fought near the location of 
an important ford or crossing, the possession of which controlled local mobility.  
Conversely rivers have also been shown to be a favoured location for medieval 
peace talks and other diplomatic negotiations (Dalton 2005: 13).  Higham has 
also theorised on traditional battlefields, citing a location near Clyst Honiton, 
north of Exeter, that was used on multiple occasions as a medieval battleground 
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(Higham 2013: 110-111).  Higham also references a standing stone cross that 
may have once been in evidence in the vicinity of the aforementioned 
battleground (ibid).  This may have important implications for the Battles of 
Coleshill (1150 and 1157), which incidentally, were located near a standing 
stone cross, Atiscross (now vanished; CPAT, Flint, online resource).  
 
 
A theoretical framework for conflict archaeology and the sociology of 
warfare 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that warfare practices in twelfth-century 
Gwynedd and England were more similar than previously supposed; the 
reasons for these similarities have several theoretical implications.  The 
following discussion of these theoretical implications, as they pertain to this 
chapter, serves to introduce the theoretical applications of conflict archaeology 
and to contextualize these applications within the military history aspects 
discussed above. A detailed discussion regarding the broader theoretical 
significances of this research, particularly once the data from the military terrain 
analysis has been synthesised, can be found in the conclusion section of the 
Military Terrain Analysis chapter.  
Behaviourism is the predominant theoretical application for conflict 
archaeology; for this there are two modes of approach, these are seen in the 
agentic behaviours of  the combatants, as individual and group agents on the 
battlefield, and through the social structural change of entire social systems 
resulting from warfare (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009).  These modes are 
cyclical in nature as one directly impacts the other.  For example, the Welsh 
adopted the Vegetian style of warfare; this was in response to the pressures 
from the social phenomena of prolonged conflict with the Anglo-Normans, which 
effected social structural change on the Welsh social system of warfare.  This in 
turn affected the individual and group behaviour in the battlefield.  Conversely, 
the behaviour (actions / tactics) of Welsh soldiers in the battlefield, in terms of 
their preference for lightly armoured infantry (over cavalry) to compensate for 
the difficulties of their native terrain, led the Anglo-Normans to adopt similar 
tactics or behaviours so that they would not be out-manoeuvred by the Welsh in 
combat.  This led to the pronounced importance of the infantry in Anglo-Norman 
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military organisation.  Indicators of these behavioural adaptations can be 
discerned by the application of the conflict archaeology methods outlined in the 
previous chapter, particularly via gross and dynamic-pattern analyses.  
Additionally, these sociological implications can be contextualized though the 
study of emergent and variant social patterns (such as those discussed above) 
present in societies involved in conflict events.  In the past conflict archaeology 
has not been a prerequisite for this type of study; however, its inclusion in such 
analyses has the potential to yield a more comprehensive interpretation.   
 
 
Theoretical applications for conflict archaeology an overview 
Conflict archaeology is predominantly a methodology driven subject still in its 
infancy and the establishment of a theoretical framework is currently an ongoing 
formative process.  In the past, many battlefield archaeology publications 
tended to focus on the description, not the explanation of battlefield events. 
(Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009:1).  This is changing as battlefield 
archaeologists strive to move beyond the static reconstruction of battlefield 
events to explain the battlefield behaviour of the combatants.  In the edited 
volumes of Fields of Conflict, Battlefield Archaeology from the Roman Empire to 
the Korean War (2009) Scott, Babits and Haecker state that ‘battlefields are 
archaeological documents of past behaviour.  Battlefield are no less an 
expression of behaviour, albeit a violent one, than are architectural elements’ 
(431).  Carman and Carman (2006 and 2009) propose that these behaviours 
can be divined through the cultural conflict landscape, that by ‘gaining a feeling 
for the place as a place, and a focus on how one moves through it in a 
performance – one can perhaps gain a particular sense of what a particular 
historic battlefield represents in terms of experience and meaning.’ (2006: 25). 
Carman and Carman seek to achieve this via a phenomenological approach to 
landscape that compares multiple conflict landscapes in multiple time periods to 
identify underlying ritualistic patterns in battlefield selection.  Their study, 
however, does not take into account the analysis of military terrain or other 
disciplinary components of conflict studies.  Pollard and Banks critique the 
Carmans’ approach to conflict landscapes stating that, ‘it is in danger of 
presenting a somewhat normative view of these landscapes or at least the 
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battlefields they present’ (2007: viii).  Landscapes of conflict are important 
battlefield artefacts that must be contextualized within other conflict study 
considerations, such as military history, underlying cultural ethos and military 
terrain analysis of the conflict landscape; only then can behaviour be 
determined.  Additionally, warfare as ritual and warfare for secular (political) 
purposes are not mutually exclusive concepts (Arkush and Stanish 2005: 10).  
This extends to fortifications which can have symbolic potency as well as 
practicle military uses (McGuire and Villalpando 2015: 432).  
Different to conflict archaeology, warfare archaeology, which began 
gaining traction within the archaeology community in the 1990s, established a 
theoretical framework which evolved in part from the metaphysical 
considerations of the sociology of warfare, yet warfare archaeology is 
somewhat lacking method and is primarily concerned with warfare in prehistoric 
cultures (Gilchrist 2003: 1-2; Carman 2014: 38).  The sociology of warfare is a 
complex subject and an in-depth discussion of the sociological implications of 
the ongoing conflict between the Welsh and Anglo-Normans is beyond the 
scope of this research.  Its inclusion in the following discussion is considered 
insofar as it relates to potential for conflict archaeology to illuminate the 
evolution of social structures due to the consequences of conflict, a concept that 
will be explored further in the discussion and conclusion of the Military Terrain 
Anlysis chapter and the Conclusion chapter.  The introduction of this theoretical 
criterion has the capacity to further advance the study of conflict archaeology.  
‘Warfare was a formative influence on the civilization and the social structures 
of the European middle ages’ (Keen 1999: preface), the ability of warfare to 
exact social structural change on a society has resounding ramifications for a 
theoretical framework for conflict archaeology and further contextualizes and 
lends pertinence to the subject. 
 Bossen states that warfare as a social practice has three primary 
aspects: first ‘it is always embedded in webs of meaning and interpretation’; 
second, it requires specialised knowledge and training such as tactics and 
weapons technology; and third, it requires organisation and strategy (2006: 91).  
As a process war can change social configurations, the military can expand into 
other networks of power, war may result in forceful integration and subjugation 
of conquered societies, and finally in societies where warfare is frequent, its 
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reoccurrence may foster social change (Bossen 2006: 96).  ‘War is, in other 
words, a central ingredient to social reproduction and change… particularly 
when war is understood as a social phenomenon’ (Vankilde 2003: 127-128).  
Given the topics covered in this chapter it can be argued that the Anglo-Norman 
and Welsh conflicts of the twelfth century had widespread ramifications not only 
on the societies as war (both directly and indirectly) but on the practice of 
warfare itself.  These resulting social adaptations are reviewed below. 
 The social change experienced by the Anglo-Normans as a result of 
conflict with the Welsh is less pronounced, than those experienced by the 
Welsh, as there was no direct effect on the Anglo-Norman social ethos of 
systems outside the military.  Within the military the most notable changes were 
in field tactics, predominantly with the increased importance of the infantry and 
the conversion to lightly armed troops to increase mobility in the difficult Welsh 
terrain.  The growing reliance on the infantry and in turn mercenaries could be 
argued as leading to the decline of the dependence on the knight and knightly 
cavalry centred warfare.  The rise of the infantry led to the proliferation of the 
professional soldier, archers in particular that were used to such a devastating 
effect in later conflicts such as the Hundred Years War (Keegan 1976).  The 
rise of the professional soldier could be argued as the formation of a new social 
class.   
 
 
Conclusion 
For the Welsh, the adaptation to the Vegetian style of warfare is a marker of 
social change.  Prior to the Anglo-Norman conquest, the Welsh embraced a 
non-Vegetian form of warfare, governed by its own rules and laws.  The non-
Vegetian style of Welsh warfare was a reflection of Welsh social systems in 
which the idea of governance, land ownership and territorial boundaries was 
fluid and changeable.  In order to protect their territory against the Anglo-
Norman insurgence, they had to adopt the Vegetian style of warfare which 
notably included the building of castles.  The reconfiguration of their warfare 
practices led  to a reconfiguration of other social systems as well, for example 
by building castles the Welsh were establishing secure bases that meant retreat 
into the mountains diminished as a relevant tactic.  This led to the establishment 
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of a sedentary polity which undoubtedly had trickle down effects on Welsh 
society at large.  The social flexibility of the Welsh to adopt new social norms 
and military tactics contributed to their overall campaign success and allowed 
them to preserve Welsh independence until the late thirteenth century.  The 
matters discussed in this chapter have shown that despite their different cultural 
backgrounds the Welsh and Anglo-Norman engaged in warfare using similar 
strategies.  These tactics will be discussed in further detail in the Military Terrain 
Analysis chapter. 
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Chapter Four – Welsh and Anglo-Norman Conflict Chronology, 1000-1272 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Written primary sources are vital to the archaeological documentation, 
interpretation and reconstruction of conflict events.  In addition to 
contextualizing historical conflict, a thorough assessment of the historical 
records documenting these engagements is often the first step in identifying 
fields of conflict.   Comprehension of historical manuscripts enables conflict 
archaeologists to reconstruct a spatial and temporal distribution of battlefield 
and other conflict events.  A sequencing of these conflict actions can be 
achieved by compiling a timeline, or chronology, of conflict events based on 
historical accounts.  ‘The quality of the historical data […] has a direct bearing 
on the specific questions that can be addressed and the extent to which the 
available archaeological record can be meaningfully and accurately interpreted’ 
(Geier et al. 2011: 83).  The resulting historical conflict record chronology can 
then be used to develop and test hypotheses of individual and group actions 
and objectives which can then, in turn, be tested against the archaeological 
record (McBride et al. 2011: 79).   This chronology will then be utilized to detect 
key events; patterns of resistance; evolution and interconnectivity of multiple 
events and adaptations in military tactics and technology.  It is also possible to 
ascertain the veracity of historical accounts by comparing how the same events 
were recorded in different sources.  The construction of a conflict chronology 
also provides a blueprint for interpreting political motivations and relationships, 
via a conflict or battlefield archaeology lens.  An understanding of the events 
recorded within these historical documents is a crucial first step contributing to 
the accurate spatial and contextual representations and reconstructions of 
discrete conflict events on the landscape, and the archaeological potential 
therein.     
What follows is a concise chronology of major inter-Welsh; Welsh and 
English; Welsh and Irish; and Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflicts in Wales and 
the marcher counties (Herefordshire, Shropshire and Cheshire) between 1000-
1272.  These dates were selected as they provide a contextualizing margin for 
the main research period of focus 1157-1165, encompassing the 1157 Coastal 
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Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  A larger margin of 
consideration exists prior to these events, as it is necessary to understand both 
inter-Welsh conflict and Welsh conflict with other cultures, in addition to 
previous Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflict.  The occurrence of underlying 
themes as evident within the manuscripts’ narratives – particularly in regard to 
military tactics, and patterns of power including socio-political and military-
political organisation – are highlighted within the chronology. 
 
 
Chronology Overview 
 
For the purposes of this research conflict has been divided into two categories: 
major and minor.  There is a degree of subjectivity present in the definitions of 
major and minor conflict.  Major conflicts, such as the 1165 Battle of Crogen 
between the combined forces of North Wales and King Henry II, are defined as 
those for which the outcome significantly altered the status quo.  Minor conflicts, 
such as the 1155 land dispute between Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd 
of Deheubarth, are defined as those which exacerbated the current condition, 
but not irrevocably.    Only major events will be considered within the 
chronology; minor events, particularly those which are not closely related to 
major events will not be included in the conflict chronology.  Consideration is 
also given to events of un-armed conflict, unlike the archaeological distributions 
produced by armed engagements, the signature of un-armed conflict is difficult 
to trace in the archaeological record.  Nonetheless, these conflicts – preserved 
in the historical record, generally in the form of correspondences and legal 
proceedings (such as the correspondence between Owain Gwynedd and King 
Louis VII) – contextualize the socio-political climate and highlight proceedings 
that escalated various situations to those of armed conflict. 
Although this research is primarily concerned with the conflicts generated 
as a consequence of the Norman incursion into Wales, it is important to also 
consider pre-Norman Welsh conflict in order to contextualize how the Welsh 
responded to the Anglo-Norman Conquest and colonization, and in order to 
understand any adaptations in Welsh military tactics.  Therefore, the year 1000 
was arbitrarily selected as a starting date in an effort to understand the 
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development of both inter-Welsh conflict, and Welsh conflict with foreign forces.   
The chronology ends in 1272, with the onset of the Edwardian Conquest which 
resulted in the dissolution of Wales under native Welsh rule.  
 
 
The Manuscripts 
 
Despite the antiquity of the mid-twelfth-century campaigns considered in this 
research, there exists a plethora of contemporary written sources that provide 
detailed documentation for both the 1157 and 1165 campaign case studies and 
the broader historical conflict chronology spanning the years 1000-1272. There 
are two principal manuscripts that were consulted for the construction of the 
conflict chronology presented in this chapter: The Brut y Tywysogyon or ‘The 
Chronicle of Princes’ (Peniarth MS 20 version, edited and translated by T. 
Jones) and The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan (edited and translated by P. Russell).  
Other valuable sources such as: The Annales Cambriae, The Journey through 
Wales and the Description of Wales and The Chronicles of the Reigns of 
Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (the William of Newburgh, Robert of Torigni and 
Gervase of Canterbury versions), among others, were referenced specifically 
for the 1157 and 1165 campaigns, these campaign specific chronologies are 
presented within the respective 1157 and 1165 Case Study Overview chapters 
(chapters six and eight).   
There are four chronicles that span the time period of the conflict 
chronology; these are the Annales Cambriae, The Brut y Tywysogyon 
(abbreviated as Brut) which includes the Peniarth MS 20, the Red Book of 
Hergest and the Brenhinedd y Saesson.  The Annales Cambriae and the two 
versions of the Brut were thought to have been compiled from a series of lost 
Latin manuscripts, originating from St David’s Monastery (Pembrokeshire; 
Remfry 2007). The Peniarth MS 20 version of the Brut and the Annales 
Cambriae are the most complete and accurate of the four chronicles (Jones 
1952).  Their histories are for the most part congruent, thus only the 
documentations within the Brut Peniarth MS 20 were used in this chronology.  
Any discrepancies between the other versions of the Brut and the Annales 
Cambriae are highlighted in the campaign specific chronologies, referenced 
above.  The conflict events documented in The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan are 
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also considered within the chronology as they provide detailed accounts of pre-
Norman and early-Norman conflict specifically between Gwynedd and England 
during the reign of Gruffudd ap Cynan c. 1081-1137.  In places modern 
literature has been consulted to provide further contextualization of key events 
included in the chronology.  Similarly, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is referenced 
in events of pre-Conquest significance to add further depth to the chronology, 
but on the whole, English or Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman chronicles were 
not used alongside the Welsh chronicles referenced in this chronology.  Many of 
the English and early Anglo-Norman chronicles are inconsistent, incomplete or 
non-existent in their documentation of Welsh events, this is particularly true for 
events in which they were not directly involved.  Documentation of early 
Conquest era conflict is poor and it is not until the reign of Henry II that the 
quality and quantity of documentation of Welsh and Anglo-Norman interaction 
improves. 
Many of the manuscripts referenced above, particularly the Brut y 
Tywysogyon, have been summarized and paraphrased in a plethora of modern 
publications, perhaps the most popular being J.E. Lloyd’s seminal publication: A 
History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest (1912).  
This source is regularly referenced by the heritage community, (particularly in 
Coflein, the heritage database of registered monuments for the Royal 
Commission of the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales), in lieu of the 
original manuscripts.  Despite the scholarship that is present in such works, it is 
nonetheless vital to refer to the original documents in an effort to circumvent 
textual interpolation.   
The Peniarth MS 20 version of the Brut spans the seventh (682) - 
fourteenth centuries (1332, the other versions terminate in 1282) and includes 
accounts of events whose detail is rarely matched in other contemporary 
sources.  Yet it is not without issue.  There are several different surviving Welsh 
and English translations of the original Latin source, which has been lost.  
Moreover, there are few modern English translations available for these 
manuscripts and most of these are problematic as the translator in many 
instances has heavily interpolated the original Welsh text.  The translation by 
Jones (1952) is by far the most accurate as it is a verbatim translation of the 
text that cites the particular manuscript being translated.  Unlike Jones, earlier 
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translations were often compiled as a composite ‘Brut’, which pulled from 
several different manuscripts while neglecting to cite the manuscript source in 
the English translation (Jones 1952: xxxi).  These composite translations are 
also problematic as the dates cited are often incorrect, even in the Peniarth MS 
20 the dates are sometimes unclear, as the Brut generally cites dates with a 
range of two to three years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Page 166 from The Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth MS 20, image from the National 
Library of Wales.  (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons). 
 
It is clear that The Brut y Tywysogyon was compiled at a monastic 
institution in Wales, probably the Cistercian abbey of Strata Florida and ‘it is 
probable that he [the compiler] wrote the original Latin chronicle towards the 
end of the thirteenth century, possibly fairly soon after the year 1282’ (Jones 
1952: xxxviii), which is the year that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd died and Wales fell to 
Edward I.  The section of the Peniarth manuscript that extended to 1332 was a 
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later addition.  The chronicler would have obtained his sources from the annals 
housed in the monastic libraries of Wales.  It is possible to detect when the 
chronicler has shifted sources, as there are sections of the text where the style 
of narration shifts abruptly.  For example, different sections of the manuscript 
hint at sympathies for different parties – Norman versus Welsh – or favouring 
Gwynedd over Powys at times and the reverse at others.  For instance, at the 
conclusion of the 1157 battle of Tal y Moelfre on the Isle of Anglesey between 
the forces of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II, the Anglo-Normans, who lost, were 
documented as being cowardly in the Brut, ‘For on the following day there was 
a battle between them [the Anglo-Normans, recorded here as French] and the 
men of Anglesey; and the French, according to their usual custom, fled’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 59-60).  Conversely the account of the siege and battle of Painscastle 
is sympathetic to the Normans (Brut Pen. 20: 79-80).  This shift in sentiment is 
significant to the research being pursued, as these sympathies represent 
possible biases in the representation of historic events.  This is why the different 
sources detailing the 1157 and 1165 campaigns are meticulously compared. 
The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan is a narrative of the acts of the king (or 
prince) of Gwynedd Gruffudd ap Cynan (d. 1137), a key figure in the early 
Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman Conquest.  This manuscript is the only 
surviving biography of a medieval Welsh prince, probably written by a cleric at 
the end of the twelfth century, originally a Latin text for which only the later 
Welsh and English translations survive (Parry n.d.: online resource).  
Consequently, caution should be exercised when consulting this text as it was 
written more than a century after Gruffudd’s death and because it has been 
translated multiple times from a lost original.  This narrative does not list dates 
for specific events, making it necessary to infer a timeframe by comparing 
events that are also documented in other sources.  Unlike The Brut y 
Tywysogyon which chronicles a medieval history of Wales in entirety, The Life 
of Gruffudd ap Cynan is concerned only with the events surrounding Gruffudd 
and consequently provides a very concise history of Gwynedd during Gruffudd’s 
life.  As a result, the tone of the narrative remains constant throughout.  
Furthermore, the amount of detail in the events documented in The Life of 
Gruffudd ap Cynan (herein LGC) rivals those of The Brut y Tywysogyon, as 
such it is possible to both enhance the understanding of conflict events in 
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Gwynedd, while ascertaining the veracity of these events by comparing the two 
sources.  For example the series of battles fought between Gruffudd ap Cynan 
and William Rufus, then later Henry I and the earls of Chester, provoked by the 
successful reclamation of Gwynedd by Gruffudd and his expansion into parts of 
Powys and Chester is documented in both the Brut and the LGC.  However, 
these events when portrayed in the LGC convey a degree of detail specific to 
Gwynedd where these events unfolded, while the same events documented in 
the Brut are conveyed in a more generalized manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Map of Medieval Welsh Territories (after Map 1. Territorial divisions of twelfth and 
thirteenth-century Wales in Pryce 2005, this image has been removed by the author of this 
thesis for copyright reasons). 
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Conflict Chronology  
 
The Normans, usually referred to as the French in The Brut y Tywysogyon, did 
not engage in armed conflict in Wales until 1070 (Brut Pen. 20: 16).  Although 
the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales was a combined English and Norman 
effort, in this chronology the term Norman will be used in favour of Anglo-
Norman when summarizing events in the manuscripts, as this more closely 
resonates with the ‘French’ to which The Brut y Tywysogyon refers.  Unlike the 
Brut the Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan differentiates between French and English 
on several occasions (when describing Anglo-Norman events) and in one 
instance uses Normans in place of French (LGC: 69).  It is unclear why this 
distinction in ethnicity was made on this one occasion, perhaps it is the result of 
a translation error.  Another distinction in terminology is to be made in referring 
to Welsh rulers as kings, princes or lords; and the use of kingdoms or 
principalities to describe distinct territorial regions.  Essentially king and 
kingdom were used in the Brut pre-Conquest whereas the Normans applied the 
term prince and lord and therefore, principality and lordship, in deference to 
Welsh fealty (in theory if not application) to the Norman kings.  Prior to the 
Norman Conquest there were eight distinct territorial divisions within Wales (see 
map above in Figure 12).  Gwynedd in the north, Deheubarth in the southwest 
and Powys in the east were the three most powerful kingdoms.  At the height of 
their power these kingdoms incorporated most of Wales; Gwynedd included 
regions 1 and 2 on the map above, Deheubarth 5, 6 and 7, and Powys 3 and 4. 
Except for the pre-Conquest period (1000-1066), the chronology has 
been grouped into series, organised by the reign of Norman monarchs.  
Although this research is seeking to avoid the Anglo-Norman centrism that is 
prevalent in current academic dialogues, in this instance an Anglo-Norman 
political chronology is favoured solely for organisational purposes.  This is 
because a Welsh political chronology over the two centuries discussed is 
fragmented, ephemeral and diverse, as it includes multiple distinct Welsh 
kingdoms or principalities.  However, it should be noted that the reigns of Anglo-
Norman monarchs hold cultural significance as each Norman king approached 
the conquest of Wales differently, which in turn exacted a different Welsh 
response.   
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A note on minor conflict events – slaying and ravaging  
The Brut and other chronicles are saturated with instances of inter-Welsh 
conflicts.  These disputes resulting from territorial and political ambitions – were 
a trend that continued well into the thirteenth century – and were materialized in 
a variety of ways.  These most notably include slaying, maiming, ravaging and 
battle.  Slaying was when a Welsh nobleman was essentially murdered.  These 
deeds could be solitary acts of political violence, insofar as they are not always 
outwardly connected with a larger conflict event such as a battle.  In the Brut 
these events are mentioned in passing, often in ten words or less, for example: 
in 1018, ‘Llwelyn ap Siesyll slew Aeddan ap Blegywryd and his four sons’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 12).  Given that Wales embraced a system of partible inheritance 
(treftadaeth), not primogeniture; it is likely that these acts of violence were the 
result of succession disputes (Chrimes 1969: 3; Turvey 2002: 30).  Gerald of 
Wales highlights the dangers of partible inheritance from which ‘[q]uarrels and 
lawsuits result, murders and arson, not to mention frequent fratricides’ 
(Description Book II Ch. 4: 261)  Maiming served a similar purpose, for example 
the castration or blinding of a rival’s heirs made them unfit as leaders, 
eliminating potential competitors.  For example: in c. 1152 ‘Owain ap Gruffudd 
[(Owain Gwynedd)] caused Cunedda ap Cadwallon, his nephew, his brother's 
son, to be castrated and his eyes to be gouged out of his head’ (Brut Pen. 20: 
58). Ravaging was an important element of not only Welsh warfare, but 
medieval warfare in general.  As defined by S. Davies, ravaging involved 
weakening the enemy forces while strengthening one’s own forces.  This often 
involved the taking of enemy provisions (anything from food to weapons), a 
scorched-earth tactic that did not necessarily lead to direct confrontation in the 
form of a full-scale battle, although skirmishes were common on ravaging 
campaigns (Davies 2004: 90-91).  For example: ‘[i]n that year [1096] Uchdryd 
ab Edwin and Hywel ap Goronwy and many other leaders and the war-band of 
Cadwgan ap Bleddyn went to the castle of Pembroke and despoiled it 
completely, and ravaged the land; and they returned home with vast spoil’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 20).   
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The Irish Connection 
 
Given that the Irish contributed to several of the early battles reviewed below, it 
is worthwhile to briefly mention their involvement in Wales during the first half of 
the eleventh century.  There existed a connection between the kingdoms of 
Wales and the kingdoms of Ireland, particularly during the tenth and early 
eleventh centuries and predominantly in North Wales and in the southwest in 
Dyfedd.  This was probably due in part to of the early medieval Irish-Norse 
settlements in these areas of Wales (Edwards 1997: 1; Silvester 1969: 104).  
Marriage between the Welsh and the Irish was not uncommon, Gruffudd ap 
Cynan’s mother was of Irish-Norse descent and Gruffudd spent a great deal of 
his youth in Ireland (while in exile). Evidence for these connections also exist 
archaeologically, for example: the unusual platform bailey at Norman Rhuddlan 
is superimposed on the pre-Norman Welsh centre of Rhuddlan and resonates 
with the platform raths in Ireland (Quinnell et al. 1994: 213; Edwards 1999: 14).  
In a conflict context the Irish were often commissioned by the Welsh and later 
the Anglo-Normans for their ships, such as during the Battle of the River Tywi 
summarized below and as part of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign (Brut 
Pen. 20: 64-65).  While it has been suggested that the ‘Welsh, English, 
Normans, Irish and Norse - built and used warships of the type perfected by the 
Vikings’ (Lewis 1996:65), the continued use of the Irish fleet may suggest that 
they were at the forefront of maritime technology in this region, or that they 
simply had access to more ships.  In addition to the use of their fleet, the Irish 
also participated in several pre-Norman inter-Welsh battles.  Whether this 
involvement was in a mercenary capacity like with the fleet or rooted in other 
obligations, perhaps those of family, is difficult to determine from the 
manuscripts.   On a different note, many similarities have been drawn between 
the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales and the conquest of Ireland c. 1169 
(Duffy 2007; Gillingham 1999: 84; Vebruggen 1997: 204).  While these 
similarities have been explored historically there has been no investigation into 
this conquest, when compared with that in Wales or otherwise, from an 
archaeological conflict landscape perspective.  The potential of such an 
investigation presents an intriguing avenue for future research, particularly 
111 
 
given that the first wave of Anglo-Norman conquest in Ireland was under the 
leadership of Henry II.  
 
Welsh conflict 1000-1069 
The period stretching from 1000-1069 is primarily distinguished by events of 
inter-Welsh conflict, many of these were in connection with Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn’s conquest of Wales and his rise to power as king of Wales in c. 1055.  
Apart from this there were several notable battles between the Irish and the 
Welsh and the English and the Welsh.  Prominent battle events spanning the 
years 1000-1069 include the battles of Abergwili in Carmarthenshire (c. 1022), 
Rhyd y Groes in Montgomeryshire (c. 1039), Pencadair in Carmarthenshire (c. 
1041), Pwlldyfach in Carmarthenshire (c. 1042), the Battle of the River Tywi in 
Carmarthenshire (c. 1042) and the sacking of Hereford (c. 1056).  The Battle of 
Abergwili was fought between the Welsh of Gwynedd and Deheubarth and the 
Irish usurper Rhain which concluded in a victory for the Welsh.  In c. 1022 
Rhain attempted to usurp the throne of Deheubarth claiming he was a son of 
Maredudd ab Owain who had been king of Deheubarth d. 999.  Against him 
came Llywelyn ap Seisyll, the legitimate king of Deheubarth and Gwynedd, and 
he defeated Rhain in battle at the mouth of the River Gwili (Brut Pen. 20: 12).  
The Battle of Pwlldyfach (c. 1042), was fought against raiders probably from 
Ireland and ‘Hywel defeated the Gentiles who were ravaging Dyfed’ (Brut Pen. 
20: 13).  At other points in the Brut ‘gentile’ seems to refer specifically to the 
Irish or the Irish and Norse from Dublin, whether this was in reference to tribal 
units or to the people of Ireland as heathens is uncertain, given the context it 
could be interpreted both ways.  It is unlikely that gentile was in reference to 
Vikings or Norsemen not from Ireland as they are referred to as ‘Germans’ in 
the Brut.  For example in c. 1055 ‘Magnus, son of Harold, king of Germany, 
ravaged the kingdom of England with the help and chieftainship of Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn, king of the Britons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 14).  The Harold referenced is 
Harold Hardrada of Norway, the same Harold that would attempt to claim the 
English throne in 1066 at the Battle of Fulford. 
The remainder of this period is hallmarked by the conflicts that defined 
Gruffudd ap Llywelyn’s rise to power as king of Wales (1055-1063).  Given that 
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these conflicts and their consequences set the stage for the Norman Conquest 
of Wales, they are discussed in more detail than events covered in other 
periods of this chronology. The Battle of Rhyd y Groes was one of the more 
significant battles from this period.  In c. 1039 Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was 
campaigning to assert his authority in Wales.  The English weary of his 
progress in Wales and along the English border assembled a force to check his 
advance.  Gruffudd ap Llywelyn ‘had his first battle [against the English] at Rhyd 
y Groes on the Severn, and there he prevailed’ (Brut Pen. 20: 13).  Around the 
same time a dynastic feud erupted between Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and Hywel ab 
Edwin over Deheubarth.  Hywel was the legitimate ruler, but Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn had a claim as well – partly because he had seized and taken Hywel’s 
wife as his own following the Battle of Pencadair (c. 1041), fought between 
Hwyel and Gruffudd (ibid) – but mainly because his father, Llywelyn ap Seisyll 
had been king of Gwynedd and Deheubarth. The matter was finally decided at 
the Battle of the River Tywi (c. 1044).  ‘Hywel ab Edwin gathered a fleet of the 
gentiles of Ireland with the intention of ravaging the whole kingdom.  And 
Gruffudd ap Llywelyn encountered him; and there was a mighty battle and many 
of the host of the foreigners and of his own host were slain at the mouth of the 
River Tywi’ (Brut Pen. 20: 14).  Following the successful annexation of 
Deheubarth, Gruffudd was established as the leader of a unified Wales in 1055.  
Around the same time, Ælfgar son of Leofric earl of Merica, disgruntled 
at his treatment by earl Godwine and King Edward the Confessor over a land 
dispute and a seemingly unfounded accusation of treason, was bent on 
retaliation.  To affect his retribution he sought the assistance of his Welsh 
neighbour Gruffudd ap Llywelyn (Lloyd 1912: 364).  Gruffudd readily accepted 
an alliance with Ælfgar.  Mercia and Wales shared a long history of mutual 
animosity the effects of which are still visible in the extant portions of Wat’s and 
Offa’s dykes.   No doubt Gruffudd was eager to seize an opportunity to enter 
into a more peaceful relationship with Merica, in addition to providing him with a 
powerful ally against the English; it would guarantee peace along much of the 
Welsh and English border and create a buffer between Wales and the rest of 
England.  In fact Wales was essentially inaccessible to the English, particularly 
after Ælfgar inherited the earldom upon his father’s death in 1057.  Their close 
alliance, reinforced by the marriage of Gruffudd to Ælfgar’s daughter, endured 
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until the death of Ælfgar in c. 1062, which witnessed the disintegration of the 
Welsh-Mercian alliance (Lloyd 1913: 364-365; Davies and Davies 2012: 46-52).    
In 1056 Gruffudd and Ælfgar along with mercenaries from Ireland, 
embarked on a devastating campaign in Hereford, during which the town itself 
was burned and laid to ruin.  It is thought that Hereford was targeted as it would 
‘shake to its foundations the Norman settlement at Hereford’ (Lloyd 1912: 364-
5).  These Normans had been invited by Edward the Confessor who was 
himself half Norman through his mother.  The English and presumably Norman 
forces, seeing as they were commanded by the Norman earl Ralph, met a 
violent end as ‘Gruffudd pursued them to within the walls of Hereford, and there 
he massacred them and destroyed the walls and burned the town’ (Brut Pen. 
20: 14).  The English were quick to attempt retribution against the Welsh, 
however each of their endeavours proved ineffective (Brut Pen. 20: 14-15).   
Weary of Gruffudd’s ever increasing strength, King Edward and his earls soon 
negotiated a peace agreement with him. The terms of the agreement were not 
recorded in any detail apart from the most important aspect documented in the 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which states: Gruffudd ‘swore oaths that he would be a 
loyal and undeceiving under-king to King Edward’ (Swanton 1996: 186) – ‘it was 
this claim to over-lordship which the Norman kings inherited’ a decade later 
(Davies 1987: 27).  
The Hereford Campaign was important for a number of reasons.  From a 
tactical standpoint it demonstrates the Welsh ability to successfully plan and 
execute a campaign against a foreign threat to discourage any future incursions 
into Welsh territory.  This is particularly relevant given that this was the first time 
that the Welsh encountered the Normans in combat, albeit in a pre-Conquest 
context.  Moreover, the Welsh forces are described as well ordered (Brut Pen. 
20: 14), a description that counters other contemporary descriptions of the 
Welsh as barbarians in their combat tactics (Davies 2004:5-6).  The Battle of 
Hereford endorses the Welsh as a sophisticated, effective and dangerous 
military power.  Along with the Battle of Rhyd y Groes, the Hereford Campaign 
also establishes a tradition of conflict in the borderlands between Wales and 
England.  The establishment of Gruffudd as an under-king to the English has 
important implications for the legitimacy of the Norman Conquest of Wales and 
future suzerainty agreements between the Welsh and Normans. 
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Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reigns of William the Conqueror 
and William Rufus 1066-1099 
In 1063 Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was slain by the treachery of his own men (Brut 
Pen. 20: 15), Wales was no longer unified and descended into chaos as 
succession battles erupted throughout the individual principalities.  When the 
Normans arrived in Wales in 1068 there was no centralized power, and battles 
for hegemony were still being fought in most of the principalities, the Normans 
simply became another group of contenders in the struggle for power.  Apart 
from Williams’s expedition to Chester in 1070, when he ordered Chester Castle 
built, and his pilgrimage to St David’s Monastery in 1081 (Davies 1987: 26-33; 
Brut Pen. 20: 17), there was no large-scale Norman royal involvement in Wales 
until c. 1095 by William Rufus.  Instead William the Conqueror entrusted the 
Welsh borders to his earls.    
The first battle documented in the Brut between the Normans and the 
Welsh was a battle fought on the banks of the River Rhymni (Rhymney) in 
southeast Wales in c. 1070, when Caradog ap Gruffudd ap Rhydderch, assisted 
by the Normans, slew Maredudd ab Owain (Brut Pen. 20: 16).  The allying of 
forces is a theme that presents itself frequently during the Norman incursion – 
both the Welsh seeking Norman allies, and the Normans seeking out Welsh 
allies; both trends are present in the 1157 Coastal Campaign.  While the Welsh 
attempted to use the Norman presence to gain the upper hand in their on-going 
inter-Welsh power struggles, the Normans sought to divide and conquer by 
taking advantage of inter-Welsh conflict (Beeler 1966: 203; Richardson 2001: 
23-33).  In doing so the Normans also hoped to establish a client relationship 
with the Welsh, in which the Welsh would recognize them as their overlords and 
perform homage.  The attempt to establish clientship more often than not failed, 
as the Welsh socio-political structure embraced a different and much more fluid 
institution of clientship than their Anglo-Norman adversaries (Davies 1990: 23; 
Lewis 1996: 72).  In this case Caradog ap Gruffudd ap Rhydderch sought out 
the Normans to assist him in destroying a rival to power in south Wales (Davies 
2004: 120).  Similarly, Gruffudd ap Cynan sought assistance from the marcher 
earls in his quest to take Gwynedd back from Powys (LGC: 61).  Many 
historians have argued that it was the subsequent allying of forces and the 
resulting enhanced disunity of the Welsh that was ultimately responsible for the 
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successful Norman Conquest of Wales (Davies 2004; Richardson 2001: 32-33; 
Lewis 1996: 65; Beeler 1966: 203; Turvey 2002: 4).   
The ensuing two decades (1070-1090) are marked by Norman ravaging 
of Wales, Ceredigion and Dyfed in particular (Brut Pen. 20: 16), and the 
continued inter-Welsh conflicts that defined the pre-Norman era.  Some of the 
more notable inter-Welsh battles fought over the control of the various 
principalities include: the Battle of Camddwr c. 1075, the battle of Bron yr Erw c. 
1075, the Battle of Gwenytwl c. 1077, and the Battle of Pwllgwdig c. 1078, (Brut 
Pen. 20: 16-17).  As mentioned above, these conflicts resulted from the power 
vacuum created by the death of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn.  In c.1081 Gruffudd ap 
Cyan sailed from Ireland in a bid to reclaim Gwynedd from Trahearn of Powys.    
He sailed from Ireland with a force of ‘thirty ships full of Irish and Viking soldiers 
ploughing a furrow across the deep sea he returned to his native soil, and he 
seized the port of Abermenai, where he found Trahearn ruling’ (LGC: 67).  
Trahearn fled from Anglesey enabling Gruffudd to reclaim the isle, it would take 
more than two decades to return the rest of Gwynedd to his control. 
In 1091 the Normans achieved dominion over Ceredigion and Dyfed; 
they maintained this control with a series of newly constructed castles.  
Between 1091 and1093 the Normans are recorded as having ‘seized all the 
lands of the Britons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19).  However, following their initial success 
in Wales, while William Rufus was absent in Normandy, ‘the Britons, being 
unable to bear the tyranny and injustice of the French, threw off the rule of the 
French’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19).  The Welsh then proceeded to destroy all the castles 
of Gwynedd, Ceredigion and Dyfed (except for Pembroke and Rhyd y Gors in 
Carmarthen).  The Normans retaliated and the battle of Coedysbys was fought 
in Gwynedd in which the forces of Cadwgan ap Bleddyn were victorious and 
‘drove them [the Normans] to flight, inflicting great slaughter upon them’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 19).  Upon his return from Normandy William Rufus attempted further 
retaliation against the Welsh.  In the autumn of 1095 William Rufus ‘moved a 
host against the Britons, but they sought a defence in their woods and their 
wilderness, and he [Rufus] returned home empty-handed and having gained 
naught’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19-20).  It is unclear from the text where in Wales Rufus 
had intended to strike.  Gower, Cydweli and Ystrad Tywi had been ravaged and 
laid to waste prior to Rufus’s unsuccessful campaign.   
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Avoiding armed conflict by seeking refuge or shelter within the natural 
defences of the remote wilderness, particularly the mountains was a common 
Welsh defensive tactic.  ‘Mountains were the natural allies of the Scots and 
Welsh, who were able to withdraw into inaccessible places with their livestock 
and most valuable possessions, and wait for the invaders to retreat’ 
(Verbruggen 1997: 320).  The Irish embraced a similar tactics, using the difficult 
nature of the terrain to their advantage (O’Conor 1998: 98-101).  The use of the 
natural terrain as a defence and the refusal to meet the opponent in armed 
combat are two important trends of medieval Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare, 
particularly in regards to Vegetian and non-Vegetian warfare, which are 
discussed at length in the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter.  
The Welsh sought refuge in the wilderness for a second time when William 
Rufus attempts another, also unsuccessful campaign in c. 1097.  Apparently the 
Normans were reluctant to pursue the Welsh into this wilderness (Brut Pen. 20: 
20).  Whether this was because they feared ambush, or were unfamiliar with the 
terrain, or lacked the appropriate arms and equipment for a wilderness 
campaign is uncertain, but deserves further inquiry.  One possibility is that 
Rufus was leading a ravaging campaign – particularly since ravaging events 
incited by the Normans took place surrounding these two events – and the 
Welsh could have successfully countered his aim by gathering their goods and 
retreating to where they knew the Normans would be reluctant to follow.  
In between Rufus’ two unsuccessful campaigns, there were two other 
notable campaigns (date range 1094-1096), the first was a Norman incursion 
into Gwent (south-eastern Wales), with the purpose of raiding and pillaging the 
countryside, they were stopped and defeated by the Welsh the Battle of Celli 
Tarfawg and the Battle of Aberllech.  Rufus does not appear to have been 
involved in these campaigns; they were probably organised by the marcher 
barons.  The other campaign was the destruction of Pembroke Castle and the 
ravaging of the surrounding countryside by the war-bands of Uchdryd ab Edwin, 
Hywel ap Goronwy and Cadwgan ap Bleddyn.   Although the Brut records that 
the Normans ‘gained naught [and] they returned home empty-handed’ from their 
campaign in Gwent (Brut Pen. 20: 20), the actual degree of the Welsh success 
is unclear as the Brut goes on to state that the castles and garrisons remained 
intact (ibid). It is unclear if the chronicler is referring to all of the extant castles in 
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Gwent, or only the ones that were in the vicinity of the named battle 
engagements.  As the precise location of the battle of Celli Tarfawg and 
Aberllech are not known it is difficult to determine which castle may have been 
nearby.  In the case of Celli Tarfawg and Aberllech (area of the battles not the 
castles), the Welsh appear to have surprised Norman forces that were out 
ravaging, thus, it would appear that the Normans’ control of Wales at this point 
in time did not extend far beyond the bounds of their castles.  Additionally these 
events highlight that the Normans also used raiding and ravaging as a warfare 
tactic. Following this, the Normans achieved notable success in their incursion 
into Gwynedd when in c. 1098; led by Hugh earl of Shrewsbury, they moved to 
attack Anglesey.  Gruffudd ap Cynan sought out and gained the assistance of 
the Irish (Gruffudd had previously lived as an exile in Ireland).  However, the 
Normans turned Gruffudd’s Irish allies against him by promising them a greater 
reward.  Through this treachery the Island of Anglesey was easily taken by the 
Normans and Gruffudd ap Cynan was forced to flee (LGC: 81; Brut Pen. 20: 20-
21).  King Magnus of Norway was also involved in this event.  He sought to take 
advantage of the power struggle between the Normans and the Welsh and 
claim Anglesey for himself and in turn ‘conquer all the island of Britain’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 21).  Magnus fought the Normans from the sea and for reasons that 
are not revealed in the Brut withdrew his ships leaving Anglesey to the 
Normans; today this engagement is known as the Battle of the Menai Straits. 
 
 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry I, 1100-1135 
The reign of Henry I, (1100-1135) was defined by a series of alliances and 
formal agreements between the king and various Welsh princes.  Both the 
Crown and the Welsh gained a great deal by entering into these pacts, such as, 
by recognizing Henry as king, a Welsh prince was expected to swear fealty to 
him and recognize him as his overlord.  In return for this recognition, which 
provided Henry with a legitimate claim in Wales, the king could officially 
proclaim that particular prince or lord as the legitimate ruler of a specific region.  
Although diplomatic in their creation, these pacts in many instances had a short 
life span and did not prevent armed conflict from erupting.  However, there were 
now legal ramifications (sometimes manipulated) for these actions, which in 
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some instances led to the imprisonment of Welsh princes such as Iorwerth ap 
Bleddyn at Shrewsbury (Brut Pen. 20: 26).  The differences between the Welsh 
and Anglo-Norman systems of clientship and fealty often arose in 
misunderstandings in their interpretations that frequently erupted in conflict.   
The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan effectively documents the incentives and 
consequences for Welsh rulers in entering into political arrangements with the 
Anglo-Norman kings.  It has been argued that Gruffudd ap Cynan ‘came to 
prominence as a client of Henry I’ (Lewis 1996: 72), in c. 1110 Gruffudd ap 
Cynan travelled to the court of Henry I to make peace, and ‘he gained from him 
a living, favour, friendship and recognition of his many possessions’ (LGC: 85).  
Once this took place, people from the Cantref of Rhos east of the Conwy River, 
(a cantref is a Welsh territorial administrative subdivision, these are shown in 
the map above in Figure 12), which was under the jurisdiction of earl Hugh of 
Chester, began to move to Gwynedd.  Hugh became enraged that the people of 
Rhos had left and taken their possessions into Gwynedd without asking his 
permission.  In addition to taking his subjects (even though it was not by force), 
Hugh also accuses Gruffudd ap Cynan of having seized his territory (ibid).  
Although Rhos was traditionally part of Gwynedd, Gruffudd ap Cynan had lost 
much of his kingdom to the marcher lords and other Welsh lords during his exile 
in Ireland.   
King Henry responded to Gruffudd’s actions by assembling a large force 
in 1114 which included the southern Welsh and the Scots, to go against 
Gwynedd, and more importantly Powys, the most powerful Welsh kingdom at 
this point in time – this was Henry’s first campaign into Wales (Lloyd 1912: 421).  
Henry took his forces to Tomen y Mur or Mur Castell (originally a Roman fort 
west of Snowdonia near the modern town of Porthmadog) and Gruffudd 
assembled his own force and gathered his people (who were seeking refuge) in 
the mountains of Snowdonia, no battles were fought and terms of peace were 
rapidly agreed upon.  While encamped at Tomen y Mur, Henry I decided 
against advancing to where Gruffudd was in Snowdonia  ‘fearing that he might 
fall into the hands of Gruffudd as he descended out of the mountain tops into 
the valleys’ (LGC: 87, Brut Pen. 20: 37-38).  Neither of the manuscripts detail 
the terms of the peace agreement(s), therefore it is unclear whether Gruffudd 
was allocated Rhos, however, Rhos was within the territorial bounds of 
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Gwynedd, whether by conquest or allocation, by the reign of Owain Gwynedd c. 
1137 (Gruffudd’s son).   
Around 1115 Gruffudd ap Rhys of Deheubarth (the large kingdom in 
south-western Wales, at times encompassing all of Dyfed, Ystrad Tywi and 
Ceredigion), who had been living in exile in Ireland since the death of his father 
Rhys ap Tewdwr Mawr (apparently at the hands of the Normans), returned to 
Wales.  Following his arrival in Wales he sought out the help of Gruffudd ap 
Cynan who welcomed him and provided him and his brother with shelter on 
Anglesey (Brut Pen. 20: 38-40).  However, soon after this Gruffudd ap Cynan at 
the request of King Henry and in exchange for royal favours (which are not 
specified in the manuscripts), was asked to capture Rhys ap Gruffudd, dead or 
alive, but the latter managed to flee safety and seek asylum at the church of 
Aberdaron (on the Llyn peninsula), from there he returned to Ystrad Tywi in 
Deheubarth (ibid).  Evidently Henry feared Welsh unification and an uprising in 
Deheubarth, suggesting that the Norman hold there was tenuous at best.  It can 
also be inferred that Henry was keen to promote inter-Welsh conflict, in an effort 
to prevent the Welsh kingdoms unifying against the Normans.  Such efforts did 
not amount to much, as fifty years later all of native Wales banded together 
under Owain Gwynedd against Henry II during the Berwyn Mountain campaign 
and again under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great, Gruffudd ap Cynan’s 
great grandson) who ruled a unified native Wales (1216-1240).  Such actions, 
on the behalf of both Henry I and Gruffudd ap Cynan highlight the necessity for 
self-preservation and the ruthless measures taken to ensure safety and 
success.   
Following Gruffudd ap Cynan’s unsuccessful attempt to hand Gruffudd 
ap Rhys over to Henry, Gruffudd ap Rhys did what Henry had feared; he 
gathered men and began a series of attacks against the Normans and the 
Flemish (who were brought as colonists to southern Wales by the Normans, 
(Beeler 1969: 219; Brown 2004:100).  While the outcome and effect of these 
initial attacks is unclear, Rhys proceeded to embark on a castle burning 
campaign.  Immediately following his restoration to Deheubarth c. 1116, Rhys 
destroyed and severely damaged seven castles.  These include the castles of 
Aberth, Llandovery, Swansea, Carmarthen, Gower, Blaen-porth (including the 
town) and Ralf.  In reaction to the assault on Aberth, Llandovery and Swansea 
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castle, the Normans gathered their Welsh allies and charged them to protect the 
king’s castle at Carmarthen in turns and ‘the French asked each of those 
[Welsh chieftains] if they were true to King Henry.  And they all answered that 
they were.  And the French said, ‘If it is so, as you say, in order that what you 
profess in your words may be shewn by your deed, each one of you, as it falls 
to his lot, must keep the king’s castle at Carmarthen’’ (Brut Pen. 20: 40-46).  
The men entrusted to hold the castle, for two weeks a piece, were: Owain ap 
Caradog (Powys), Rhydderch and Maredudd ap Rhydderch ap Caradog 
(possibly of Dyfed or Gwent).  While the castle was under the guardianship of 
Owain ap Caradog, Gruffudd ap Rhys besieged the castle at night.  Owain’s 
forces fled and Owain himself was killed.  This test to prove Welsh loyalty to 
Henry presents yet another instance of the Normans successfully encouraging 
inter-Welsh conflict.  It was a cunning manoeuvre, as it provided the Normans 
with the manpower with which to oppose Gruffudd ap Rhys, without having had 
to employ or risk any casualties to Norman forces, unfortunately for the 
Normans it did not prevent Rhys from capturing Carmarthen Castle.   
In c. 1121 there arose conflict between Henry and the men of Powys, 
marking the second and final royal campaign into Wales under the leadership of 
Henry I.  Upon discovering that the king was moving against Powys with a large 
force, the men of Powys, under Maredudd ap Bleddyn and the sons of 
Cadwgan ap Bleddyn, Einion,  Madog and Morgan, sought assistance from 
Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd.  They ‘…ask[ed] him whether he would unite 
with them against the king […] But he had made peace with the king, and he 
informed them that, if they fled near his bounds, he would come against them 
and would despoil them’ (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48).  As Gruffudd ap Cynan refused 
to help, the men of Powys proceeded against the king alone.  At an unspecified 
location they were able to use the physical landscape to their advantage and 
ambush the king.  ‘And Maredudd sent young men to way-lay the king, to a 
certain counter-slope the way along which he was coming, in order to engage 
him with bows and arrows and then cause confusion among his host with 
missiles’ (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48).    During this ambush the king himself was 
nearly killed with an arrow.  Maredudd and the sons of Cadwgan then came to 
terms of peace with the king, under terms of heavy tribute (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48).  
The Welsh forces of Owain Gwynedd used a similar terrain tactic, also to their 
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success, when they ambushed Henry II at Coleshill (see Chapters Six and 
Seven).   
  
 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Stephen, 1135-1154 
The Welsh were quick to take advantage of the succession dispute and civil war 
following the death of Henry I in 1135.  Throughout the anarchy that defined 
Stephen’s reign Wales was generally ignored by the Crown (Davies 1987: 47).  
During the Anarchy many of marcher barons took up the cause of the Empress 
Matilda against Stephen.  Some of the marcher lords, such as Earl Ranulf of 
Chester formed alliances with the Welsh who in turn provided troops at the 
decisive Battle of Lincoln in 1141 (ibid).  However, not all marcher and Welsh 
relationships were amicable during this period.  Taking advantage of the 
marcher barons’ distraction, notable Welsh leaders from north and south Wales 
combined their forces against the Normans, they included the sons of Gruffudd 
ap Cynan (who died in 1137), Gruffudd ap Rhys, Hywel ap Maredudd (Powys) 
and Madog ab Idnerth (Maelienydd in the middle marches).  Following an 
unrelenting castle campaign in Ceredigion c. 1136, in which many of the regions 
castles, including Aberystwyth were burned, they directed their unified force 
toward Cardigan but were opposed by the Norman forces that had assembled 
to counter the Welsh insurgence.  They were met by Stephen (the constable), 
Robert fitz Martin and the sons of Gerald and William fitz Odo in open battle on 
the banks of the River Dyfi (Dovey), which marks the border between Gwynedd 
and Ceredigion.  The total number of troops on both sides was estimated to be 
around 8000 and following a fierce battle, during which the Normans and their 
Flemish allies lost 3000 men, they were defeated (Brut Pen. 20: 51-52).  
Although this battle event is un-named and its location not precisely known, it is 
clear from the large number of combatants involved, most likely exaggerated to 
demonstrate the scale of the battle, that this was a major event.  The Brut does 
not go into detail describing why the battle was fought or what was 
accomplished by the Welsh victory apart from gaining ‘a great abundance of 
captives and spoils and costly raiment and fair armour’ (ibid).  One can infer that 
the main intent of this campaign was to throw off the Norman yoke, Ceredigion 
was probably targeted as it was an area, along with Glamorgan, Brycheiniog 
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(Brecknockshire) and Dyfed that were the first to come under the control of the 
Normans following the initial wave on conquest.  Although unlike the other 
territories, Ceredigion was not controlled by the Normans to the same degree, 
making it an appealing target (Beeler 1966: 217).     
Another significant battle fought during this period was the battle of 
Coleshill in 1150 when ‘Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the 
help of Ranulf, earl of Chester, to rise up against Owain’ (Brut Pen. 20: 57).  
Owain Gwynedd had steadily been encroaching on Powysian and Anglo-
Norman territory.  Even going so far as to build a castle at Tomen y Faerdre or 
Tomen y Rhodwydd (there is some debate over which castle was built by 
Owain) in northern Powys in 1149 after capturing Mold Castle in 1146 while the 
garrison was absent engaging in the Battle of Wich with Powys.  The 1150 
conflict did little to stop Owain’s expansion as ‘after the host of [Maredudd’s] 
supporters had been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (ibid).  The 1157 Battle of 
Coleshill was adjacent to the 1150 location which brings to question the idea of 
traditional battlefield locations, as reviewed in Chapter Three (see page 95).  
It is possible that with the death of Henry, the Welsh princes felt that their 
oaths were void and they were at liberty to form new alliances, although the 
nature of Welsh clientship would not have required such circumstances to exit 
an agreement.  There was a slight increase in the amount of inter-Welsh 
slayings following Henry’s death, perhaps suggesting that there was a power 
vacuum in Wales until Stephen was able to establish himself.  Conversely, the 
lapse in Norman interference during this time may have allowed the Welsh to 
return to ‘business as usual’, in so far as they were at liberty to resume border 
disputes within native Wales.  The reduced Norman presence also enabled the 
Welsh to organise and strengthen their defences against the Normans, namely 
with the construction of castles.  During the period of Stephen’s reign, the Brut 
documents that the Welsh were capturing and reusing Noman castles in 
addition to their earlier practice of burning and destroying them.  (Brut Pen. 20: 
55-57).  The first documentation of a Welsh built castle was actually in 1116 for 
Cymer Castle in Merioneth (Gwynedd; Kenyon 2009: 26), however, it was 
during Stephen’s reign that Welsh castle building grew in popularity.  Tomen y 
Rhodwydd  or Tomen y Faerdre (also known as Iâl Castle) was built by Owain 
Gwynedd in 1149, as was Llanrhystad by Cadwaladr (Owain’s brother) and 
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Oswestry Castle, originally of Norman construction, was rebuilt by Madog ap 
Maredudd of Powys.  The conclusion drawn  is that the Welsh experienced a 
temporary respite from Norman interference in Wales, this afforded them the 
ability to more effectively defend themselves – particularly by the building of 
new castles and their establishment in conquered Norman castles – prior to the 
campaigns of Henry II.  The Welsh were quick to realise that the adoption of 
castle building technology was necessary to counter the Norman threat.    
 
 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry II, 1154-1189 
The reign of Henry II saw the reinstatement of royal interest in Wales and is 
marked by a series of major campaigns and battles that are indicative of the 
escalation in tensions between the Welsh and the Normans.  Henry II led a total 
of three campaigns into Wales; the 1157 campaign targeted at Gwynedd and 
1165 campaign targeted at Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys, are the focus of 
the case studies in this research and as such a more detailed conflict 
chronology will be provided in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters.  The 
other campaign led by Henry II was against Rhys ap Gruffudd (Deheubarth) in 
1163, this was a bloodless venture as no battles were fought.   
Prior to the 1157 conflict, Owain Gwynedd had been expanding the 
borders of his kingdom south-east into northern Powys and east into the 
marcher territory of Cheshire, particularly the Cantref of Tegeingl (which 
traditionally had been part of the ancestral kingdom of Gwynedd (Quinnell et al. 
1994: 214-216; Domesday 263a/R/7).  In 1157 to stop this expansion Henry II 
led an army into Chester intent on subduing Gwynedd.  The Welsh of Gwynedd 
led by Owain Gwynedd moved their host to Basingwerk which they fortified, 
intent on blocking the Norman advance into Gwynedd.  Henry II advanced up 
the coastal Roman road toward the Welsh encampment, while at the same time 
a fleet set sail from Chester to Anglesey.  At an unspecified distance from 
Basingwerk Henry split his army into two contingents, one was to proceed down 
the Roman road, the other was to cut inland through the forest to circumvent 
Owain’s position and take his rear by surprise.  The Welsh seemingly 
anticipated such a manoeuvre as a detachment of Owain’s army, led by his 
sons Dafydd and Cynan,  was stationed in the forest in advance of Basingwerk, 
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‘And there Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him, and there they 
gave him a hard battle’ (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60).  Following this Owain retreats to a 
place referred to as Tal Llwyn Pynna and Henry to Rhuddlan to await news of 
the fate of a naval contingent he had sent to Anglesey.  Meanwhile at Rhuddlan 
the Normans endured a series of raids by the Welsh before learning that the 
Anglesey expedition had been an utter disaster with heavy casualties suffered 
by the Normans at the Battle of Tal Moelfre (ibid; Clancy 2003: 127 and 136).  
Peace terms were then established between Owain and Henry, in exchange for 
Owain’s withdrawal from Tegeingl and recognition of Henry as his overlord 
(officiated at the 1163 Council of Woodstock, see page 244), Henry would leave 
Gwynedd in peace, meaning no further Norman conquest would be attempted 
within Gwynedd.   
The following year Rhys ap Gruffudd burned all the castles in Ceredigion 
in what he regarded as retribution against a broken alliance with Henry.  
Previously Rhys had unwillingly entered into a peace with the king; but, when 
Roger Earl of Clare and Walter Clifford pillaged Rhys’s land the king was 
indifferent to the injustice against Rhys.  In 1159, taking advantage of Henry’s 
absence while abroad in France, Rhys burned all the castles in Dyfed.  In 1163 
Henry gathered a massive force to retaliate.  Rhys then gathered his men to the 
mountain of Cefn Rhestr Main, and as the Normans and their allies were 
reluctant to pursue Rhys into the mountains they instead offered him a truce, 
‘And he accepted it, and gave his men leave to go to their own land’ (Brut Pen. 
20: 61).  Similar to Owain Gwynedd, Rhys was also required to surrender 
hostages to Henry and recognize him as his overlord as part of the peace 
terms, also officiated at the same Council of Woodstock.  The terms of this new 
relationship with Henry were not observed for long by either Rhys ap Gruffudd 
or Owain Gwynedd.  Rhys entered into conflict with the marcher lords almost 
immediately after the Woodstock agreement and Gwynedd followed suit in 1165 
when his son Dafydd led raids on Cantref of Tegeingl once again.  
 In the summer of1165 Henry II embarked on a campaign of massive 
proportions, the purpose – to ‘annihilate all Welshmen’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63-64).   
The king left his base at Oswestry and turned his army west into Wales, along 
the Ceiriog river valley.  In this valley at the ancient border between Wales and 
England – Offa’s Dyke – a contingent of Welsh who were stationed in advance 
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of the main force (led by Owain Gwynedd) encamped at Corwen, ambushed 
Henry’s forces as they attempted to negotiated passage through a gap in the 
dyke.  This event is now referred to at the Battle of Crogen.   Having recovered 
from the ambush, the king’s army then advanced into the Berwyn Mountains 
towards the Welsh encampment at Corwen, but bad weather and lack of 
supplies forced him to retreat to England in defeat.  After this Henry attempted 
no further campaigns into Wales, Gwynedd had preserved its independence 
and would not see another royal campaign for more than forty years (1210 King 
John) and would retain its independence until 1282. 
 Following Crogen a power struggle ensued between the Welsh and the 
marcher barons over the control of castles, including the castles of Cilgerran, 
Caerinion, Rhuddlan and Hen Blas, which were taken by the Welsh (Brut Pen. 
20: 64-65).  Despite Henry’s efforts, by the end of his reign (d. 1189) the Welsh, 
predominantly Gwynedd, had managed to reclaim their territory as the Normans 
receded in the wake of Welsh success.  The exercise in Welsh cooperation 
during the 1165 Campaign would be repeated again in the thirteenth century 
when native Wales was united under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and later Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd.  
  
 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reigns of Richard I, 1189-1199 
and John, 1199-1216 
The reign of Henry II’s son Richard I (1189-1199) saw no royal involvement in 
Wales, as Richard’s concerns were centred on the Third Crusade.  The majority 
of conflicts that occurred in these years were confined to inter-Welsh conflicts 
and the continuing struggle for control of castles between the Welsh and the 
marcher lords.  The one notable exception is the siege and battle of Painscastle 
(Powys).  In 1198 the Welsh princes (un-named in the Brut), united under 
Gwenwynwyn, prince of Powys and laid siege to Painscastle for three weeks.  
The Anglo-Normans mustered a relief force and successfully ended the siege 
and defeated the Welsh (Brut Pen. 20: 79-80).  The narrative style for 
Painscastle bears further comment as the author refers to the Anglo-Normans 
as the Saxons; additionally the tone of the account is decisively pro-Saxon.  For 
example the account of the battle concludes with: ‘And the Saxons, being 
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unable to suffer that, as God showed thereafter, fell upon the Welsh and 
immediately drove them to flight and slew untold numbers of them like sheep... 
And so the Saxons returned joyfully to their land, enriched with the spoils of the 
Welsh’ (ibid).  This is curious as generally the Anglo-Normans are referred to in 
the Brut as the French and later the English, the term Saxon evokes an earlier 
pre-Norman period.  Additionally, most of the accounts, while perhaps not 
always overtly pro-Welsh, are rarely so blatantly pro-English/French/Saxon.  
The chroniclers of the Brut were Welsh monks, perhaps this particular entry was 
by an individual of Anglo-Norman heritage and sentimentality.  One could even 
theorise that he was descended from a pre-Conquest marcher family, thus the 
use of the word Saxon.  These interesting introspections aside, the most 
important element to glean from this change in narrative style is that the 
accuracy of the events recorded in the Brut, (or any other medieval 
manuscripts), must be interpreted carefully, since they clearly were subjected to 
the biases of the authors.   
Conflicts in Wales during the first decade of King John’s reign were 
defined once again by inter-Welsh conflict and struggle over castle rights, 
although, the last six years of his reign were characterised by an escalation in 
conflict between the Crown and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth also known as Llywelyn 
the Great (ap Fawr), prince of Gwynedd, that eventually led to the creation of 
the Principality of Wales in 1216 (Black 2000:53).  In 1201 John noting 
Llywelyn’s rise to power in Gwynedd recognized him as the ruler of Gwynedd 
and in a treaty gave Llywelyn leave to exercise Welsh rule and Welsh laws, so 
long as those were applied within the territorial bounds laid out in the treaty 
(Davies 1987: 239).  The relationship between Gwynedd and England was 
further strengthened when in 1205 Llywelyn married Joan, John’s natural 
daughter and accompanied John on his campaigns in Scotland in 1209 (ibid: 
239-241).  The nature of their friendship was so strong that John overlooked 
Llywelyn’s transgressions when he invaded and claimed southern Powys, given 
that Llywelyn promised John homage (Lloyd 1912: 621-2; Brut Pen. 20: 81).  
The events that led to conflict between Llywelyn and John are unclear, it has 
been suggested that Llywelyn took advantage of the King’s absence in Ireland 
in 1210 and attempted to encroach on marcher territory (Lloyd 1912: 631).  
Evidently these conquest attempts were not successful as the earl of Chester 
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moved against him the same year and advanced as far as Holywell where he 
built a castle (Treffynnon), then to Degannwy to rebuild the castle that Llywelyn 
had destroyed, presumably to prevent the Anglo-Normans from claiming it 
(Davies 1987: 241; Lloyd 1912: 632).  Upon his return from Ireland in 1211, 
John embarked on a campaign against Llywelyn advancing from Chester to 
Degannwy.   In response Llywelyn implemented a scorched earth tactic and 
withdrew with his people into the refuge of the wilderness of Snowdonia.  While 
at Degannwy John’s ‘host suffered lack of food to such an extent that an egg 
was sold for a penny-halfpenny; and they found the flesh of their horses as 
good as the best dishes’ (Brut Pen. 20: 85).  Unable to feed his army, John 
retreated from Degannwy back to England (ibid; Davies 2004: 107).  Undeterred 
John embarked on another campaign against Gwynedd in August, ‘and with him 
a host that was greater and fiercer’ (Brut Pen. 20: 85).  John learned quickly 
from his failed attempt months earlier and this time he brought enough supplies 
with him for his troops to reach the heart of Gwynedd, destroying everything he 
encountered on his route of march and building castles as he went.  Threatened 
by John with the destruction of Bangor, Llywelyn was defeated and forced to 
accept humiliating peace terms, in which he lost all of his territory east of the 
River Conwy (Davies 2004: 108; Davies 1987: 241; Lloyd 1912: 636).    
Llywelyn’s defeat proved but a momentary setback as John’s hold on 
Wales became tenuous as a result of the discord that arose between him and 
the leading men of England and Wales (the marcher barons), which eventually 
led to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.  In the same year significant 
territory within Wales was yielded to the Welsh without resistance (Brut Pen. 20: 
89-92).  During this period Llywelyn, with the assistance of other Welsh lords, 
led a successful series of campaigns throughout the whole of Wales.  Later that 
year Rhys Ieuanc ap Gruffudd and Maelgwn ap Rhys subdued Dyfed and 
burned and captured all the castles therein.  Following this Llywelyn, ‘by 
counsel of all the princes of Wales along with him, led a host, by their common 
counsel against Carmarthen.  And by the fifth day the castle was surrendered to 
them and they razed it to the ground’ (Brut Pen. 20: 89-92).  Other castles then 
fell in succession and Carmarthen was successfully subdued.  This fluctuation 
in the control of castles provides further evidence for the important role castles 
could play in determining the success of both the Anglo-Norman Conquest and 
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Welsh resistance.  By 1216 Llywelyn had brought most of Wales under his 
control, his march on Swansea in December 1215 signalled the end, at least 
momentarily, of the Anglo-Norman occupation and conquest of Wales, apart 
from small regions of Gower and Monmouthshire that remained under marcher 
baron control (Davies 1987: 242-243).  The terms of Llywelyn’s control over 
Wales were officially laid out in the Treaty of Worcester in 1218.  The creation of 
the native Welsh principality ushered in a new era of both stability and conflict in 
Wales.   
 
 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry III, 1216-1272 
Not unlike the Welsh Campaigns of Henry II, the campaigns of his grandson 
Henry III are also often overlooked and merit further scholarship.  Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman relations during the reign of Henry III set the stage for the 
Edwardian conquest, as it ushered in a new era of royal policy towards Wales, 
bringing an end to the status quo of previous Anglo-Norman engagement. This 
shift in policy can be credited to the creation of the Principality of Wales as 
recognized by the early administration of Henry III, when the terms Treaty of 
Worcester came into fruition in 1218.  As such the relationship between Wales 
and England was different than that which defined the previous 150 years; 
although armed conflict was not obsolete, matters of dispute tended to be 
negotiated on paper rather than on the battlefield (Davies 2004: 111).    
While the Treaty of Worcester did mark a distinct improvement in 
diplomatic relations between Wales and England it did not actually give 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth the rite of continued supremacy in Wales, he was 
provisionally granted the position of overlord in Wales, on the condition that he 
and the other powerful Welsh lords recognized the suzerainty of Henry III.  
Much of the content of the treaty was conditional and temporary, but it provided 
Llywelyn a platform with which to continue his unification of Wales, and place 
himself in the position of sole ruler (Davies 1987: 242).  R.R. Davies has stated 
that ‘The years 1218-40 may readily be characterised as a period of relative 
quiescence’, Llywelyn was keen to preserve the settlement he received in the 
Treaty of Worcester, as such he sought to promote and maintain a friendly 
relationship with Henry III (Davies 1987: 297).    The ‘quiescence’ of the period 
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is debatable, as Llywelyn was pushing to extend the boundaries of native Wales 
and to ensure his dominion within Wales through the coercion of his fellow 
Welsh lords and princes (Lloyd 1912).  If anything the described period of 
‘quiescence’ may mark the desire of both England and Wales to solve their 
issues with diplomacy rather than by engaging in armed conflict.   
The early years of Henry’s reign saw little royal involvement in Wales, 
part of this was due to the young age of the king – he was only nine when he 
became king – additionally the first few years of his reign were preoccupied with 
settling the dissension kindled by John both in England and on the continent.  In 
fact, the Crown was initially eager to pacify Llywelyn, to ‘give England time to 
recover from the wounds of civil war’ (Lloyd 1912: 654).  As a gesture of 
goodwill Llywelyn was given the stewardship of Cardigan and Carmarthen 
Castles to maintain until the king came of age (ibid: 653).  There were three 
minor campaigns during Llywelyn’s reign, these generally involved territorial 
qualms with marcher barons who sought to regain the territories they had lost 
while engrossed with the uprisings during the latter part of John’s reign.  These 
eventually escalated to a point Henry was obliged to become involved.  In c. 
1223 the earl of Pembroke, William Marshall ‘brought a large fleet and a 
multitude of knights and foot-soldiers from Ireland to Deheubarth…he moved 
his mighty host to Cardigan; and forthwith the castle was surrendered to him.  
On the Wednesday following he went to Carmarthen; and there too the castle 
was surrendered to him forthwith’ (Brut Pen. 20: 99).  William Marshall was 
unhappy that the Crown had given Llywelyn the castles of Cardigan and 
Carmarthen (normally in the earl of Pembroke’s jurisdiction) to Llywelyn to keep 
until the king came of age.  William was punished by Henry for his actions, and 
was required by the ‘king to make reparation for what wrongs he had done, and 
to receive reparation from the prince for what wrongs had been done to him too’ 
(Brut Pen. 20: 100).  Llywelyn and William were unable to come to a peaceful 
arrangement and as a result of escalating tensions the king, having proclaimed 
himself of age in 1227, moved a host against Llywelyn in c. 1228.  A series of 
skirmishes were fought in mid-Wales, most likely near a place called Ceri, this 
shot-lived campaign was a failure and Henry was compelled to arrange terms of 
peace between England and Llywelyn in which Llywelyn received a large sum 
of money and land (Brut Pen. 20: 101).  In c. 1231, in a continued effort to 
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dissuade Llywelyn’s expansionist campaigns, Henry sent the ‘royal army [to] 
Painscastle for almost two months witnessing…the erection of one new castle 
while Llywelyn destroyed ten others’ (Davies 1987: 298).  
 Following the death of Llywelyn in 1240 the rule of the Principality was 
contested amongst his sons; this led to a period of instability and the eventual 
collapse of the unified Principality.  This period of chaos ensued until 1250 
when Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s grandson, began to 
successfully reunify Wales, eventually establishing himself as the ruler of the 
restored Principality.  Henry III was a shrewd politician and took advantage of 
the Welsh political disarray following Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s death, to reclaim 
previously conquered territory that had been lost to Llywelyn and to reassert 
himself as the overlord of the Welsh Principality.  This period of instability 
witnessed an English presence in Wales that had not been seen since the early 
conquests of Henry I, these however proved to be short-lived accomplishments 
after Llywelyn ap Gruffudd asserted himself as the sole ruler of Gwynedd, 
following a battlefield victory against his brother and cousins, ending the  
succession dispute in 1255.  Other Welsh leaders who had been disposed of 
their territory following the wave of English conquest turned to Gwynedd and 
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd for guidance.  Under the astute military leadership of 
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the English were purged from Wales, with most of Wales 
being returned to native Welsh rule by 1257 (Davies 1987: 309-10).  In 1267 the 
Treaty of Montgomery acknowledged ‘Llywelyn’s right to bear the title Prince of 
Wales, which was now confirmed to him and to his heirs’ as was his position of 
overlord to the other Welsh rulers (Lloyd 1912: 740).  Although the terms of the 
treaty still required that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd recognize Henry III as his 
overlord, this was a significant moment as the English Crown confirmed 
leadership of Wales to the Welsh, and established Gwynedd as the ruling family 
of Wales.  
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s disobedience when he repeatedly ignored 
Edward I’s summons of homage, following his ascension to the throne in 1272, 
provoked Edward to brutal retaliation.  Like many Welsh rulers before him, 
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd disregarded the suzerainty of the English monarchy.  As 
has been discussed in the Medieval Warfare chapter, this was in part due to the 
cultural differences in the nature of Welsh versus English clientship.  Yet, it is 
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unlikely that this was the only reason that the Welsh repeatedly disregarded and 
in effect dismissed the Anglo-Normans as their overlords, although it probably 
fuelled the discontent.  The long history of this repeated disregard (beginning 
with Gruffudd ap Llywelyn in the mid-eleventh century) suggests that the Welsh 
princes were wilfully disobeying the English monarchy as they did not want to 
be in a dependent client relationship with England, they desired native Welsh 
rule without foreign interference.   The nature of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman 
relationship changed dramatically with the on-set of the Edwardian Conquest in 
c. 1273-1283.  The campaigns of Edward I were exhaustive in terms of the size 
of troop deployment, the scale of the castles constructed and perhaps most 
significantly with the dramatic increase in investment of time and financial 
resources.  The untimely death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd at the Battle of Cilmeri 
near Builth Wells in central Wales in 1282 (Davies 1987: 279) left Wales unable 
to rally against Edward and the principality fell to Anglo-Norman dominion in 
perpetuity.  Other uprisings were attempted such as the failed revolt led by 
Owain Glyndŵr from 1400-1401, but Wales would never again know the 
independence it had fought for and won from the Anglo-Normans during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The chronology of major conflict events that have been summarized spanning 
the period 1000-1272, highlighted important trends and developments in the 
conflicts surrounding the Welsh resistance to the Norman incursion into Wales.  
These include: the importance of castles in the attempt to both dominate and 
preserve Welsh territories; the political finesse of the Normans that made it 
possible for them to exploit inter-Welsh conflict to their advantage; and the 
effective Welsh use of the landscape in military situations, particularly their use 
of wooded terrain and the proximity of many major battle events to rivers.  It is 
clear from this chronology that a precedent had been established which 
recognized Gwynedd as the strength of native Wales, this trend began in the 
eleventh century with Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and was echoed during the 1165 
Berwyn Mountain Campaign when Wales rallied under the leadership of Owain 
Gwynedd and again under the leadership of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn 
132 
 
ap Gruffudd in the thirteenth century.  As the power of Gwynedd increased the 
amount of inter-Welsh conflict slowly decreased, although conflict over 
succession still remained as the Welsh did not embrace primogeniture.  The 
patterns of conflict that have been highlighted in this chronology will now be 
contextualized archaeologically and represented spatially within their broader 
conflict landscapes. 
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Chapter Five – Study Area, 
archaeological conflict landscape reconstruction 
 
 
Introduction 
In order to contextualize discrete events of conflict, it is necessary to reconstruct 
the broader conflict landscapes within which these events took place.  For the 
purposes of this research, this will be done by identifying and briefly discussing 
all sites of conflict that fall within the study area (as described in the 
Methodology Chapter) of medieval Gwynedd and the bordering marcher 
counties of Cheshire and Shropshire, spanning 1066-1272.  The temporal 
selection of 1066-1272 is bounded by the arrival of Normans in Britain, to the 
Edwardian conquest of Wales.  The Edwardian conquest is excluded as those 
efforts were tactically and politically distinct from the Anglo-Norman conquest of 
the two preceding centuries.  The prolonged and direct involvement of King 
Edward against the principality of Wales resulted in a different pattern of 
conflict.  The caveat to this temporal parameter is the inclusion of Welsh castles 
that were captured or destroyed as a result of the Edwardian Conquest.  These 
events are included as they lend further contextualization to the significance of 
the castle in the conquest of Wales.  Earlier events are not considered as the 
evidence is not sufficient for spatial representation.  Additionally, events that 
were documented in the manuscripts, such as those described in the 
Chronology Chapter, are only included in the following conflict landscape 
reconstruction if they can be spatially located with reasonable confidence.  
Therefore, many of the battles recounted in the conflict chronology cannot, at 
present, be represented spatially.  The method presented by this study was 
applied to address such inadequacies as shall be demonstrated in the following 
chapters.      
This documentation will highlight patterns and trends of conflict within the 
study area which will consequently assist in the contextualization of the wider 
sphere of conflict within which the 1157 and 1165 campaigns took place.  The 
documentation will focus predominantly on castles involved in events of armed 
conflict, as they are more perceptible on the landscape than battlefields which 
are often not associated with any built features and whose locations rely heavily 
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on place-name evidence.  The principal sources consulted for this 
documentation were the Historic Environment Records (herein HER) from the 
National Monument Records (herein NMR) for sites in England – accessed 
through the NMR online database Pastscape.  HERs for sites in Wales were 
accessed through the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historical Monuments 
of Wales’ (herein RCAHMW) online database Coflein, which uses a unique 
reference number identified as a NPRN (national preservation record number).  
Additional HERs were consulted from the Clwyd-Powys and the Gwynedd 
Archaeological Trusts (herein CPAT and GAT).  David Cathcart King’s seminal 
work Castellarium Anglicanum (1983) was integral in the identification of castle 
sites and when applicable primary sources, such as the Brut y Tywysogyon or 
The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan, have also been evidenced.  Independent 
archaeological reports and other scholarly research were not consulted at this 
stage as the data present in the HERs and the manuscripts is sufficient for 
reconstructing the broader conflict landscape setting in which the 1157 and 
1165 campaigns took place.  Additional sources, such as excavation reports, 
were consulted for sites within the core areas and areas of integrity; these are 
reviewed within the Campaign Case Study chapters. What follows is a brief 
survey of all conflict related sites that fall within the study area of the medieval 
principality of Gwynedd and the neighbouring marcher counties.  For the 
purposes of this survey, only sites with evidence of armed conflict will be 
discussed.  Sites that do not have evidence of armed conflict but are still 
important to the general discussion (castles with no documented evidence of 
armed conflict and llysoedd) are spatially represented in the following Case 
Study chapters (chapters seven and nine).   Figures 34 and 35 on pages 167 
and 168 of this chapter document all battlefields and castles with episodes of 
armed conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
Defining the Study Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Map of eleventh-century Wales, from Map 1. Wales and its Borders in the Eleventh 
century (Davies 1987: 5), note the medieval Welsh kingdom of Deheubarth historically 
comprises Ceredigion and Dyfed.  (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis 
for copyright reasons). 
 
Ideally the geographical boundaries of the study area would be delineated 
exclusively by historical political boundaries, however, the territorial boundaries 
of the medieval polity of Gwynedd and indeed most medieval Welsh 
principalities, were in a state of perpetual flux (Davies 1990).  This type of 
instability is endemic to frontier zones and can be credited for the fluctuating 
boundaries of Gwynedd with its Anglo-Norman marcher neighbours of Cheshire 
and Shropshire, and with other Welsh polities such as Powys and Deheubarth 
(see Figure 13 above).  Therefore, the study area will be defined using a 
combination of political, geographical and other features.  The ancestral 
kingdom of Gwynedd approximately encompassed the area west of the Rivers 
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Dee and Dyfi and included the Isle of Anglesey (Davies 2007).  This area 
roughly encompasses the historic Welsh counties of the Isle of Anglesey, 
Caernarfonshire, Denbighshire, Flintshire and Merioneth (see Figure 14 below), 
or the modern Welsh counties of the Anglesey, Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, 
Gwynedd and Wrexham.  At certain points, such as during the reigns of 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd during the thirteenth century, 
Gwynedd’s political control extended much further south encompassing most of 
Wales.  These areas will not be considered as they comprise a landscape of 
conflict separate from that of the ancestral kingdom of Gwynedd and are 
beyond the scope of the twelfth-century campaigns considered by this research.  
Cheshire and Shropshire are the two English counties that fall within the 
study area, as these were the marcher counties of the earldom of Cheshire and 
Shrewsbury, which abutted medieval Gwynedd.  Only the western half of 
Cheshire will be included within the study area, and only the north-western 
quadrant of Shropshire will be incorporated into the study area.  This is roughly 
the area north of the River Severn at Shrewsbury.  The reason for this 
intentional exclusion of the eastern extremities of these counties is that they are 
politically separate from the border-zone with Wales and do not contain sites or 
areas that were involved in conflicts with Gwynedd or Wales.  Southern 
Shropshire is excluded because it shared a border with medieval Powys which 
represents a separate and discrete landscape of conflict from Gwynedd. 
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Figure 14: Historic county divisions of North Wales, from ‘The National Gazetteer of Wales’ 
(online resource, this image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons). 
  
 
Site Typologies 
 
Castles 
The castle is arguably the most durable testament to the culturally contested 
border zones that define the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth-century Anglo-
Norman conquest of Wales (Lieberman 2010: 126).  The construction, location 
and control of castles were key determinates in the control of power and the 
resulting success of respective parties to dominate, preserve or expand 
Gwynedd or Anglo-Norman territories.  This is evident in the sheer quantity of 
castles constructed, both by the Anglo-Normans and the Welsh and the number 
of sieges or battles that were fought to gain control of those castles and the 
territory they commanded.  The density of castle distribution per county was 
recorded by King in Castellarium Anglicanum (1983), the table below lists the 
castle density for the counties (using historic county designations as listing in 
King) included within the study area.  Not all castles within the study area were 
involved in events of armed conflict, but nonetheless, they and their besieged 
neighbours need to be holistically interpreted and contextualized within a wider 
archaeological landscape of conflict.   
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County  
note: numbers in brackets 
correspond to page number 
references in King (1983). 
Castle Density 
Anglesey (1) 1 castle to 92 square miles 
Caernarfonshire (31) 1 castle to 35.6 square 
miles 
Cheshire (65) 1 castle to 44.1 square 
miles 
Denbighshire (102) 1 castle to 44.6 square 
miles 
Flintshire (151) 1 castle to 13.5 square 
miles 
Merioneth (275) 1 castle to 34.7 square 
miles 
Shropshire (419) 1 castle to 12 square miles 
 
Table 2: Castle Densities in Gwynedd and the marches, after King (1983). 
 
The density of castle distributions in northern Wales is strikingly less than other 
areas.  For example, Monmouthshire in southern Wales has a density of 1 
castle to 9.58 square miles (King 1983: 280).  According to King this is because 
the northern extremities of Wales were the stronghold of the independent 
Principality of Gwynedd (King 1983: 31).  Additionally, the contested zone in 
Gwynedd was predominantly restricted to Flintshire. 
 
 
Battlefields 
For the purposes of the following study area survey, a battlefield, exclusive of 
castle conflicts such as sieges, is considered to be any event of pre-meditated 
armed conflict between two opposing forces regardless of size and 
organisational qualities. This designation moves beyond the heritage 
communities’ application of a post-medieval definition of battle (English Heritage 
2012) which does not give sufficient consideration to other types of armed 
engagements such as skirmishes or raids, unless these smaller actions were 
directly attached, temporally and spatially, to a larger battle event.  The heritage 
community currently defines a battle as ‘an action involving wholly or largely 
military forces, present on each side in numbers totalling c. 1000 or more, and 
normally deployed in formal battle array’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 6).  This 
constraining definition and intentional slight of so-called lesser actions 
negatively impacts the holistic comprehension of the landscapes of conflict 
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particular to the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales.  The battles represented 
within the study area include inter-Welsh as well as Welsh and Anglo-Noman 
battles.    
 
 
Llysoedd 
Although rarely the site of armed conflict, the llys as a centre of Welsh power 
needs to be included within the broader conflict landscape, and while not 
spatially represented within the following study area maps (apart from Figure 16 
below), known llysoedd are spatially displayed within the core areas of the 1157 
and 1165 campaign case studies.  The following discussion is a brief overview 
of the geopolitical divisions and centres of power within native medieval Wales 
as they existed at the time of the Anglo-Norman Conquest.  This is an important 
consideration as shifts in control and displays of power can be defined by both 
the location of llysoedd and their enhancement or replacement by castles. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The great hall at Llys Rhosyr, a thirteenth-century llys on Anglesey (photo by the 
author). 
 
Administrative divisions in medieval Wales were comprised of: the 
cantref (equivalent of the English ‘hundred’); the commote (there were two or 
three commotes per cantref); the trefi or township; and the maenolydd or manor 
(Davies 2004: 16; Seaman 2012).  ‘Within each commote there existed one 
township which contained the commotal centre or llys, these townships are 
often referred to as maerdrefi’ (Johnstone 1995: 9).  A llys was a ‘defended 
settlement consisting of a collection of buildings which housed the lord's family, 
workers, soldiers, craftsmen and their families. The largest building was a 
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wooden hall […] Other buildings included workshops, kitchens, storerooms and 
stables. The whole complex would be surrounded by a wooden palisade or 
fence often built on top of an earthen or stone bank’ (see Figure 15 above; 
Earwood and Townsend n.d.:1).  On occasion Iron Age or Roman forts were 
repurposed as a llys, an example of this can be seen at the Iron Age hillfort of 
Caer Drewyn, which as already noted in the Literature Review, was also reused 
by the Romans during their occupation of North Wales.  Additionally, there are 
instances of Anglo-Norman mottes being repurposed by Welsh princes as 
llysoedd, for example during the mid-twelfth century Madog ap Maredudd of 
Powys reclaimed the territory surrounding Roft Motte and converted it into a llys 
(see Figure 16 below).  Roft motte was probably constructed c. 1086 by Osbern 
Fitztesso (Johnstone 1995: 6).  The site was damaged in 1140, probably in 
connection with Madog’s re-conquest suggesting that Anglo-Norman structures 
were destroyed prior to the construction of the llys.  Interestingly, Roft motte 
was superimposed on an Iron Age hillfort, the embankments were refortified for 
use as a bailey (CPAT: 101298).  It is unclear whether an earlier llys structure 
also existed prior to the construction of the Anglo-Norman motte and bailey 
castle. 
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Figure 16: Extant llysoedd and llysoedd in use during the mid-twelfth century. Only Aberffraw, 
Arllechwedd, Whitford wood, Llysfain, Roft, Edeirnion and Crogan are included within the core 
areas of the campaign case studies.  The inclusions of the other llysoedd in this map are meant 
to contextualize the wider distribution of known llysoedd in the twelfth century.  Degannwy and 
Rhuddlan were also believed to have been constructed on top of llysoedd, these llysoedd were 
not included on this map as no discrete remains of either supposed llys have been documented. 
 
In the 1990s the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust undertook a project that 
investigated llysoedd and maerdrefi (plural of llys and maerdref) in medieval 
Gwynedd.  This survey confirmed no less than ten mottes associated with a 
maerdref on mainland Gwynedd.  Only five maerdrefi on the mainland were 
without a motte; currently there is no evidence of mottes being associated with 
maerdrefi on Anglesey, an enigma that requires further archaeological 
investigation (Johnstone 1995: 7).  An earlier survey by the Gwynedd 
Archaeological Trust established the basic pattern of one motte per commote, a 
similar pattern was also confirmed to the south in Ceredigion (ibid: 6). 
Interestingly, later thirteenth-century Welsh built masonry castles appear to be 
situated away from commotal centres, it seems that these later constructions 
were instead associated with the ffridd or vaccary, a demesne cattle farm or 
pasture (ibid: 9).  Johnstone draws parallels between the function of the llys to 
that of the castle stating that: ‘in simple terms a castle is no more than a 
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strongly defended residence with administrative functions.  A llys could be a 
defended or non-defended residence with administrative functions’ (Johnstone 
1995: 6).  Archaeologists have been hesitant to consider this similarity, due to 
uncertainty over the quality and presence of llys fortifications (ibid; Longley 
1997: 53).   
As highlighted in the Literature Review, the construction chronology of 
these mottes in connection with maedrefi is unknown, as is whether they were 
erected by the Welsh or Anglo-Normans.  Nonetheless, the alteration of typical 
llys construction is a product of the conflict generated by the Anglo-Norman 
incursion into Wales.  This is regardless of whether it was a Welsh reaction to 
the conquest that required additional fortification for their administrative centres, 
or a visible demonstration of Anglo-Norman power restructuring with a motte in 
each commote as a symbol of conquest.  Additionally, in order to characterise 
llys fortifications it is necessary to contextualize them within the appropriate 
theatre of war, for instance the function of inter-Welsh warfare prior to the 
Anglo-Norman conquest differed from armed engagements during the 
conquest.  A further discussion of this can be found in the preceding chapter on 
Welsh and Anglo-Norman Warfare.  As little archaeological work has been done 
it is difficult to spatially document known llysoedd that were extant in the mid-
twelfth century, this is particularly challenging in Flintshire and regions of 
Denbighshire that were heavily contested since the early medieval period, with 
territorial control continually fluctuating between the English and the Welsh in 
Gwynedd.  The llysoedd represented above in Figure 16 and below in Tables 3 
and 4, are llysoedd documented as in use during the mid-twelfth century by the 
historic environmental records, or llysoedd of an earlier foundation whose 
location could have impacted the campaigns considered by this research.  For 
example Whitford Wood and Llysfain (CPAT: 89612; 58206), are considered to 
be early medieval llysoedd and are in close proximity to the 1157 Coastal 
Campaign Battle of Coleshill core area.  However, as no archaeological survey 
was conducted at either of these llysoedd it is possible that they could have 
been in use during the mid-twelfth century.  This dearth of evidence is pervasive 
for llysoedd throughout the twelfth century; therefore the llysoedd included in 
the charts below are not a comprehensive representation as further 
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archaeological evidence is needed.  Due to this absence of evidence llysoedd 
will not be discussed in the following regional consideration of sites. 
 
 
Study area statistics 
 
 
Site 
Type Anglesey 
Caernarfon-
shire 
Denbigh-
shire 
Flint-
shire Merioneth Cheshire 
Shrop-
shire 
Total 
for 
study 
area 
Battle-
field 6 4 3 5 3 0 1 22 
Castle 6 17 16 14 19 21 34 127 
Llys 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 7 
Total 
no. of 
sites 
per 
county 13 22 19 21 24 22 35 156 
 
Table 3: Study Area Statistics 1066-1272. 
 
There are 156 conflict related monuments, (castles, battlefields and llysoedd) 
included within the study area (see Table 3 above, and Figure 17 and Table 4).  
Only castles with evidence of conflict and battle sites will be included in the 
following overview, Table 3 above enumerates all castles within the temporal 
bounds of the study area. For organisational purposes these sites will be 
divided by counties, (using historic counties for Welsh sites as this is often how 
they are presented in scholarly literature), and then chronologically by type, 
battlefield or castle.  When possible these sites will also be contextualized by 
political reign.  
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Figure 17: Chart display of the quantity of sites by type, note: this includes all castles, not just 
those with evidence of armed conflict. 
 
There are 22 battlefields, 7 known llysoedd (these only include the 
confirmed llysoedd that fall within the campaign core areas) and 127 known 
castles within the study area (possible or unconfirmed castles were not 
included, although consideration is given to them in the Case Study chapters).  
Approximately 35% of these sites, 59 in total, have evidence of armed conflict.  
The Anglo-Norman marcher counties of Cheshire and Shropshire contain a total 
of 55 castle sites, out of which 12 contain evidence of conflict (approximately 
22%).  This is in comparison with Gwynedd, which has a total of 73 castle sites 
out of which 26 have evidence of conflict (approximately 35%, for further detail 
see Table 4 below).  Out of the 127 castle sites 30 are Welsh built.  The number 
of Welsh built castles is possibly higher as the builders/commissioners for some 
castles are unknown, this is particularly true for those that are poorly 
documented.  Of the 30 known Welsh built castles, 28 are located within 
modern Wales and two are in present-day Shropshire, thirteen of the Welsh 
built castles have evidence of armed conflict.  Almost one-third of the castles 
within the study area have evidence of conflict while approximately twenty-five 
percent were Welsh built; the majority of the castles with documented episodes 
of conflict were those of Anglo-Norman construction, only one-third of Welsh 
built castles have evidence of conflict. 
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Table 4: Castle distributions by county, Welsh built and evidence of conflict. 
 
 
 Anglesey 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Anglesey (red dot = battlefields, blue diamond= castles with conflict). Google Earth 
7.0 (2013). North Wales, Anglesey, 53˚17’00.31”N 4˚21’00.70”W, eye alt. 103.62km, Clouds 
data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
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Battlefields 
The battle of Abermenai (NPRN 404304) was fought between the Welsh forces 
of Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd and Trahearn ap Caradog of Powys 
sometime in 1076 or 1077.  Trahearn ap Caradog was from the Powysian 
dynasty that had usurped the kingdom of Gwynedd from the Aberffraw dynasty 
(from which Gruffudd ap Cynan was descended) of Gwynedd in 1005.  Gruffudd 
was fighting to reclaim his birth-right. 
 In the 1098 the battle of the Menai Straits (NPRN 404305) was a 
prolonged and complex series of battles, possibly including a maritime or naval 
component, fought between the forces of Hugh d’Avranches, first earl of 
Chester with his ally Hugh of Montgomery, second earl of Shropshire against 
the Welsh of Anglesey.  King Magnus of Norway was also involved in one of the 
battles.  ‘A year after that, the French a third time moved hosts against the men 
of Gwynedd, with two earls as their leaders, namely Hugh, earl of Shrewsbury, 
and another [Hugh of Chester] along with him.  And they made for the island of 
Anglesey.  And the men of Gwynedd, as was their custom, retreated to the 
strongest and wildest places they had’ (Brut Pen. 20: 20-21).  It is clear from 
this statement that there were two previous conflict events between the marcher 
earls and Gwynedd.  It is not known when or where these earlier conflicts were 
fought.   
 In 1157 the battle of Tal y Moelfre was fought between the forces of King 
Henry II and Owain Gwynedd with an outcome that was favourable for the 
Welsh (NPRN: 404314).  This battle was part of a larger series of battles fought 
in 1157 between Owain Gwynedd and King Henry II, the other battles took 
place in Flintshire where the forces of Gwynedd experienced additional 
victories.  A more detailed description of the Battle of Moelfre can be found in 
the 1157 Coastal Campaign Case Study Chapter (see page 202)  The following 
three battles are unsubstantiated, insofar as their location and veracity of the 
event are unconfirmed.  The battle of Rhos y Gad, 1170, was an inter-Welsh 
conflict; Menai Bridge in 1195 and the battle of Coedaneu in the early thirteenth 
century, involved the Welsh against an unidentified force (NPRN: 404314, 
404316 and 404481). 
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Castles 
There is only one out of the six extant castles on the Isle of Anglesey that has 
evidence of conflict, this is the Castell Aberlleiniog (see Figure 19 below).  It 
was a motte and bailey constructed by Hugh d’Avranches, earl of Chester in 
1088.  In 1094 the castle was successfully besieged by Gruffudd ap Cynan, 
abolishing the brief Anglo-Norman conquest of Anglesey (NPRN: 58448).  The 
castle was repurposed during the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the 
masonry remains visible today date to the seventeenth century (GAT: 2570).  It 
should be noted that the evidence for other pre-Edwardian castles on Anglesey 
is thin and further archaeological investigation is needed.  
 
 
 
Figure 19: View of Castell Aberlleiniog, from RCAHMW: DI2009_1411 (C.531476) NPRN: 
58448, © Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of 
Wales. 
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Caernarfonshire 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Caernarfonshire. Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, Caernarfonshire, 
53˚06’51.95”N 4˚04’37.46”W, eye alt. 167.06km. Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
 
 
Battlefields 
The battle of Bron-yr-erw in 1075 was fought between Gruffudd ap Cynan and 
Trahaearn ap Caradog of Powys (the usurper of Gwynedd).  The battle ended 
unsuccessfully for Gruffudd and he was forced to flee back to Ireland in exile, 
unable on this occasion to reclaim Gwynedd (NPRN: 404388; Brut Pen. 20: 16).  
In 1194 Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great) won an important victory near 
Aberconwy (NPRN: 404453 and Llyod 1912: 589), which preceded his victory in 
Anglesey at the battle of Menai Bridge in 1195 (see Figure 18 above).   
The next conflict evident documented in Caernarfonshire is the battle of 
Bryn Derwin in 1255, between Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Llywelyn the Last) and his 
brothers Owain and Dafydd, which resulted in Llywelyn’s triumph and 
established him as the sole ruler of Gwynedd (NPRN: 402322;  Lloyd 1912: 
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715; Brut Pen. 20: 110).  The only other battle documented in Caernarfonshire 
is the unsubstantiated battle of Snowdonia, supposed to have taken place in 
1063 (NPRN: 405355).  While this battle falls slightly outside the study area 
time period of 1066-1272, it was included as it demonstrates the mountainous 
conditions in which inter-Welsh battles could take place. 
 
Castles 
Degannwy Castle was built by Robert of Rhuddlan sometime during the late 
eleventh century.  This castle endured a series of sieges in: 1120, 1213, 1241 
and 1263 as it fluctuated between Welsh and Anglo-Norman control.   In 1263 it 
was methodically destroyed by Llywelyn ab Gruffudd.  Interestingly Degannwy 
Castle was built on the site of a sixth-century maerdref which was destroyed by 
the Saxons in 812 (NPRN: 95282; King 1983: 34).  Dolbadarn Castle was built 
by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (the Great) in the early thirteenth century as one in a 
chain of castles to guard the mountain passes of Snowdonia.  The other castles 
built for this purpose were Dolwyddelan Castle also in Caernarfonshire and 
Castell y Bere in Merioneth.  Dolbadarn Castle was situated on the prominent 
medieval route through Wales, formerly a Roman road; it fell to King Edward I in 
1282 (NPRN: 93541).  Dolwyddelan Castle was constructed approximately 
around the same date Dolbadarn (see Figure 21 below) and it also fell to 
Edward I in 1282 following the defeat of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.  It is believed the 
Dolwyddelan Castle was built to replace the earlier nearby castle, Tomen 
Castle, constructed in the late twelfth century (NPRN: 95299).  Criccieth Castle 
was built by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in the 1230s, it was successfully besieged by 
Edward I in 1283 (NPRN: 95281).  Edward made additions to Criccieth including 
a gatehouse; the castle was destroyed in 1404 during Owain Glyndŵr’s 
rebellion (King 1983: 33). 
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Figure 21: from left to right: Dolbadarn and Dolwyddelan Castles, from RCAHMW D.O.E. 
Photographic Collection: C.538712 and C.5192 NPRN: 93541, from the collections of the 
National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Department of the Environment.. 
 
 
Denbighshire 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Denbighshire.  Google Earth 7.0 (2013) North Wales, Denbighshire , 53˚06’35.40”N 
3˚14’37.26”W, eye alt. 87.35km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
 
 
Battlefields 
The bloody battle of Maes Maen Cymro fought in 1118 deomonstrates how the 
Welsh exploited the Anglo-Norman presence to their benefit against their Welsh 
enemies.  Although this battle did not directly involve Gwynedd it took place 
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near their border.  The battle was fought over a border dispute between the lord 
of the cantref of Dyffryn Clwyd and the lord of the cantref of Rhos (see map in 
Figure 13 of the Chronology chapter).  Four-hundred warriors were conscripted 
from Powys to come to the aid of Rhos, while the Earl of Chester (Hugh II) sent 
men to assist Dyffryn Clwyd.  Although the cantref Rhos and their Powysian 
allied forces were victorious, this victory was of short duration as the leader of 
this expedition, Hywel ap Ithel died soon after from wounds received in battle 
(Lloyd 1912: 465-6).  ‘And Hywel was wounded in the battle, and on the fortieth 
day after coming home he died.  Maredudd and the sons of Cadwgan, although 
they had won the victory, did not dare to take possession of the land because of 
the French, but they returned home’ (Brut Pen. 20: 46-47).  However, as neither 
Powys nor Chester had enough man-power to hold Dyffryn Clwyd, it was 
cunningly absorbed into Gwynedd by Gruffudd ap Cynan (NPRN: 404828). 
 In 1132 there was a battle event at Wadiece (near Llangollen) between 
Cadwallon, a son of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and Cadwgan ap Gronw ab Owain of 
Powys: ‘In that year Cadwallon ap Gruffudd ap Cynan was slain in Nanheudwy 
by Cadwgan ap Goronwy and Einion ab Owain, his first-cousins’ (Brut Pen. 20: 
50).  Apparently this was done in order to avenge the death of their father 
(NPRN: 404833); it should be noted that the site of this battle is unverified.  In 
1165 King Henry II ‘came to Oswestry thinking to annihilate all Welshman.  And 
against him came Owain and Caewaladr, sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and all 
the host of Gwynedd with them…’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63-64).  The battle of Crogen 
(also sometimes referred to as the Battle of Glyn Ceiriog) was a momentous 
encounter between the forces of King Henry II and the combined forces of 
Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys.  As the events surrounding this engagement 
are included within the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign case study they will 
be considered in depth in the 1165 Case Study and Military Terrain Analysis 
chapters.   
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Figure 23: Crogen Battlefield (photo by the author). 
 
Castles 
There are five castle sites within Denbighshire that were involved in events of 
armed conflict. Erddig was a large and powerful marcher motte and bailey 
castle which is sometimes referred to historically as Wrexham or Wristlesham 
Castle (King 1983: 103; NPRN: 307144).  It is possible that Erddig was 
superimposed over an earlier and more modest earth and timber construction, 
possibly the castle of Bromfield which was burned in 1140 and is now 
considered to be a vanished castle. It is not clear whether the castle was 
burned by accident or intentionally to clear the site for the construction of Erddig 
(King 1983: 103, 105).  However, the Annales Cestrienses which document the 
event also record the burning of Chester on the same occasion (Annales 
Cestrienses: yr.1140).  In all likelihood these events were a result of the 
hostilities between King Stephen and the earl of Chester during the Anarchy 
(Davies 1987: 46-7).  Although this episode did not directly involve the Welsh, it 
demonstrates how the hostilities between the marcher lords and King Stephen 
distracted the Anglo-Normans, allowing the Welsh the reclaim territory that had 
been lost during the first wave of Anglo-Norman conquest without any notable 
opposition.    
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Following his annexation of the northern Powysian commote of Iâl in 
1149, Owain constructed a castle, referred to in the Brut as Iâl Castle (Brut Pen. 
20: 57).  The timber castles of Tomen y Rhodwydd and Tomen y Faerdre, have 
both been suggested as Iâl.   Rhodwydd was a motte and bailey, whereas 
Faerdre seems to have only had a motte (CPAT 100888, 100932; King 1983: 
104; Pratt 1979).  Both King and Pratt favour Tomen y Rhodwydd (near the 
modern community of Llandegla) as Iâl, Pratt believes that Rhodwydd was 
stationed more appropriately to control access ‘into the Vale of Clwyd…and the 
passage of the upper Alun valley towards Mold’ (Pratt 1979: 130).  Iâl was 
relinquished by Owain in 1157 as part of the peace terms between him and 
Henry II following the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign.  Shortly 
afterwards the castle was destroyed by Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd of Powys 
(NPRN: 94737; CPAT: 100888, 100932; King 1983: 104; Pratt 1979).  
Interestingly the Pipe Rolls record the restoration of Iâl Castle by King John in 
1212, probably in connection with his failed campaign in Gwynedd in 1211, in 
an attempt to prevent any further expansion of Gwynedd (see Chronology 
Chapter; King 1983: 104).  Pratt believes the Iâl referred to in the Pipe Rolls in 
connection with King John’s rebuild was Tomen y Faerdre instead of Tomen y 
Rhodwydd, although his reason for this is not entirely clear, Pratt believes that 
Faerdre was a new construction by John, whereas King believes that Faerdre 
was in existence at the time of Domesday (Pratt 1979: 132; King 1983: 104).  
Further investigation and archaeological excavation is needed to verify the 
foundation location of Owain’s Iâl.    
Castell Dinas Bran, situated on top of the remains of an Iron Age hillfort, 
had a lifespan of only seven years (NPRN: 307064).  Built in 1270 by north 
Powys it was destroyed by its own garrison in 1277 to ensure that it did not fall 
into the hands of Edward I (Davies 1987: 333; King 1983: 103).  The 
construction of Denbigh Castle by the English in 1282 was hindered and 
damaged by the brief Welsh revolt in 1294 following the Edwardian Conquest 
(NPRN: 95209).  Although not within the temporal bounds of the study area 
spatial representation, Denbigh was included as it is suggestive of continued 
instability along the traditional contested zone between Gwynedd and England.  
Castell y Waun (NPRN: 307013), located near the Crogen battlefield may have 
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been involved in the battle, however, as this is difficult to determine it is not 
included on the map above. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: view of Castell Dinas Bran with the remains of the Iron Age earthworks in the centre 
ground and the town of Llangollen and the Dee river valley to the centre left (photo by the 
author). 
 
 
Flintshire 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Flintshire, Google Earth 7.0 (2013) North Wales, Flintshire, 53˚12’02.21”N 
3˚06’49.45”W, eye alt. 128.03km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
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Battlefields 
There are five battlefield events documented within Flintshire, four of these 
were concentrated in the mid-twelfth century, the remaining battle of Pant y 
Terfyn is unsubstantiated and consequently not precisely dated, but is believed 
to have taken place in the eleventh century.  This is based on finds evidence 
from the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust’s records of a metal detector survey 
conducted at this location which did not yield any conclusive evidence (NPRN: 
404840; CPAT: 17410).   However, the metallic artefacts uncovered from the 
survey were considered to be too corroded for identification and were seemingly 
not subjected to any conservation techniques to assist in identification (Wayne 
1992: 4,5).  In 1146 a force from Powys crossed the River Dee and began to 
ravage the cantref of Maelor Saesneg, they were challenged by the forces of 
Robert of Mold and defeated at the battle of Wich (NPRN: 404862 and Lloyd 
1912: 491).  
 In 1150 the Welsh forces of Gwynedd under the command of Owain 
Gwynedd and a force from Powys, reinforced with a contingent of Anglo-
Norman allies met in the field at Coleshill.  The purpose of this campaign 
against Owain was to check the expansion of Gwynedd, into Powys and 
Cheshire.  ‘In that year Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the 
help of Ranulf, earl of Chester, to rise up against Owain.  And after the host of 
his supporters had been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (Brut Pen. 20: 57; NPRN: 
404847).  The 1157 Battle of Coleshill, fought in connection with the 1157 
Coastal Campaign, was fought near the location of the 1150 event.  As the 
1157 battle is one of the case studies considered, it will be discussed in detail in 
the following Case Study and Military Terrain Analysis chapters. 
  
Castles 
There are eleven castles with documented events of armed conflict in Flintshire, 
almost double the amount of any other county within the study area.  This is 
because the disputed border-zone between Wales and England was further 
west than the modern boundary between Flintshire and Cheshire.  This is also 
why there were considerably fewer Anglo-Norman marcher castles in western 
Cheshire than in the western districts of Shropshire or Herefordshire.  
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Rhuddlan Castle’s earth and timber predecessor now known as Twt Hill, 
was constructed in 1073 by Robert of Rhuddlan seemingly on top of an earlier 
Welsh centre, it was replaced by an Edwardian masonry castle in 1277 (see 
Figure 26 below).  This castle endured a series of attacks sieges by the Welsh 
in 1075, 1167 and again in 1213 (King 1983: 154).  In 1075 Gruffudd ap Cynan 
led an assault of Rhuddlan Castle where he ‘laid waste and burnt everything 
taking home extremely rich spoils.  Many of their [Rhuddlan’s] armoured and 
helmeted cavalry fell from their horses and perished in the battle, and many of 
the infantry too; and barely a few of the Gauls safely retreated to the tower 
unharmed’ (LGC: 63).  According to this account from The Life of Gruffudd ap 
Cynan, the Welsh did not successfully capture the castle, although it is apparent 
that some damage was inflicted.  In 1167 ‘Owain and Cadwaladr, princes of 
Gwynedd, and Rhys from Deheubarth, gathered together with their hosts to 
attack the castle of Rhuddlan.  And they besieged it for three months; and after 
taking the castle and destroying it, and burning it, and after they had won the 
victory, they returned again joyfully to their lands’ (Brut Pen 20: 64-65).  Finally 
in 1213 Llywelyn the Great took permanent possession of Rhuddlan Castle 
(NPRN: 157156 and Brut Pen 20: 87-88), this is the same year that he took 
possession of Degannwy Castle in Caernarfonshire (see above), a castle that 
had also been originally constructed by Robert of Rhuddlan.  The final episode 
of conflict to occur at Rhuddlan was in 1282 when the Edwardian edifice was 
unsuccessfully attacked by the Welsh (NPRN: 92914).  
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Figure 26: from top to bottom: Twt Hill and Rhuddlan Castle (photos by the author). 
  
Mold Castle was constructed sometime prior to 1146 (NPRN: 307119) 
when it was successfully besieged and taken by Gwynedd.  This was 
accomplished in lieu of Owain’s conquest of the marcher territory that abutted 
the north-eastern frontier of Gwynedd.  For ‘neither the nature of the place nor 
tis strength nor its forces could defend it from being burnt and completely 
destroyed; and many of the garrison were slain and others captured and 
imprisoned’ (Brut Pen. 20: 54-55).  Presumably Mold Castle was rebuilt as it 
was besieged again in 1199, 1245 and 1256 (King 1983: 154).  Similar to the 
situation described above between the marcher lords and Stephen, Owain took 
advantage of the struggle between Powys and Robert of Mold.  While Powys 
and the Anglo-Normans were engaged in the Battle of Wich (NPRN: 94737). 
 Coleshill Castle, also known as Hen Blas was built in 1157 and was 
captured by the Welsh in 1166 (NPRN: 307131; Brut Pen. 20: 64); further 
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discussion of the castle and its role in the 1157 Battle of Coleshill can be found 
in the 1157 Case Study chapter and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.  
Prestatyn Castle was built prior to 1167, when it was destroyed by the Welsh, 
during the same campaign that targeted Rhuddlan and Hen Blas (Coleshill; 
NPRN: 92922 and King 1983: 154; Brut RBH: 149).  Holywell Castle was 
probably constructed sometime during the middle of the twelfth century.  This 
castle is also identified as the possible site of Basingwerk Castle, now vanished.  
Similar to Prestatyn, Rhuddlan and Basingwerk were successfully besieged by 
the Welsh in 1166 (NPRN: 300557 and King 1983: 155; Brut Pen. 20: 64).  
Basingwerk is recorded as the site where the forces of Owain Gwynedd 
encamped prior to the battle of Coleshill with Henry II in 1157.  Henry II also 
fortified a castle at Basingwerk at the conclusion of the 1157 campaign 
(Annales Cestrienses yr.1157; AC, B text: 87).    
It should be noted that there is some confusion over the location and 
naming of Hen Blas (or Coleshill Castle) and Basingwerk Castle.  As there are 
no visible remains of a castle within the modern boundaries of Basingwerk it is 
possible that Basingwerk is in reality Hen Blas, particularly since they were 
constructed in the same year, 1157.  Therefore, Hen Blas and Basingwerk are 
rather confusingly referred to interchangeably. King has suggested that 
Basingwerk is most likely Bryn Castell, a tumulus of undetermined origin east of 
Hen Blas, however, his reasons for this are unclear and unverified (King 1983: 
153). Further discussion of this can be found in both the 1157 Case Study 
chapter and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. 
 Hawarden Castle was an earth and timber motte and bailey constructed 
sometime prior to the thirteenth century when it was converted into a masonry 
castle in 1297, (see Figure 27 below).  It was besieged in 1205, 1282 and 1294.  
In 1205 it was besieged by the Welsh unsuccessfully as the castle garrison was 
relieved by English royal forces (NPRN: 95095 and King 1983: 153).  Hawarden 
wood has been connected with a battle events the 1157 campaign and will be 
discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). 
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Figure 27: Hawarden Castle (photo by the author). 
 
Dyserth Castle, built in 1241 by King Henry III is thought to have been 
built on the site of a prehistoric hillfort; it was attacked by the Welsh in 1245 and 
destroyed by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1263 following a blockade and siege.  
There is a poor level of preservation at this site, as Dyserth Castle was quarried 
in the early twentieth century (NPRN: 92974; CPAT: 102060). 
 Ewloe Castle was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257, following his 
seizure of most of present day Flintshire from England.  The castle was possibly 
built on the site of llys dating to the eleventh or twelfth centuries, although this 
claim has yet to be substantiated (Davies-Cook 1891). The castle was 
successfully besieged and destroyed by King Edward I in 1277 following the 
refusal of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to do homage to newly crowned King Edward I 
in 1272 (NPRN: 94447 and King 1983: 132).  Flint Castle was constructed in 
1277 by Edward I and was used as a base of operation for the Edwardian 
conquest of Wales.  Flint Castle was the first in what would become a ring of 
masonry castles constructed by Edward in Gwynedd.  It was unsuccessfully 
besieged by Dafydd ap Gruffudd (brother to Llywelyn ap Gruffudd) in 1282 
(NPRN: 94448 and King 1983:152).  Caergwrle Castle was the last Welsh 
masonry to be built.  It was constructed in 1278 by Dafydd ap Gruffudd and was 
abandoned to the English in 1282, presumably following the death of Llywelyn 
ap Gruffudd (NPRN: 95099 and King 1983: 151).  
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Merioneth 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Merioneth.  Google Earth 7.0 (2013) North Wales, Merioneth, 52˚48’34.08”N 
3˚52’59.57”W, eye alt. 128.03km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
  
 
Battlefields 
There are only three battlefields documented within the historical boundaries of 
Merioneth; of these only one is relevant to the Anglo-Norman and Welsh theatre 
of war.  The Battle in Dyffryn Glyncul also known as Gwaeterw or the ‘Bloody 
Acre’, was between Gruffudd ap Cynan and Trahaearn ap Caradog in 1075 
(NPRN: 404928).  This battle was one in a series of attempts, fought over the 
course of six years as Gruffudd sought to reclaim Gwynedd from Powys.  
Gruffudd was successful in this particular instance and ultimately regained 
control of Gwynedd in 1081 (LGC: 63).  In 1094 ‘the French brought a host to 
Gwynedd; and against them came Cadwgan ap Bleddyn, and he defeated them 
and drove them to flight, inflicting great slaughter upon them.  And that battle 
was in Coedysbys’’(Brut Pen. 20: 19).  In 1216 there was a battle between King 
John and Ffouike Fitzwarren at the alleged battle site of Llynor near Llandrillo.  
Although an intra-English conflict it is possible that one or both sides could have 
received Welsh assistance (NPRN: 404924).   
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Castles 
Cymer, the first Welsh built castle, constructed by Uchdryd ap Edwin in 1116 
was destroyed in the same year (NPRN: 93825). ‘For Cadwgan ap Bleddyn [at 
that time an ally of King Henry I] had given Meirionnydd and Cyfeiliog to 
Uchdryd on this condition: that he should be a true inseparable friend to him 
and his sons and a helper against all opposition that might come upon them.  
He [Uchdryd], however, was opposed to Cadwgan and his sons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 
40-46).  It is unclear whether Uchdryd ap Edwin had allied himself with 
Gwynedd and Gruffudd ap Cynan.  Castell Cynfal, another Welsh built castle, 
was destroyed as a result of an intra-Gwynedd conflict in 1147 and had 
probably only been constructed several years previous to its destruction.  
‘[S]trife was begotten between the sons of Owain, Hywel and Cynan, and 
Cadwaladr, their uncle.  And then Hywel, from the one direction, and Cynan, 
from the other came together to Merionnydd… they turned their army towards 
the castle of Cynfael, which Cadwaladr had built […] Hywel and Cynan […] took 
the castle by force’ (Brut. Pen 20: 55-56). 
 Castle Tomen y Bala was built by the Welsh and may be an associated 
defensive feature of the llys of the Penllyn commote.  It is unclear when it was 
originally constructed but it was taken by the English in 1202 and remained in 
use through the thirteenth century (NPRN: 303419).  Castell y Bere (see Figure 
29 below) was a masonry castle constructed by Llywelyn the Great in 1221 to 
protect the southern boundaries of Gwynedd; it was captured by the English in 
1283.  In 1294 the Welsh unsuccessfully attempted to retake the castle (NPRN: 
93719 and King 1983: 276). 
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Figure 29: Castell y Bere, from RCAHMW D.O.E. Photographic Collection: C.538332 NPRN: 
93719, from the collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: 
Department of the Environment. 
 
Cheshire 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Cheshire (note: Stockport Castle not shown as exact location is unknown (King 1983: 
67-71). Google Earth 7.0 (2013) Marcher Counties, Cheshire, 53˚11’22.50”N 2˚44’55.10”W, eye 
alt. 173.14km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
 
 
Castles 
Chester Castle was commissioned in 1070 by William the Conqueror.  
Throughout its prolonged history it served as an operations base for multiple 
Anglo-Norman monarchs and marcher earls in their campaigns into Wales.  It 
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was not directly involved, insofar as it was not besieged, in any events of armed 
conflict against the Welsh.  The only exception to this was its involvement in 
inter-English conflict, the Barons’ Rebellion in 1265, but it is unclear if the 
English had any Welsh allies at this particular event (NMR: SJ46NW44).  
Beeston Castle (see Figure 31 below), was built in the 1220s by Ranulf de 
Blundeville, the sixth earl of Chester.  It was captured by Prince Edward in 
1265, also probably in connection to the Baron’s Rebellion.  Again it is unclear 
whether there was any Welsh involvement in this action (NMR: SJ55NW3 and 
King 1983: 65). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Beeston Castle, from NMR SJ55NW3.  (This image has been removed by the author 
of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
 The following group of castles do not appear to be scheduled 
monuments as no national monument record was found to exist.  Dunham 
Massey, Stockport and Ullenswood Castles are documented in King’s 
Castellarium Anglicanum where they are sourced to The Chronicles of the 
Reigns of Henry II and Richard I by the chronicler Benedict of Peterborough.  
They were involved in the revolt of 1173-1174, when the sons of Henry II and 
their supporters rebelled against him.  It is unclear whether any Welsh lords or 
princes were included in this group of supporters (King 1983: 67-71).   
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Shropshire 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Shropshire (note: the ‘Capture of Shrewsbury’ is the same location as the siege of 
Shrewsbury Castle).  Google Earth 7.0 (2013) Marcher Counties, Shropshire, 52˚50’16.37”N 
2˚52’35.67”W, eye alt. 129.68km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] 
Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
 
 
Battlefields 
In 1215 ‘the men of the North from the one side rose up against him [(King 
John)], and the Welsh from the other side….And Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, Prince of 
Gwynedd, and the Welsh made for Shrewsbury; and the town and castle were 
surrendered to them without resistance’ (Brut Pen. 20: 89-92).  The capture of 
the town of Shrewsbury, including the castle (described in further detail below) 
was not a battle in the traditional sense as they were both surrendered ‘without 
resistance.’  The ease with which Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and his Welsh allies 
were able to capture Shrewsbury, seat of the earldom of Shrewsbury, speaks to 
the strength of a united Wales.  
 
Castles 
In connection with the conflict described above, Shrewsbury Castle was 
commissioned by William the Conqueror and built by Robert de Montgomery, 
the first earl of Shrewsbury, sometime during the last quarter of the eleventh 
century.  It was besieged on two separate occasions prior to 1215 when it was 
successfully taken by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, once in 1102 and again in 1138.  
The 1108 siege was in lieu of a conflict between the barons and Henry I.  It was 
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besieged by King Stephen in 1138 in connection to the civil war between 
Stephen and Matilda (NMR: SJ41SE45 and King 1983: 430).  Oswestry Castle 
was built sometime prior to 1086 when it is recorded as Luvre Castle in 
Domesday.  It was captured by Madog ap Maredudd, Prince of Powys in 1149 
and then rebuilt as a masonry castle; it was destroyed by King John in 1216 
(NMR: SJ22NE1; King 1983: 427 and Brut Pen. 20: 57).  Oswestry Castle was 
used as a military base by Henry II before setting out on the 1165 Berwyn 
Mountain Campaign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Shrawardine Castle, from NMR SJ41NW5.  (This image has been removed by the 
author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
Shrawardine Castle, a shell keep situated on a motte including three 
baileys, was constructed by the order of King Henry I some time during the first 
quarter of the twelfth century (see Figure 33 above).  It was destroyed by 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in 1215 as part of the campaign against Shrewsbury 
(NMR: SJ41NW5 and King 1983: 429).  Whittington Castle was built by the 
Anglo-Normans as an earth and timber motte and bailey in 1138; it was 
converted into a masonry castle in 1221.  In 1223 it was captured by Llywelyn 
ap Iorwerth but was later restored to English control by King Henry III (NMR: 
SJ33SW7; King 1983: 432).  Ruyton Castle, of an unknown construction date, 
was destroyed by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in 1212 (NMR: SJ32SE6).  Similar to 
Ruyton, the castle of Belan Bank is of an unknown construction date.  It was 
captured by the Welsh in 1223, probably by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth.  It was not 
destroyed but was out of use by 1249 (NMR: SJ32SW2 and King 1983: 425).  
Hodnet Castle near Marchamely may have been built as a siege-work in 1223.  
It is also possible that there was an existing motte at Hodent that was modified 
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into a siege work in response to renewed warfare with the Welsh (NMR: 
SJ52NE8). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The conflict landscape reconstruction of Gwynedd, Cheshire and Shropshire 
from the period of 1066-1272 has highlighted the significant role of castles in 
determining the success or failure of Anglo-Norman conquest attempts and 
Welsh resistance efforts.  A clustering of castles is evident in the frontier zones 
both along the borders between Gwynedd, Cheshire and Shropshire, and along 
the coast.   Although less complete of a representation (due to the difficulty in 
determining their location), battles also occurred within highly contested frontier 
zones.  Welsh verse Anglo-Norman battles took place on the periphery of these 
frontiers, such as at Coleshill, Crogen and Wich; while inter-Welsh conflict took 
place along commotal boundaries (see Figures 12 and 13).  Additionally, as has 
been discussed in the chapter on Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare, the Welsh 
adoption of castle building technology is indicative an adaptation to a Vegetian 
style of warfare.  By the mid-twelfth century, Owain Gwynedd was using castles 
in a similar manner to the Anglo-Normans; to secure his claim to the land he 
had conquered (e.g. Tomen y Rhodwydd).  The prolific use of the castle as a 
symbol and scion of conquest and security presents a visual pattern of 
conquest and resistance that was epitomized by the systematic destruction of 
Welsh built castles during the Edwardian Conquest.   
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Figure 34: All battlefield sites in study area.  Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, All Study Area Battlefields, 52˚58’41.24”N 3˚27’09.06”W, eye alt. 
175.32km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
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Figure 35: All castle sites with evidence of armed conflict in study area. Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, All Study Area Castles, 52˚58’41.24”N 
3˚27’09.06”W, eye alt. 175.32km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth. 
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Chapter Six – Introduction and Overview of the 1157 Coastal Campaign 
 
 
Most deeply does the deep pain of his taking away pierce me, 
A cruel one in claiming his right in a fierce attack 
Whenever red blood flowed, 
A torrent upon a spear at the ready. 
 
The sword of the one who was ardent in versecraft was ready 
On the day of battle by Chester strand, 
One swift to anger, a shield in a hundred battles, 
A hero, a splendid hero, a foremost slayer in battle. 
Excerpt from the twelfth-century poem An elegy for Bleddyn Fardd: Cynddelw sang it  
(in Gruffydd 2003: 57). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Henry II ascended to the English throne in December of 1154 and by 1157 he 
had organised a military campaign against Gwynedd.  Henry II’s active 
involvement in Wales, initiated by the 1157 Coastal Campaign, hallmarked an 
era of renewed royal interest in Wales that had not been seen since the reign of 
his grandfather, Henry I (d. 1135).  The purpose of this campaign was to check 
Gwynedd’s eastwards expansion and in doing so, neutralize them as a threat to 
the Anglo-Norman marcher territories and the neighbouring Welsh principality of 
Powys.  The wider goal of this assault was to continue the conquest efforts of 
Henry I, in an attempt to subdue and conquer the Welsh.  Gwynedd’s response 
to Henry II’s 1157 and 1165 campaigns is unique as it demonstrates how the 
Welsh, and Gwynedd in particular, successfully adjusted their military tactics to 
compensate for the Anglo-Norman threat (see the Welsh and Anglo-Norman 
Medieval Warfare chapter).  The successful application of these tactical 
innovations established a new precedent and pattern of Welsh resistance to the 
Anglo-Norman Conquest.  These behavioural shifts are documented and 
discussed in detail in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.   
As reviewed in the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter, 
battle was a rare event in medieval conflicts (see page 81) and usually only took 
place either by force, such as in a siege, or ‘when both sides wanted to, and 
thought they had a chance of winning’ (Verbruggen 1997: 329).  The Battle of 
Coleshill is one of these rare exceptions, when the Welsh forces led by Dafydd 
and Cynan, the sons of Owain Gwynedd, ambushed Henry’s troops, forcing 
them into battle (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). The Battle of Coleshill was one of two 
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battles that took place during the 1157 Coastal Campaign; the other was the 
Battle of Moelfre which took place on the Isle of Anglesey.  Due to a dearth of 
evidence for the Battle of Moelfre, it will not be subjected to spatial analysis and 
its inclusion within the 1157 campaign discussion is limited to the conflict 
landscape reconstruction of the 1157 campaign core area in the next chapter.  
The following is a summary of the source material and a synopsis of the 1157 
Coastal Campaign.   This historical overview provides a platform for the gross- 
pattern analysis presented in the next chapter.  A significant proportion of this 
discussion is given to the historiography of the Battle of Coleshill; this is due to 
inaccuracies in antiquarian publications that have led to the identification of an 
unsubstantiated battle event at Ewloe in connection with the 1157 campaign.   
 
 
Source Material 
 
Previous Academic Inquiry 
Academics past and present have shown an undeniable favouritism for the era 
of Edwardian Conquest in Wales at the close of the thirteenth century, much of 
this focus can be credited to the popularity of the study of Edwardian castles in 
Wales (Gravett 2012; Butler 2010; Longley 2010; Prestwich 2010; Prestwich 
1988; Morris 1901; Chrimes 1969; Lloyd 1917).  Thus, the grandeur associated 
with events of the Edwardian Conquest, most notably the castles that were its 
outcome, has overshadowed the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales during the 
twelfth century.  However, the twelfth century has not been ignored in entirety 
by the academic community.  The events that transpired during Henry II’s 1157 
campaign into Gwynedd have been analysed by a handful of historians, notably 
J.E. Lloyd (1912), D.C. King (1965), J.G. Edwards (1967) and J.D. Hosler 
(2004).  These events have not been subjected to any prior archaeological 
investigation.    
King’s and Hosler’s research centres on the military abilities of Henry II, 
both concluding that he was more adept than the chroniclers recording events 
indicate.  Edwards attempts to ascertain more accurately the location of 
Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk and the location of the battle.  In an 
attempt to rectify the discrepancy in the manuscripts that list the site of the 
battle either in Hawarden Wood or Coleshill (see historiography section below), 
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Edwards essentially averages the distance putting the site of the battle 
somewhere between Hawarden and Coleshill (1967: 262).  Lloyd summarises 
the events that transpired in 1157 with his usual flair, and while his narrative 
provides a solid overview of events, it is too full of artistic licence to use as a 
reference.  Additionally, Lloyd’s translations of the Latin manuscripts are less 
accurate than those by Jones (1952).  Unfortunately, many scholars and 
heritage bodies have relied heavily on Lloyd’s translations and interpolations – 
even though many of these manuscripts now have proper translations – 
propagating further errors and inhibiting scholarly advancement.  The over-
reliance on Lloyd has been noted by other scholars such as W. Davies who, 
although predominantly discussing pre-Conquest Wales states: ‘most aspects 
of most [manuscript] interpretations are arguable.  For that very reason Sir John 
Lloyd's interpretation of early Welsh political development, which has dominated 
all consideration of pre and post-Norman Conquest politics since the early 
twentieth century, needs questioning’ (1990:4).   
 
  
Manuscripts 
The 1157 campaign timeline, to follow in the next chapter, is predominantly 
derived from five principal twelfth-century sources.  The most detailed accounts 
are found in the Peniarth 20 and the Red Book of Hergest versions of the Brut y 
Tywysogyon, the Brehinedd y Saesson, Annales Cambriae (B and C texts) and 
the William of Newburgh version of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, 
Henry II and Richard I.  The Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales), 
Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, 
Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (the Robert of 
Torigni version), the Great Roll of the Pipe (Pipe Roll Series), The Historical 
Works of Gervase of Canterbury and The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond 
were also consulted.  The Annales Cambriae, Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 
version and Brut y Tywysogyon Red Book of Hergest version manuscripts are 
all believed to have been derived from one original lost Latin text which could be 
used for justification to not compare or consult all three.  However, there are 
‘specific comments within the texts of the Bruts which do not appear in any 
version [A, B, C texts] of the Annales Cambriae.  This in turn suggests that the 
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Annales and the Bruts used separate texts for their narratives, although their 
similarities would suggest that these texts themselves originated from an 
original St David’s chronicle’ (Remfry 2007: 2).  Therefore, for the purposes of 
this research they have been treated as three distinct texts. 
 
 
Campaign Overview and Historical Context 
 
Historical Context 
Wales was largely ignored by the English Crown during the civil war resulting 
from the ‘Anarchy’ that consumed King Stephen’s reign (1135-1154).  This 
enabled the Welsh to strengthen their borders and reclaim territory lost to the 
English during the reign of Henry I.  Many Welsh princes also capitalized on the 
power vacuum created during the Anarchy in the Welsh Marches, expanding 
their territories to the east into the highly contested frontier zone (Davies 1987: 
45-7; Crouch 1994).  The reclamation and expansion of territory led to 
competition and created friction between neighbouring Welsh principalities, 
which in some cases led to armed conflict, such as the 1150 Battle of Coleshill 
(discussed below). 
Owain ap Gruffudd, better known as Owain Gwynedd came to power in 
Gwynedd in 1137, following the death of his father, Gruffudd ap Cynan.  He 
spent the first two decades of his reign strengthening his kingdom and 
expanding its borders to the east.  Due to the turbulence caused by the 
anarchy, the first twenty years of his reign was relatively free from Anglo-
Norman intervention.  Powys, Gwynedd’s Welsh neighbour to the east and 
southeast, was attempting to expand their territory into the same region of the 
Welsh Marches as Gwynedd, the commote of Tegeingl (see Figure 12).  In 
1146 the Anglo-Norman contingent at Mold challenged the Powsian conquest of 
the marcher territory of Maelor Saesneg at the Battle of Wich near Whitchurch 
(Brut Pen. 20: 54-5; NPRN 404862).  Owain Gwynedd, taking advantage of 
their distraction successfully besieged and claimed Mold Castle.  In doing so he 
was able to securely establish himself in this contested region, and in one 
shrewd manoeuvre was able to abolish Anglo-Norman control of the area and 
annex part of northern Powys to Gwynedd’s dominion.  To further secure his 
annexation of Mold and northern Powys, Owain built the timber motte castle of 
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Iâl (popularly identified with either Tomen y Rhodwydd or Tomen y Faerdre) in 
1149 (Brut Pen. 20: 57).  In the meantime Oswestry Castle, an early Anglo-
Norman construction appearing in Domesday (Suppe 1984), was taken by 
Madog ap Maredudd either in 1147 or 1148 (ibid), Oswestry did not stay under 
Welsh control for long, as it was used by Henry II as an operations base prior to 
setting out on the 1165 campaign (see Chapters Eight and Nine on the Berwyn 
Mountain Campaign).  Owain’s conquest of northern Powys did not go 
unchallenged, In 1150 Madog ap Maredudd of Powys contested Owain 
Gwynedd’s claim to northern Powys at the Battle of Coleshill.  ‘In that year 
Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the help of Ranulf, earl of 
Chester, to rise up against Owain.  And after the host of his supporters had 
been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (ibid).   The allied Welsh and Anglo-Norman 
contingent from Powys and Chester were unable to subdue Owain in battle, and 
his claim to the region remained unchallenged until Henry II’s Coastal 
Campaign against Gwynedd in 1157 (ibid).  
 
 
Campaign Overview 
Prior to 1157 discord arose between Owain Gwynedd and his brother Cadwaldr 
in which ‘Owain had ejected his brother Cadwaladr’ and proclaimed himself the 
sole ruler of Gwynedd (King 1965: 369).  As discussed in the earlier chapters on 
Medieval Warfare and Chronology, the Welsh system of partible inheritance 
meant that kingdoms were frequently divided amongst siblings.  Due to this, 
conflict between siblings was common, as they sought to reclaim the land that 
had belonged to their father.  Cadwaldr, disgruntled by the loss of his territory, 
reportedly sought the assistance of King Henry II.  Undoubtedly Henry was 
delighted with Cadwaladr’s request, ‘since its fulfilment would involve a division 
of Owain’s authority and a legitimate reason to invade Gwynedd (ibid).  
However, given that Owain had already seized marcher territory, namely the 
cantref of Tegeingl (which incorporates all of the territories displayed below in 
Figure 36), as well as the Powysian commote of Iâl it was unlikely that Henry 
needed any further excuse to wage war against Gwynedd.     
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Figure 36: the contested region of northeast Wales (after Owen 1994: xxvii, this image has been 
removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
In 1157 Henry II gathered a large force near Chester, some of the 
manuscripts indicate that Madog ap Maredudd of Powys assisted the king on 
this expedition, as at this point Powys was allied with England (Brut Pen. 20: 
59-60).  From Chester, Henry led his troops up the coastal Roman road to 
where Owain Gwynedd and his Welsh forces were encamped at Basingwerk.  
At an undisclosed distance from Basingwerk Henry divided his forces into two 
contingents.  One group continued along the coastal road while the other turned 
aside into the forest (coed or coet in the Brut) with the intention of looping 
around in order to assault the Welsh forces from the front and rear (ibid).  
Unfortunately for Henry, Owain anticipated this manoeuvre and had strategically 
stationed his sons, Cynan and Dafydd, in an attempt to prevent any such 
advance.  At a disputed location in the woods between Hawarden and 
Basingwerk, Cynan and Dafydd led a force that ambushed Henry in the woods 
with devastating effects to the Anglo-Norman troops, who suffered heavy 
casualties.  Although that ambush proved damaging for the Anglo-Norman 
contingent they were able to regroup and continue to where the bulk of Owain’s 
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force remained encamped at Basingwerk.  Aware that he was about to be 
surrounded, Owain retreated to a place of refuge referred to in some of the 
sources as Tâl- Llwyn Pynna or Cil Owain.  Henry did not pursue Owain; 
instead he gathered his divided force and continued to Rhuddlan.  While 
encamped at Rhuddlan the king endured a series of raids by the Welsh forces 
(ibid; BS: 159; RBH: 135; AC: 87).  
At the same time these events were transpiring a naval contingent sent 
by Henry was arriving at Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd.  The order of 
battle on Anglesey is less certain; however it is clear that after pillaging several 
of the island’s churches the Anglo-Normans were met in battle by the men of 
Anglesey and were driven back to sea in a crushing defeat.  Due to the 
prolonged impasse at Rhuddlan and the defeat on Anglesey, Henry and Owain 
entered into negotiations and arrived at a settlement whereby Henry would 
leave Gwynedd in exchange for Welsh hostages and the return of the territory 
that Owain had acquired in Powys and the marches (ibid).  Traditionally 
historians have regarded the conclusion to these events as a crushing defeat 
for Owain Gwynedd.  The analysis that follows challenges these assumptions 
and seeks to reinstate a native Welsh narrative, via an archaeological conflict 
landscape analysis, into what has become an oversimplified conflict account 
clouded by an Anglo-Norman bias in modern scholarship (Warren 1973; Hosler 
2004; Duffy 2007). 
 
 
Historiography of the Battle of Coleshill  
 
Currently there exist two traditions for the location of the 1157 battle event, 
referred to in this study as the Battle of Coleshill.  This distinction is supported 
by manuscripts referenced above and by three manuscripts in particular that 
identify Coleshill by name as the site of the battle: The Journey Through Wales 
(Book II Ch. 7: 189, Book II Ch. 10: 196), the Annales Cestrienses (yr. 1157) 
and The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond (110).  This location is also 
archaeologically confirmed using the conflict archaeology methods of military 
terrain and spatial analysis; the results from these analyses are described in the 
Military Terrain Analysis chapter.  Conversely, the Battle of Coed Eulo (or Ewloe 
Wood, presently located in Wepre Wood Park) has been popularized by local 
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historical societies and the press as the location of the 1157 battle event.  This 
misidentification is the result of earlier erroneous antiquarian research.  This 
error needs to be addressed, particularly given the extensive commemoration 
and press that Coed Eulo has undeservedly received (for example: BBC News 
2008; Fflint Through the Ages n.d.; Green 2012; North Wales Post 2008).   
 The other manuscripts do not agree on a named location for the battle.  
Jones’s 1952 English translation of Peniarth 20 version of the Brut names the 
wood of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20; 59-60), whereas the Red Book of Hergest 
merely states that the battle transpired in a ‘wild wood’ (RBH: 135).  The original 
Welsh word for Hawarden as documented in the Brut has been transliterated in 
different ways, depending on which translation of the Peniarth 20 is consulted.  
The 1860 translation by J.W. Ithel states Koet Kennadlaoc, however, since 
there is no ‘k’ in the medieval Welsh alphabet this was probably a poor English 
transliteration of a ‘c’ or more likely a ‘p.’  Owen, in Place Names of East 
Flintshire, states that the earliest reference to this wood is documented in 
Owain Gwynedd’s successful ambush of Henry II’s troops in 1157 as recorded 
in the Brut y Tywysogyon as ‘‘koet pennardlaoc’, ‘the wood of Penarlâg’ 
(Hawarden)’’ (1994: 169). 
A reliable translation of the Bruts did not exist until the mid- twentieth 
century, therefore, historians if they were able, could attempt to translate the 
manuscripts themselves, or more often than not, they relied on other 
translations, most notably those of David Powel.  In 1589 Powel published a 
tome entitled Historie of Cambria.  This was the first monograph to be published 
on the history of Wales and it soon became a primary reference source for 
generations of historians to follow.  Powel’s publication was arguably the 
authority on Welsh history until J.E. Lloyd’s volumes were published in 1912.  
While Powel did draw upon the medieval manuscripts for his monograph, his 
translation of them was rough and he admittedly enhanced them with records 
and accounts from his peers.  Many of the assertions in these insertions were 
later proven unfounded and devoid of any historical accuracy by J.E. Lloyd 
(Jenkins 2009).   
Despite this, Powel’s account of the 1157 campaign has endured through 
the centuries and survives in academic publications to this day.  There are two 
primary discrepancies, involving the 1157 campaign, which originate in Powel’s 
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account and are later recycled in academic literature of the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The first is that the ambush led by Owain’s 
sons, Cyan and Dafydd, took place at Coed Eulo (Ewloe Wood).  Following this 
account Powel’s manuscript provides an indented quote which he cites to W. 
Parnus lib. 2 cap. 5. This excerpt claims that the battle took place ‘in a strait at 
Counsylth’ which is translated as Coleshill (Powel 1589:150-151).  This except 
contradicts Powel’s earlier claim of the battle having taken place at Coed Eulo.  
Many later historians have interpreted Powel’s allusion to two places as two 
separate armed engagements.  The first at Coed Eulo followed by Coleshill, this 
is a surprising conclusion given that all of the manuscripts clearly reference only 
one engagement.  Powel does not clearly cite his reference or evidence for 
Coed Eulo, a flaw that J.E. Lloyd highlights, suggesting that it may be based on 
an inference on Powel’s part (Lloyd 1912: 497).  Yet, it was from this unfounded 
inference that future generations of historians would locate the 1157 ambush.     
The transcendence of Powel’s account into modern publications is 
perhaps most apparent when looking at consecutive publications of Gerald of 
Wales’, the Journey Through Wales.   In 1806 Journey was published by R.C. 
Hoare as The Itinerary of Archbishop Baldwin through Wales.  This version 
quotes Powel’s account verbatim, which is referenced as ‘the Welsh Chronicle’, 
(credited to Powel), to provide the reader with a more in-depth synopsis of the 
event, than the brief account provided by Gerald of Wales (1806: 159-161).  
Wright’s 1863 publication of Journey was included within The Historical Works 
of Giraldus Cambrensis.  Again the entirety of Powel’s account is included, 
however, unlike the 1806 version which included Powel’s narrative in the body 
of the text, the 1863 publication allocates Powel’s version to a footnote.  
Currently, in the most widely circulated translation of Journey (by Thorpe first 
published in 1978), Powel’s account is not mentioned by name.  Nevertheless it 
is still present; in a footnote, Thorpe explains to the reader that the Battle of 
Coleshill named by Gerald of Wales is in actuality the Battle of Coed Eulo.   
In 1778 in a Tour in Wales, Pennant cites Powel when discussing the 
battle of Coed Eulo.  Pennant has interpreted Powel’s indented quote 
describing the Battle of Coleshill as a secondary engagement following Coed 
Eulo (1778: 85).  In the nineteenth century other historians such as Cathrall 
(The History of North Wales 1828) and Lewis (A Topographical Dictionary of 
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Wales 1849) followed suit.  Similar descriptions were echoed in works by:  
Nichols (1872), Edwards (1914) and Louis (1854).  The legacy of the so-called 
‘Battle of Coed Eulo’ is preserved today by a faded placard at the alleged 
location of the battle near the ruins of Ewloe Caste in Wepre Park.   
Additionally, recent news articles detailing the events of the battle, and 
identifying it as Coed Eulo, can be found in local and national media outlets, a 
selection of which are referenced above.   
 
 
 
Figure 37: Placard describing the Battle of Ewloe (Coed Eulo; photo by author). 
 
 
Place-name analysis 
Although the location of a battle during 1157 at Coed Eulo has been shown to 
be an error originating with Powel, which was later transmitted to generations of 
historians, it is nonetheless important to consider the possibility of Coed Eulo as 
a battle site.  This will be done archaeological in the Military Terrain Analysis 
chapter, whereas place-name analysis is evidenced in the following discussion.    
Coed Eulo, is the name of the forest (coed is the Welsh word for forest or 
woods) that surrounds the Ewloe region.  The name was first recorded in 1337, 
preserved in Harleian MSS 4484 and again in the Recognizance Rolls in 1390, 
prior to this the woods surrounding Ewloe were included in and called the forest 
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of Hawarden (Owen 1994: 174).  Although not documented until 1337, 
presumably the name came into use following the construction of Ewloe Castle 
around 1256 by Llywelyn the Great (Davies-Cooke 1890: 3).  As previously 
mentioned, the Brut Peniarth 20 names the forest of Hawarden as the location 
of the ambush, while the Journey Through Wales, the Annales Cestrienses and 
the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond specify the location further as Coleshill, 
which historically was included within the forest of Hawarden.   There appears 
to be no direct reference to Ewloe (in any of its variations i.e. Iollo, Eulo, etc.) in 
the Domesday Book and instead it is included within the manor of Hawarden 
(Penarlag in Welsh or Haordine in early English) in the hundred of Atiscross 
(Domesday 263c/R/21, 268d/FD9/1; Tait 1925: 17).  The Coed Eulo  that 
Pennant refers to is in actuality a small remnant of the great forest of Tegeingl, 
described by G. Owen in his 1613 publication The Description of 
Pembrokeshire.  In terms of the later naming of the wood there appears to 
exists a preference amongst the Anglo-Normans to call the wood Ewloe, while 
the Welsh prefer the older name of Penarlag (Owen 1994).   Additionally 
Domesday Book only surveys the territory in Northeast Wales from Chester to 
Rhuddlan, essentially the territory that Robert of Rhuddlan conquered in the 
immediate years post the 1066 Norman Conquest.  Unlike Ewloe, Coleshill is 
documented in Domesday as Coleselt (Cwnsyllt in Welsh; Domesday 
268d/FD3/2 Tait 1925: 17).  Interestingly, there is no mention of woods at 
Coleshill, indicating that there were pockets of open land within the great forest 
of Penarlag.  The actual size of the great forest of Penarlag as recorded in 
Domesday was approximately ten by three leagues2 or 55 x 17 kilometres 
(Domesday 268d/FD3/2, 268d/FD9/1; Davies 1987: 141; Williams and Martin 
1992: 719-740).  The hundred of Atiscros is named after an ancient stone cross 
that stood within the vicinity of the modern town of Flint, this cross was probably 
a prominent landmark and perhaps even a meeting place (CPAT n.d. (a); Lloyd 
1912: 386).  
It is clear from the place-name analysis that the great forest of northeast 
Wales went by a plethora of names, depending on both date and culture 
(Welsh, English, Anglo-Norman), Perhaps one of the most intriguing references 
                                                 
2
 1 league = approximately 5.5 kilometres. 
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to this forest is in the now lost place-name of Swerdewod, meaning the ‘dark 
wood’. This could be in allusion to a part of the forest that abutted Montem 
Altum (Mold), but from the available medieval documentary evidence it seems 
more likely that this was a part of the forest close to the Wirral (Owen 1994: 
154).  The reference to Swerdewod is found in the Calendar of Ancient Petitions 
Relating to Wales in reference to Edward I’s expedition into Flintshire. 
          [The King] enclosed a great part of the manor that is to say, Ewlawe,    
          Kelynges and a great part of the wood of Swerdwode… The King hath  
          commanded to cut the Passes of Swerdwode but there came forth the  
          people of Wryhale and of all Cestresire that all the people might go to this  
          same wood of Swerdwode and they took fuel and they cut throughout and  
          everywhere at their will.  And thus they waste this wood and cut it, beside  
          the passes and not at all in the pass (in Owen 1994: 154). 
 
Originally Pennardlaawc (later Hawarden) was the name of a large area 
that included a settlement, a church and some form of fortification or enclosure, 
perhaps a cattle enclosure as the second half of the name Pennardlaawc is 
most likely derived from alaawg or alaog, meaning cattle, or ‘rich in cattle’ if the 
‘og’ suffix is added.  The first part of the name pennardd is Welsh for height or 
high land.  The original settlement of Pennardlawwc or Penarlag was conquered 
by the Mercians, sometime prior to the arrival of the Normans, and came to be 
known as Haordine, it is from this name that the modern name Hawarden 
evolved (Owen 1994: 62-3).  Place-name evidence suggests that a 
considerable area of the landscape west and south of Haordine continued to be 
referred to as Pennardlaawc.  Additionally, and perhaps most derisive in terms 
of locating the battle the koet pennardlaoc referred to the in Brut Peniarth 20, is 
that this region seems to correspond with the portion of the great forest of 
Tegeingl that was at elevation and west of the Hawarden settlement (ibid).  
This, coupled with the reference to Coleshill in the sources mentioned above, 
would seemingly focus the location of the battle within the commote of Coleshill 
and within the portion of the forest that was at elevation.  Gerald of Wales 
alludes to this landscape feature when describing the battle location as 
occurring at a ‘narrow wooded pass near Coleshill’ (Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189), 
given the place-name analysis and landscape history reconstruction, it seems 
clear that Gerard of Wales is in fact naming the koet pennardaoc of the Bruts, 
which was the portion of the great forest of Tegeingl between Chester and 
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Rhuddlan located on a ridgeline within the commote of Coleshill.  It is also 
unsurprising that Edward I ordered the woodland within the ‘passes’ cleared 
(see quote above), particularly given the ambush Henry II had sustained in such 
a landscape more than one hundred years previous.   
Although multiple sources document the forest as dark, dense and wild 
there were evidently pockets of cleared or open land within the forest.  
Domesday Book makes no reference to woodland within the commote of 
Coleshill (Domesday 268d/FD2/6; Tait 1925: 10-87).  Additionally, the 1150 
battle of Coleshill between Owain Gwynedd and Powys allied with the earl of 
Chester seems to have been an open-field engagement (Brut Pen. 20: 57).  
This would suggest that although possibly in close proximity to one another, the 
1150 and 1157 battles of Coleshill took place in different locations, a probability 
that is reflected by RCAHMW and the OS Map series (further discussion of this 
can be found in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter).  It must also be noted that 
despite the numerous historic references, it is impossible to ascertain the exact 
degree to which northeast Wales was afforested in the mid-twelfth century.  The 
descriptions found within these sources are useful insofar as they provide an 
outline for reconstructing the historic landscape.  Given the above textual and 
place-name evidence it seems highly unlikely that a battle transpired within 
Ewloe Wood at the location commemorated in the plaque above (see Figure 
37).  Instead the evidence suggests that the battle transpired in a wooded 
location at elevation within the commote of Coleshill.  Military terrain analysis 
will be used to further ascertain the location of the battle.   
 
 
Campaign Legacy 
 
Following the failure of the amphibious assault on Anglesey (the Battle of 
Moelfre), and due to the losses he had suffered at Coleshill, Henry was forced 
to seek peace terms with Owain.  In return for being left in peace, Owain agreed 
to relinquish Tegeingl and Iâl.  Cadwaladr’s lands were returned as well (AC B 
text: 87).  Owain also agreed to pay homage to Henry, indicating that he had 
entered into a client-kingdom relationship with Henry (a further discussion of the 
homage which was performed at Woodstock can be found in Chapter Eight, 
page 244).  However, the nature of Welsh clientship, as established by Davies 
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(1990), would suggest that this would not have been regarded as a binding 
relationship by Owain, and would not have represented defeat.  The outcome of 
the 1157 Coastal Campaign enabled Gwynedd to endure as an independent 
native Welsh kingdom.  However, the peace of 1157 did not last, in 1165 Owain 
once again sought to extend the limits of his kingdom, this coupled with similar 
acts by other Welsh principalities led to the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign 
and the Battle of Crogen.  
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Chapter Seven – Case Study One, the 1157 Coastal Campaign 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What follows is a consideration of the actions and events encompassing the 
core area of the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the associated archaeological 
landscapes of conflict, resulting in a gross-pattern analysis.  This analysis will 
be discussed in three principal sections: 1) a timeline of conflict events as 
evidenced in the medieval manuscripts and represented spatially on maps 
created using GIS technology; 2) a consideration of the archaeological aspects 
of the events and key sites; and 3) an introduction to the military terrain analysis 
in which the historical and archaeological attributes of the key conflict events 
are synthesised.  A more in depth discussion of the spatial analysis data, in 
which the historical and archaeological data from both campaign case studies is 
synthesised to form a dynamic conflict event reconstruction, can be found in the 
following Military Terrain Analysis Chapter. 
 
 
Case study site types 
 
The following is a description of the types of archaeological sites that will be 
considered in the in the conflict landscape reconstruction and analysis of the 
1157 and 1165 campaign core areas.  Ten types of sites were investigated in 
order to reconstruct the historic landscape of conflict.  These sites, documented 
archaeologically in the Historic Environment and National Monument Records, 
and discussed in the manuscripts, are represented spatially using ArcGIS 
technology.  The following table (Table 5) lists and describes site types. 
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Site Type Description 
Battle site The site of the battle, this category also 
includes associated military sites, such 
as encampments. 
Castles Known castles that were extant during 
the period of conflict covered in the case 
study, i.e. 1157. 
Possible Castles Includes castle type features that are 
extant on the current landscape and 
vanished castles documented historically 
and/or in historic surveys but are now 
gone. 
Llys Welsh elite centres, often associated with 
palace structures and small settlements. 
Churches Only churches which could have been 
directly impacted by the conflict events 
are included. 
Transport Primarily roads, Roman and medieval.  
Also included are bridges and landmarks 
(i.e. ancient trees). 
Iron Age Hillforts Hillforts were included in the survey area 
as they offer potential vantage points and 
places of refuge. 
Roman Fort Roman forts were included in the survey 
area for the same reason as Iron Age 
hillforts 
Wat’s Dyke Wat’s Dyke was included due to its 
proximity to the case study.  As a past 
military feature it had the potential to be 
exploited by the combatants 
Offa’s Dyke Offa’s Dyke was included for the same 
reason as Wat’s Dyke. 
 
Table 5: Case study archaeological site types. 
 
Settlements were not included as Welsh settlements from this period are 
still poorly understood and poorly documented in the archaeological record (see 
Literature Review page 36 for further detail).  All castles that were extant by the 
middle of the twelfth century, regardless of whether they were directly involved 
in the conflicts being analysed, are documented spatially.  The construction of 
these castles was the product of conflict, therefore, by documenting them 
spatially the broader conflict landscape in which the 1157 Coastal Campaign 
and 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign took place, can be contextualized.  Also 
to be noted under the site type ‘probable castle’ is the distinction between 
vanished and possible castles.  Vanished castles are those for which solid 
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documentary evidence exists, but the actual built feature is no longer extant.  
Possible castles are those which have the appearance of a motte but have yet 
to be positively identified as a castle.  
Iron Age and Roman forts proximal to both case studies were included 
as not only do they evidence a tradition of conflict in this region, but as 
defensible features they had the potential to be exploited by the combatants.  
Additionally, the reuse of past military features offers an intriguing insight into 
medieval military tactics.  Offa’s and Wat’s Dyke were included in the study area 
for the same reasons.  These dykes were constructed by the early medieval 
kingdom of Mercia as a demarcation line or barrier between the Welsh and the 
English frontier (Hill 1991: 142; Williams 2009: 35).  They are yet another 
testament that this region of Wales has been highly contested since antiquity.  
Only roads for which an original element is known or visible are 
documented spatially, no attempt was made to ‘connect-the-dots’ as this could 
lead to inaccurate routes.  The same is true for the sections of Wat’s and Offa’s 
Dykes that no longer survive.  Although all of the sites represented in the 
twelfth-century landscape of conflict are relevant to the conflict events being 
discussed, only those which were directly involved with either the 1157 Coastal 
Campaign or the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign will be discussed in detail.  
British National Grid references for these sites, as well as sites reviewed in the 
study area, can be found in appendix two. 
 
 
1157 Coastal Campaign timeline 
 
The following battlefield timeline is derived from the principal twelfth-century 
sources available for this campaign.  These are the: Annales Cambriae (B and 
C texts), Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 manuscript, Brut y Tywysogyon Red 
Book of Hergest manuscript, Brenhinedd y Saesson, The Journey Through 
Wales (by Gerald of Wales), Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de 
Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II 
and Richard I (William of Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions), the Great 
Roll of the Pipe and the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond.  The most detailed 
accounts are found in are both versions of the Brut y Tywysogyon, the 
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Brehinedd y Saesson, Annales Cambriae and the William of Newburgh version 
of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I. 
 
 
Part 1, The Encampments 
 
 
 
Figure 38: The Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments from the 1157 Coastal Campaign (A = 
Welsh, B = Anglo-Normans). 
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Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red 
Book of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), 
Brenhinedd y Saesson  
Action: 
Setting up / 
fortifying 
encampments 
Location: 
Basingwerk 
(Welsh) 
camp A, 
The ‘plains 
of Chester’ 
(Anglo-
Normans) 
camp B. 
Participants: 
Welsh under 
Owain 
Gwynedd, 
Anglo-
Normans 
under Henry 
II 
Event Overview:  
The Welsh fortify their 
position at Basingwerk 
where their army is 
encamped.  Henry II 
gathers his forces at an 
undisclosed army 
encampment in the 
‘plains of Chester’ before 
embarking on his 
expedition into Wales. 
Key Sites/terrain: Basingwerk (general area), Basingwerk Castle, level 
ground around Chester (plains) 
Associated Sites: Roman road and Wat’s Dyke (near Basingwerk); 
Chester Castle and Roman road near Chester. 
 
Table 6: 1157 campaign encampment timeline 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Basingwerk encampment area. 
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The Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 version records that in 1157 ‘Henry king of 
England, led a mighty host to Chester, in order to subdue Gwynedd.  And there 
he pitched a camp.  And Owain, prince of Gwynedd, after summoning to him his 
sons and his leading men, and gathering together a mighty host, encamped at 
Basingwerk.  And he raised a ditch [(dychauel)] there to give battle to the king’ 
(Brut Pen. 20: 59).  Although no place-name is given for the encampment of 
Henry’s forces, the Red Book of Hergest and the Annales Cambriae add that it 
was in ‘the open land of Chester’ or ‘open plain of Chester (Brut RBH: 135; AC, 
B text: 87).  The Brenhinedd y Saesson indicates that ‘King Henry led his host 
as far as the marsh of Chester, and there he pitched his tents’ (BS: 159).  It is 
possible that ‘marsh’ was mistranslated and instead it meant to be march, as in 
the border between Cheshire and Wales, which would be a more logical setting 
for a military encampment than a marshland.  
 All of the sources agree that the location of Owain Gwynedd’s 
encampment was at Basingwerk.  Basingwerk is located in the present town of 
Greenfield in the parish of Holywell, although in the twelfth century it is likely 
that Basingwerk encompassed the surrounding area and may have been 
included within the commote of Coleshill (Lloyd 1917: 17).  The medieval 
sources also concur that Owain had defences raised at Basingwerk.  The Red 
Book of Hergest indicates that multiple ‘ditches [were] raised with the intention 
of giving open battle to the king’ (Brut RBH: 135).   While the Brenhinedd y 
Saesson elaborates further stating that ‘a site for a castle was measured and 
huge dykes raised’ (BS: 159), although this is unlikely given that none of the 
other manuscripts make reference to a castle, and the Bruts in particular were 
fastidious in their documentation of castles, Welsh or Anglo-Norman.  As the 
exact location of the Basingwerk encampment is not precisely known its 
representation in Figures 38 and 39 above is an approximation, based on place-
name evidence and the strategic locations of the turning point in the coastal 
Roman road and  the terminus  of Wat’s Dyke.  Similarly the inclusion of a 
Basingwerk Castle in the Basingwerk encampment vicinity is based on the 
approximations of the HER (CPAT: 102369).  There is no physical evidence that 
indicates the presence of a castle at that location, nevertheless given the 
confusion over the location of Basingwerk Castle (see page 158 and 208), the 
HER location has been represented spatially.  
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Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Chester 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red 
Book of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), 
Brenhinedd y Saesson  
Action: 
Anglo-
Norman 
march from 
Chester into 
Wales (prior 
to point of 
division of 
forces) 
Location: 
Northwest 
Cheshire 
and 
northeast 
Wales 
(Flintshire) 
Participants: 
Anglo-
Norman 
army. 
Event Overview:  
The route of march the 
Anglo-Norman forces follow 
from their encampment in 
Chester up to the point 
where the forces separate 
into two contingents. 
Key Sites/terrain: Coastal Roman road from Chester northwest through 
Wales to Basingwerk where it turns west into Gwynedd’s heartland. 
Associated Sites: Alford Castle, Pullford Castle, Dunham Massey Castle, 
Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, 
Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Shotwick Castle 
 
Table 7: 1157 campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester. 
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Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brenhinedd y 
Saesson, Journey Through Wales, Chronicles of Jocelin of Brakelond.  
Action: 
Anglo-
Norman 
route of 
march 
through 
woods 
(after 
division of 
forces). 
Location: 
West of the 
Roman road, 
possibly 
anywhere 
between 
Hawarden 
and Coleshill. 
Participants: 
Anglo-
Norman 
army. 
Event Overview:  
The point and route of march 
where the divided Anglo-
Norman contingent led by 
Henry II turns into the 
woods. 
Key Sites/terrain: Coastal Roman, forests of Hawarden, forests of 
Coleshill, Wat’s Dyke. 
Associated Sites: Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, 
Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, 
Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rosesmor. 
 
Table 8: 1157 campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester detailing 
possible turn-off points into the woods. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Anglo-Norman possible turn-off points into the woods. 
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There is some dispute between the sources regarding Henry’s progress from 
Chester into Gwynedd.  The following are relevant excerpts from the four 
primary manuscripts describing Henry’s advance into Gwynedd.  Given that 
these descriptions are important for locating the Battle of Coleshill and 
determining the order of battle, an excerpt of the relevant section of each 
manuscript is presented below.   
          And when the king heard that, he divided his host and sent many knights  
          and barons beyond number together with a strong multitude along the  
          shore towards the place where Owain was. And the king himself 
          unperturbed, and armed forces most ready to fight along with him,  
          advanced through the wood that was between them and the place where  
          Owain was (Brut RBH: 135). 
 
          And when the king heard that, he sent his host and many earls and  
          barons beyond number, and with them a strong force fully equipped,  
          along the shore towards the place which Owain was holding.  And the  
          king and an innumerable armed host, fearless and ready for battle, came  
          through the wood which was between them, which was called the wood  
          of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20: 59). 
 
          This I have often heard, the king with diligence acted cunningly, he  
          pressed on up the seashore road to Owain’s entrenchment; but before he  
          reached it he turned aside (AC, B Text: 87). 
       
           
          And after the king had heard that, he sent leaders, earls and barons  
          thither [toBasingwerk], and a great host with them (BS: 159) 
 
The Red Book of Hergest clearly states that Henry divided his forces into two 
contingents.  One division proceeded to advance along the coastal road to 
Owain’s position at Basingwerk, whist the division led by the king came through 
a wood.  Similar to the Red Book of Hergest, the Peniarth 20 although less clear 
about the division of forces, indicates that Henry led his forces through a wood, 
which is named as the wood of Hawarden (see place-name analysis section in 
the preceding chapter).  The Annales Cambriae also state that Henry turned off 
the coastal road.  It does not elaborate where between Chester and Basingwerk 
this point was, or whether it was his entire force or a contingent that left the 
road.  Unlike the three previous manuscripts the Brenhinedd y Saesson is less 
specific and seemingly indicates that Henry’s forces progressed en masse 
along the coastal road towards Basingwerk.  The four possible turn-off points 
represented above in Figure 41 were determined using place-name evidence, 
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as suggested in the manuscripts, and the physical terrain descriptions in the 
Journey Through Wales and the Chronicles of Jocelin of Brakelond, which refer 
to a narrow-wooded pass (see excerpts below). 
 
 
Part 3, The Battle 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brenhinedd y 
Saesson, Journey Through Wales, Annales Cestrienses, Chronicles of the 
Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, William of Newburgh version, 
Chronicles of Jocelin of Brakelond.  
Action: 
The 
battle. 
Location: 
Two main 
possibilities: 
the wood of 
Hawarden or 
the woods 
near Coleshill. 
Participants: 
Section of 
Anglo-Norman 
army led by 
Henry II, Welsh 
army led by 
Owain 
Gwynedd’s 
sons Cynan 
and Dafydd. 
Event Overview:  
The contingent of the Anglo-
Norman army led by Henry II 
were ambushed by Welsh 
forces whilst attempting to 
trek through the forest in an 
effort to circumnavigate 
Owain’s position at 
Basingwerk. 
Key Sites/terrain: Battle of Coleshill 1157 location (according to the 
RCAHMW), Battle of Coleshill 1150 location (according to the RCAHMW), 
Bryn Dychwelwch (supposed hill of retreat according to RCAHMW), forests 
and ravines near Hawarden, forests and ravines near Coleshill, Wat’s Dyke. 
Associated Sites: Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, 
Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, 
Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rosesmor, Basingwerk 
Encampment/castle, Moel Ffagnallt hillfort, Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor hillfort. 
 
Table 9: 1157 campaign timeline for the battle. 
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Figure 42: the two possible locations for the wooded battle, upper = Coleshill, lower = Ewloe. 
 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, the location and the history of the Battle of 
Coleshill is highly contested, with the popular assessment being that main battle 
action took place near Ewloe, the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo.  Although the 
modern academic and heritage communities make no reference to this 
erroneous event, there exist uncertainties regarding the location of the Battle of 
Coleshill. The Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust attributes the current 
battlefield location to a 1960 Ordnance Survey map (see Figure 43 below), but 
they concede that the battlefield could be located elsewhere within the Coleshill 
vicinity (CPAT: 100320).  It is curious that the 1960 Ordnance Survey locates 
the battlefield at some distance from the actual Coleshill (a geographic feature 
named Coleshill), where the 1150 battle (reviewed in the previous chapter) 
between Gwynedd and Powys was fought.  The 1150 battle location is not 
indicated on the Ordnance Survey maps, but was instead roughly located in the 
Coleshill vicinity.  The 1157 location, determined by the Ordnance Survey is 
now beneath the site of an industrial park.  Further consideration of the location 
of these battlefields can be found in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.  The 
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following manuscript excerpts detail the varying accounts regarding the location 
and the actions of the battle. 
 
Figure 43: 1960 OS Map indicating the location of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill.  
(contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 1960). 
 
          And Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him in the wild wood  
          and gave the king a severe battle.  And after many of the king’s men had  
          been slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped back to the plain  
          (Brut RBH: 135). 
 
          And there Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him, and there  
          they gave him a hard battle.  And after many of his men had been slain  
          he escaped to the open country (Brut Pen. 20: 59). 
 
          Cynan and Dafydd, with those guarding against this, gave a sharp battle,  
          and many of the king’s men were killed, those who pressed on evading  
          death (AC, B Text: 87). 
 
          And against them came Dafydd ab Owain and he pursued them as far as  
          the strand of Chester, slaughtering them murderously (BS: 159). 
 
          In our own times Henry II, king of the English, led an army into Gwynedd.   
          He was defeated in battle in a narrow wooded pass near Coleshill, that is  
          the hill of coal (Journey, Book II Ch. 7: 189). 
           
          On our right we passed the forest of Coleshill, the hill of coal.  It was there  
          in our own time that Henry II, king of the English, was badly mauled when  
          he made his first assault on Wales.  In his youthful ardour and rash  
          enthusiasm he was unwise enough to push on through this densely  
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          wooded pass, to the great detriment of his men, quite a few of whom  
          were killed (Journey, Book II Ch. 10: 196). 
 
          Henry [Essex], in the course of the Welsh war, in the difficult pass of  
          Coleshill, had treacherously cast down the standard of the lord king, and  
          proclaimed his death in a loud voice (Brakelond: 110). 
           
          A battle royal fought at Coleshill, in which Eustace (Fitz-John, fourth  
          baron of Halton), the constable (of Cheshire) perished with many of his  
          comrades (Annales Cestrienses: yr. 1157). 
 
          Therefore the king, advancing through much wrestling with the nature and  
          the bad quality of the places, had an unfortunate beginnings of the  
          business.  For part of the army, while advancing  too incautiously through  
          forested and wet places, was caught out by an ambush of enemies  
          lurking close by the road […] thinking that the king […] had fallen in death  
          with the rest, and announcing his fall to the ranks still arriving and  
          hastening to the narrows, incited not a small part of the army, having  
          been terrified by the enormity of the rumour, to flee weakly.  Therefore  
          when the king, flying rather swiftly to the disordered army, had cheered  
          them with his own appearance […] drew themselves up more cautiously  
          facing the enemy’s ambush(Chronicles W.N.: 107). 
 
Of the eight manuscripts referenced only the Annales Cestrienses, The 
Journey Through Wales and The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond specifically 
mention Coleshill in connection with the site of the battle.  Gerald of Wales in 
the Journey Through Wales, although identifying the geographical Coleshill 
specifically, as the ‘hill of coal’, states that the battle did not happen at this 
location but near it in a ‘narrow wooded pass’.  The other manuscripts, apart 
from the Brut Pen. 20 which names the location of the battle as Hawarden 
wood, indicate that it took place in an unspecified wooded area.  It is also clear 
from the various manuscripts that Henry’s forces suffered severe casualties.  
The fighting was so fierce and the casualties so great that in the confusion of 
battle the king was feared dead.  ‘Indeed those who escaped the danger, 
thinking that the king…had fallen in death with the rest, and announcing his fall 
to the ranks still arriving and hastening towards the narrows, incited not a small 
part of the army, having been terrified by the enormity of the rumour, to flee 
weakly’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107).  In terms of the location of the battle, the 
Chronicles also indicate that it was close to a road, it is unclear whether this 
was the extant Roman road or another track-way.   Regardless, this would 
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indicate that Henry’s forces were not too far from their turnoff point before they 
were ambushed.  
 
Part 4a, the Retreat of the Anglo-Norman Forces 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest 
versions) and the Brenhinedd y Saesson. 
Action: 
The 
retreat of 
the 
Anglo-
Norman 
forces. 
Location: 
A plain/flat 
area, 
possibly the 
‘strand’ of 
Chester.  
Participants: 
Section of 
Anglo-Norman 
army led by 
Henry II. 
Event Overview:  
Following the ambush in the 
woods, Henry retreats to 
what is indicated as an open 
area to regroup his forces. 
Key Sites/terrain: The shoreline northeast from the site of the battle 
possibly extending southeast to the mouth of the River Dee.  Bryn 
Dychwelwch.   
Associated Sites:  Bryn y Cwn Motte, Hen Blas Castle 
 
Table 10: 1157 Campaign timeline for the retreat of the Anglo-Norman forces. 
 
The manuscripts are vague about the order of events directly following the 
battle, only the Red Book of Hergest and the Brenhinedd y Saesson give any 
indication as to the location of Henry’s movements after the battle.  ‘And after 
many of the king’s men had been slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped 
back to the plain’ (Brut RBH: 135).  The Brenhinedd y Saesson indicates that 
Owain’s sons pursued Henry’s forces all the way to the ‘strand of Chester’ (BS: 
159), possibly the coastal plain referred to earlier from which Henry’s forces 
encamped prior to setting out on the campaign.  Alternatively, this could also be 
in reference to the coastal plain that stretches from the River Dee estuary at 
Chester northwest towards Prestatyn.  Following the retreat from the wooded 
ambush Henry regroups his forces before resuming his advance towards 
Basingwerk.  
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Part 4b, the Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B text), Brenhinedd y Saesson. 
Action: 
The Welsh 
Retreat and 
Anglo-
Norman 
repositioning 
at 
Rhuddlan. 
Location: 
The routes of 
march for 
both armies 
to their new 
positions, 
Rhuddlan, 
Tâl-Llwyn 
Pina and 
possibly Cil 
Owain. 
Participants: 
The Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman 
armies. 
Event Overview:  
Owain moves his forces to 
a new and presumably 
more defensible location in 
order to undermine Henry’s 
attempt to surround him at 
Basingwerk.  Henry 
reassembles the two 
halves of his army and 
moves them to Rhuddlan. 
Key Sites/terrain: Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain, 
Bryn Dychwelwch, Basingwerk, Roman Road. 
Associated Sites:  Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, 
Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Prestatyn Castle, The Mount (the Peel) Castle, 
Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort. 
 
Table 11: 1157 Campaign timeline for the Welsh retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at 
Rhuddlan. 
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Figure 44: repositioning of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces following the Battle of Coleshill. 
Yellow = Welsh, Red = Anglo-Norman.  There lines are not meant to represent the direction of 
travel and are not representative of the actual route of advance. 
 
Although the Welsh ambush in the woods inflicted many casualties on Henry’s 
forces, it did not weaken his army sufficiently to prevent them from advancing 
further into Gwynedd.  Once Owain became aware that his position at 
Basingwerk could be compromised he chose to remove his army to what was 
presumably a more protected position at Tâl Llwyn Pynna/Pennant or Cil 
Owain, depending on the manuscript (Brut Pen 20: 56; Brut RBH: 135). ‘Owain 
heard that the king himself was threatening his rear, while he faced the bulk of 
the king’s army, so he abandoned his entrenchment and fell back to a safe 
place.  Then the king collected his forces into one army and advanced to 
Rhuddlan where he marked out a castle’ (AC, B text: 87).  It is evident from 
these accounts that Henry, despite being weakened by the ambush still 
intended to surround the Welsh position at Basingwerk.  Owain, avoided open 
field confrontation with the Anglo-Norman forces by removing his army to a 
place of refuge; Henry then regrouped his troops and advanced to Rhuddlan. 
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Part 5, Welsh Raids on Rhuddlan 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson. 
Action: 
Welsh raids 
on Henry’s 
encampment 
at Rhuddlan. 
Location: 
Rhuddlan 
and Tâl-
Llwyn Pina 
(possibly Cil 
Owain) and 
the avenue 
of approach 
between 
them. 
Participants: 
The Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman 
armies. 
Event Overview:  
Welsh raiding parties 
harass Henry’s army 
where they are encamped 
at Rhuddlan. 
Key Sites/terrain: Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain,  
Associated Sites:  Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, 
Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort, Prestatyn 
Castle, the Mount (the Peel) Castle. 
 
Table 12: 1157 Campaign timeline of the Welsh raids on the Anglo-Normans at Rhuddlan. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Vicinity of Welsh raids on Rhuddlan. 
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Only three of the manuscripts allude to the harassment of the Anglo-Norman 
army by the Welsh while encamped at Rhuddlan (Brut Pen. 20: 59; Brut RBH: 
135; BS: 159).  Although the location of Owain’s refuge at Cil Owain (Tâl Llwyn 
Pynna) is unknown, the ability to coordinate raids on Rhuddlan would seemingly 
indicate that it was not at a great distance from Rhuddlan. From Tâl Llwyn 
Pynna Owain’s troops ‘harassed the king both by day and by night.  ‘And 
Madog ap Maredudd, lord of Powys, chose for himself his place between the 
king and Owain, where he might have the first encounter [with Owain]’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 59).  Given the description in the Brut Pen. 20 manuscript it would 
seem that this harassment was of some duration as it was occurring 
simultaneously with the assault on the Isle of Anglesey.  Intriguingly this action 
is one of the only instances, in any of the manuscripts that makes a reference to 
the involvement of Madog ap Maredudd, Prince of Powys, in this conflict as an 
ally of King Henry. 
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Part 6, the Anglo-Norman Assault on the Isle of Anglesey 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brenhinedd y 
Saesson, Journey Through Wales, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, 
Henry II and Richard I, William of Newburgh version. 
Action: 
Anglo-
Norman 
amphibious 
assault on 
the Isle of 
Anglesey, 
pillaging of 
churches and 
battle with 
the men of 
Anglesey 
Location: 
Isle of 
Anglesey, 
particularly 
the churches 
of St Mary’s, 
St Peter’s 
and St 
Tyfrydog, as 
well as an 
undisclosed 
battle 
location, 
probably 
near the sea. 
Participants: 
Anglo-
Norman 
sailors and 
soldiers and 
the ‘men of 
Anglesey’. 
Event Overview:  
Simultaneously to the 
events transpiring in 
northeast Wales, Henry 
orders a fleet to Anglesey 
to subdue the island and 
weaken Owain’s seat of 
power.  The Anglo-Norman 
soldiers ransack a few of 
the island’s churches and 
the next day face severe 
battle with the men of 
Anglesey in which they are 
defeated. 
Key Sites/terrain: Navigable bays and inlets around the island, sand 
beaches suitable for beaching ships, St Mary’s, St Peter’s, St Tyfrydog. 
Associated Sites:  Aberffraw Llys, Aberlleiniog Castle. 
 
Table 13: 1157 Campaign timeline of the assault on Anglesey. 
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Figure 46: Detail of assault on Anglesey (the Battle of Moelfre) included the churches that were 
pillaged by the Anglo-Normans. 
 
Henry was a shrewd campaign planner.  In an effort to assure his success in 
Gwynedd he sent a fleet to Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd and Owain 
Gwynedd’s seat of power at Aberffraw Llys (Turvey 2002: 26).   The objective 
was to subdue the population there, no doubt intending to take advantage of the 
absence of Gwynedd’s leaders.  Despite this, Henry’s landing party, after 
ravaging several of the island’s churches encountered a sharp resistance from 
the men of Anglesey, led by Owain’s younger son Hywel, which resulted in their 
total defeat (Journey, Book II Ch. 7: 189; Brut Pen. 20: 59).  ‘For on the 
following day a battle took place between them and the men of Anglesey and in 
that battle the French fled, according to their usual custom, after many of them 
had been slain and others had been captured and others had been drowned.  
And it was with great difficulty that a few of them escaped to the ships’ (Brut 
RBH: 135, 137).   
The Anglesey campaign can be split into two main events: the arrival of 
the fleet and the pillaging of the churches of St Mary, St Peter and St Tyfrydog; 
followed by the sea-side battle between the men of Anglesey and the Anglo-
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Norman sailors and soldiers.  According to the manuscripts this was harsh 
battle in which the Anglo-Norman contingent suffered severe casualties 
including Henry II’s uncle, also named Henry, the son of King Henry I.  (AC, B 
Text: 87; Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189)  The location of the Battle on Anglesey is 
debatable; the majority of the primary sources do not reference the location of 
the battle by name except to state that it was on Anglesey.  The Brenhinedd y 
Saesson claims that Henry’s ships went to Abermenai, a location along the 
Menai Strait that separates the mainland from Anglesey, and incidentally where 
a battle was fought in c. 1076 (Figure 18 in the Study Area chapter, page 145; 
BS:159).  Interestingly there are two contemporary poems that describe the 
battle, one was written by Owain’s son Hywel, who as his poem would suggest, 
participated in the battle, which he references as being on Menai’s shore. The 
other poem, by court poet Gwalchmai ap Meilyr alludes to both Moelfre and 
Menai, as is revealed in the excerpts of both poems displayed below.  Lloyd, 
referencing Gwalchmai’s poem, concludes that the battle took place near the 
present day village of Moelfre (Lloyd 1912: 499).  However, Gwlachmai states 
Tâl Moelfre, tâl is the Welsh word for ‘front’ or ‘end’ (Davies, B. 2001: 87), which 
may indicate a position that was not in Moelfre, but nearby.  Gwlachmai also 
alludes to Menai, making it difficult to determine the exact location of the battle.    
  
When red flame reddened, it flamed to the heavens, 
Home offered no refuge. 
Easy to see its bright burning, 
The white fortress on Menai’s shore. 
- Hywel ab Owain Gwynedd (in Clancy 2003: 136).  
 
Host on bloodstained host, shudder on dreadful shudder, 
And at Tâl Moelfre a thousand war-cries; 
Shaft on flashing shaft, spears upon spear, 
Thrust on wrathful thrust, drowning on drowning, 
and no ebb in Menai from the floodtide of bleeding, 
And the stain of men’s blood in the brine. 
-Gwalchmai ap Meilyr (in Clancy 2003: 127-128). 
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Part 7, Campaign Conclusion and Terms of Peace 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B text), Brenhinedd y Saesson, 
Annales Cestrienses, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and 
Richard I, William of Newburgh version, Annales Cestrienses 
Action: 
Campaign 
Conclusion 
and terms of 
peace. 
Location: 
Unknown. 
Participants: 
Owain 
Gwynedd and 
Henry II. 
Event Overview:  
Terms of peace are agreed 
between Owain and Henry.  
Owain is required to 
relinquish his border 
territories of Tegeingl and 
the land annexed from 
Powys (in addition to 
returning his brother 
Cadwaladr’s lands) in 
return for Henry 
withdrawing his troops. 
Key Sites/terrain: Rhuddlan (Twt Hill) Castle, Basingwerk Castle, Tomen y 
Faerdre Castle, Tomen y Rhodwydd. 
Associated Sites:  Border castles including: Ewloe, Trueman’s Hill Motte, 
Hawarden Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, Mold, Tyddyn, Hen Blas, Bryn y 
Cwn Motte, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Chester Street Mound. 
 
Table 14: 1157 Campaign timeline for the conclusion of the campaign. 
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Figure 47: Map detailing the approximate bounds of territory that Owain had conquered prior to 
the 1157 Campaign and was obliged to relinquish as part of the peace terms agreed upon with 
Henry. 
 
The majority of the manuscripts are vague about the events culminating in the 
cessation of hostilities.  For this the Chronicles of William Newburgh are the 
most illuminating.  Owain was required to relinquish certain castles and territory 
in the border region of Tegeingl (or Englefield in English) and the land he had 
annexed from northern Powys.  ‘When, in return for gaining the favour of such a 
great leader, and having surrendered certain fortifications of their territory they 
stood before the king with hostages as guarantees’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107). 
Owain was also obliged to pay homage to Henry in recognition of him as his 
overlord (see section on Woodstock, page 244).  Essentially, in geographic 
terms he renounced his claim on all land east of the Clwyd river valley and 
south of and including the Powysian commote of Iâl (Yale), along with the castle 
of Iâl (with Tomen y Rhodwydd or Tomen y Faerdre), which Madog ap 
Maredudd of Powys then destroyed (Brut Pen. 20: 60; Brut RBH: 137; BS: 159).   
He was also required to send hostages to the English court as a gesture of 
good faith.  In return Henry abandoned his campaign and withdrew his troops 
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from Gwynedd after fortifying castles at Rhuddlan and Basingwerk (Annales 
Cestrienses: yr.1157; AC, B text: 87).  
           
  
Site Archaeology and History 
 
The archaeological analysis that follows comprises of an examination of the 
historic environment records or HERs (from the Clwyd-Powys and Gwynedd 
Archaeological Trusts, herein CPAT and GAT), National Preservation Records 
or NPRNs (from the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of 
Wales, herein RCAHMW) and National Monument Records or NMRs from 
Historic England, for each key site associated with the seven campaign events 
discussed in the previous section.  In some instances the veracity of these 
reports are questionable as they are sourcing data from antiquarian literature 
and often quote Lloyd’s 1912 monograph, problems with which have been 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
When possible any data from previous archaeological inquiry including 
excavation reports will be incorporated into the discussion.  However, this type 
of data is limited as the majority of these sites have never been excavated.  
Additionally, many sites have never received any academic attention apart from 
initial HER ‘scheduled monument’ surveys.  This lack of evidence highlights 
current inadequacies in the medieval Welsh archaeological record.  Although a 
detailed analysis of each site within the campaign case study core areas 
(reviewed below) is beyond the scope of this research; contextualizing these 
sites within their conflict landscape setting is a step towards increasing 
awareness of these often poorly understood medieval sites.  Each of the key 
sites will also be analysed for their military features, utilizing the military terrain 
device KOCOA and viewshed analysis, which is included in the Military Terrain 
Analysis chapter.  
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Part 1, the Encampments 
 
Action: 
Setting up / fortifying encampments 
Key Sites/terrain: Basingwerk (general area), Hen Blas Castle, level 
ground around Chester (plains) 
Associated Sites: Roman road and Wat’s Dyke (near Basingwerk); 
Chester Castle and Roman road near Chester. 
 
Table 15: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the encampments. 
 
The Welsh encampment at Basingwerk: 
Basingwerk, located near the present-day communities of Greenfield and 
Holywell, is situated on a plateau above the River Dee estuary.  Most notable 
for the ruins of Basingwerk Abbey founded by the earl of Chester, Hugh Ranulf 
in 1131, and moved to its present location in 1157 when it became a Cistercian 
house (Davies 1987: 46; NPRN 35649, CPAT 102397).  It was near here where 
Owain’s forces encamped and fortified their position against the Anglo-Norman 
army.  Although the ruins of the abbey are still extant, the surrounding area has 
been heavily impacted by industry, including a battery factory adjacent to the 
Abbey.  
 
 
 
Figure 48: View of Basingwerk Abbey to the east (photo by the author). 
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In 1796, Thomas Pennant in his survey of The History of the Parishes of 
Whiteford and Holywell indicated that earthwork fortifications, perhaps part of 
Wat’s Dyke, or a fortlet associated with where the dyke terminates, could be 
seen ‘in the foundation of a wall on the edge of the ditch, and on the road side, 
near the turnpike gate, opposite to the ruins of the abbey’ (Pennant 1796: 192).  
Pennant believes that this fortification was raised to protect the abbey and it is 
unclear from his description whether he is referring to a castle, a linear 
earthwork or both.   Conversely, the fortifications that were in evidence near the 
abbey in the late eighteenth century, could have been associated with the 
entrenchment excavated to protect Owain’s position at Basingwerk (AC, B text: 
87), during the 1157 campaign.  It is also possible that Pennant’s feature could 
be the castle referred to in the Brenhinedd y Saesson, or the fortification raised 
by Henry at the conclusion of the campaign, which has since been referred to 
as Basingwerk Castle (BS: 159; Annales Cestrienses: yr. 1157).  However, as 
will be discussed below, there is some contention surrounding the location of 
Basingwerk Castle, which was destroyed in 1166 by Owain, along with 
Rhuddlan and Prestatyn Castles in 1167 (Brut Pen. 20: 64-65).   
 
 
Hen Blas and Basingwerk Castles 
Although the name, Basingwerk Castle, suggests that the castle was within the 
modern bounds of Basingwerk, this was probably not the case.  As has been 
suggested by Lloyd and others (A.J. Taylor in Leach 1960 and H. Taylor in 
1883), Basingwerk referred to a larger region than the confines of the Abbey 
(Lloyd 1917: 17).  The uncertainty and confusion of place-names for this region 
endured until the Edwardian Conquest.  In 1277 Edward arrived with a large 
host near the present-day town of Flint where he set to building Flint Castle.  
Exchequer records, detailing the cost of the castle, document Edward’s base of 
operations while he was in Flint interchangeably as 'the camp near Hawarden 
[and] the camp near Basingwerk' (E 101/350/25; E 101/3/19 in Taylor 1883: 
309).   Lloyd suggests that the reference to Basingwerk was ‘merely a loose 
indication of the king’s whereabouts by mention of a well-known site’ (Lloyd 
1917: 17).  Indeed, the lack of nameable locations, both in 1157 and 1277 may 
be indicative to a sparsely populated or ‘wasted’ landscape as referenced in 
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Domesday (see discussion of Domesday wastes page 78 in the Welsh and 
Anglo-Norman Warfare chapter).   This would not be surprising given that the 
region of Tegeingl had been a highly contested frontier zone dating back to the 
early medieval period, as evidenced by the construction of Wat’s Dyke, which 
was probably constructed by King Æthelbald of Merica in the mid-eighth century 
(Rowley 2001: 79).   The position of a chain of Iron Age hillforts on the summits 
of the Clwydian range (which form a natural western boundary of Tegeingl), 
may be suggestive of an earlier contested frontier (see Figure 47 above and 
discussion of hillforts below and in the Literature Review page).  Interestingly 
the name Flint, in reference to the town and the region was not used until after 
the construction of the castle there by Edward I in 1277.  Thereafter the region 
was referred to as Flint (Unknown 1950; Lloyd 1917: 19).    Given this, is it 
probable that Basingwerk Castle was in fact located near Flint.  This has 
important implications not only for the location and chronology of the castle, but 
also for the location of the battle of Coleshill, which according to the Brut Pen. 
20, took place in the wood of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20: 59).  If Hawarden and 
Basingwerk were used interchangeably in 1277 to indicate the region that now 
surrounds Flint, it is likely that these place-names could have been used 
similarly in 1157.   
Basingwerk Castle has been suggested to be one in the same with 
Holywell and Bryn Castell (King 1983: 153-155).  Although Holywell Castle is in 
close proximity to Basingwerk Abbey; RCAHMW have identified it with Castel 
Treffynnanw probably built in 1210 (NPRN: 300557).  Bryn Castell, which is 
King’s favoured location for Basingwerk, is a tumulus of unconfirmed origin, 
located a short distance to the east of Hen Blas Castle (see Figure 49 below; 
King 1983: 153). CPAT suggest that although the Ordnance Survey indicates 
that this feature is a barrow, that ‘its size and profile may suggest a motte rather 
than a barrow, but [it is] difficult to be sure’ (CPAT: 100338).  Another possibility 
is that this is the site of a mass grave from the Battle of Coleshill, although this 
is equally difficult to confirm without actual excavation.  Hen Blas Castle, 
located nearby, is another possibility for Basingwerk. 
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Figure 49: OS Map detailing the location of Hen Blas Castle and Bryn Castell,the tumulus east 
of Hen Blas, (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 2015). 
 
Hen Blas Castle, also known as Coleshill Castle, was excavated in 1957 
by G.B. Leach.  Initially constructed as a timber motte and bailey timber castle it 
is located on an 80 metres rise directly adjacent to a steep ravine.  Leach 
records ‘[Hen Blas as being] situated in a thick wood at the confluence of two 
streams which have scoured out ravines to a depth of 53 ft. at their junction’ 
(Leach 1957: 1).  The initial assessment by RCAHMW in 1910 determined that 
the motte was hastily constructed for defensive reasons, probably in connection 
with the Battle of Coleshill (Leach 1957: 2).  Leach discredits this assumption 
asserting that the site received more intense planning; however his excavations 
were unable to provide conclusive proof of the phasing or quality of 
construction.  Although a foundation date is not known for the timber motte and 
bailey, RCAHMW and CPAT both cite an 1157 date, this corresponds with 
Leach’s assessment that the castle was the original Basingwerk, which 
according to the Annales Cestirenses was constructed by Henry II in 1157 
(Annales Cestrienses: yr. 1157; NPRN: 307131; CPAT: 100339).    
 Excavations did not yield any datable material from the early timber 
castle phase, and the majority of material culture is associated with the mid-
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fourteenth-century domestic phase of Hen Blas manor (Hen Blas is translated 
as the old mansion or manor).  Additionally the dimensions of the site were 
difficult to determine as they have been heavily impacted by agricultural 
activities.  An excavation trench bisecting the motte revealed a layer of charcoal 
‘which varied from 1 in. to 4in. in thickness, spread evenly throughout the ditch 
section…The charcoal extended from the northern end of the ditch for 16ft., and 
there is little doubt that it had been formed by the burning of timber’ (Leach 
1957: 8).  This burning event of the original motte features seems to correspond 
with the capture and destruction of Basingwerk Castle in 1166 by Owain 
Gwynedd in connection with his re-conquest of the region, following Henry II’s 
permanent withdrawal from Wales, due to the disastrous outcome of his 1165 
Berwyn Mountain Campaign (Brut Pen. 20: 65).   
 
 
 
Figure 50: Plan of Hen Blas (Leach 1960:14). 
 
 
212 
 
Anglo-Norman encampment 
The precise location of the Anglo-Norman encampment near Chester is difficult 
to determine as it is not recorded as being associated with any built features.  
The only notable landscape feature indicated in the manuscripts is that it was in 
a plain or flat area.  Lewis in A Topographical dictionary of Wales suggests that 
Henry’s forces encamped at Saltney marsh near Chester (Lewis 1849: online 
resource).  It is probable that Lewis was referencing the description in the 
Brenhinedd y Saesson of the encampment being located in a marsh (ibid: 159).  
As referenced above this may have been a mistranslation of march or border.  
Regardless, in light of the evidence available, it is currently not possible to 
precisely locate the site of the Anglo-Norman encampment.    
 
 
Part 2, The Anglo-Norman Route of March from Chester 
 
Action: 
Anglo-Norman route march from Chester into Wales.  
Key Sites/terrain: Coastal Roman road from Chester northwest through 
Wales to Basingwerk where it turns west into Gwynedd’s heartland. 
Associated Sites: Alford Castle, Pullford Castle, Dunham Massey Castle, 
Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, 
Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Mold Castle, Shotwick Castle 
 
Table 16: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman route of march from 
Chester. 
 
Route-ways 
The networks of roads constructed during the Roman occupation of Wales were 
still in use during the medieval period (Lewis 1996: 66).  Sections of the coastal 
Roman road in northeast Wales remain today in the form of modern roads, 
particularly the A548 and the aptly named Roman Road west of St Asaph (see 
below in Figure 51 and 52).  Wat’s Dyke, in addition to its reuse or refortification 
by Owain at the Basingwerk encampment, it may also have been used as a 
route-way by the Welsh to and from Coleshill.  It may also have been the path 
Henry had intended to follow in order to circumvent Owain’s forces. Today the 
dyke exists in varying degrees of preservation from Wrexham to Greenfield 
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(near Basingwerk) where it terminates.  The function of Wat’s Dyke in the 1157 
Campaign will be discussed in detail in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. 
 
 
Figure 51: View of Roman Road to the east, near St Asaph (photo the by author). 
 
 
Figure 52: Extant route-ways, the major Roman roads include the northern and southern-most 
route-ways displayed. 
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Castles along the route of advance 
A series of castles border the Roman road from Chester to Basingwerk, where 
the road turns west and heads inland.  The exact date for many of these castles 
(listed in the associated sites above) is unknown, making it difficult to ascertain 
whether these castles were garrisoned during the 1157 expedition, and if they 
were it is equally difficult to determine if they were garrisoned by the Welsh or 
the Anglo-Normans.  This particularly applies for Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s 
Hill Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, and Ewloe Castle.  What is certain is that for 
Henry’s forces these castles either represented a useful resource – if they were 
vacant or controlled by the Anglo-Normans – and conversely they represented a 
potential obstacle if they were garrisoned by the Welsh.  In this last instance, 
this would have had a role in determining where Henry split his forces to take 
half inland through the woods.  These castles could have been used by the 
Welsh as lookout points, to monitor the progression of Henry’s army into Wales 
enabling them to prepare for and select the location of the ambush.  Alford, 
Pullford, Dunham Massey and Shotwick castles (NMR SJ57NW9, SJ35NE1, 
SJ78NW7 and SJ37SW6 respectively) are on the English side of the border.  
Given their location it is unlikely that they played any key role in the 1157 
campaign unless Henry utilised them as scouting lookouts or places of refuge, 
should he be forced to retreat in their direction. 
Connahs Hey Mound, Trueman’s Hill Motte and Hawarden Motte are 
spread over a distance of less than 2 kilometres from each other.  Connahs Hey 
Mound is the easternmost of these fortifications and the only one for which 
there is no surviving evidence, although this motte was documented by Pennant 
(1778; CPAT 100167).  Hawarden Motte was the original timber motte and 
bailey fortification underlying the present masonry castle.  It was built in the 
eleventh century by Hugh earl of Chester and was rebuilt as a masonry castle in 
the late thirteenth century (King 1983: 153; CPAT 100164).  The base diameter 
of the motte measures 21 metres with a height of 9 metres (RCAHMW file no. 
ANC/1102).  It is located at an elevation of approximately 60 metres and is at a 
distance of 2 kilometres from the Roman road.  There is a steep ravine located 
to the immediate northwest and southeast of the motte.  Hawarden Castle has 
never been excavated. 
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Figure 53: Hawarden Castle: plan courtesy of Cadw: ANC/1102/1 (C.50815) NPRN: 95095, 
from the collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw. 
Although little is known about Trueman’s Hill Motte, the 1987 RCAHMW 
monuments record states that ‘tradition says that is was raised as a fortification 
to prevent Henry II from advancing into Wales’ (Cadw File no. ANC/1101).  This 
is an intriguing notion, particularly given its proximity to Hawarden Motte, less 
than one kilometre to the northwest.  It can be speculated that at the time of the 
1157 campaign the division between Wales and England, or more accurately 
Gwynedd and England was somewhere in the Hawarden region.  If Hawarden 
Motte was still controlled by the Anglo-Normans in 1157 then it is possible that 
Trueman’s Hill Motte was built by Gwynedd as a frontier castle on their side of 
the border.  However, Hawarden was attacked several times in the thirteenth 
century (King 1983: 153). This could suggest that Trueman’s was in fact a siege 
castle, particularly given its proximity to Hawarden.  Trueman’s Hill Motte was 
partially excavated in 1820 by Rev. Stanley but no finds were reported (CPAT 
100157).  The motte has a base diameter of approximately 33 metres and a 
height of 3.4-7.1 metres (NPRN 307153).   
The masonry castle of Ewloe was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257.  
It is thought that this was built on the site of an earlier fortification, possibly built 
by Owain Gwynedd, as evidenced in the irregular plan of the masonry castle 
(NPRN 94447; Davies-Cook 1891: 2).  Ewloe castle is situated on a narrow 
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ridge approximately 100 metres above sea level.  Wepre Brook flows through a 
steep ravine directly north of the castle.  It is located 1.25 kilometres southwest 
of the Roman road and approximately 3 kilometres northwest of Trueman’s Hill 
Motte.  Although it is highly unlikely that a castle existed here in 1157, the 
surrounding landscape is nevertheless important to consider given that this was 
the supposed location of the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo or Ewloe Wood. 
 
 
Figure 54: Ewloe Castle, above: aerial photo detailing the ravine and the surviving Ewloe Wood, 
RCAHMW: 96/CS/1655 (C.60288) NPRN: 94447, © Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the 
Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales; right: masonry remains of the thirteenth-century 
Welsh castle (photo by the author).  
Similar to Ewloe and Hawarden, Bryn y Cwn Motte is situated above a 
river valley, although unlike Ewloe it is not associated with a ravine or narrow 
pass and for this reason it has been dismissed as a potential location for the 
Battle of Coleshill.  Bryn y Cwn is approximately 60 metres above sea level and 
1.4 kilometres from the Roman road and approximately 2 kilometres from 
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Coleshill.  Nothing is known about the origins of this fortification and it has never 
been excavated.  An earthwork survey carried out by Cadw documents the 
dimensions of the motte as follows.  The base of the motte is 58.2 metres in 
diameter, the summit is 14 metres in diameter and the height is 8 metres.  
‘There are three banks and ditches to the south of the motte, and a natural 
slope to the north renders any further fortification unnecessary.  There is no 
evidence of a bailey’ (CPAT 100346). 
  
 
Part 3, the Battle 
 
Action: The Battle 
Key Sites/terrain: Battle of Coleshill 1157 location (according to the 
RCAHMW), Battle of Coleshill 1150 location (according to the RCAHMW), 
Bryn Dychwelwch (supposed hill of retreat according to RCAHMW), 
forests and ravines near Hawarden, forests and ravines near Coleshill, 
Wat’s Dyke. 
Associated Sites: Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, 
Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, 
Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Basingwerk 
Encampment/castle, Moel Ffagnallt hillfort, Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor 
hillfort. 
 
Table 17: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Battle of Coleshill. 
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Figure 55: detail of the OS and HER locations of the 1150 and 1157 Battle of Coleshill. 
 
Coleshill 
Given that a detailed analysis of the data resulting from the military terrain 
analysis of the Battle of Coleshill is discussed at length in the Military Terrain 
Analysis chapter, the following is merely an overview and introduction to the 
sites considered.  The location of the Battle of Coleshill both the 1150 and 1157 
events, as indicated by RCAHMW and situated on the OS maps (only the 1157 
battle in included in the OS maps, see Figure 43 above) is not accurate.  The 
placement of the battlefields at these locations are based solely on place-name 
analysis of the ridge west of Flint named Coleshill, therefore, any of the 
‘adjoining fields in the modern township of Coleshill Fechan would suit the 
required conditions’ (NPRN 402325).  
The site of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill as indicated on the OS Maps has 
been heavily impacted by industrial development over the last 50 years.  The 
1960 OS Map above shows the landscape surrounding Coleshill prior to heavy 
industrialization.  The most recent OS Map shows a much altered landscape 
with the 1157 Battle of Coleshill now being located beneath a series of 
warehouses.  No explanation is given by RCAHMW or CPAT regarding the 
219 
 
reason for the location of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill (between Owain 
Gwynedd, Madog ap Maredudd and the earl of Chester), therefore it is inferred 
that its location is also the product of place-name inference (NPRN 404847).  
Neither is any reason given to why there are two different locations for the 
Battles of Coleshill.  The plausibility of these two sites, as identified by 
RCAHMW and the OS Maps, as the actual location of the battlefield(s), will be 
considered in further detail in the spatial analysis section of the chapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 56: View of the supposed 1150 Coleshill Battlefield, north-eastern aspect (photo by the 
author). 
   
Battle associated sites 
Bryn Dychwelwch, loosely translated as the ‘hill of retreat’ by CPAT is thought 
to be the location where, either Henry’s army or the Welsh contingent led by 
Owain’s sons, retreated following the battle.  There is no documentary evidence 
that supports this place-name.  The feasibility of this hill as an avenue of retreat 
will be considered in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. 
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Figure 57: Annotated OS 1912 map from RCAHMW showing the location of Bryn Dychwelwch 
or the hill of retreat.  O.S. Map: Flintshire, 1912, annotated NPRN: 404849, from the collections 
of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Ordnance Survey. 
 
There are two Iron Age hillforts that could have been exploited by 
Owain’s forces in the events leading up to the battle.  These are Moel Ffagnallt 
and Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor (CPAT 101758 and 100296; see Figure 42).  
These hillforts are close enough to the proposed location(s) of battle to have 
been used as lookout points to observe the movement of Henry’s troops as they 
made their way to Basingwerk.  Additionally, the contingent of the Welsh army 
led by Cynan and Dafydd could have been stationed at one of these forts, as 
besides from being probable points of good visibility they also offered a degree 
of protection in the form of any earthwork fortifications still extant from the Iron 
Age.  This is not implausible as many of these earthwork fortifications survive 
well today.  It would also not have taken much time or energy to enhance any 
fortifications that were there.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58: View of Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor (Aerial photograph from, CPAT ID: 85-C-0325, this 
image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
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Part 4, the Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan 
 
(Note: Part 4a, the Anglo-Norman retreat will not be discussed in this section as the sites 
associated with this event have already been reviewed also the sites included Part 5, the Welsh 
raids on Rhuddlan will not be included in this section as they are reviewed in the following 
section). 
 
Action: The Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan. 
Key Sites/terrain: Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain, 
Bryn Dychwelwch, Basingwerk, Roman Road. 
Associated Sites: Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, 
Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Prestatyn Castle, The Mount (the Peel) Castle, 
Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort. 
 
Table 18: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Welsh retreat and Anglo-Norman 
repositioning at Rhuddlan. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59: map detailing possible locations of Welsh retreat. 
 
The route of Welsh retreat/advance and the place to which the Welsh forces 
repositioned to harass Henry at Rhuddlan, are difficult to conceptualize insofar 
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as the place-names listed in the manuscripts of Tâl -Llwyn Pina (or Pennant) 
and Cil Owain are not existent in any place-names or built features.  Roughly 
translated Tâl-Llwyn Pina, (Davies, B. 2001) is the scrubby area at the head of 
the stream.  Cil Owain is translated as Owain’s place or Owain’s refuge.  
Neither of these translations are useful as they could describe countless 
locations in northeast Wales.  For this reason several sites within the area have 
been considered as the potential locations for Owain’s place of refuge.  These 
are the early medieval llys Whitford Wood Palace, the Mount Castle (sometimes 
called the Peel), and Prestatyn Castle, as well as Dinorben, Castell Cawr and 
Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillforts.  The location of Cil Owain on the map is a result of 
a description provided by Thomas Pennant, suggesting that Cil Owain was near 
the community of St Asaph (Pennant 1796), there is no other evidence to 
suggest that this was indeed the location.  It is likely that the place of Owain’s 
refuge was located in the vicinity of Rhuddlan, to enable him to harass the 
Anglo-Normans (Brut RBH: 135).  Therefore, distance to Rhuddlan will be 
considered in the following site analysis.   
 The early medieval llys of Whitford Wood Palace is located 4.5 
kilometres northwest of Basingwerk, 4.5 kilometres from the Roman road and 
approximately 10 kilometres northwest from Coleshill.  Rhuddlan Castle is 
located just shy of 13 kilometres to the west of Whitford Wood Palace.  The 
location of this llys was documented by Pennant in 1796 and there are no 
visible surface remains there today (CPAT 89612; Pennant 1796).  As there are 
no longer any visible remains it is difficult to know whether this site would have 
had any fortifications with which it was associated.  If Owain was aware of this 
llys it is unlikely he would have retreated there unless it had some defensive 
capabilities.  
 Prestatyn Castle is a low motte surviving to a height of 0.9 metres and 
approximately 20 metres in diameter.  Excavations conducted in 1913 
concluded that it is eleventh-century in origin.  Unfortunately, the author of this 
excavation is unknown, and the report, cited by both RCAHMW and CPAT, was 
not retrievable.  The current location of any material culture from this excavation 
is also unknown. (NPRN 92922; CPAT 102226).  One of the most interesting 
features of this site is the stream named the Nant, which runs to the south of the 
castle.  It is possible that this could be the stream referred to in the place-name 
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Tâl-Llwyn Pennant.  The word for stream in Welsh is nant (Davies, B. 2001).  
There are many streams named nant throughout Wales, however, the one that 
flows by Prestatyn Castle seems to be the only one so named in this part of 
Wales. Even though excavations in 1913 concluded that the site dates from the 
eleventh century there has been some debate surrounding this date.  It is 
possible that they castle was not constructed until the twelfth century, possibly 
by Owain Gwynedd (RCAHMW file no. 1921).  Prestatyn Castle is situated 7.2 
kilometres east of Rhuddlan and only 1 kilometre from the sea. 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Plan of Prestatyn Castle, Cadw: ANC/1921/1 (C.51383) NPRN: 92922, from the 
collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw. 
 
 Little is known about the mound referred to interchangeably as The 
Mount or The Peel which resembles a castle motte and is thought to be 
medieval in date.  It measures 30 metres square and has a height of 1.2 metres 
(NPRN: 303516).  It is situated 1.2 kilometres south of the coast and 
approximated 3 kilometres north of the Roman road.  It is possible that Owain 
chose to remove his army to this castle as its location 7.8 kilometres west of 
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Rhuddlan and close to the Roman road would have made it possible for him to 
have prevented Henry from advancing further into Gwynedd.  Additionally, the 
proximity of The Mount to the sea could have made it possible (depending on 
visibility) for Owain to monitor any Anglo-Norman naval movement.  The same 
could also be said for Prestatyn Castle. 
 
 
Figure 61: Location of the Ffordd y Ffrainc or the French Road. 
 Apart from the Roman road there is one other road in the region that 
could have been used to convey Henry’s troops to Rhuddlan Castle.  This is the 
Ffordd y Ffrainc, or the French Road linking Rhuddlan to Dyserth, 4.5 
kilometres to the east.  This road was removed in the nineteenth century and 
the dot on the map above indicates the only location in which this road survives 
(NPRN: 23584).  It is unknown whether this road continued any further to the 
west or east or whether is connected to the Roman road at any point.  If it was 
extant at the time of the 1157 campaign it could have provided Henry’s troops 
with an easy march to Rhuddlan. 
 
 
225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62: Aerial photograph of Castell Cawr Hillfort (CPAT, ID: 90-C-0390, this image has been 
removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
Dinorben, Castell Cawr and Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillforts could have 
been favoured as places of retreat by Owain due to their pre-existing defensive 
nature.  Also, given the elevation of these sites it stands to reason that they 
would have provided Owain with good vantage points from which to monitor 
Henry’s position.   
 
 
Anglo-Norman position at Rhuddlan 
Rhuddlan Castle is perhaps one of the best known castles in north Wales.  It 
was originally constructed in 1073 by Robert of Rhuddlan shortly following the 
initial wave of Anglo-Norman Conquest in the eleventh century (CPAT 102027).  
However, the castle associated with the conflicts of the eleventh and twelfth-
centuries was not the masonry castle shown below, it was instead a motte and 
bailey timber castle, known today as Twt Hill (little hill), located a short distance 
to the south of the current masonry castle which was built in 1277 (see Figures 
63-65 below).  The motte survives to a height of 11 metres and was formed by 
enhancing an existing natural hill; the bailey is located to the north of the motte.  
Although Twt Hill has never been excavated, the defences surrounding the town 
of Rhuddlan were excavated by Quinnell, Blockley and Berridge from 1969-
1973.  Their results, based primarily on radio carbon dating, indicate that 
Rhuddlan may have been the location of the short-lived Saxon burgh (fortified 
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town) of Cledemutha, in the tenth century (Quinnell et al. 1994: 209).  Clearly, 
Rhuddlan had been located within a contested frontier zone since the early 
medieval period.  Additionally, Quinnell suggests that Twt Hill was probably the 
location of the pre-Norman llys, as evidenced by ‘the unusual platform bailey’ 
(ibid: 213) 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Plan of Twt Hill, Cadw: ANC/1955/1 (C.51404) NPRN: 157156, from the collections 
of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw. 
 
 
Figure 64: Twt Hill (photo by the author). 
227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65: Aerial Photograph of the remains of the earth and timber castle and the masonry 
castle at Rhuddlan (CPAT, ID: 85-C-0132, this image has been removed by the author of this 
thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
 
Part 6, the Anglo-Norman Assault on the Isle of Anglesey 
 
Action: Anglo-Norman amphibious assault on the Isle of Anglesey, 
pillaging of churches and battle with the men of Anglesey. 
Key Sites/terrain: Navigable bays and inlets around the island, sand 
beaches suitable for beaching ships, St Mary’s, St Peter’s, St Tyfrydog. 
Associated Sites: Aberffraw Llys, Aberlleiniog Castle. 
 
Table 19: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman assault on Anglesey. 
 
The exact location of the amphibious assault and the battle that ensued 
on Anglesey are difficult to determine, the favoured locations are in the vicinities 
of the village of Moelfre or the Menai Straits.  At Moelfre there are navigable 
bays and sandy/shingle beaches that could have enabled the safe mooring or 
beaching of the ships; additionally, Moelfre is near two of the churches raided 
by the Anglo-Normans, St Mary’s and St Tyfrydog’s (see Figure 46).  It is also 
far enough removed from Aberffraw Llys (Owain Gwynedd’s court) and 
Aberlleiniog Castle to avoid immediate detection.  However, there are many 
other locations around the island that meet the necessary prerequisites of a 
228 
 
navigable and sheltered bay and access to the land from a sand or shingle 
beach.   
 
 
 
Figure 66: The shingle beach at Moelfre, southern aspect toward the mainland (photo by the 
author). 
 
 Three churches are referenced as having been pillaged by the Anglo-
Normans on Anglesey, these are St Mary’s, St Peter’s and St Tyfrydog’s (BS: 
159; Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189).  There are two ecclesiastical features on 
Anglesey bearing the name St Mary, as the foundation of neither is known it is 
difficult to say which of these sites, or possibly both, were raided by the Anglo-
Normans.  The record for St Mary’s Cross is vague but is seems to have been 
in reference to a feature in the churchyard of an un-named church.  The cross 
has been dated to the eleventh century (GAT 3615).  St Mary’s Church is a 
multiphase building, the earliest datable features are from the fifteenth century, 
but it is possible that the church had an earlier foundation.  St Mary’s church is 
located 9.5 kilometres from the sea and St Mary’s cross is at a distance of 1.5 
kilometres from the sea.  These distances have been included because it is the 
possible distance the Anglo-Norman raiders would have had to travel to and 
from their ships, if they were moored near Moelfre. 
 St Peter’s Church is located in southwest corner of Anglesey, 
approximately 6 kilometres from Aberffraw Llys and 2 kilometres from the sea.  
This church may have been built in the twelfth century; this church was restored 
in the mid-nineteenth century (GAT 2623).  The earliest datable aspects of St 
Tyfrydog’s are recorded as being from the fifteenth century (GAT 2096); 
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however, as it was mentioned so prominently by Gerald of Wales, it is possible 
that it had a much earlier foundation date (Journey, Book II Ch. 7: 189).  
Part 7, Campaign Conclusion and Terms of Peace 
 
Action: Campaign Conclusion and terms of peace. 
Key Sites/terrain: Rhuddlan (Twt Hill) Castle, Basingwerk Castle, 
Tomen y Faerdre Castle, Tomen y Rhodwydd. 
Associated Sites: Border castles including: Ewloe, Trueman’s Hill 
Motte, Hawarden Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, Mold, Tyddyn, Hen Blas, 
Bryn y Cwn Motte, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Chester Street 
Mound. 
 
Table 20: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the campaign conclusion and terms of 
peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67: Aerial photo of Tomen y Rhodwydd Castle (CPAT, ID: 84-C-0278, this image has 
been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons). 
 
The majority of the sites associated with this event have already been 
considered for their archaeological features in their connection to an earlier 
event.  Chester Street Mound (CPAT 100323) while proximate to earlier events 
it has not been included in the dialogue as it is fairly certain that this is not 
actually a castle.  It is much more likely that it is a feature associated with the 
Roman road, possibly a mile-castle, the same is true for Cae Mount (CPAT 
12708).  However, in the event that future survey showed these features to be 
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castles, they would have likely been included within the group of castles that 
Owain was required to surrender when he relinquished his claim to Tegeingl. 
Iâl Castle was built by Owain in 1149 in connection with his annexation of 
northern Powys, it was then destroyed by Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd of Powys 
at the conclusion of the 1157 campaign, when Owain was required to hand over 
this territory as part of the peace settlement with Henry. (Brut Pen. 20: 57; AC B 
text: 87).  As reviewed earlier, there is some debate over the location of Iâl 
Castle and both Tomen y Faerdre and Tomen y Rhodwydd have been 
suggested (see page 153 in the Study Area chapter).  Tomen y Faerdre is a 
motte measuring 54-58 metres in diameter with a surviving height of 7 metres.  
Tomen y Rhodwydd was a timber motte and bailey castle.  The motte measures 
38-42 metres in diameter at its base with a height of 4.9-8 metres.  The bailey is 
southwest of the motte and measures 57-46 metres (Pratt 1979; CPAT 100932; 
NPRN: 94737).  Although Iâl was destroyed by Madog in 1157 it was rebuilt by 
King John in 1212 (NPRN 306839 and CPAT 100888). 
 
 
 
Figure 68: Aerial photograph of Tomen y Faerdre Castle, RCAHMW: AP_2006_0737 
(C.859218) NPRN: 306839, © Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and 
Historical Monuments of Wales. 
. 
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Spatial Analysis and Synthesis 
 
The following section is a synthesis of the two preceding sections, the campaign 
timeline as evidenced in the primary documentary sources and the archaeology 
of the key sites involved in the 1157 campaign.  This synthesis is guided by the 
military terrain analysis of each event. The spatial analysis presented below 
represents only the preliminary data of the total military terrain analysis 
conducted for this campaign.  The Military Terrain Analysis chapter contains an 
in-depth consideration of the spatial analysis for this campaign and the 1165 
Berwyn Mountain Campaign. The following analysis considers the KOCOA (see 
descriptive table below in Table 20) features of two key campaign events: the 
encampments and the coastal march into Wales, giving to consideration to 
terrain features that match Gerald of Wales’ battle location descriptions (the 
most detailed of all the manuscripts): ‘a narrow wooded pass near Coleshill’ and 
‘densely wooded pass’ (Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189, 196).  Both are 
accompanied by viewshed models.  The retreat after the battle of Coleshill; the 
raids on Rhuddlan; the amphibious assault on Anglesey, and the peace 
settlement and campaign conclusion will not be considered, as they are 
secondary to the campaign narrative. The Battle of Coleshill and the supposed 
Battle of Ewloe Wood are not considered within this section as they will receive 
an in-depth KOCOA and reverse KOCOA analysis in the following chapter; the 
KOCOA analysis included here provides a preliminary overview, as such no 
viewsheds for Coleshill or Ewloe are included in the following section. 
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The encampment at Basingwerk 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: Basingwerk Encampment 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain Site of Encampment on or near 
present location of Basingwerk 
Abbey 
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Wat’s Dyke, surrounding castles 
and hillforts 
Cover and Concealment Wat’s Dyke 
Obstacles Sea (cutting off a poss. route of 
retreat) 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Roman Road 
 
Table 21: 1157 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the encampments. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 69: viewshed from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk.
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The position of Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk and its proximity to both 
the Roman road and Wat’s Dyke was not coincidental.  Many scholars are 
surprised by Owain’s decision to leave the safety of the mountains, stating that 
this deviates from normal Welsh military tactics, essentially of hiding in the 
mountain forests and attacking invaders with guerrilla style ambushes (King 
1965; Davies 2004).  However, Owain decided to come forward and meet 
Henry’s army.  Whether he ever intended to enter into open battle with the 
Anglo-Norman army is another matter, as the planned ambush in the woods 
and the withdrawal of his troops when they were directly threatened by Henry’s 
forces could suggest otherwise.  It can also be argued that Owain’s position on 
or near Wat’s Dyke was selected as Wat’s Dyke represented a traditional, albeit 
contested, boundary between Wales and England.  
The site of Basingwerk was shrewdly chosen by Owain.  Essentially 
located on the Roman road, it is at the point in the road where it turns west, 
inland from the coast into the heart of Gwynedd.  Undoubtedly Owain 
anticipated that Henry and his troops would advance along the coastal Roman 
road from Chester.  By entrenching his forces at Basingwerk Owain was 
checking Henry’s ability to progress further into Gwynedd.  Additionally, by 
choosing Basingwerk instead of another location deep in the heartland of 
Gwynedd Owain was preventing Henry’s land based contingent from entering 
Gwynedd, instead he brought the fight to the area that was contested.  As 
previously mentioned, Owain’s position at Basingwerk seems to have taken 
advantage of pre-existing earthworks from Wat’s Dyke, this would have limited 
the amount of time and energy the Welsh would have had to expend 
constructing fortifications.  Clearly Owain was also familiar with the surrounding 
terrain given the proximity of Basingwerk to the site of the 1150 Battle of 
Coleshill.  Given this it can be conjectured that Owain would have been inclined 
to station himself on or near a battlefield that he had previously been able to 
dominate. 
The site of Basingwerk afforded superior visibility as can be seen in the 
viewshed above (Figure 69).  Numerous stretches of the Roman road can be 
seen all the way to Chester, making it possible for Owain to monitor Henry’s 
advance into Wales.  Most importantly, by choosing Basingwerk as the Welsh 
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position, Owain controlled the theatre of war and set the tone of the campaign 
by forcing Henry to come to him. 
 
 
The Anglo-Norman march and turn-off point into the woods 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: The Anglo-Norman March 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain Roman road, Wat’s Dyke, ravines  
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Surrounding castles and hillforts 
Cover and Concealment Wat’s Dyke, surrounding castle and 
hillforts, ravines and ridge tops 
Obstacles Ridges 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Roman Road, Wat’s Dyke 
 
Table 22: 1157 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of march. 
 
The downplaying of Welsh military capability by Anglo-Norman 
chroniclers, to the detriment of our comprehension of past events, is a theme 
that runs throughout this research.  What is surprising is that the authors of the 
twelfth century also did Henry II a similar disservice, in regards to what became 
his catastrophic decision to lead half of his forces off the Roman road and into 
the dense Welsh forest where they were ambushed and nearly decimated by 
Welsh forces led by Owain’s sons.  Gerald of Wales states that ‘in his youthful 
ardour and rash enthusiasm he was unwise enough to push on through this 
densely wooded pass’ (Journey Book II Ch. 10: 196). This assumption by 
scholars past and present, that Henry led his troops blindly into Wales is naïve.  
Although Henry was young, he would not have been without military advisers on 
this campaign; the omission of the Anglo-Norman military strategy, from the 
primary sources, has led to the oversimplification of events, as has been 
highlighted by King’s and Hosler’s research (1965; 2004).   
Henry would have undoubtedly have realised that dividing his troops and 
leading one half of them through the Welsh wilderness in hope of 
circumnavigating and surrounding Owain’s position at Basingwerk was a risk 
laden endeavour.  This was in all probability a calculated risk, and Henry must 
have felt confident that he could reach the Welsh at Basingwerk via the route he 
had chosen through the woods, while leaving the other force to advance 
northwest along the Roman road.  Moving a force of a few thousand men 
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through the dense forests of northeast Wales would have been laden with 
difficulties and dangers.  The exact numbers of troops deployed during the 
campaign are not known, although these were probably in the thousands as the 
Robert Torigni version of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and 
Richard I states that ‘King Henry prepared a very great expedition, in such a 
way that two out of three soldiers out of the whole of England were preparing’ 
(Chronicles R.T: 193).  
Hawarden Wood, one of the favoured ‘turn-off’ points described in the 
Brut (Brut Pen. 20: 59), in the region of Ewloe and Hawarden, was 
approximately 15 kilometres from Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk.  Given 
inherent military probability (see page 50 in Methodology chapter), it seems 
improbable that Henry would have subjected his men to a long and arduous trek 
through the Welsh forest.  Wat’s Dyke parallels the Roman coastal road all the 
way to Basingwerk where it terminates.  If Henry turned half his troops off the 
Roman road near Coleshill instead of Hawarden, he would have been a mere 3 
kilometres from Wat’s Dyke (versus the distance of 8 kilometres between 
Hawarden/Ewloe and Wat’s Dyke) which he could have used to convey his 
forces toward Basingwerk.  It is uncertain what condition the dyke would have 
been in nearly four hundred years after its construction, but as much of it is still 
extant today it is probable that it was better preserved in the twelfth century.  
Regardless of the condition of the dyke, it would have provided Henry’s forces a 
defensible route of march through the forest.  In addition, viewshed analysis of 
this particular stretch of the dyke shows that the terrain to the north was largely 
visible.  This would have made it difficult for the Welsh to ambush the Anglo-
Norman forces, if they had reached the dyke.  
The viewsheds from Coleshill vicinity, the other described ‘turn-off’ 
location, show that the visibility from the Roman road incrementally decreased 
when progressing northward (see Figures 70-73).  The fourth viewshed below 
(Viewshed from Roman road near Coleshill, Figure 73) is from a point on the 
Roman road nearest to Coleshill near Hen Blas, the potential battle site.  The 
William of Newburgh version of the Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry 
II and Richard I indicated that the ambush happened close to the Roman road 
(Chronicles WN: 107).  From this point a stretch of Wat’s Dyke, 2 kilometres to 
the west is visible.  Assuming that Wat’s Dyke was Henry’s target, this point on 
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the road represents the most likely ‘turn-off’ point that would have led Henry into 
the probable area of the Welsh ambush.  This would have taken Henry’s troops 
through a narrow wooded pass that corresponds with a narrow ravine which 
terminates at Hen Blas or Basingwerk Castle.  As previously discussed it is 
unlikely that the castle was extant during the 1157 campaign.  Henry may have 
chosen this location to build Basingwerk Castle following the conclusion of the 
campaign as a means of fortifying and staking a claim to the area where he had 
been attacked.   
 
 
 
Figure 70: Viewshed from the coastal Roman road adjacent to Hawarden Castle.  (Note: the 
level area to the northeast roughly outlined in orange, is the tidal estuary of the Dee which is 
covered by water at high tide and is also impassable at low tide, for this reason only visibility 
points on land were considered in the analysis). 
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Figure 71: Viewshed from the Roman road south of Bryn y Cwn Motte. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 72: Viewshed from the Roman road south of Bryn y Cwn Motte. 
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Figure 73: Viewshed from the Roman Road near Coleshill. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has given due consideration to the historical and archaeological 
evidence of key events and sites associated with the 1157 Coastal Campaign.  
The spatial representation of these sites and events made it possible to 
synthesize a probable battle narrative that indicates the region surrounding Hen 
Blas Castle as the probable location of the Battle of Coleshill.  The resultant 
gross-pattern analysis along with preliminary military terrain analysis, utilizing 
KOCOA, has highlighted key features and terrain elements to be explored in 
depth in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.  By placing the events, associated 
sites and terrain features of the 1157 Coastal Campaign into a broader cultural 
and conflict landscape, key elements became apparent that allowed for the 
identification of probable battlefield locations.  These locations will receive an in-
depth military terrain analysis, using elements of regular and reverse KOCOA in 
the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.    
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Chapter Eight – Introduction and Overview of the 1165 Berwyn 
Mountain Campaign 
 
 
 
 
Figure 74: View of the Ffordd y Saeson – The English Road, looking west toward Corwen over 
the Berwyn Mountains (photo by the author). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the summer of 1165 Henry II organised a campaign whose purpose was to 
subdue the Welsh in totality.  This campaign came to fruition as a result of the 
stalemate from the 1157 campaign against Gwynedd and in response to the 
escalating Welsh raids – including the raids by Owain Gwynedd’s son Dafydd – 
in the frontier zone of Tegeingl, the disputed region of northeast Wales where 
the majority of the 1157 campaign was centred (see Figure 12; Brut Pen. 20: 
64-5).  Wales united under the leadership of Owain Gwynedd, allied with Rhys 
ap Gruffudd (the Lord Rhys) of Deheubarth, the powerful southern Welsh 
principality, along with various minor princes from Powys (eastern and central 
Wales), amassed a large force at Corwen to prevent Henry II’s advance into 
Wales and protect Welsh independence.   
The importance and magnitude of this conflict is not to be 
underestimated; the Anglo-Norman force that threatened Wales in 1165 did not 
have an equal in manpower or expense until the campaigns of Edward I during 
the last quarter of the thirteenth century (Latimer 1989).  The occasion of the 
Welsh principalities uniting to stand against the threat from England would set a 
precedent for consensual unification, under the reigns of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth 
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(c. 1216-1240) and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (c. 1250-1282).  The outcome of the 
Berwyn Mountain campaign was so economically and psychologically damaging 
to Henry II – and in turn the Angevin Empire – that Henry abandoned his efforts 
in Wales in entirety turning his attentions instead to Ireland and ‘the Continent, 
leaving the marcher barons to cope as best they could in the face of the Welsh 
revanche’ (Duffy 2007: 137).  There would not be another royal sponsored 
campaign or conquest attempted of Wales for nearly fifty years, until the failed 
campaigns of King John in the early thirteenth century.  The following is a 
summary of the source material and a synopsis of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign.   This historical overview provides a platform for the archaeological 
analysis presented in the next chapter. 
 
 
Source Material 
 
Previous Academic Inquiry 
Similar to the 1157 Coastal Campaign discussed in the previous chapters, there 
are few modern analyses of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  Instead the 
legacies of the events, particularly the Battle of Crogen, are preserved in what 
amounts to an oral tradition, bordering between history and legend.  The most 
notable and complete modern scholarship is Latimer’s 1989 article ‘Henry II’s 
Campaign against the Welsh in 1165’ published in The Welsh History Review.  
Additionally R.R. Davies devotes several paragraphs to the campaign in his 
publication The Age of Conquest, Wales 1063-1415 (1987).  Both authors 
provide a thorough historical analysis of the chain of events culminating in the 
armed conflict and include a brief examination of the actual events of the 
campaign.  Curiously the military historian S. Davies’ 2004 publication, Welsh 
Military Institutions 633-1283, which contextualizes multiple Welsh campaigns in 
terms of their role in the evolution of the Welsh military ethos, only mentions the 
1165 campaign in passing.   
Apart from J.E. Lloyd’s monograph, A History of Wales from the Earliest 
Times to the Edwardian Conquest (1912) highlighted in previous chapters, 
further scholarship relating to the Berwyn Mountain campaign can be found in 
several eighteenth and nineteenth-century antiquarian volumes.  These include: 
A Memoir of Chirk Castle from Original Manuscripts (unknown author 1859), 
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Cambro-Briton, An Excursion through North Wales Volume 3 (unknown author 
1822), Annals and Antiquities from the Counties and County families of Wales 
(Nicholas 1872), A Tour in Wales (Pennant 1778), The History of North Wales 
Volume II (Cathrall 1828) and A History of Chirk Castle and Chirkland with a 
chapter on Offa’s Dyke (Mahler 1912).  The importance of these publications 
lies in their description of the landscape.  Although the region in which the 
events of the Berwyn Mountain Campaign took place remains rather rural, there 
have been both industrial and natural alterations to the landscape.  The 
description of these landscapes as they appeared in the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when contrasted against the original accounts of 
the campaign from the medieval manuscripts, allows for a more complete 
reconstruction of the historic landscape.  
 
 
Manuscripts  
The 1165 campaign timeline, to follow in the next chapter, is predominantly 
derived from five principal twelfth-century sources.  These are the: Annales 
Cambriae (B and C texts), Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 manuscript, Brut y 
Tywysogyon Red Book of Hergest manuscript, Brenhinedd y Saesson, and The 
Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales).  Additionally the  Annales 
Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, Chronicles of 
the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I the William of Newburgh and 
Robert of Torigni versions, the Great Roll of the Pipe (Pipe Roll Series) and The 
Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury were also consulted.   
 
 
Historiography of the Battle of Crogen 
As was noted in the introduction the 1157 campaign, Powel’s Historie of 
Cambria (1589), although fraught with historical inaccuracies and literary ‘slights 
of hand’, was and to some extent still is one of the most referenced volumes on 
medieval Welsh history.  However, much of its appearance in modern day 
publications, scholastic or otherwise, can be attributed to the absence of source 
criticisms, as will be evidenced in the discussion below.  Indeed, a large amount 
of the information concerning the Battle of Crogen, as it is presented in 
brochures, information placards and even a short film produced in 2011 (all 
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sponsored by the Wrexham County Council), is derived from this 1589 
publication.  An in-depth consideration of the historiography of this publication is 
due as it was the first source to name Crogen as the location of the battle that 
happened between Henry II and the Welsh forces in the woods of the Ceiriog 
Valley.  It is because of this that the battle to this day is called the Battle of 
Crogen, yet none of the twelfth-century or other medieval manuscripts make 
any mention of Crogen.  Apart from Lloyd’s 1912 publication, all of the other 
early histories mentioned above rely on Powel’s narration in their interpretations 
of the Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  
 Powel claimed that the information presented in his book was largely 
sourced from original Welsh manuscripts.  The primary manuscript being an un-
named piece of work that Powel attributes to the twelfth-century Welsh cleric, 
Caradoc of Llancarfan.  That Caradoc was an actual person seems probable, 
as he was mentioned in Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regnum Britanniae as 
a contemporary writer (Tatlock 1938: 140).  Caradoc of Llancarfan is most 
commonly associated with being the author of two Arthurian texts, The Life of 
Gildas and the Life of St Cadog.  It is unclear why Powel thought the manuscript 
he was referencing was a product of Caradoc, a mystery that more modern 
analysis has not been able to solve.  It is evident that the actual source that 
Powel is using for the majority of the Historie of Cambria is in fact the Brut y 
Tywysogyon (ibid: 151).  Although it is possible that Caradoc as Powel claims, 
‘collected the succession and actes of the Brytish Princes after Cadwalder’ 
(Powel 1589: ix) perhaps as the original compiler of the original Brut, (the one 
that is now the lost Latin original) and possibly the author of sections of the Brut, 
yet, it is unlikely that his name would go unrecorded in the annals as the master 
of such an important task (Tatlock 1938).  Regardless of Caradoc’s involvement 
or the origin of Powel’s manuscript, Powel indicates that Caradoc’s narrative 
ends in 1156, nine years before the Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  It is not clear 
where Powel was sourcing his material from for post-1156 events.  Based on 
comparisons to other medieval manuscripts, it seems that Powel was using a 
combination of the manuscripts, mentioned in the previous section, which he 
enhanced with the inclusion of his own version of events.  It is evident that an 
over-reliance on historical sources, such as Powel’s, can lead to an inaccurate 
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understanding of events, which is why they need to be contextualized within a 
wider archaeological conflict landscape. 
 
 
Campaign Overview and Historical Context 
 
Historical Context 
Gwynedd’s relationship with England and Henry II during the eight years 
between the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign to the outset of the 1165 
Berwyn Mountain Campaign was predominantly peaceful.  As part of the terms 
for peace, Owain Gwynedd yielded his claim to the frontier zone of Tegeingl at 
the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign.  He also relinquished the 
commote of Iâl (or Yale) back to Powys, and with it Iâl Castle.  In the ensuing 
years Owain was preoccupied with extending and securing his borders with his 
Welsh neighbours and essentially ignored the English frontier.  However, the 
peace between Gwynedd and England would not last, as early in 1165 Owain’s 
son Dafydd launched a series of successful raids on Tegeingl and threatened 
the security of the castles in that region, namely Rhuddlan and Basingwerk 
(Lloyd 1912: 515).  Henry went to North Wales in the spring of 1165 and spent 
only three days at Rhuddlan, probably to confer with the marcher earls there on 
how to best strengthen the defences of Tegeingl against further Welsh raids 
(Brut Pen. 20: 63).  Yet, it was not Dafydd’s actions alone that provoked Henry 
to amass a campaign; it was in reality a culmination of complex political and 
social circumstances.   
In 1160 Madog ap Maredudd, the predominant Powysian prince died 
depriving Henry of a formidable Welsh ally; Maredudd had assisted Henry in his 
1157 campaign against Gwynedd.  Following Maredudd’s death Powys fell into 
a state of chaos as the principality was broken up and distributed to Maredudd’s 
heirs, in accordance with the Welsh system of partible inheritance (Turvey 
2002: 30) .  In 1163 Henry moved against Rhys ap Gruffudd3 prince of 
Deheubarth to quell the conflict between Rhys and the marcher lords.  Rhys 
                                                 
3
 Interestingly the three main principalities in Wales were connected by blood ties.  
Owain Gwynedd was Rhys ap Gruffudd’s uncle and Madog ap Maredudd was Rhys’s 
father-in-law. 
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was captured and in return for his release he surrendered to Henry, ending 
what was an essentially bloodless campaign (Latimer 1989: 525).   
Following the settlement between Henry and Rhys, in 1163 the major 
Welsh princes including Owain Gwynedd, as part of the peace terms from the 
1157 conflict, did homage to Henry II at Woodstock.  Woodstock (Oxfordshire) 
was an important royal centre, more commonly associated with the much later 
Blenheim Palace; it has a long history and has been connected to Anglo-Saxon 
Monarchs such as Alfred the Great (d. 899; Brookes 1820).  Henry I established 
a hunting lodge at Woodstock which was later elaborated into a palace by 
Henry II (ibid; Salzman and Page 1990); that the 1163 homage was held at 
such an important and historical location demonstrates the significance of the 
event.  Although the exact terms of the homage are unknown, it has been 
speculated that it changed ‘the nature of English suzerainty’ over the Welsh to 
one of stringent vassalage in place of the previous, more malleable client 
relationship (ibid: 524).  The precedent for this client relationship dates back to 
the mid-eleventh century as part of the peace terms between Gruffudd ap 
Llywelyn and Edward the Confessor (see page 113 in Chronology chapter for 
further detail).  It was this altered relationship that historians such as Latimer 
and Davies (1989: 52; 1987: 52) point to as the ‘tipping-point’ for renewed 
Welsh armed aggression against England.   
When Henry II returned to England from an expedition in Normandy in 
early 1164 he found Wales in a state of open rebellion.  Latimer acknowledges 
that the source of renewed Welsh aggression was probably more complex than 
resentment over a new political relationship with the English Crown.  He points 
to the deaths of members of Rhys’s family at the hands of the marcher earls 
and Rhys’s obligation to avenge the deaths as a more rational reason for the 
renewed conflict (Latimer 1989: 526).  Lloyd, on the other hand, suggests that 
death of Rhys’s kin at the hands of the marcher barons was only used by Rhys 
as an excuse to renew hostilities against the Anglo-Normans (Lloyd 1912: 514).  
Regardless of Rhys’s motives, there are seemingly no similar motivations for 
Gwynedd’s renewed campaigning in their frontier with England.  However, 
careful examination of Domesday Book shows that Edward the Confessor gave 
all the land in northeast Wales ‘that lies beyond the river called Dee’ to Gruffudd 
ap Llywelyn, following a dispute with Edward this land was then taken from 
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Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and instead given to the Bishop of Chester (Domesday 
263a/R/7).  This region ‘beyond the Dee’ essentially comprises all of Tegeingl 
and establishes a precedent for it having been included within Gwynedd’s 
dominion.    
Previous academic inquiry into the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign 
has overlooked the societal motivations and functionality of the Welsh body 
politic.  To this point it should be notated that Welsh perceptions of territory and 
attitudes towards client relationships differed greatly from that of the Anglo-
Normans.  For example, the Welsh gwlad or sphere of rule ‘is not so much 
‘country’, ‘territory’, ‘political unit’, a ‘piece of ground and its people’ but rather 
the changeable, expandable, contractible sphere of any ruler's power 
[therefore,] we should see the arrangements as short-term and flexible in a 
world of fluid and changing relationships’ (Davies 1990: 17, 23).  Given this it is 
possible that Owain or Rhys would not have regarded their actions as being in 
direct violation of the homage settlement at Woodstock, particularly as Henry 
was only indirectly the target of their raids, which were primarily directed against 
at the marcher earls.   
 
 
Campaign Overview 
Undoubtedly Henry was exasperated by the renewed conflict in the Welsh 
Marches following the 1163 settlement, which was meant to bring peace and 
the subjugation of the Welsh principalities.  In 1164 Henry held a council at 
Northampton and began preparations for a campaign against the Welsh 
(Latimer 1989: 531).  Unlike the 1157 Coastal Campaign which was targeted 
solely at Gwynedd, the 1165 campaign’s objective was the submission and 
subjugation of all Wales.  Whether this was Henry’s original objective is unclear, 
but it may have quickly became that once he realised that all of Wales had 
united against him.  The scope of this operation was so immense that it 
understandable why the medieval chronicles state that his intent was to 
annihilate all Welshmen (Brut Pen. 20: 63).  A large army was raised from 
England and abroad; the use of mercenaries was common practice in the 
medieval world (Nicholson 2004: 49).  An exact number of troops are not 
known, though it was probably in the tens of thousands, based on the massive 
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amount of funds raised for the hiring of mercenaries and for food and supplies, 
as is evidenced in the Pipe Rolls (Pipe Roll Series 1164-1165 in Latimer 1989: 
545).   
 Henry gathered his forces first at Shrewsbury, where he met with his 
bishops in July of 1165; at the conclusion of the colloquium he moved his troops 
to Oswestry (Latimer 1989: 534).  It is unclear why he did this, it may have been 
that Oswestry was the planned destination for his troops to perform a final 
muster before setting off for Wales.  Alternatively, he may have received 
intelligence that the Welsh forces were gathered at Corwen, possibly on the 
natural escarpment known as Pen y Bryn y Castell or on the prehistoric hillfort 
Caer Drewyn.  Oswestry is significantly closer to Corwen and would, therefore, 
make a more suitable Anglo-Norman base of operations prior to marching on 
Wales.  In August, after having waited to see if the Welsh would make the first 
foray, Henry decided to take his army into Wales.  His route of march took him 
northwest to what is now the parish of Chirk in the modern county of Wrexham 
(originally within in bounds of Denbighshire), from there he turned his forces 
west where he planned to march along the Ceiriog valley, following the Ceiriog 
River into the heartland of north Wales.  
 At the ancient border between England and Wales, demarked by Offa’s 
Dyke, Henry was faced with his first obstacle.  He encountered dense woodland 
in the Ceiriog river valley, probably in the vicinity of Offa’s Dyke, which in itself 
was an obstacle for the army.  Well aware of the danger that forests could 
conceal, providing the perfect environment to camouflage an ambushing force, 
Henry ordered the wood to be cut down.  Evidently he had learned from his 
experience in the Welsh ambush of the 1157 Coastal Campaign, which took 
place in a heavily wooded ravine, not too different from the environment in 
which he now found himself (Brut Pen. 20: 63). 
 Henry’s fears were realised when a contingent of Welsh forces stationed 
in advance of the encampment at Corwen ambushed Henry’s army as they 
were at work cutting down trees.  The fighting was fierce and there were many 
casualties on both sides (Brut RBH: 147).  This ambush was the event that is 
now referred to as the Battle of Crogen.  Although weakened Henry was not 
deterred for he continued to advance along the Ceiriog valley up onto the 
Berwyn Mountains where he set up an encampment (Brut Pen. 20: 63).  Once 
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there he may have reused the defences of the Iron Age hillfort Cerrig Gwynion 
for his encampment, and there he waited, for neither side seemed inclined to 
make the first move.  While in this holding-pattern Gerald of Wales states that 
some of Henry’s troops occupied themselves with pillaging and burning several 
of the local churches and villages (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 202).  In the end 
Henry’s indecision on whether to continue his advance on the Welsh was 
settled when bad weather descended over the Berwyns (Brut RBH: 147).  The 
unseasonable wet and cold conditions took its toll on his men, faced with the 
possibility of starvation as supplies began to run low or were damaged by the 
wet weather.  Frustrated and infuriated Henry retreated to England.  In a final 
effort he went to Chester in an attempt to enlist an Irish mercenary fleet, 
perhaps hoping to launch an assault on the Welsh from the sea.  As it was, the 
numbers of ships were insufficient and he turned away from Wales once and for 
all (Brut Pen. 20: 64). 
 
 
Campaign Legacy 
In total Henry II was responsible for three large-scale military expeditions into 
Wales: the Coastal Campaign in 1157; the campaign against Rhys in 1163; and 
the Berwyn Mountain Campaign of 1165.  The first campaign resulted in what 
amounts to a stalemate, as although Owain Gwynedd was required to relinquish 
his claim on the frontier territory of Tegeingl he had not lost any of his original or 
ancestral territory to the Anglo-Normans and Henry had not gained any ground 
in the heartland of Gwynedd.  The second campaign against Rhys ap Gruffudd 
of Deheubarth was short-lived and essentially bloodless as Henry gained a 
rapid victory upon the capture of Rhys.  However, this victory was short-lived as 
Rhys renewed hostilities against the Anglo-Normans less than a year later.  
Henry had hoped that the homage of the Welsh princes at Woodstock in 1163 
would secure stability in Wales now that the Welsh princes were his vassals.  
Any peace that resulted from this arrangement was fleeting and Henry was 
provoked to organise the 1165 campaign.  The defeat he suffered from this 
venture coupled with his inability to penetrate the Welsh heartland in this 
campaign or in any prior endeavours, permanently deterred him from any future 
military ventures in Wales.  For the remainder of his reign (d. 1189) Wales was 
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largely ignored by Henry, instead he turned his attention to conquest and 
colonization of Ireland, which proved to be a more rewarding pursuit than his 
failed conquest attempts of Wales. 
Despite his victory, Owain was concerned that Henry would soon lead 
another campaign into Wales.  In an effort to enhance the security of Wales, 
Owain sought out and formed an alliance with Louis VII, the king of France.  
These communications are evidenced in a series of three surviving letters 
between Owain and Louis.  Although undated, it seems that Owain established 
diplomatic contact in the early 1160s, sometime before the Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign, and after performing homage at Woodstock in 1163 (Pryce 1998: 1-
2).  ‘As far as is known, this was an unprecedented move by a native Welsh 
ruler’ (ibid).  Henry II was involved in ongoing hostilities with Louis throughout 
his reign, given this; it was natural for Owain to seek out Henry’s powerful 
enemy for support.  It is clear that Louis responded to Owain, and possibly even 
gave him advice regarding Henry.  In a letter written by Owain to Louis, shortly 
after the 1165 Campaign, Owain refers to Louis as his ‘adviser’ and entreats 
him to enter into a war with Henry.  The contents of this letter candidly display 
the rawness of the hostilities between England and Wales. The following except 
effectively sets the tone for the analysis of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign in the next chapter: 
          [Henry may] come against us again after next Easter.  On that  
          account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me […]  
          whether you are resolved to wage war against him, so that in that war I    
          may both serve you by harming him according to your advice and take  
          vengeance for the war he waged against me (Pryce 1998: 7). 
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Chapter Nine – Case Study Two, the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What follows is a consideration of the actions and events encompassing the 
core area of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign and the associated 
archaeological landscapes of conflict, resulting in a gross-pattern analysis.  This 
analysis like the 1157 Coastal Campaign will be discussed in three principal 
sections: 1) a timeline of conflict events as evidenced in the medieval 
manuscripts and represented spatially on maps created using GIS technology, 
2) a consideration of the archaeological aspects of the events and key sites, 3) 
an introduction to the military terrain analysis in which the historical and 
archaeological attributes of the key conflict events are synthesised.  A more in 
depth discussion of the spatial analysis data, in which the historical and 
archaeological data from both campaign case studies is synthesised to form a 
dynamic conflict event reconstruction, can be found in the following Military 
Terrain Analysis chapter. 
  
 
1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign timeline 
 
The following battlefield timeline is derived from the available medieval 
manuscripts that document this campaign.  The most detailed accounts are 
found in are both versions of the Brut y Tywysogyon, and in the Brehinedd y 
Saesson.  Unlike the 1157 campaign, the Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), 
and the Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (William of 
Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions), do not record the events of the 1165 
campaign in as much detail.  Other chronicles that were referenced include: The 
Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales), Annales Cestrienses, Chronica 
Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, and The Historical Works of Gervase 
of Canterbury.  The following narrative of the campaign timeline is 
predominantly Anglo-Norman centric.  This is not the product of any bias; 
rather, the impetus behind the majority of the campaign actions were Anglo-
Norman driven.  Unlike the 1157 Coastal Campaign, the Welsh involvement in 
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the 1165 campaign, apart from the Battle of Crogen, was liminal and reactive in 
nature. 
  
 
Part 1, The Encampments 
 
 
 
Figure 75: 1165 Campaign, map of Welsh and Anglo-Norman Encampments, A = Welsh, B= 
Anglo-Norman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson  
Action: 
Establishing / 
fortifying 
encampments 
Location: 
Camp A: 
Corwen 
(Welsh) 
Camp B: 
Oswestry 
(Anglo-
Normans) 
Participants: 
Welsh under 
Owain 
Gwynedd, 
Anglo-
Normans 
under Henry 
II 
Event Overview:  
The rulers of all Wales with 
their armies gather at 
Corwen where they 
establish their position to 
prevent Henry’s 
advancement and set up an 
encampment.  Henry brings 
his army as Oswestry where 
they set up an encampment. 
Key Sites/terrain: Oswestry Castle and the immediate surrounding area, 
Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn, Castell Edeirnion and Llys Edeirnion 
(Castell and Llys Edeirnion occupy the same site). 
Associated Sites: Roman Road commencing from Corwen and heading 
due west. 
 
Table 23: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments. 
 
Following a short lived excursion to Rhuddlan in the spring of 1165, Henry 
returned to the Welsh frontier in August, this time in Shropshire and brought 
with him ‘a host beyond number of the picked warriors of England and 
Normandy and Flanders and Gascony and Anjou and all the North [of England] 
and Scotland.  And he came to Oswestry, thinking to annihilate all Welshmen’ 
(Brut Pen. 20: 63).  As enumerated in the previous chapter, Henry probably 
decided to use the castle of Oswestry as his base of operations as it was closer 
to where the Welsh were encamped and located more directly along the route 
of march.  This was in contrast to Shrewsbury, the larger town where he had 
held a colloquium with his bishops several days prior.   
 Owain Gwynedd and his Welsh allies ‘all steadfastly united together 
came into [the commote] of Edeirnion, and they encamped at Corwen’ (pebyllu 
is the medieval welsh word used in the Bruts meaning encampment; Brut RBH: 
145).  Owain and his Welsh allies probably chose this location to counter 
Henry’s advance into Wales as Corwen was situated at the head of a Roman 
road.  This road was the only route-way that provided access from central 
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Wales west through one of the few mountain passes of Snowdonia to the coast 
and Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd.  Henry I had successfully invaded 
Wales, Powys specifically, using this route in 1118 (Brut Pen. 20: 47-8), 
undoubtedly this was where Henry II received his inspiration to attempt the 
same forty-seven years later.   The Brenhinedd y Saesson in addition indicates 
that the Welsh built a castle at Corwen (167), this could be in reference to the 
construction of an actual castle, field fortifications and fortifications for the 
encampment.  Potentially this could include the enhanced fortification of Llys 
Edeirnion with the addition of a motte, located approximately three kilometres 
west of Corwen, as well as the hillfort Caer Drewyn located on the outskirts of 
Corwen or the natural escarpment known as Pen y Bryn y Castell which has 
been suggested as the site of the Welsh encampment (further detail of these 
sites can be found in the following section on site archaeology and history). 
 
 
Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Oswestry 
 
 
 
Figure 76: Map of Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley. 
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Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red 
Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson  
Action: 
Anglo-
Norman 
march from 
Oswestry 
into Wales  
Location: 
Northwest 
Shropshire 
and Eastern 
Wrexham 
near Chirk 
and the 
Ceiriog 
River 
Participants: 
Anglo-
Norman 
army. 
Event Overview:  
The route of march the 
Anglo-Norman forces follow 
from their encampment in 
Oswestry up to the point 
where they halt to cut down 
trees and are ambushed by 
the Welsh. 
Key Sites/terrain: Level terrain between Oswestry and Chirk, route-ways 
between these two locations are not well documented, Offa’s Dyke, 
Ceiriog River and valley, either Dyffryn Ceiriog or Aberceiriog. 
Associated Sites: Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte 
 
Table 24: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the 
Ceiriog river valley. 
. 
Weary with waiting for the Welsh to make the first move, Henry advanced his 
troops north along the English and Welsh border from Oswestry to the Ceiriog 
river valley near the present day community of Chirk.  Once at Chirk, the 
entrance of the Ceiriog river valley, Henry turned his army west along the banks 
of the Ceiriog River.  The manuscripts illuminate little about the actual march 
into Wales stating only that Henry ‘moved his host into the wood of Dyffryn 
Ceiriog, and had the wood cut down and felled to the ground’ (Brut RBH: 145, 
147).  Interestingly the Brenhinedd y Saesson names the location where Henry 
ordered to the trees to be cut down at Aberceiriog (167).  Dyffryn is the Welsh 
word for valley, therefore Dyffryn Ceiriog translates as the Ceiriog Valley (which 
is approximately sixteen kilometres long), whereas the Welsh word aber is 
commonly translated as either the mouth of a river or the confluence of two 
rivers (Davies, B. 2001).  The Ceiriog River flows into the River Dee 
approximately two kilometres northeast of Chirk.   
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Part 3, The Battle of Crogen, ambush in the woods of the Ceiriog Valley 
 
 
 
Figure 77: Map of the supposed location of the Battle of Crogen.  The dark blue dashed line 
indicates the approximate extent of Offa’s Dyke, the solid blue line indicates the approximate 
course of the Ceiriog River. Note: The location of the Battle of Crogen is based on a national 
grid reference provided by the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust, it is an approximation only.   
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Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book 
of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson and Chronica Rogeri de 
Hoveden  
Action: 
The 
battle. 
Location: 
Most likely 
somewhere in 
the Ceiriog 
river valley, 
the popular 
location being 
the fields in 
the area 
surrounding 
Crogen 
Wladys and 
Crogen Iddon 
near Chirk 
Castle. 
Participants: 
Welsh soldiers 
stationed in 
advance of the 
main contingent 
at Corwen.   
The Anglo-
Norman army. 
Event Overview:  
Henry halts the advance into 
Wales to cut down trees to 
make a path through a dense 
section of forest along the 
Ceiriog.  Welsh soldiers 
stationed in advance, 
probably as lookouts and a 
blocking force, decide to take 
advantage of the momentary 
disarray of the Anglo-Norman 
army and ambush them while 
they are at work cutting down 
trees.  There are heavy 
casualties on both sides. 
Key Sites/terrain: Crogen battlefield, Ceiriog river valley, Offa’s Dyke, 
Adwy’r Beddau 
Associated Sites: Chirk Bank Motte and Castell y Waun, more for their 
vicinity to Crogen than actual involvement in the battle.  St Mary’s Church of 
Chirk should be included for similar reasons, although it is not clear if it had 
been founded by 1165. 
 
Table 25: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Battle of Crogen. 
 
Rather than find an alternative route Henry ordered the woods blocking his 
advance through the Ceiriog Valley to be cut down, clearly he was determined 
to follow his planned route of march (Brut Pen. 20: 63-4).  The woods presented 
two possible challenges, the first was that they were too dense and had to be 
cut down to make way for Henry’s forces and supply train.  The second is that 
they could have provided concealment for Welsh combatants and Henry was 
acting out of vigilance when he ordered them to be cut down.  As previously 
discussed, Henry would have been wary to pass through such an environment 
after he nearly lost his life in a similar situation in the narrow wooded pass 
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where his forces were ambushed by the sons of Owain Gwynedd during the 
1157 campaign. 
 Henry’s actions were not unfounded as despite his best efforts to avoid 
such an encounter, the Welsh troops that were stationed in the vicinity, probably 
on the ridgelines paralleling the valley, ambushed Henry’s forces while they 
were preoccupied cutting down trees.  ‘And there a few picked Welshmen, who 
knew not how to suffer defeat, manfully encountered him in the absence of their 
leaders.  And many of the doughtiest fell on both sides’ (Brut RBH: 147), 
including many of Henry’s nobles (Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden: 217-20).   The 
dead were buried nearby, probably in the ditch of Offa’s at a place known locally 
as Adwy’r Beddau or the ‘pass/gap of the graves’ (Nicholas 1872: 405, Pennant 
1778: 268, Powel 1584: 187).  Whether this is based on place-name evidence 
or from an actual mound is not known.  Today there is no evidence for either.  
Although the field-names near Chirk Castle (c. 1310), Crogen Wladys and 
Crogen Iddon are traditionally the favoured location of the battle, further 
archaeological investigation is necessary and will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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Part 4, The Advancement of the Anglo-Norman Army into the Berwyn 
Mountains 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest 
versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson. Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), and 
The Journey Through Wales. 
Action: 
The 
advancement 
of the Anglo-
Norman 
forces into 
the Berwyn 
Mountains 
and their 
establishment 
of an 
encampment. 
Location: 
The route of 
march along the 
Ceiriog River into 
the Berwyn 
Mountains near 
Llanarmon 
Dyffryn Ceiriog 
and the English 
Road across the 
mountains, 
including the 
encampment 
possibly at 
Cerrig Gwynion 
hillfort. 
Participants: 
The Anglo-
Norman 
army. 
Event Overview:  
Following the ambush 
in the woods, Henry 
continues his route of 
march into North-
Central Wales.  He 
took his forces onto 
the Berwyn Mountains 
where he established 
an encampment. 
Key Sites/terrain: The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English 
Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge, St Garmon’s 
Church  
Associated Sites Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably part 
of the Ffordd y Saeson. 
 
Table 26: 1165 Campaign timeline for the advancement of the Anglo-Norman army into the 
Berwyn Mountains. 
 
Despite the losses he suffered from the Welsh ambush, Henry was not deterred 
from his objective and pushed his army onwards into the Berwyn Mountains and 
there he ‘pitched a camp’ (AC, B text), where he ‘stayed for a few days’ (Brut 
Pen. 20: 63).  The same actions are just as sparsely echoed in the Red Book of 
Hergest version of the Brut and in the Brenhinedd y Saesson.  Due to the lack 
of historical information it is difficult to ascertain the route of march the Anglo-
Normans took from Crogen to the Berwyn Mountains.  In place of written 
evidence it is necessary to turn to place-name analysis to complete the event 
timeline.  If Henry indeed continued to follow the Ceiriog river valley into the 
Berwyn Mountains, his troops would have undoubtedly found it difficult.  The 
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valley narrows rapidly and in places between Crogen and Llanarmon Dyffryn 
Ceiriog; where the river turns to the northwest, the valley is little more than a 
narrow gorge.  
There is a local tradition that Henry and his forces crossed the Ceiriog 
River to access the Ffordd y Saeson (ffordd is welsh for road or route) at the 
Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge (pont is the welsh word for bridge; Jones and Jones 
1989: 27), although in the mid-twelfth century the crossing may have been little 
more than a ford.  The suggestion that Henry had to cross the river in order to 
access the Berwyn Mountains and the Ffordd y Saeson indicates that he would 
have taken the upland route south of the Ceiriog River from Crogen, perhaps 
following a Welsh line of retreat after the battle (these possible avenues of 
approach are detailed below in Figure 96). 
Once in the Berwyn Mountains Henry halted his troops and set up an 
encampment.  Again local tradition, as documented by the Clwyd Powys 
Archaeological Trust, states that Henry’s forces occupied the Iron Age hillfort of 
Cerrig Gwynion, on the 470 metre summit of Mynydd Bach, one kilometre 
northwest of the present day village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (CPAT 
59549).  Henry deliberated on his next course of action while his troops rested 
and recuperated.  Gerald of Wales indicates that during their stay in the 
Berwyns, ‘leaders of the English army had burnt down certain Welsh churches 
with their villages and churchyards’ (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 202).   St 
Garmon’s church in the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog could have been 
one of the churches that the Anglo-Normans burnt, particularly since it was 
located at the easy distance of one kilometre from their encampment.  As was 
discussed in the chapter on warfare, the looting of churches was common 
practice amongst Anglo-Norman knights and soldiers (Strickland 1996: 81-3).  
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Part 5, The Anglo-Norman Retreat back to England 
 
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest 
versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson. Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), The 
Journey Through Wales, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de 
Mailros and the William of Newburgh version of The Chronicles of the 
Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, 
Action: 
Anglo-
Norman 
retreat to 
Chester 
Location: 
Route of march 
from 
encampment in 
the Berwyn 
Mountains to 
Chester 
Participants: 
The Anglo-
Norman army. 
Event Overview:  
Due to extreme 
weather conditions the 
Anglo-Norman army is 
forced to turn back to 
England in defeat. 
Key Sites/terrain: The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English 
Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge.  
Associated Sites Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably part 
of the Ffordd y Saeson, the port of Chester.  
 
Table 27: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman retreat back to England. 
 
Henry’s indecision on his next course of action while encamped in the Berwyn 
Mountains was ultimately what cost him the campaign; ‘after he had stayed 
there [in the Berwyns] a few days, he was oppressed by a mighty tempest of 
wind and exceeding great torrents of rain’ (Brut RBH: 147).  This, coupled with a 
lack of supplies and the difficulty of the terrain, prompted him to withdraw ‘his 
tents and his host to the open land of the flats of England’ (Brut RBH: 147; 
Chronicles W.N.: 145).  Gerald of Wales is more poetic in his description of the 
events, claiming that the Anglo-Normans had incurred the wrath of God by 
burning churches and were punished with the storms (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 
202). 
 Clearly the king was enraged by the situation he found himself in ‘and in 
anger toward the Welsh he caused the hostages, whom he already had in 
prison, to be blinded, namely, the two sons of King Owain, Cadwallon and 
Cynwrig and Maredudd, sons of Rhys, and many of the others’ (BS: 167).  The 
Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden and the Chronica de Mailros also indicates that 
the ‘noses and ears of the girls’ were cut off to do ‘justice’ against the Welsh 
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(217-220; 79).  Henry undoubtedly felt justified in maiming all twenty-two Welsh 
hostages (AC, C text: 90-91), probably given to him as a symbol of good faith at 
the homage of 1163.  After this was done Henry ‘decided in council to come as 
far as Chester, and there he repaired the castle [(presumably Chester Castle)] 
until there should come to him a fleet from Dublin and from Ireland’ (BS: 167).  
Given this it would seem that Henry thought to attempt an amphibious assault 
on Wales after his overland campaign had failed.  To his dismay the number of 
ships that arrived were not sufficient to transport his forces and he was left with 
no further options but to return to England in defeat (Brut Pen. 20: 64).  
 
 
Site Archaeology and History 
 
The archaeological analysis that follows comprises of an examination of the 
historic environment records or HERs (from the Clwyd-Powys and Gwynedd 
Archaeological Trusts), National Preservation Records (from the Royal 
Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of Wales) and National 
Monument Records from Historic England, for each key site associated with the 
five campaign events discussed in the previous section.  In some instances the 
veracity of these reports are questionable as they are sourcing data from 
antiquarian literature, which is true in particular for the Battle of Crogen and the 
Ffordd y Saeson.   
When possible any data from previous archaeological inquiry including 
excavation reports will be incorporated into the discussion.  However, this type 
of data is limited as the majority of these sites have never been excavated.  
Additionally, many sites have never received any academic attention apart from 
initial HER ‘scheduled monument’ surveys.  This lack of evidence highlights 
current inadequacies in the medieval Welsh archaeological record.  Although a 
detailed analysis of each site within the campaign case study core areas 
(reviewed below) is beyond the scope of this research; contextualizing these 
sites within their conflict landscape setting is a step towards increasing 
awareness of these often poorly understood medieval sites.  Each of the key 
sites or key actions will also be analysed for their military features, utilizing the 
military terrain device KOCOA and viewshed analysis which is included in the 
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following chapter section on spatial analysis.  For an explanation of the types of 
archaeological sites included in the historic landscape reconstructions table five. 
 
 
Part 1, The Encampments 
 
Action: 
Establishing / fortifying encampments 
Key Sites/terrain: Oswestry Castle and the immediate surrounding area, 
Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn, Castell Edeirnion and Llys Edeirnion. 
Associated Sites: Roman Road commencing from Corwen and heading 
due west. 
 
Table 28: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the encampments. 
 
Oswestry Castle 
 
 
 
Figure 78: View of Oswestry Castle mound (centre), masonry remains of castle and view toward 
Wales (bottom right; photos by the author). 
 
Although Oswestry Castle is mentioned in passing by a number of publications, 
little of note is actually said.  Portions of the motte were excavated in 1988 
which determined that the keep was rectangular and therefore, not a shell keep 
as previously thought.  Apart from this the excavations predominantly revealed 
evidence of occupation in the post-medieval period from the seventeenth 
century onwards (NMR: SJ22NE1; HER: 00332).  Oswestry was an early 
foundation and was recorded as Luvre (c. 1086) in the Domesday Book.  
Originally a timber motte and bailey construction, Oswestry was traditionally 
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held by the sheriffs of Shropshire (Suppe 1984: 64).  In 1149, during the 
confusion of the civil war of King Stephen’s reign, the Castle was taken and 
rebuilt by Prince Madog ap Maredudd of Powys and later retaken by the Anglo-
Normans sometime prior to 1160 (King 1983: 427).  It is unclear when it was 
converted into a masonry castle, but is thought to have occurred sometime 
during the early years of Henry II’s reign (Suppe 1984: 64).  ‘The Pipe Roll for 
1162-63 also shows expenditure on supplies sent into Wales and on the 
garrisoning of the border castles, including the considerable force of 310 
sergeants at Oswestry’ (Latimer 1989: 530; Suppe 1984: 68).    
 
Pen y Bryn y Castell  
The medieval manuscripts name the Welsh encampment as being at Corwen.  
It is unlikely that they set up their camp next to the settlement as it is located in 
a vulnerable valley alongside the River Dee.  Two sites in the vicinity have been 
suggested by antiquarians and by Denbighshire County Council as the location 
of the Welsh encampment, these are Pen y Bryn y Castell and Caer Drewyn 
hillfort. 
 
 
 
Figure 79: Ordnance Survey map of Corwen and vicinity, the town of Corwen is circled, the 
supposed location of Pen y Bryn y Castell is shown with a red arrow, Caer Drewyn hillfort with a 
dark blue arrow (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 2015). 
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Cathrall states that the ‘place of encampment is pointed out at some 
distance above the church southward, and there are still visible the remains of a 
rampart of earth, and marks of the sites of numerous tents from thence to the 
village of Cynwyd’ (1828: 262).  Although he does not term Pen y Bryn y Castell 
by name, the area that Cathrall refers to is on historic versions of the Ordnance 
Survey maps indicated as Pen y Bryn.  The ‘Castell’ was probably added later 
in reference to the alleged earthworks.  In the 1870 edition of the Ordnance 
Survey the area is disrupted by what appears to be a series of hillocks but 
probably indicates bracken as the same symbol is found on other parts of the 
map that are culturally unaffiliated (see below in Figure 80).  The 1890 edition 
shows a similar set of markings.  
 
Figure 80: 1870 Ordnance Survey map zoomed to the location of Pen y Bryn, 
(contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 1870). 
 
In 1998 an archaeological survey was conducted at Pen y Bryn by 
Cambrian Archaeology Projects on behalf of the Forest Enterprise Welsh 
Heritage Assets project.  The survey determined that there were no cultural 
features in the vicinity; as a result the area became a conifer plantation.  
Unfortunately, Cambrian Archaeology made a significant historical error.  They 
associated Pen y Bryn with a battle between Owain Glyndŵr and Edward I 
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(Cambrian Archaeology 1998).  Despite the connection between Corwen and 
Owain Glyndŵr, the town was a Welsh stronghold during Glyndŵr’s uprising, no 
battles took place between Glyndŵr or any English monarch in Corwen.  
Specifically not with Edward I, who had been dead for fifty years before 
Glyndŵr’s birth.  It is unfortunate that this site was not subjected to a more 
thorough survey using battlefield archaeology techniques.  Regrettably the 
conifer plantation was recently logged (which included using machinery to 
uproot the trees) severely damaging the viability of any future archaeological 
investigations (see Figure 81 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 81: The aftermath of logging on Pen y Bryn y Castell (photo by the author 20/04/2014). 
 
Caer Drewyn  
An information board sponsored by the Denbighshire County Council, the town 
of Corwen and the Forestry Commission among others, states that in 1157 
Owain Gwynedd occupied the Iron Age hillfort Caer Drewyn while Henry II was 
encamped in the Berwyn Mountains (see Figure 82 below). 
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Figure 82: Zoomed-in photo of information placard detailing Owain’s encampment at Caer 
Drewyn (photo by the author).  
 
Despite the blunder in the date, which should state 1165, this is a reasonable 
possibility.  The reuse of prehistoric hillforts was not a foreign concept to the 
Welsh in the medieval era (see page 35 in the Literature Review).  For example, 
Castell Dinas Bran was within an Iron Age hillfort (CPAT: 101173).  The only 
academic reference which alludes to the reuse of Caer Drewyn in 1165 is 
Gardner’s article on Caer Drewyn in the 1922 edition of Archaeologia 
Cambrensis.  Gardner remarks that ‘it has been said that Owen Gwynedd 
fortified himself here in A.D. 1164 [65], but he was probably a better strategist 
than to have occupied such an undesirable position for his army’ (1922: 117).  
Viewshed analysis of the site in the following section will show that Gardner’s 
assertions are not unfounded.  The 1958 ‘Bala-Report’ also from Archaeologia 
Cambrensis concludes that ‘there is no archaeological evidence to support the 
tradition that Owain Gwynedd refortified the site in 1164’ (1958: 136).  Despite 
this it cannot be ruled out as a possibility, which will be discussed at further 
length in the next section on military terrain analysis.  The univallate hillfort is 
roughly circular in its layout with two entrances, one in the north-eastern corner 
and the other on the western face with complex outworks.  It measures 192 
metres north to south and 215 metres east to west (NPRN: 95431, Gardner 
1922: 113). 
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Figure 83: left, plan of Caer Drewyn after Gardner (1922: 113), right photo of the hillfort, 
southern exposure (photo by the author).  (Image at left has been removed by the author of this 
thesis for copyright reasonts). 
 
Castell Edeirnion 
In 1160 the Pipe Rolls record a castle at Edeirnion, called Dernio which has 
since been identified with Rûg Castle, in the County of Merioneth, located a few 
kilometres west of Corwen in a wide valley (Renn 1968: 304-5).  The castle is 
situated adjacent to the Roman road that cuts west from Corwen to cross 
Snowdonia (Gardner 1961: 3).  The motte, now located on private land within 
the modern estate of Rhug (which is now home to an American Bison ranch), is 
3.7- 5 metres high and is 10-12 metres across at the summit (NPRN: 306598, 
Salter 1997: 87).  Rûg is associated with a medieval mansion probably a llys, 
given that there are several other examples in Merioneth of an unfortified 
residence, usually a llys, being associated with a motte, such as Castell Prysor 
(NPRN: 306598; see discussion on page 34 and 139).  Excavation of the motte 
by Gardner in 1922 showed that it was built on top of a Bronze Age barrow; no 
Bronze Age artefacts were uncovered during excavations apart from burned 
bones, believed to be contemporary with the Bronze Age tumulus (Gardner 
1961: 3; CPAT: 100806, King 1983: 276).  Seven bone draughtsmen gaming 
pieces (commonly used in the game draughts or checkers) and a quernstone 
were found dating to the medieval occupation of the site, unfortunately the 
photographs of these artefacts are of poor quality and as such are not 
represented (see Gardner 1961, plate IV.2).  Precise dates were not provided 
for these items, however, checkers was not a popular European game until the 
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twelfth century, suggesting that the medieval sequence excavated dates to this 
period at the earliest (Westerveld 2009: xxv).    
Spurgeon suggests that Rûg castle may have been built by Owain 
Gwynedd in 1165, referencing the castle mentioned in 1165 at Corwen in the 
Brenhinedd y Saesson (1987: 31).  This theory would negate the Pipe Rolls 
claim that the castle was in existence by 1160.  It is possible that the Pipe Rolls 
were referring not to Rûg as Dernio but Hendom, an alleged site of a motte or 
prehistoric barrow, which may be no more than a natural mound (NPRN: 
406423).  Hendom is located 5.5 kilometres east of Corwen in the Dee river 
valley (see Figure 84 below).  It is also possible that Rûg may have a much 
older Norman foundation, as Domesday ‘records that the Norman earls of 
Chester and Shrewsbury were in possession of the upper valley of the Dee by 
1086’ (Gardner 1961: 5).  Additionally, the Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan records 
that Gruffudd met the marcher earls at ‘Rûg in Edernion’, where he was ‘then 
treacherously [taken] as a prisoner to Chester’ and held there for twelve years 
(ibid: 5; LGC: 71).  Regardless of whether Owain built Rûg castle, it is possible 
that Owain Gwynedd used it along with the other Welsh princes during the 1165 
campaign.  The earlier treachery committed against Gruffudd ap Cynan, Owain 
Gwynedd’s father, may have bestowed a symbolic quality to the position of the 
Welsh troops at Rûg, perhaps as a statement of native Welsh solidarity in the 
reclamation of their native territories.  Practically, the position of the Welsh at 
Rûg, as previously stated, would have halted an Anglo-Norman advance along 
the Roman Road through Snowdonia.  Although the positioning of Rûg does not 
lend it to any strategic military importance or defensibility, this would not have 
been necessary since the bulk of the Welsh army was stationed forward, either 
at Caer Drewyn or Pen y Bryn y Castell.  Furthermore, the reference in the 
Brenhinedd y Saesson to the construction of a castle was probably in 
connection to the fortifications raised for the Welsh troops on either Pen y Bryn 
y Castell or Caer Drewyn.  The later section on viewsheds will demonstrate the 
virtues of viewsheds in establishing the defensibility of a site.      
268 
 
 
 
Figure 84: Map showing the vicinity of the Welsh encampment near Corwen. X= location of 
Corwen. 
 
 
Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Oswestry 
 
Action: 
Establishing / fortifying encampments 
Key Sites/terrain: Level terrain between Oswestry and Chirk, route-
ways between these two locations are not well documented, Offa’s Dyke, 
Ceiriog River and valley, either Dyffryn Ceiriog or Aberceiriog. 
Associated Sites: Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte 
 
Table 29: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman march from Oswestry. 
 
There are few relevant or distinct archaeological sites along Henry’s route of 
march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog Valley.  The most notable features are the 
actual terrain, which will be considered at length in the section on military terrain 
analysis.  Apart from Offa’s Dyke, which is discussed below in the ‘Battle of 
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Crogen’ section, there are only two archaeological sites of note.  These are 
Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte. 
 
 
 
Figure 85: Castell y Waun (photo by the author). 
 
Castell y Waun 
Castell y Waun is a motte located in the village of Chirk above the Ceiriog River, 
less than half a kilometre from the modern English border.  A probable early 
timber castle, there have been no excavations of the motte.  Castell y Waun 
was replaced at the close of the thirteenth century by the formidable masonry 
fortress of Chirk Castle, located just over three kilometres west of its earth and 
timber predecessor (King 1983: 103).  Antiquarian literature has suggested that 
Chirk Castle had an earlier castle on the same site as the thirteenth-century 
masonry castle, this was called Castell Crogen.  This assertion is ‘devoid of 
foundation [as Castell Crogen] was in the parish of Llandderfel, Edeirnion’ 
(Archaeologia Cambrensis 1935: 328).  This is an important distinction and will 
be discussed in further detail in the following section on the Battle of Crogen. 
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Figure 86: plan of Castell y Waun, Cadw: 8M/0554/1 (C.52845) NPRN: 307013, from the 
collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw. 
The motte of Castell y Waun is now an overgrown garden feature of a 
private residence.  There is no trace of a bailey, the motte is 5.7 metres high 
with a diameter of 30 metres, the diameter of the summit is 22 metres (NPRN: 
307013).  These castle dimensions are not well reflected in the photograph 
above in Figure 85, as alterations have taken place to the site since the 1988 
plan was drawn; in fact the dimension of the registered area was altered in 1990 
as a result of property ‘improvements’.  The foundation date of the castle is not 
precisely known, however Renn suggests that it is mentioned in the Pipe Roll of 
1165, although this has yet to be verified (Renn 1968: 143).   If Renn’s 
assertions are correct, Castell y Waun may well have been in existence prior to 
Henry’s campaign, alternatively it may have been built as a result of the failed 
campaign, to strengthen defences along the border.  In her 1912 publication A 
History of Chirk Castle and Chirkland, Mahler suggests that Castell y Waun may 
have had a much earlier foundation.  The evidence for this is found in the 
Anglo-Norman poem The History of Fulk Fitz Warine in the following verse: 
‘William Peverel conquered by the sword the land of Morelas as far as the water 
of Dee…in Ellesmere he made another tower, and on the water of Keyroc 
(Ceiriog) another’ (Mahler 1912: 4).  This could be in reference to Castell y 
271 
 
Waun or Chirk Bank, a motte on the English side of the Ceiriog River, half of a 
kilometre to the south (both of these sites can be seen above in Figure77). 
 
Chirk Bank Motte 
There is little data available about the motte known interchangeably as Chirk 
Bank and Oaklands Mount (adjacent to the current Oaklands Hall).  Similar to 
Castell y Waun, Chirk Bank has ‘succumbed to the domestic requirements of an 
adjacent house’ (NMR: SJ23NE1) and is now completely overgrown by mature 
trees.  At its base the motte measures 46 x 26 metres, it has an average height 
of 3 metres and the summit which has been levelled is 26 x 10 metres.  It has 
been suggested that the situation of Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank on the 
opposite side of the Ceiriog River were ‘deliberately sited in view of one 
another, in order to control the movement of people moving along and across 
the valley, the ancient [and current] border between England and Wales’ (ibid). 
If these castles were in existence by the mid-twelfth century, either of them 
could have been exploited by the Anglo-Norman forces as they made their way 
into the Ceiriog Valley.  Although they do not provide good vantage points, they 
could have been garrisoned by a contingent of Anglo-Norman troops to ensure 
that Henry’s line of retreat remained opened.   
 
 
Part 3, The Battle of Crogen 
 
Action: 
The ambush in the woods of the Ceiriog Valley. 
Key Sites/terrain: Crogen battlefield, Ceiriog river valley, Offa’s Dyke, 
Adwy’r Beddau (pass of the graves). 
Associated Sites: Chirk Bank Motte and Castell y Waun, more for their 
vicinity to Crogen than actual involvement in the battle.  St Mary’s Church 
of Chirk should be included for similar reasons, although it is not clear if it 
had been founded by 1165. 
 
Table 30: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Battle of Crogen. 
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Figure 87: The oak at the ‘Gate of the Dead’, the Battle of Crogen (photo by the author). 
 
Crogen 
The Battle of Crogen is not associated with any known built features 
contemporary to the battle (insofar as they were constructed around the same 
time as the battle or for the battle; NPRN: 410131).  Although some historians 
claim that a Crogen Castell occupied the current location of Chirk Castle, which 
is situated adjacent to the battlefield, this has since been shown to be incorrect 
(Mahler 1912: 19; Pennant 1778: 268; Powel 1584: 186).  The manuscripts are 
vague in their description of the battle location, merely indicating that it took 
place in the Ceiriog river valley, a feature that stretches for approximately 10 
kilometres from its confluence at the River Dee to the town of Glyn Ceiriog, after 
which the valley narrows considerably, at many places becoming a steep ravine 
to its source in the Berwyn Mountains, (the total course of the river is 
approximately 24 kilometres).  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter in the section on the historiography 
of the Battle of Crogen, the concept of naming the battle ‘Crogen’ was not 
introduced until Powel’s publication in 1589, 429 years after the actual battle 
had taken place.  During the reign of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in the early thirteenth 
century the rebellious Powsian lord Gwenwynwyn, refused to take an oath of 
allegiance to Llywelyn.  After being threatened by Llywelyn’s army, he 
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surrendered and took an oath of allegiance.  As a gesture of good will he gave 
to Llywelyn his castle at Crogen (Powel 1589: 186).  Powel makes the 
assumption that this castle was based in the Chirk vicinity given the place-
names of Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon (see Figure 88 below).   
Incidentally Wladys and Iddon both translate as ‘the name of’, therefore, these 
two place-names can be translated as Crogen’s Place, possibly a medieval 
farm and homestead belonging to someone named Crogen. The castle referred 
to by Powel has since been identified with Crogen Castell in the community of 
Llandderfel; it is documented in the Brut y Tywysogyon in connection to the 
1202 conflict mentioned above (Brut Pen. 20: 82).   Llandderfel is 25 kilometres 
west of Crogen Wladys and Iddon, along the River Dee.  It is thought that 
Crogen Castell (sometimes spelled Crogan) was a motte associated with a llys, 
similar to Rûg Castell (GAT: 3272, NPRN: 306558, Renn 1968: 161).  Due to 
Powel’s error, historians up until the early twentieth century alleged that Chirk 
Castle had been built on top of an earlier Castell Crogen (Mahler 1912: 19; 
Pennant 1778: 268).  The Battle of Dyffryn Ceiriog has since been known as the 
Battle of Crogen. 
 
 
 
Figure 88: Ordnance Survey Map of Chirk Castle and vicinity, showing the place-name locations 
of Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon.  The area inside the red line indicates potential locations 
for the battle, (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 2015). 
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Adwy’r Beddau (Pass/Gap of the Graves) and Offa’s Dyke 
Despite Powel’s error in identifying the location of Crogen Castell, it is likely that 
the Battle of Dyffryn Ceiriog was fought in the vicinity of Crogen Wladys and 
Crogen Iddon.  As can be seen in Figure 88 above, the valley between these 
location is more level and wider than at other locations along the Ceiriog River.  
Additionally,  both modern and historic (1870) Ordnance Survey maps indicate 
that there is a 200 metre wide gap in Offa’s Dyke before it crosses the Ceiriog 
to continue up the opposite southern ridge line.  Historians have suggested that 
it was at this opening where the Anglo-Norman army was ambushed by the 
Welsh as they attempted to pass through (Lewis 1849; Mahler 1912: 20; 
Pennant 1778: 268; Powel 1589: 187; Nicholas 1872: 405).  Local tradition 
states that after the battle the dead were ‘buried in the fosse of Offa’s Dyke’, 
known as Adwy’r Beddau or the ‘Gap of the Graves’ (Nicholas 1872: 405; 
Pennant 1778: 268; Unknown 1822: 155; Powel 1589: 187).  The oak tree 
pictured above in Figure 87 is said to mark the entrance to the pass of the 
graves and is called the gates of the dead.  Legend has it that this oak, which is 
believed to be nearly 1200 years old, was spared by Henry’s army as they were 
cutting down trees, due to its substantial size.  It would have been nearly 350 
years old in 1165 (BBC News 2010; 2013).  The age of the tree suggests that it 
took root soon after the construction of Offa’s Dyke at the close of the eighth 
century (Fox 1955).  That the oak was allowed to mature suggests that this 
stretch of Offa’s Dyke may not have been as contested or heavily monitored as 
other locations given that trees regrew in the vicinity soon after the Dyke’s 
construction, which would presumably reduce visibility and therefore 
defensibility.    
The rationale for disposing of the dead in a pre-dug ditch is sound, 
insofar as it makes logistical sense, however, archaeological excavation would 
need to be conducted to verify this tradition.  The area believed to be the 
location of the mass grave has been severely eroded by the placement of a 
drainage conduit through this portion of the dyke (see Figure 89 below).  An 
archaeological survey of Offa’s Dyke was undertaken on a small portion to the 
south of Chirk Castle in 1991 (near the vicinity of the middle photo in Figure 89 
below).  The reason for this survey was to determine whether the dyke would be 
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impacted by the installation of a new sewage disposal system for the castle.  
During the course of excavations it was revealed that a drainage conduit had 
already been diverted into the dyke in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Arnold 1991).  No associated artefacts or other archaeological 
features of note were documented.  Interestingly, none of the historians 
referenced above make a mention of any earthwork mounds, which are 
occsionally (when preserved) associated with mass graves from medieval 
battlefields (see discussion in Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare 
chapter, page 94).   
 
 
 
Figure 89: top: view of potential battle ground immediately to the east of Adwy’r Beddau, middle: 
Offa’s Dyke south towards the Ceiriog river valley, bottom: Offa’s Dyke at the alleged location of 
the mass burial, due north of Adwy’r Beddau, (photos by the author). 
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Part 4, The Advancement of the Anglo-Norman Army into the Berwyn 
Mountains4 
 
Action: The advancement of the Anglo-Norman forces into the Berwyn 
Mountains and their establishment of an encampment. 
 
Key Sites/terrain: The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English 
Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge, St Garmon’s 
Church 
Associated Sites: Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably 
part of the Ffordd y Saeson. 
 
Table 31: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the advancement of the Anglo-Norman 
army into the Berwyn Mountains. 
 
 
Ffordd y Saeson 
The location of the Ffordd y Saeson, or English road, is based primarily on 
place-name evidence, a modern foot-path is now superimposed on the 
theoretical route of the Ffordd y Saeson (see Figure 74; Mahler 1912: 25).  This 
medieval route-way is thought to originate at Pen-y Rhewl, the place-name of a 
farmhouse meaning ‘top of the road, [it is] located near the supposed line of the 
medieval track-way’ (CPAT: 101582).  Local lore states that this was the road 
Henry II used through the Berwyn Mountains, explaining its etymology (NPRN: 
401058, Mahler 1912: 25).  It is possible that the road has more ancient origins 
as it is associated with several prehistoric features, including Cerrig Gwynion 
hillfort and the cairn pictured below in Figure 90. 
 
                                                 
4
 Part 5, the Anglo-Norman retreat is not considered separately as the key sites 
associated with the action are included in part 4. 
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Figure 90: Cairn located near the Ffordd y Saeson, (photo by the author). 
 
Pont Rhyd y Gad Bridge 
Similar to the Ffordd y Saeson, the involvement of the Pont Rhyd y Gad (also 
known as the Pontricket Bridge) is founded on local oral tradition (CPAT: 
12239).  Jones and Jones in their 1998 historical photographic account of the 
Ceiriog Valley assert that the Pont Rhyd y Gad Bridge was built at the location 
‘where the mercenary army of King Henry II is reputed to have forded the 
Ceiriog before his disastrous defeat in the Berwyn Mountains’ (Jones and Jones 
1998: 27).  The actual construction date of the bridge is not known, but it is 
probably post-medieval in origin.   
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Figure 91: View of the Ceiriog River from the Pont Rhyd y Gad Bridge, (photo by the author). 
 
Cerrig Gwynion 
The Iron Age Hillfort of Cerrig Gwynion5 is located approximately one kilometre 
northwest of the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (see Figure 92 below).  
Apart from a monument survey undertaken by Cadw there has been no 
archaeological investigation of the hillfort (NPRN: 306806).  In addition there is 
little mention of the site in any historical volumes; Lewis in The Topographical 
Dictionary of Wales merely refers to it in passing when discussing the history of 
the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (1849).  In their photographic account 
Jones and Jones claim that Cerrig Gwynion was ‘the site where Owain 
Gwynedd stood and defeated the mercenaries of King Henry II’ (1998: 36, 
CPAT: 59549).  The claim that there was a battle at the hillfort is poorly 
referenced and must therefore be treated with caution.  Mahler claims that an 
early publication of the journal Archaeologia Cambrensis was the first to 
suggest that the Anglo-Norman army encamped on Cerrig Gwynion.  The 
volume she cites has been searched but this reference was not found (Mahler 
1912: 26).  Yet, this suggestion is not unfounded.  Cerrig Gwynion is located 
directly adjacent to the Ffordd y Saeson; the hillfort is in a defensible position 
                                                 
5
 Cerrig Gwynion is on private land, the author requested access from the owner and 
was denied on 19/04/2014. 
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and provides good visibility over the surrounding landscape.  Although in a state 
of decay its defences could have been refortified with comparable ease.  At a 
distance of twelve kilometres from Corwen the Anglo-Norman army would have 
been within a day’s march of the Welsh forces, yet the distance was 
considerable enough that if desired, armed conflict could be avoided.  
 
 
 
Figure 92: above: view toward Cerrig Gwynion (photo by the author), below: aerial photo of 
Cerrig Gwynion (83-c-0533 CPAT). 
 
The hillfort itself is believed to have Iron Age foundations; it is univallate 
with two entrances, one to the east and one to the west.  On the south facing 
slope eight circular hut platforms have been documented, these have an 
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average diameter of 9 metres (CPAT: 100984).  The enclosure is an irregular 
oval in shape and measures 214 metres (east to west) x 130 metres (NPRN: 
306806).  The landscape surrounding the hillfort remains unaltered apart from 
several conifer plantations. 
 
St Garmon’s Church 
Whilst not recorded in the other manuscripts, Gerald of Wales claims that while 
the Anglo-Norman army was stationed in the Berwyn mountains they burned 
and pillaged some of the local churches and communities.  St Garmon’s church 
is one kilometre southeast of Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, making it and the village of 
Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog an easy target.  The only other church in the vicinity 
of the Anglo-Norman encampment would have been St Trillo Church in the 
village of Llandrillo, 12 kilometres west-southwest from Cerrig Gwynion and 8 
kilometres southwest from Corwen.  Whether the Anglo-Normans would have 
ventured as far as Llandrillo is questionable, particularly since they would have 
been visible to the Welsh at Corwen and at too far a distance from the rest of 
the Anglo-Norman army to receive assistance in the event that they were 
attacked.  St Garmon’s however presented no such obstacles and would have 
been perceived as an easy target.  The church is reputed to have been founded 
in the fifth century by St Garmon; there are no remains of this early Christian 
site or of its medieval successor and the present building dates to the 
nineteenth century (CPAT n.d. (b)).  Within the churchyard is a preaching 
mound (see Figure 93 below), a feature that is commonly associated with 
churches dedicated to St. Garmon (CPAT: 101000).    
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Figure 93: Preaching mound at St Garmon’s church, Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (photo by the 
author). 
 
There are other sites not discussed in the preceding sections that are 
represented spatially within the Berwyn Mountain Campaign core area.  While 
not directly involved in the campaign, they are included in the historic landscape 
reconstruction as they represent integral components of the broader conflict 
landscape. However, there is one site that merits a brief overview.  Coed Y 
Gadfa is a site along the Dee river valley, its location is circumstantial of place-
name evidence of a farmhouse named Coed Y Gadfa, which is translated as 
battlefield wood (CPAT: 101586).  The battle event responsible for the 
namesake of this wood is undocumented.  Although it is unlikely that this was 
the site of an armed engagement from the 1165 campaign, it is nevertheless 
indicative of a frontier landscape with an extensive conflict tradition (see Figure 
75). 
 
 
Synthesis and Spatial Analysis 
 
The following section is a synthesis of the two preceding sections, the campaign 
timeline as evidenced in the primary documentary sources and the archaeology 
of the key sites involved in the 1165 campaign.  This synthesis is guided by the 
military terrain analysis of each event. The spatial analysis presented below 
represents only the preliminary data of the total military terrain analysis 
conducted for this campaign.  The next chapter contains an in-depth 
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consideration of the spatial analysis for this campaign and the 1157 Coastal 
Campaign. The following analysis considers the KOCOA features of four key 
campaign events: the encampments; the march to Wales; the battle; the route 
of march into the Berwyns and the encampment in the mountains.  All four are 
accompanied by viewshed models.  The Anglo-Norman retreat from the Berwyn 
Mountains will not be considered here, as it is secondary to the campaign 
narrative. The Battle of Crogen will receive an in-depth KOCOA analysis in the 
following chapter; the KOCOA analysis included here provides a preliminary 
overview. 
 
 
The Encampments 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: Welsh Encampment at Corwen 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain Site of Encampment, Pen y Bryn y 
Castell, Caer Drewyn, Castell 
Edeirnion 
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Hills forward of encampment (south 
and east), Caer Drewyn, Pen y 
Bryn y Castell 
Cover and Concealment South face of Pen y Bryn y Castell 
Obstacles River Dee 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Dee river valley and the Ffordd y 
Saeson 
 
Table 32: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the encampments. 
 
 
Within this campaign there are only two certainties for event location, the first 
being that the Welsh were encamped at Corwen; the other is Henry II’s 
advancement into the Berwyn Mountains.  Operating under these two 
certainties the other events of this campaign can be spatially inferred and 
reconstructed.  
 Oswestry did not offer the Anglo-Normans any tactical advantages other 
than the proximity of its location to the Ceiriog river valley, thus providing an 
avenue of approach.  The terrain features surrounding Oswestry offer little in 
the way of natural defences and the visibility from the castle, the highpoint in 
that region, is poor.  These conditions suggest that Henry never intended to use 
Oswestry as anything more than a staging ground for the expedition into Wales. 
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 Conversely, the Welsh encampment near Corwen was selected for its 
tactical advantages as their position at Corwen was intended to prevent the 
Anglo-Norman advancement into Wales, as it was located at the head of the 
Roman road where it turns west into Snowdonia.  This road may well have been 
Henry’s objective as during the twelfth century it was the only way through 
Snowdonia to the Welsh strongholds.  Corwen itself is situated in the Dee river 
valley but is surrounded by numerous highpoints including the aforementioned 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell and Caer Drewyn. 
 A series of viewsheds were executed for both of these locations from 
geo-referenced points collected at diverse locations on the sites (see 
Methodology chapter page 57 for data point collection strategy).  Caer Drewyn 
despite its location on a prominent knoll is actually located on a false crest, as 
the actual summit is located half of a kilometre to the east; this in turn limits the 
visibility to the east.  Despite this, Caer Drewyn affords a degree of visibility 
toward to Ffordd y Saeson, approximately 5 kilometres southeast, which would 
mean that the Welsh would have been able to anticipate the Anglo-Norman 
approach.  The blind spot to the east could have been overcome by posting 
lookouts on the eastern summit, although as Henry’s army advanced along the 
Ceiriog River, the vantage point to the east along the Dee river valley may not 
have been a primary concern.    
 Pen y Bryn y Castell possesses a different set of advantages from Caer 
Drewyn.  Unlike Caer Drewyn, which would have been as visible to the Anglo-
Norman army from the Ffordd y Saeson as the Ffordd y Saeson was to Welsh 
encampment on Caer Drewyn, Pen y Bryn y Castell would have been 
concealed from the Anglo-Normans as they advanced along the English Road 
towards Corwen.  Viewshed analysis indicates that Caer Drewyn and Castell 
Edeirnion were both visible from Pen y Bryn y Castell, although there was no 
visibility to the south, the direction of the Anglo-Norman approach (see Figures 
94 and 95 below).  Interestingly, all three sites: Castell/ Llys Edeirnion (where 
the Welsh princes may have been stationed), Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y 
Castell are mutually inter-visible of each other.  It is possible that the Welsh 
army was encamped at both Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y Castell.  Caer 
Drewyn was probably too small in size to accommodate the entire Welsh army, 
but may have been used as vantage point to monitor the Anglo-Norman 
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progress through the Berwyn Mountains.  The bulk of the army would have 
been encamped at Pen y Bryn y Castell, which could have easily 
accommodated the Welsh forces.  Additionally, Pen y Bryn y Castell is a more 
hospitable encampment than Caer Drewyn as it contains a series of springs and 
streams for fresh water supply.  By placing the bulk of the Welsh army at Pen y 
Bryn y Castell, the Welsh forces would have had the element of surprise if the 
Anglo-Normans had advanced as far as Corwen.   
It is evident that Owain Gwynedd was utilizing similar tactics to those 
implemented at the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk during the 1157 Coastal 
Campaign.  Specifically, by the selection of a strategic point at which to oppose 
the Anglo-Norman advancement, Owain effectively had the campaign 
advantage.  By selecting the field of conflict he controlled the engagement. 
 
 
 
Figure 94: Viewshed from Caer Drewyn which is indicated with a red arrow. 
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Figure 95: Viewshed from Pen Y Bryn Y Castell which is indicated with a red arrow. 
 
 
The Anglo-Norman avenue of approach to Wales from Oswestry 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain Oswestry Castle and surrounding 
environs, route of march (following 
river valley), Offa’s Dyke 
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Surrounding castles, such as 
Castell y Waun 
Cover and Concealment Wat’s Dyke, surrounding castles 
Obstacles Foothills of the Berwyn Mountains, 
rivers, castles along the river 
Tanant 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Dee and Ceiriog river valleys  
 
Table 33: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of march from 
Oswestry. 
 
 
Henry II’s decision to advance through Wales via the Ceiriog river valley rather 
than the Dee river valley is perplexing and must be addressed.  The Dee river 
valley is located approximately 4 kilometres north of the Ceiriog River at Chirk.  
Unlike the Ceiriog river valley, which is at places little more than a ravine, the 
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valley along the Dee is wide.  Additionally, by following the Dee river valley into 
Wales Henry would have avoided the difficult upland journey in the Berwyn 
Mountains.  In 1118 Henry I successfully transported his troops along the Dee 
river valley to the Roman Road at Corwen; although unverified, the Llangollen 
Bridge is credited as being originally built by Henry I in connection with this 
campaign (CPAT: 101214; Pennant 1778).  Presumably, Henry II would have 
been aware of his grandfather’s campaign, and the success he achieved by 
using this route-way through Wales.  In light of this it is puzzling why Henry II 
favoured the Ceiriog Valley and the Berwyn Mountains over the gentle terrain of 
the Dee river valley.  His aversion of the other possible route along the River 
Tanat, 5 kilometres south of Oswestry, requires little explanation.  It is bordered 
by numerous castles (such as Sycharth, Tomen yr Allt and Tomen Cefnoch) 
that at this point in history were probably garrisoned by the Welsh, additionally 
once at the river’s source in the heart of the Berwyn Mountains where the river 
valley terminates, there is no way across the mountains.  Additionally, it is 
almost double the distance of the other routes (see Figure 96 below). 
 There are two probable explanations for why Henry favoured the Ceiriog 
over the Dee.  The Welsh would have remembered the route Henry I took 
through Wales 47 years earlier and they would have anticipated the possibility 
that Henry II could follow suit.  Henry II would also have been aware of this and 
may have chosen the Ceiriog route in the hope of entering Wales undetected.  
Yet, given the size of the Anglo-Norman army stealth seems implausible.  
Regardless, the Welsh were evidently aware of the route via the Ceiriog as they 
had stationed a small contingent in advance, the same small force that 
ambushed Henry at Crogen.  Secondly, Henry may have chosen to transverse 
the Berwyn Mountains so that his army would have the advantage of the high 
ground (this will be elaborated upon in the section on the Berwyn Mountains 
below).  Henry may have been willing to sacrifice the temporary vulnerability 
along the Ceiriog Valley in order to gain the advantage of the higher ground. 
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Figure 96: Map detailing possible avenues of approach into Wales from Oswestry. Yellow: Dee 
river valley, red: Ceiriog river valley, black: Tanat river valley. 
 
 
The Battle of Crogen 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: The Battle of Crogen 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain River valley / flood plain of the 
Ceiriog near Offa’s Dyke at Chirk 
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Ridgeline to the north and south of 
the battlefield 
Cover and Concealment Offa’s Dyke, wooded hillsides 
Obstacles Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog River, wooded 
terrain 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Gap in Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog river 
valley, ridgetops bordering the 
battlefield  
 
Table 34: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Battle of Crogen. 
 
By contextualizing the 1165 Campaign, particularly the Battle of Crogen, within 
a wider conflict landscape that utilizes military terrain analysis it has been 
possible to define and reconstruct key events associated with this conflict.  As 
previously stated the precise location of the battle was not known.  However, 
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the terrain features in the region of Crogen Iddon and Crogen Wladys, the pass 
through Offa’s Dyke, along with the local tradition of the mass grave at Adwy’r 
Beddau, lend support to the theory that the so-called Battle of Crogen did in fact 
take place in this area.  Both the Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions 
of the Brut y Tywysogyon state that Henry’s forces were ambushed in the 
woods of Dyffryn Ceiriog, which is translated as the Ceiriog Valley.  The 
Brenhinedd y Saesson states that this event occurred at Aberceiriog, which is 
translated as the mount or confluence of the Ceiriog River.  The Ceiriog River 
flows into the Dee only a few kilometres east of Crogen so it is conceivable that 
the mouth of the Ceiriog could be considered to be located in the Crogen 
vicinity.   
 The Welsh would have had excellent visibility of the Anglo-Norman 
approach along the Ceiriog and of their tree-cutting activities from the ridge-tops 
on either side of the Ceiriog Valley.  As the tree-cutting would indicated, this 
area was densely wooded, a factor that the viewshed models do not take into 
account (see discussion on this on page 61 of the Methodology chapter).  
Nevertheless, the Anglo-Normans would not have been able to see the ridge-
tops from their location on the valley floor and the forest would have offered the 
Welsh forces ample cover and concealment.  The ambush could have come 
from two sides, by Welsh forces stationed on both the north and south ridges.  
Only archaeological testing using battlefield archaeology methodologies will be 
able to verify these hypotheses.  Viewsheds are not presented in this section as 
the Battle of Crogen is discussed at length in the following Military Terrain 
Analysis chapter.  
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The Berwyn Mountains, Anglo-Norman route of approach and encampment 
 
KOCOA Analysis for: Berwyn Mountains, Anglo-Norman route of 
approach and encampment 
Battlefield Element Terrain Feature 
Key Terrain Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y 
Saeson, Cerrig Gwynion Hillfort, 
river crossings / fords 
Observation and Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Ridgeline to the north and south of 
the battlefield progressing west into 
the Berwyns, Cerrig Gwynion Hillfort 
Cover and Concealment Wooded terrain 
Obstacles Wooded terrain, steep terrain, 
Ceiriog River 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat Ffordd y Saeson, ridgelines, Ceiriog 
River Valley, Offa’s Dyke  
 
Table 35: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of approach and 
encampment in the Berwyn Mountains. 
 
After the battle, Henry decided to continue his campaign despite the losses he 
had sustained at Crogen.  Based on the terrain, there are three possible routes 
that the Anglo-Normans could have taken to reach the Ffordd y Saeson.  These 
are detailed below in Figure 97.  The route indicated by the red line follows the 
Ceiriog River turning north at the Ffordd y Saeson.  The purple route moves 
rapidly upland from Crogen and continues at elevation to the Ffordd y Saeson, it 
is not unreasonable to conclude that Henry would have wanted to gain high 
ground as soon as possible, given that staying in the river valley would have left 
his army vulnerable to additional ambushes.  The third option, the route 
indicated in black, follows the course of Offa’s Dyke to the south where it rapidly 
gains elevation after crossing the Ceiriog River.  Once on level ground the army 
would have turned west, following the ridgeline to Pont Rhyd y Gad where they 
would have forded the river before continuing onto the Ffordd y Saeson.   
Each of these hypothetical routes poses a series of challenges.  The 
purple route would have probably been forested, lending the same difficulties 
that caused Henry to order the woodland around Crogen cut down.  The route 
along the Ceiriog River would have been almost impassable at places where 
the valley transforms into a steep ravine.  Indeed the difficulty of the terrain, 
steep in many places, would have been a challenge for all three potential route-
ways, and particularly for Henry’s supply train.  Part of the supply train may 
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have been abandoned due to the difficulty of the terrain.  This would explain 
why the Anglo-Norman army ran out of supplies so quickly when encamped in 
the Berwyn Mountains. 
 The route that parallels Offa’s Dyke is perhaps the more logical choice.  
Despite the rapid ascent of the Dyke from the south bank of the Ceiriog, once 
upland the ground levels out making the landscape fairly easy to transverse.  
The major challenge of this route is at the point of descent to the ford through 
the Ceiriog, it is doubtful that the wagons in Henry’s supply train would have 
been able to manage the decent.   
Henry’s choice of route may also have been informed by the route of the 
Welsh retreat from Crogen.  It is unlikely that the Anglo-Normans would have 
tried to pursue them in the aftermath of the battle.  What is more likely is that 
Henry decided to follow them, assuming that, as they were familiar with the 
area, they would take the path of least resistance back to Corwen. 
 
 
 
Figure 97: Possible routes of approach into the Berwyn Mountains and to the Ffordd y Saeson 
from Crogen.  The line of Offa’s Dyke is indicated by the dotted line on the eastern edge of the 
map, the approximate route of Ffordd y Saeson is represented by the solid pink line and St 
Garmon’s Church, which may have been pillaged by the Anglo-Normans when encamped at 
Cerrig Gwynion is indicated by the red lightning bolt. 
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 Cerrig Gwynion, the alleged location of the Anglo-Norman encampment 
in the Berwyn Mountains is situated on a commanding location over the Ceiriog 
River.  Similar in size to Caer Drewyn, it is doubtful that Ceirrig Gwynion would 
have been able to support the entire Anglo-Norman army within its defences.  
However, the summit on which Cerrig Gwynion is situated, Mynydd Bach, would 
have been able to accommodate the entire army with ease.  Unfortunately, due 
to the site being located on private land, viewshed analysis could not be 
conducted as access is needed in order to gather geographically referenced 
points.  Only the southern and western exposures of Mynydd Bach offer Cerrig 
Gwynion natural defence; the eastern and northern portions of the summit flow 
out into the level terrain of the Berwyn uplands (see Figure 98 below).  From 
there it is relatively easy to access the Ffordd y Saeson, located 1 kilometre 
northeast of the hillfort. 
 
 
 
Figure 98: View of Cerrig Gwynion from the northeast, looking southwest (photo by the author). 
  
The Ffordd y Saeson is unique in that it affords constant forward visibility, 
in the direction of Corwen.  By this it is meant that at no point would forward 
(north-westerly) visibility be obscured.  From any given observation point along 
the road there is an average visibility of 2 kilometres, an example of this is 
shown in the viewshed below in Figure 99.  This visibility would make it difficult 
for the Welsh to ambush the Anglo-Normans and may indicate why Henry II 
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chose to use the Ffordd y Saeson in favour of the Dee river valley, as the 
avenue of approach for his 1165 campaign in Wales.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 99: Viewshed from the Ffordd y Saeson demonstrating the continuous vantage points in 
the direction of Corwen which is indicated with the pink dotted line, the points from which the 
viewshed were calculated are underlined. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given consideration to the historical and archaeological 
evidence of key events and sites associated with the 1165 Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign.  The spatial representation of these sites and events made it 
possible to synthesize a battle narrative for key events and locations, such as 
the Battle of Crogen and the Anglo-Norman march from Crogen into the Berwyn 
Mountains.  The military terrain analysis of the Welsh position at Corwen 
illuminates the strategic qualities of their position.  Similar to the 1157 
encampment at Basingwerk, both were chosen to halt the Anglo-Norman 
advance and allowed the Welsh to set the terms of the engagement by 
selecting the location.  Overall, the resultant gross-pattern analysis along with 
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preliminary military terrain analysis, utilizing KOCOA, has highlighted key 
features and terrain elements to be explored in depth in the following chapter 
using elements of reverse and regular KOCOA.  
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Chapter Ten – Military Terrain Analysis 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The following section encompasses a comprehensive military terrain analysis 
for the key sites and events identified in each case study from the previous 
chapters, the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and the 1165 Battle of Crogen.  As 
previously discussed in the Methodology chapter, military terrain analysis is 
essentially a methodological tool-set for conducting spatial analysis of a conflict 
landscape.  The battle event analysed for the 1157 Coastal Campaign is the 
Battle of Coleshill and includes the areas surrounding the Coleshill (Hen Blas) 
region and the Ewloe region.  The historiography of the 1157 case study 
identified historical errors that led to the misidentification of Ewloe as the 
popular location of the battle event in 1157, often referred to as the Battle of 
‘Coed Eulo’ or Ewloe Wood.  The following military terrain analysis will contrast 
these two possibilities, other prospective battle locations having been 
addressed and ruled out in the 1157 Case Study chapter, specifically the areas 
surrounding Hawarden Castle and Bryn Y Cwm Motte.  The military terrain 
analysis illuminates and compares the variables for these two prospective battle 
sites and explores how the terrain would have been perceived and could have 
been exploited by the combatants.   
Subsidiary events from the 1157 campaign, such as the Anglo-Norman 
raid on Anglesey and the Welsh raids on Rhuddlan following the battle of 
Coleshill have not been subjected to military terrain analysis; this is because the 
historical renderings of the nature of these engagements is too vague to allow 
for in-depth military terrain analysis.  These sites still have survey potential, but 
due to the scope of this research they have not been considered further than 
their inclusion in the conflict chronology and the conflict landscape 
reconstruction.  Other battle related events and sites from the 1165 campaign 
such as: the Anglo-Norman encampment at Cerrig Gwynion, the Anglo-Norman 
advance along the Ffordd y Saeson (the English road) and the Welsh 
encampments at Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn and Castell Edeirnion have 
already been analysed for their spatial relationships in the 1165 Campaign 
Case Study chapter.  
296 
 
Military terrain analysis toolset review 
 
The battlefield elements as identified by KOCOA (see Table 36 below) and 
adapted for conflict archaeology are as follows (after Scott and McFeaters 
2011: 115; McBride et al. 2011). 
 
Battlefield 
Element 
Definition Examples 
Key Terrain 
and cultural 
terrain 
Any portion of the battlefield, 
possession of which gives an 
advantage to the possessor. 
High ground, 
castles 
(fortifications), 
trenches and other 
earthworks, 
monuments 
Observation & 
Fields of 
Fire/Assault 
Points on the landscape that allow 
observation of enemy activity that is 
not necessarily key terrain; offers 
opportunity to observe an area, 
acquire targets; and can allow for an 
effective line of fire. 
High ground, line 
of site, viewshed 
Cover & 
Concealment 
Landforms or landscape elements 
that provide protection from assault 
and enemy fire and conceal troop 
positions from observation. 
Ravines, cliff-face, 
castle wall, forest  
Obstacles Landscape elements that affect troop 
movements.  These can be natural or 
manmade features 
Rivers, marshes, 
ravines, 
earthworks, forest 
Avenues of 
Approach & 
Retreat 
Corridors used to transport troops 
between the core battle area and 
outer logistical areas.  Again these 
can be natural or manmade features 
Roads, paths, 
steam beds, 
navigable 
waterways 
 
Table 36: KOCOA battlefield elements. 
 
An addendum to this standard military terrain protocol is the author’s addition of 
cultural features, (which for the sake of remaining succinct and consistent have 
not been included in traditional KOCOA table layout above). These features are 
considered battlefield elements, as they can contribute to determining the point 
at which a battle takes place, for example, a boundary marker such as a 
standing stone cross, or a known centre of political or religious importance.  
Moreover, they are integral components in the reconstruction and 
contextualization of a medieval conflict landscape.  For these reasons cultural 
features will be treated as a sub-section within the Key Terrain feature-set of 
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KOCOA.  The addition of a cultural feature sub-category is a product of the 
‘reverse’ KOCOA applied in this study.  As reviewed in the Methodology 
chapter, a significant part of what makes this study unique is its application to a 
medieval conflict and the inclusion of an in-depth reconstruction of the 
contemporary historic landscape.  As discussed in the Methodology chapter, 
generally KOCOA is used to better delineate and define features of a known 
battlefield to assist in the analysis and reconstruction of discrete battlefield 
events.  Reverse KOCOA uses these elements to identify potential battlefield 
locations, in events where the site of the engagement is not always precisely 
known, for example the Battle of Coleshill.  Once this is achieved, KOCOA is 
then applied in the traditional mode.  ‘Reverse’ KOCOA was applied in the 
previous Case Study chapters to identify potential battlefield locations and other 
conflict related sites.  What follows now is a combination of the reverse and the 
traditional application of KOCOA and viewshed analyses of the Battle of 
Coleshill, including the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo and the Battle of Crogen.  
The data from the military terrain analysis and the battle narratives from the 
manuscripts are then synthesised to create an order of battle – a dynamic 
pattern analysis, a gross-pattern having been presented in the preceding Case 
Study chapters.  The results from this analysis are then discussed in their 
capacity to reconstruct battlefield events and highlight events of social change 
as evidenced in the following data.  The viewsheds are displayed at the end of 
this chapter, pages 334-414.  The Ewloe or Coed Eulo viewsheds can be found 
on pages 334-348 (Figures 113-127), Coleshill pages 349-381 (Figures 128-
160) and Crogen pages 382-414 (Figures 161-193). 
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The Battle of Coleshill – the 1157 Coastal Campaign 
 
 
 
Figure 100: 1157 Coastal Campaign, Battle of Coleshill core area.  This represents the two 
possibilities for the location of Coleshill, the Ewloe area and Coleshill area. 
 
 
Ewloe Castle environs, spatial military analysis 
Ewloe castle was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257.  It has been suggested 
that this masonry castle stands on the site of an earlier earth and timber 
fortification, as evidenced in the irregular plan of the masonry castle, suggesting 
the foundations had to compensate for a previous building (CPAT 100050), 
however, there is no archaeological or documentary evidence to support this 
claim.  Ewloe castle is situated on a narrow ridge approximately 100 metres 
above sea level.  The surrounding environment is dominated by Wepre Wood; it 
is thought that this woodland represents all that is left of the once great forest of 
Tegeingl (Owen 1994: 154).  Wepre brook flows northeast through a steep 
ravine directly north of the castle, the castle itself is situated on a narrow rise 
less than 30 metres south of the confluence of Wepre Brook with a subsidiary 
stream.  Most of the remaining woodland is now enclosed within Wepre Park, a 
160 acre parkland maintained by the Flintshire Countryside Service.  The 
landscape is dominated by steep ravines, narrow ridges and cliffy outcrops.  
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Wepre Wood is approximately 4 kilometres northwest of Hawarden, directly 
adjacent to the coastal Roman road (based on the present day boundaries of 
Wepre wood), and approximately 4.5 kilometres east/northeast of Wat’s Dyke.  
The Ewloe castle area is also located approximately 11 kilometres northwest of 
Henry’s encampment near Chester and 13.5 kilometres southeast of Owain’s 
encampment at Basingwerk. 
 As has been previously discussed, the great forest of Tegeingl covered 
an immense area of northeast Wales, place-name evidence suggests that it 
stretched from the marches of Cheshire northwest to the River Clwyd.  It is not 
known precisely how far west this forest stretched, the place-name evidence 
suggest it encompassed Mold and the immediate area to the west.  The 
Clwydian Mountains appear to have been the natural boundary of the forest, 
although parts of the forest probably stretched into their lowland terrain (Owen 
1994).  The coastal plain to the east of the forest was generally open and 
marshy in places, in the Bruts this is described as ‘open country’ (Brut Pen. 20: 
59).  The coastal Roman road transects the coastal plain, staying clear of the 
forest to the west.  Despite the ‘wildness’ of the forest recorded by the Bruts, it 
is probable that there were open pockets within the forest, as evidenced in 
Domesday Book and the Journey Through Wales (see Chapter Six). 
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Figure 101: The terrain of the environs surrounding Ewloe Castle and observer points used for 
viewshed analysis. 
Key: dotted pink line = coarse of coastal Roman road 
         large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach 
         small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenue of approach  
         red explosion = supposed site of the so-called battle of Coed Eulo. 
 
 
KOCOA Analysis for the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo or Ewloe Wood 
 
Key Terrain 
For the battle action the key terrain is fairly straight forward, being the high 
ground or ridges over the ravine which would have given the advantage to the 
Welsh, who would have had possession of this terrain feature.  The Welsh 
would have also had control over the avenue of retreat at the south of the ravine 
where it terminates; this would have ensured their ability to withdraw while 
blocking that exit from the Anglo-Normans.  These terrain features can be 
viewed in Figure 101 above. 
 
Observations and fields of fire  
The complex topography surrounding Ewloe castle, yields a varied series of 
dynamic viewsheds.  A total of fourteen observer points were collected including 
Ewloe Castle.  A scale of 1:15,000 has been used for all viewshed 
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representations.  The following table (Table 37) represents the elevation for 
each of the observer points; the corresponding distance to the horizon has not 
been included within this table as all viewsheds for the Ewloe battle site region 
are restricted to an approximate four kilometres radius, which given the 
elevation of the observation points is well within the boundaries of sight. 
 
Ewloe Observer Points and Viewshed map title Elevation above sea 
level in metres 
Page 
Number 
Fig. 113: Ewloe Castle Environs, observation points used 
for viewshed analysis 
n/a 334 
Fig. 114: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 1 30 335 
Fig. 115: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 2 40 336 
Fig. 116: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 3 18 337 
Fig. 117: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 4 50 338 
Fig. 118: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 5 23 339 
Fig. 119: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 6 45 340 
Fig. 120: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 7 28 341 
Fig. 121: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 8 40 342 
Fig. 122: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 9, 
supposed site of battle 
41 343 
Fig. 123: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 10 45 344 
Fig. 124: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 11 65 345 
Fig. 125: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 12 65 346 
Fig. 126: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 13 65 347 
Fig. 127: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 14 65 348 
 
Table 37: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Coed Eulo (Ewloe) 
observation point. 
 
Several trends are present within these viewsheds.  The first is that 
visibility decreases as the depth of the ravine increases, this is true for observer 
points at both low and high elevations.  This terrain feature is clearly 
represented in Figures 114 and 115, which present greater visibility in the 
shallow northern section of the ravine, while the viewsheds in Figures 120 and 
121 indicate poor visibility in the deeper southern section of the ravine.  In 
addition, viewsheds at lower observer elevations from the northern half of the 
study area tend to have poor visibility (see Figures 116 and 118), while 
viewsheds from observer points at higher elevation tend to have a larger degree 
of visibility (see Figures 117 and 119).  The cut-off line for poor or good visibility 
seems to be around the 30 metre elevation contour.  Moreover, visibility from 
the northern section of the area indicates that the ridgeline would have in many 
instances been visible from the ravine floor, although part of this would have 
been obscured by vegetation.  All of the viewsheds indicate that the Welsh, on 
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the ridge at the southern end of the ravine, would have been invisible to the 
Anglo-Norman army until they were right upon them, arguably the perfect 
setting for an ambush. 
 
Cover and Concealment  
The ravine in places would have provided the Anglo-Normans concealment 
from the Welsh.  Cover from projectiles (arrows) could be purchased by taking 
refuge against any available cliff faces.  Additionally large portions of the ridge 
top (that are not located on the immediate edge) are not visible from the ravine, 
affording the Welsh concealment from the Anglo-Norman army until they were 
within attacking range, tree cover would have added to this feature (Figures 118 
and 120).   
 
Obstacles 
The ravine and the ridge line for all of their other positive qualities are also 
obstacles in themselves.  Once in the ravine it would be difficult to gain higher 
ground due to the steepness of the terrain (see Figure 102 below).  Conversely, 
it would have been equally perilous for the Welsh troops to have descended the 
steep terrain to the Anglo-Norman army below.  There is one exception; the 
topography in the immediate vicinity of Ewloe Castle is less severe.  The Anglo-
Norman army would have been at a disadvantage as they would have been 
engaged in an uphill battle.  Meanwhile the Welsh could have exploited the 
gradual downward slope to their advantage.   Other obstacles are minor and 
include the shallow brooks and streams prevalent in the region. 
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Figure 102: clockwise from upper left : view from ridge top to Wepre brook, supposed location of 
the battle of Ewloe, example of the rocky cliff faces prevalent throughout the ravine, flood plain 
near ravine extremity note how the narrow nature of the ravine is not perceptible from this 
vantage point, (photos by author). 
 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat 
There are only two avenues of approach and retreat for Ewloe.  The avenue of 
approach used by the Anglo-Normans would have been from the Roman road, 
which abuts the Wepre brook drainage basin.  The entrance to the ravine is 
essentially perpendicular to the Roman road.  The avenue of approach into the 
ravine is broad, approximately 190 metres wide and at an elevation of 15 
metres. Advancing 0.75 kilometres into the ravine it narrows dramatically to 
approximately 18 metres at its most narrow point.  At its entrance, it is not 
apparent that the Wepre brook culvert will progress into a ravine.  In fact many 
parts of its eastern extremities appear hospitable, with flat flood plains (see 
Figure 4 above).  This environment rapidly gives way to cliff faces and steep 
slopes, these features would not have been immediately visible to the 
304 
 
advancing army as they are obscured both by the limited terrain visibility and 
tree cover.  The manuscripts indicate that Henry had Welsh allies led by Madog 
ap Maredudd of Powys on this expedition, at least some of the members of the 
Welsh retinue must have been familiar with the terrain of northeast Wales.  As it 
was Henry’s intention to cut through the Welsh forest, a territory unknown to 
him, he likely had a Welsh guide.  Given this, it is probable that they would have 
advised Henry of the difficulties of the landscape.  This theory will be discussed 
in further detail in the Ewloe conclusion section below.  
The Welsh avenue of approach would probably have been in the vicinity 
of Ewloe Castle (elevation 85 metres), as mentioned above in the obstacle 
analysis; this is the only access point to the ravine that did not have precipitous 
drop-offs.  According to the documentary evidence, the Anglo-Normans 
retreated back the way they came: ‘[a]nd after many of the king's men had been 
slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped back to the plain’ (Brut RBH: 135).  
Following this engagement the Welsh also retreated back towards their 
encampment at Basingwerk.  Apart from the avenue of approach in the 
immediate vicinity of the battle location, is unclear from the historic landscape 
reconstruction and military terrain analysis what route-way the Welsh would 
have used to both advance and retreat.  It is possible that they could have been 
stationed at Mold Castle (6 kilometres southwest of Ewloe), which had been in 
Gwynedd’s possession since 1146.   
  
Coed Eulo Conclusions 
This terrain analysis has highlighted three principal issues with locating the 
battle at Ewloe.  These are in addition to the lack of historical references 
discussed in earlier chapters.   The first is distance; Ewloe is located 13.5 
kilometres from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk and 4.5 kilometres from 
Wat’s Dyke.  Given that Henry’s intent was to cut through the wood to take the 
Welsh by surprise from their rear, (once their front was engaged by the other 
half of Henry’s army), he would have been faced with a long and arduous trek 
through the Welsh forest.  Even without the supply train to slow his progress it is 
unlikely that he would have been able to arrive at Basingwerk in time with the 
other half of his contingent; this potential tardiness could have had disastrous 
consequences for the other half of his army, expecting a relieving force.  While 
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the manuscripts and antiquarian literature attributes the calamity that befell 
Henry’s forces to his inexperience with warfare, this was not the case as he was 
not as inexperienced as previously assumed (Hosler 2004, King 1965). 
Although he was young, only 23 at the time of the 1157 campaign he had 
experience with conflict in France and he was undoubtedly assisted by 
seasoned military advisers.  Even with a Welsh guide, it is unlikely that Henry 
would have been so imprudent as to attempt this long trek, even with the 
advantage of Wat’s Dyke as a route-way.  Furthermore, many of the 
manuscripts allude to the fact that once Owain realised that the king intended to 
surround him, he retreated.  ‘And when Owain heard that the king was coming 
against him from the rear side, and he saw the knights approaching from the 
other side, and with them a mighty host under arms, he left that place and 
retreated as far as the place that was called Cil Owain’ (Brut RBH: 135).  This 
indicates that the location of the assault was close enough to Basingwerk for 
Owain to have received news of the king’s intention, possibly while having the 
other half of Henry’s army in his sight.  
Also of concern is the proposed location of the battle in the ravine.  
Despite the fact that the Welsh would have had the initial advantage as they 
careened down the slope into the ravine, once there they would have been as 
trapped as the Anglo-Normans.  They would have either had to fight uphill to 
retreat or else push through the Anglo-Norman ranks to the road, where the rest 
of the Anglo-Norman army was located, as they would not have had time to 
advance far from the ravine entrance.  In fact the other half of the army was 
close enough to hear the commotion from the ambush and they attempted to 
come to the aid of their king.  Given the wording of the manuscripts, it appears 
that they arrived at the end of the ambush.  Unlike their Anglo-Norman 
counterparts, the Welsh soldiers were lightly armed allowing for increased 
agility (Davies 2004: 5, 145).  This would have certainly given them the 
advantage during a retreat following an ambuscade.  A Welsh advance into the 
ravine would have been tantamount to a suicide mission (Davies 2004; Kenyon 
1996); it is unlikely that they would have engaged in such a precarious attack.  
As discussed in the earlier chapter on Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval 
Warfare, Welsh field tactics were cleverly calculated to do the most possible 
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damage, in a short space of time, in an environment that would minimize the 
risks to themselves and put their opponents at a pronounced disadvantage.   
 Alternatively the Anglo-Normans could have advanced up along the ridge 
rather than the ravine, counting on the vegetation to protect them from the 
prying eyes of Welsh scouts, the western side having the gentler incline.  The 
Welsh positioned above the southern end of the ravine would have remained 
invisible to the Anglo-Normans until they advanced beyond an elevation of 80 
metres, this is in the vicinity of the comparatively level ground that is directly 
north of viewshed observation point Ewloe 10 (see Figure 113 and 123).  
Nevertheless, given the other deficiencies of evidence from the accounts in the 
manuscripts and from the military terrain analysis, it is highly unlikely that the 
battle took place at Coed Eulo.    
 
 
Coleshill environs, spatial military analysis 
 
Unlike the so-called Battle of ‘Coed Eulo’, there are manuscript references for 
the Battle of Coleshill.  The following are references from contemporary sources 
that recognize Coleshill by name as the site of the battle. 
Gerald of Wales – The Journey Through Wales: 
 ‘In our own times Henry II, king of the English, led an army into 
Gwynedd.  He was defeated in battle in a narrow wooded pass near 
Coleshill, that is the hill of coal’ (Book 2, Chapter 7: 189).   
 ‘On our right we passed the forest of Coleshill, the hill of coal.  It was 
there in our own time that Henry II, king of the English, was badly  
mauled when he made his first assault on Wales’ (Book 2, Chapter 10: 
196).   
 
Annales Cestrienses: 
 In this year [1157…] a battle royal was fought at Coleshill (21). 
 
The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond (in reference to the arraignment of Henry 
of Essex): 
 Henry [Essex], in the course of the Welsh war, in the difficult pass of 
Coleshill, had treacherously cast down the standard of the lord king, and 
proclaimed his death in a loud voice (110). 
 
It is important to note that Gerald while visiting this part of Wales as part of 
Archbishop Baldwin’s retinue, on a tour to gain support for the Third Crusade, 
stayed with Prince Dafydd – Owain’s son who along with his brother Cynan, led 
the ambush on Henry’s troops at Coleshill (Journey Book II Ch. 10: 196).  It is 
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possible that during his stay, Dafydd recounted the events of the ambush to 
Gerald.   
Other chronicles simply state that the battle took place in the woods of 
Hawarden, the location of which has been addressed in the place-name 
analysis section of chapter six, as the section of the great forest of Tegeingl 
located on the ridgeline that stretched west of Hawarden northwest towards 
Basingwerk and beyond.  Gerald states that the pass traversed by Henry’s 
troops was narrow, the ravine or pass leading to Hen Blas Castle is narrow 
measuring at its narrowest a mere 10 metres.  The William of Newburgh version 
of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I further 
illuminates the landscape setting, stating that the Welsh ‘concealed themselves 
in the forests, and watched over the narrow passes from the road’, followed by 
‘while advancing too incautiously through forested and wet places, [Henry II] 
was caught out by an ambush of enemies lurking close by the road’ (Chronicles 
W.N.: 107-8).  This environment is also present at Ewloe, which was one of the 
reasons why the supposed location for the so-called battle of Coed Eulo had to 
be addressed via military terrain analysis, given its current popularity it could not 
have been dismissed by historiography alone.   
The Chronicles W.N. further describe the battlescape of Wales as a 
place riddled with ‘unpassable woodland and other difficulties…Moreover it is 
known to have certain inextricable retreats, so that however dangerous it is for 
anyone powerful to advance with an army, it would be equally impossible to 
continue any further within’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107).  As The Chronicles W.N. 
provide this landscape description leading up to the account of the Battle of 
Coleshill, it is possible that the preceding description is resultant of the account 
of the battle.  Yet, despite the numerous references to the difficult wooded 
terrain, some of them in connection to the battle, Domesday Book makes no 
mention of woodland at Coleshill.  This suggests that c. 1086 there were no 
noteworthy woods in the region (Domesday 268d/FD2/6; Tait 1925: 17).  Given 
the lapse of several decades from the Domesday Survey to the battle of 
Coleshill, it is possible that the environment changed from one of cultivated 
fields to a more wooded landscape.  This is especially probable given the 
continuous conflict in the region that would have made it difficult to maintain 
agricultural activities.  Given this possibility it remains unlikely that any resultant 
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new-growth woodland would have been as dense as the main body of the great 
forest of Tegeingl, sometimes historically referred to as Swerdewod, meaning 
the dark wood.  It is equally possible that the landscape existed much in the 
same way then as it does today.  The region of northeast Wales (modern-day 
Flintshire) that stretches from the border near Chester to the present day 
community of Greenfield (historically Basingwerk,) is defined by three 
geophysical features.  A flat coastal plain rises fairly rapidly to an average 
elevation of 280 metres; this ridge line stretches uninterrupted between Chester 
and Greenfield.  The ridge is scarred in numerous locations by a series of 
ravines created by drainage streams, these ravines tend to be heavily wooded 
while the remainder of the landscape comprises of undulating fields, cultivated 
for agricultural purposes.   
The Hen Blas ravine is situated approximately 18 kilometres from 
Chester and 4.5 kilometres from Basingwerk.  At its entrance it is 75 metres 
wide narrowing to a confined ten metres at its terminus, the ravine only 
stretches for one kilometre.  The entrance of the ravine, located approximately 
130 metres from the coastal Roman road, is shallow and increases to a 
maximum depth of 15 metres at its terminus, approximately 27 metres 
southeast of Hen Blas Castle.  Wat’s Dyke is situated 2 kilometres 
west/southwest of the Roman road and 1 kilometre from Hen Blas Castle.  The 
distance from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk to Hen Blas, using Wat’s 
Dyke as a route-way, is 6 kilometres.  Also of note is the standing stone cross 
(now vanished), known as Atiscross or Croes-ati in Welsh, it was from this 
monument that the Domesday hundred of Atiscross (in which Coleshill was 
located) takes its name.  Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust suggests that the 
cross would have once been a prominent landmark (CPAT n.d. (a)).  Place-
name research suggests that the cross was probably located in the vicinity of 
Atis Cross Road in Oakenholt near Flint, approximately 1.5 kilometres 
southeast of Hen Blas ravine.  The existence of the cross is also an indicator 
that this region was not heavily wooded, given that stone crosses were often 
erected at locations of high visibility (Carver 2003).  
In its present situation, the ravine is situated in a wooded area known as 
the Coed Ffrith, loosely translated as the enclosure woods, probably in 
reference to the medieval manor house, fortified with a palisade, which replaced 
309 
 
Hen Blas Castle at the close of the thirteenth century (Leach 1957 and 1960).  
Through the ravine runs a rivulet, making for marshy environment on the ravine 
floor.  Approximately 700 metres south/southeast of Hen Blas is a wood named 
Gwaith y Coed, or coal woods (see Figure 103 below).  In all likelihood this 
wood represents the original Coleshill forest, named by Gerald of Wales; given 
that the fortified manor house at Hen Blas was not constructed until the close of 
the thirteenth century, it is probable that Coed Ffrith was included in the original 
Gwaith y Coed. 
 
 
 
Figure 103: Aerial photo showing the location of Coed Ffrith where Hen Blas is located (arrow) 
and Gwaith y Coed (circle).  Google Maps (2014). Gwaith Y Coed (satellite) [online]. [Accessed 
30/01/2014]. Available from http://google.co.uk/maps. 
 
This partially explains the location of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill by RCAHMW 
and the Ordinance Survey location of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill (in Figure 6 
below).  The 1150 battle has been located directly adjacent to Gwaith y Coed, 
while the 1157 siting is located close to the road, probably in deference to a 
battle feature described in the manuscripts. 
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Figure 104: Aerial photo showing supposed locations of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill (RCAHMW) 
and the 1157 Battle of Coleshill (Ordnance Survey). Google Maps (2014). Coleshill Locations 
(satellite) [online]. [Accessed 30/01/2014]. Available from http://google.co.uk/maps. 
  
 
Hen Blas Castle, also known as Coleshill Castle was constructed in 1157 
in connection with the campaign (Annales Cestrienses: year 1157).  What is 
unknown is whether the castle was originally constructed by the Welsh in 
preparation for the campaign, or if it was constructed post-campaign by Henry 
as a means of enhancing his defences in contested territory, particularly given 
his defeat at that location.  If this was the case, Hen Blas is probably the original 
site of the much debated Basingwerk Castle.  The initial assessment by 
RCAHMW in 1910 determined that the motte was hastily constructed for 
defensive reasons, probably in connection with the battle of Coleshill (Leach 
1957: 2).  This assessment intimates that the castle was built by the Welsh in 
preparation for war.  G.B. Leach, who excavated the site in the 1950s, 
discredits this assumption asserting that the site received more intense 
planning; however his excavations were unable to provide conclusive proof of 
the phasing or quality of construction.  It is also conceivable that the initial castle 
was hastily constructed by the Welsh and then enhanced by Henry II at the 
close of the 1157 Coastal Campaign when sections of Tegeingl were 
relinquished to him, per the terms of the peace agreement.  Similarly, the 
construction date of the tumulus, located 350 metres northeast of Hen Blas is 
unknown (CPAT 100338).  It may be a prehistoric feature, or it could also be a 
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mass grave from the battle.  The indeterminate nature of the castle’s and 
tumulus’ existence at the time of battle will be taken into consideration in the 
following military terrain analysis.   
 
KOCOA Analysis for the Battle of Coleshill 
 
 
 
Figure 105: The terrain of the environs surrounding the Hen Blas ravine and observer points 
used for viewshed analysis.  Note: the battle features indicated with the red stars do not 
represent the location of the Battle of Coleshill. 
Key: dotted pink line = course of coastal Roman road 
         dotted blue line = course of Wat’s Dyke 
         large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach 
         small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenue of approach (2 possibilities)  
 
 
Explanation of viewshed points taken 
There are three main areas where observation points were collected in the 
Coleshill region.  These are the areas of the retreat known as Bryn Dychwelwch 
(translated as the field of retreat), the immediate environment surrounding Hen 
Blas Castle, and the area to the northeast of Hen Blas centred on the ravine 
close to the coastal Roman road.  A total of 31 viewsheds were compiled for 
use in the following military terrain analysis (see Table 38 below).  A scale of 
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1:15,000 was used for all viewshed representations unless otherwise noted, 
producing viewsheds within a range of four kilometres.   
Coleshill Observer Points and Viewshed map title Elevation 
above sea 
level in 
metres 
Page 
number 
Fig. 128: Coleshill Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis n/a 349 
Fig. 129: Coleshill Viewshed Point 1, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat 88 350 
Fig. 130: Coleshill Viewshed Point 2, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation 
point 1 
85 351 
Fig. 131: Coleshill Viewshed Point 3, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation 
point 2 
95 352 
Fig. 132: Coleshill Viewshed Point 4, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation 
point 3 
133 353 
Fig. 133: Coleshill Viewshed Point 5, Wat’s Dyke near Hen Blas 
observation point 1, scale 1:19,000 
140 354 
Fig. 134: Coleshill Viewshed Point 6, Wat’s Dyke near Hen Blas 
observation point 2, scale 1:21,000 
135 355 
Fig. 135: Coleshill Viewshed Point 7, field 250 m west of Hen Blas 
observation point, scale 1:15,000 
100 356 
Fig. 136: Coleshill Viewshed Point 8, field 250 m west of Hen Blas 
observation point, scale1:40,000 
100 357 
Fig. 137: Coleshill Viewshed Point 9, from Hen Blas observation point 1 93 358 
Fig. 138: Coleshill Viewshed Point 10, from Hen Blas observation point 2 85 359 
Fig. 139: Coleshill Viewshed Point 11, from Hen Blas observation point 3 87 360 
Fig. 140: Coleshill Viewshed Point 12, from Hen Blas observation point 4 
(motte),scale 1:15,000 
88 361 
Fig. 141: Coleshill Viewshed Point 13, from Hen Blas observation point 4 
(motte),scale 1:40,000 
88 362 
Fig. 142: Coleshill Viewshed Point 14, from Hen Blas observation point 5 87 363 
Fig. 143: Coleshill Viewshed Point 15, from Hen Blas observation point 6 84 364 
Fig. 144: Coleshill Viewshed Point 16, from tumulus (burial mound) near 
Hen Blas observation point 
73 365 
Fig. 145: Coleshill Viewshed Point 17, from ditch near tumulus observation 
point 
66 366 
Fig. 146: Coleshill Viewshed Point 18, from near Hen Blas observation 
point 1, scale 1:15,000 
58 367 
Fig. 147: Coleshill Viewshed Point 19, from near Hen Blas observation 
point 1, scale 1:40,000 
58 368 
Fig. 148: Coleshill Viewshed Point 20, from near Hen Blas observation 
point 2,scale 1:15,000 
67 369 
Fig. 149: Coleshill Viewshed Point 21, from near Hen Blas observation 
point 2,scale 1:40,000 
67 370 
Fig. 150: Coleshill Viewshed Point 22, from near ravine observation point, 
scale 1:15,000 
55 371 
Fig. 151: Coleshill Viewshed Point 23, from near ravine observation point, 
scale 1:40,000 
55 372 
Fig. 152: Coleshill Viewshed Point 24, from ravine observation point 1 44 373 
Fig. 153: Coleshill Viewshed Point 25, from ravine observation point 2 39 374 
Fig. 154: Coleshill Viewshed Point 26, from ravine observation point 3, 
scale 1:15,000 
45 375 
Fig. 155: Coleshill Viewshed Point 27, from ravine observation point 3, 
scale 1:40,000 
45 376 
Fig. 156: Coleshill Environs retreat area total visibility n/a 377 
Fig. 157: Coleshill Environs Hen Blas Castle area total visibility n/a 378 
Fig. 158: Coleshill Environs Hen Blas Castle area total visibility (without 
motte) 
n/a 379 
Fig. 159: Coleshill Environs northeast of Hen Blas area total visibility n/a 380 
Fig. 160: Coleshill Environs total area visibility from all observation points in 
Coleshill region 
n/a 381 
 
Table 38: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Coleshill observation 
point (Hen Blas region). 
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None of the viewshed distances represented stretch to the horizon; most are 
within a ten kilometre radial field of view.  Contour intervals at five and twenty 
metres are represented within near distance fields of view, while only twenty 
metre intervals are present for the far distance fields of view. The land between 
Hen Blas and the area northeast of Hen Blas is private and restricted with 
barbed wire fence.  In lieu of inaccessibility, inferred observation points were not 
transposed on the DEM at it was felt that these would undermine the 
authenticity of the terrain survey.  For future research, permission to survey this 
area would have to be obtained from the landowner.  The supposed locations of 
the 1150 and 1157 battle sites are notated on the map as it is important to 
reference the current favoured locations in lieu of the locations highlighted by 
the following military terrain analysis.   
 
Key Terrain 
Similar to Ewloe Wood, the key terrain feature for Coleshill is straightforward, 
being the high ground on either side of the ravine which would have been in the 
control of the Welsh.  Also the high ground at the rear of the ravine in the area 
between Hen Blas and Wat’s Dyke, as this would secure a possible line of 
retreat for the Welsh and block the Anglo-Norman advance to Wat’s Dyke and 
in turn Basingwerk (see Figure 105, page 311).  As surmised in the previous 
Case Study chapter, it is likely that when Henry split his forces, in an attempt to 
surround the Welsh at Basingwerk, he intended to use Wat’s Dyke as a 
concealed route to the Welsh encampment.  Another notable key terrain feature 
is the false crest located nearly 95 kilometres east of the tumulus denoted by 
the 60 metre contour line (see Figure 128, page 349).  
 
Observations and Fields of Fire 
The working premise is that the Welsh approached Coleshill from the northwest, 
possibly travelling from Basingwerk on Wat’s Dyke.  Once at Coleshill they 
stationed the bulk of their forces at the southern end of Hen Blas ravine, with 
lookouts and scouting parties posted at other strategic locations around the 
ravine.  The base of the ravine is outside the field of view from most of the 
observation points positioned around Hen Blas Castle; exceptions are from 
observation points Hen Blas 1 and Hen Blas 5 (see Figures 137 and 142).  The 
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viewshed in Figure 142 is of particular importance as it provides a cone of 
visibility to the coastal Roman road and given its elevation it is unlikely that tree 
cover would have prevented visibility to the road.  To this point, the tumulus (if it 
was extant at the time of the battle) could have been a key terrain feature as it 
provides visibility from Coleshill to the Roman road (see Figure 143).  The motte 
and keep at Hen Blas (if extant during the battle) would have also provided 
increased visibility (see Figures 140 and 141). 
Given the extreme narrowness and dampness of the ravine base, it is 
more likely that Henry and his forces would have traversed the slope of the 
ravine, although steep in places particularly at the terminus, the ravine slope at 
its entrance is gentle by comparison.  The grade of the northern side of the 
ravine is less severe than that of the southern slope.  (This terrain element will 
be considered in further detail in the avenues of approach section to follow).  
The visibility from the entrance of the ravine is negligible (see Figures 152 and 
153) and none of the viewsheds from this area revealed any significant degree 
of forward visibility, and what visibility there was would have been greatly 
diminished by tree cover.  Conversely, rearward visibility was substantial, which 
would have allowed Henry to mark the progress of the other half of his army as 
they continued their advance along the Roman road; this is most pronounced in 
Figures 148 and 149.  None of the viewsheds from Henry’s position at the 
entrance of the ravine would have afforded the Anglo-Norman Army any 
visibility of the Welsh position. 
 
Cover and Concealment 
The Welsh would have remained concealed from the Anglo-Normans as long as 
they stayed behind the crest of the ravine ridge and south of the tumulus or 
upland of the false crest referenced in the key terrain section above (see 
Figures 145-155).  Small portions of these features can be seen in Figures 154 
and 155; however as will be discussed below, it is unlikely that Henry’s troops 
advanced up the southern side of the ravine.  As previously stated, it is equally 
unlikely that the Anglo-Normans were concealed from the Welsh at any point in 
their advance. 
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Obstacles 
The ravine is in itself the largest terrain obstacle, advancing into its depths 
would have been perilous as there was no way out from its enclosure, except to 
scale the steep ravine walls.  Any attempt to do so would have opened the 
Anglo-Normans to Welsh arrow fire without any means of cover.  Conversely, it 
would have been equally difficult for the Welsh to descend into the ravine from 
this point due to the steep grade of the terrain.  It is unlikely that the Welsh 
would have ambushed the Anglo-Normans in the ravine, as it would have made 
any avenue of retreat difficult for them as well as the Anglo-Normans.  The 
tumulus (see Figure 106 below), if it was present at the time of the battle could 
also be considered to be an obstacle, as an army advancing up the north slope 
of the ravine would have had to circumvent the mound which also limits visibility 
when approached from any direction at lower elevation. 
 
 
 
Figure 106: Tumulus, viewed from the southwest (photo by the author). 
 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat 
In anticipation of the Anglo-Norman advance from Chester, it is likely that bands 
of Welsh troops positioned themselves at strategic points in the landscape, like 
Coleshill, in advance of the Anglo-Normans.  There are three possible avenues 
of approach the Welsh forces could have utilized to get to Coleshill.  From 
Basingwerk they could have advanced down the coastal Roman road, turning 
aside at Coleshill and positioning themselves in the upward reaches of the Hen 
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Blas ravine (see Figure 105 on page 311 which details two possible 
approaches).  Essentially this was the same route taken by Henry, the 
exception being that his forces were arriving from the opposite direction on the 
Roman road.  As already stated the Welsh could have also used Wat’s Dyke.  
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the dyke would have been well preserved in 
the mid-twelfth century, given that it is still well preserved in many locations 
today.  The steep incline of the dyke tends to limit the growth of vegetation, thus 
providing a semi-navigable route-way through the woods.  However, given that 
the Welsh were familiar with this terrain, negotiating it would not have been as 
arduous for them as it would have been for the Anglo-Normans.  Particularly 
since many Welsh warriors were not encumbered by the heavy armour that was 
popular with the Anglo-Normans (Davies 2004: 145).  The terrain of the 
immediate battlefield environs would not have been visible from the portion of 
Wat’s Dyke that is on the immediate approach to Coleshill (see Figures 133 and 
134). 
 After reaching the ravine, it is likely that the Anglo-Normans advanced 
along one of the ravine slopes, the northern slope being less precipitous than its 
southern counterpart, in an attempt to reach Wat’s Dyke located only 2 
kilometres from the road.  Given that the ravine terminates in a dead-end, which 
is particularly narrow and steep, it is unlikely that Henry would have led his 
troops into such an environment.  Presumably Henry would have had advice 
from his Powysian Welsh allies, some of whom were undoubtedly familiar with 
the terrain in northeast Wales, particularly given the 1150 Battle of Coleshill in 
which Powys was allied with the earl of Chester against Owain Gwynedd.   
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Figure 107: View of Hen Blas ravine from the northern face of the slope (photo by the author). 
  
After the ambush Henry retreated back to the road and reassembled his 
divided force.  The avenue of retreat used by the Welsh is less clear.  The field-
name Bryn Dychwelwch, to the northwest of Hen Blas, has been loosely 
translated as the hill of retreat.  It is possible that the Welsh cut across this area 
before retreating north, possibly falling back to Wat’s Dyke.  The viewshed 
analysis from this so-called hill of retreat does not illuminate any key features; 
however, as the Welsh would have been confident as to position of the Anglo-
Norman army on the Roman road, visibility would not have been an essential 
element of their retreat (see Figures 129-132).  It is also possible that Bryn 
Dychwelwch was a feature of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill.  It is unlikely that 
there were any further route-ways through this region than the ones discussed, 
as throughout Wales many vanished routes are preserved in place-names, 
none of these exist in the Coleshill region. 
 
Coleshill Battle Location and Order of Battle 
The military terrain analysis has yielded two possible battle locations; these are 
highlighted in Figure 108 below.  The following is a description of the order of 
battle for each theorised location.   
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Location A 
Henry II’s army advanced northwest along the coastal Roman road from the 
Anglo-Norman encampment near Chester.  At a short distance of roughly 4.5 
kilometres from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk, Henry divided his forces 
into two contingents.  One was to continue the advance along to road to 
Basingwerk where they would engage Owain’s forces in open battle, the other 
half led by Henry would cut inland along Wat’s Dyke to circumvent Owain’s 
forces and surprise their rear.  Acting on the advice of his native Welsh guides 
and military advisers, Henry’s forces turned aside at the Hen Blas ravine.  This 
narrow wooded ravine would provide passage across Coleshill to Wat’s Dyke, 
while concealing Anglo-Norman movements from the Welsh at Basingwerk.  
Due to the obstacles presented by staying in the ravine: confinement, marshes 
and no clear avenue of retreat, Henry advanced along the north flank of the 
ravine slope.  The Welsh, unknown to the Anglo-Normans were in position at 
the southern end of the ravine, where they watched the progress of the Anglo-
Norman army.  The Welsh moved into position as the Anglo-Normans 
approached the summit of the false crest on the ridge.  An attack was launched 
and the Anglo-Normans, taken by surprise struggled to organise their ranks to 
counter the Welsh ambush.  The other half of the Anglo-Norman army, only a 
short distance from the ambush site, heard the sounds of battle and rushed to 
the aid of their king.  Once the Welsh saw their enemy being reinforced, they 
retreated northwest across Bryn Dychwelwch to Basingwerk.  The Anglo-
Normans who suffered severe casualties were left to assess the damage before 
regrouping and continuing their advance along the road to Basingwerk.   
 In the meantime Owain became aware of Henry’s plan to surround him 
and accordingly he fell back to a safe place at Cil Owain (also known as Tâl Lyn 
Pina).  Henry arrived in Basingwerk to find his enemy gone and decided to 
continue his advance to Rhuddlan Castle where he paused his advance and 
waited for news of the expedition to Anglesey.  While at Rhuddlan the king 
endured a series of raids from the Welsh.  Once Henry learned of the disastrous 
outcome on Anglesey, he sought to make peace with Owain.  Owain was to 
relinquish the eastern portion of Tegeingl to Anglo-Norman control; in return he 
would be left alone, ensuring the independence of Gwynedd. 
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Figure 108: Possible battle locations A and B for the Battle of Coleshill near Hen Blas. 
 
 
Location B and Coleshill conclusions 
The order of battle for Location B is fundamentally the same as Location A; 
instead of advancing along the north face of the ravine slope they would have 
used the south slope.  Also, the line of Welsh retreat would have either had to 
circumvent the ravine to continue across Bryn Dychwelwch, or they could have 
cut a path southwest to Wat’s Dyke.  Other differences include: the steeper 
grade of the southern slope and the false crest on the south side of the ravine 
ridge is not as dramatic as its northern counterpart.    The cumulative viewshed 
analysis presented above in Figure 108 indicates that sizeable extents on both 
sides of the ravine would not have been visible to the approaching Anglo-
Normans.  The tumulus adjacent to Location A, potentially where the battle 
dead were buried, is a distinguishing feature that would favour Location A as 
the site of the battle.  However, as the nature of the mound is unknown, this can 
only be theorised.  As has been demonstrated, both locations are plausible and 
for any future research, remote sensing and excavation would be conducted at 
both locations. 
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Crogen environs, spatial military analysis 
 
Tensions soon arose between Gwynedd and England after a short period of 
peace following the 1157 campaign.  This fresh wave of tumult was not isolated 
to Gwynedd, but included the other major kingdoms of Wales, such as 
Deheubarth and Powys.  In an ambitious attempt to master the Welsh once and 
for all, Henry embarked upon a campaign, the scale of which had never been 
seen in Wales and would not be seen again until the Edwardian Conquest, 
more than a century later.  Preparations were more than a year in the making 
and in the summer of 1165 Henry gathered his army at Oswestry.  To counter 
this threat to their independence, the Welsh kingdoms banded together under 
the leadership of Owain Gwynedd, an unprecedented act in medieval Welsh 
history (earlier Welsh unification under Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was accomplished 
through force).  The willingness of the Welsh to work together highlights the 
severity of the situation. 
 On route from Oswestry to the Welsh encampment at Corwen, Henry 
encountered an obstacle that halted his army’s advance in the Ceiriog river 
valley, near the present day community of Chirk (Y Waun in Welsh) in the 
modern Welsh county of Wrexham (traditionally part of Denbighshire).  Dense 
woodland blocked his advance into Wales; these woods presented a particular 
challenge for his supply wagons.  Henry ordered the woods cut and while 
distracted with this task the Anglo-Norman army was ambushed by the Welsh, 
this ambush event was what is now referred to as the Battle of Crogen. The 
location of the Battle of Crogen is less than 3 kilometres from the modern 
border between England and Wales.  Although the exact line of the border in 
the twelfth century is less clear, it was probably near if not on Offa’s Dyke, the 
early medieval boundary constructed by the kingdom of Mercia.  Offa’s Dyke, a 
testament to a contested frontier, intersects the Crogen battlefield.  The 
battlefield itself is located on a flood plain on the northern bank of the Ceiriog 
River at a 200 metre wide gap in the Dyke where it crosses the Ceiriog and 
continues up a steep slope south of the river.   
 The position of the battlefield as represented on the map below in Figure 
109 (page 323) is RCAHMW’s battle location.  The explanation for this location 
is that it corresponds with the field-name Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon, as 
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such this is only an approximation of the battlefield location, the actual location 
will be defined more concretely following the military terrain analysis below.  As 
described in detail in the 1165 Case Study chapter, the concept of calling the 
battle ‘Crogen’ was not introduced until Powel’s publication in 1589, 429 years 
after the actual battle had taken place (Powel 1589: 186).  Whereas the 
chronicles record a battle at Dyffryn Ceiriog (Brut Pen 20.: 63, Brut RBH: 145 
and 147) or Aber Ceiriog (BS: 167).  ‘Dyffryn’ meaning ‘valley’, and ‘aber’ 
meaning ‘the mouth of a river’, given these landscape descriptions, it is 
probable that the battle was fought in or near the fields known as ‘Crogen 
Wladys’ and ‘Crogen Iddon’.   
 Unlike the Battle of Coleshill discussed above, the terrain environs for the 
Battle of Crogen are in some ways more simplistic than those of the 1157 
conflict landscape.  Part of this is due to the fact that the landscape surrounding 
Crogen, prior to the 1165 engagement, had not been altered by repeated 
conflict in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the way that it had been in 
northeast Flintshire.  Additionally, the battlefield was not confined by terrain 
features such as the ravine at Hen Blas and the battle events were spread out 
over an area more than three times the size of the Coleshill environs.  The 
cultural landscape of this region was also less cluttered, indicating a rural 
environment.    
The only possible exceptions to this are the two earth and timber castles, 
Castell y Waun on the Welsh side of the border and Chirk Bank Motte on the 
English side.  The exact foundation date of these castles is unknown, although 
evidence in the Pipe Rolls indicates that Castell y Waun was in existence in 
1165, although whether it was built before or after the campaign is not known.  
Similar to Hen Blas Castle of the 1157 campaign, it may have been built as a 
consequence of the failed campaign in 1165, possibly to control mobility 
between Wales and England (NMR: SJ23NE1).  If these castles were in 
existence by the mid-twelfth they could have been exploited by the Anglo-
Norman forces as they made their way into the Ceiriog Valley.  For example, 
they could have been garrisoned by a contingent of Anglo-Norman troops as 
lookouts and to ensure that Henry’s line of retreat remained opened.  The 
indeterminate nature of the castles’ existence at the time of battle will be taken 
into consideration in the military terrain analysis.     
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This region of Wales remains predominantly rural and has not been 
subjected to the wide-scale industrialization that has impacted the cultural 
landscape in Flintshire.  Since 1165 the landscape encompassing the 
immediate battle terrain has only been impacted by the addition of a road that 
parallels the north bank of the Ceiriog River, the construction of a few cottages 
near the proposed battle location and the construction of Chirk Castle in the 
fourteenth century, directly north and 100 metres above the battlefield.  The 
alteration that has had the single largest impact to the battlescape was the 
positioning of a drainage conduit into the ditch of Offa’s Dyke.  This has 
severely eroded the dyke in places and has seemingly washed away the mass 
grave known as Adwy’r Beddau.  Domesday Book did not survey the areas 
surrounding Crogen, unlike northeast Flintshire which at the time of the survey 
happened to be part of England, Crogen was securely on the Welsh side of the 
border, and therefore not assessed.  The lack of contemporary and unbiased 
landscape descriptions make it difficult to determine the degree of past tree 
cover in the region.  Although the chronicles unanimously state that Henry had 
to halt his advance in order to cut down a wooded area that blocked his 
progress, they are not specific as to the extent of the vegetation.  ‘[Henry] 
moved his host into the wood of Dyffryn Ceiriog, and he had that wood cut 
down, and felled to the ground.  And there a few picked Welshmen, in the 
absence of their leaders, manfully and valorously resisted them.  And many of 
the bravest on either side were slain’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63).  Several oak trees that 
pre-date the battle still survive in this region; according to local lore they were 
spared by Henry’s woodsmen, as in 1165 they were already so large that it 
would have been too time consuming to cut them down (Wrexham County 
Council).   
In a more general sense the landscape surrounding the Battle of Crogen 
is defined by the Ceiriog river valley, the foothills of the Berwyn Mountains and 
the lowlands of England to the east.  Incedentally, the demarcation between 
upland and lowland environments is delineated by Offa’s Dyke.  Flood plains, 
such as the ones along the north bank of the Ceiriog are often cultivated for 
agricultural purposes due to the richness of their soils.  It is possible that these 
flood plains were cleared and being used for agricultural purposes at the time of 
the campaign, particularly since arable land was a rare and precious commodity 
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in the upland environment of Wales.  The wooded area blocking passage 
through Offa’s Dyke is seemingly suggestive of a widely afforested landscape.  
This may not have been the case.  Apart from any vegetation that may have 
covered the flanking hillsides, the river valley may have been devoid of woods 
apart from the gap in the dyke.  Given that the gap in the dyke would have been 
a vulnerability for the early medieval defended frontier, a wood may have been 
allowed to grow in the gap to restrict movement through the dyke.  This seems 
highly probable given that many of the large trees surviving in the area are 
almost contemporaneous with the construction of the dyke (BBC News online 
resource: 2008; 2013).  The fact that trees were allowed to grow on the dyke 
shortly after its construction could also be indicative that this region was not 
regularly maintained or manned in the early middle ages.   
 
KOCOA Analysis for the Battle of Crogen 
 
 
             Figure 109:  Battlefield elements and observer points for the Battle of Crogen. 
Key: dotted blue line = course of  Offa’s Dyke 
             large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach 
             small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenues of approach (2 possibilities)  
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Explanation of viewshed points taken 
A total of 20 observation points were established for the Crogen viewshed 
analysis.  These were in addition to the established points of Chirk Bank Motte, 
Castell y Waun, the RCAHMW location of the Battle of Crogen, and points on 
Offa’s Dyke recorded by RCAHMW and CPAT.  Observer points were 
established on either side of the Ceiriog River, in the vicinity of Offa’s Dyke 
where it crosses the river.  The area along Offa’s Dyke near Adwy’r Beddau, or 
the Gap of the Graves, was surveyed more intensively as the results of the 
reverse KOCOA analysis conducted in the 1165 Case Study Chapter 
highlighted elements which suggested that terrain features in this vicinity were 
more conducive for battle.  There are three main areas where observation 
points were collected in the Crogen region.  These are Offa’s Dyke, the area 
surrounding the Gap of the Graves and the field to the northeast of the Gap of 
the Graves.  Areas encompassing the field-names ‘Crogen Wladys’ and 
‘Crogen Iddon’ could not be accessed for collecting observation points as they 
are on private property with no points of public access.  The viewsheds 
produced from these observation points (see Table 39 below) can be found on 
pages 383-414 (Figures 161-193). The majority of the Crogen viewsheds are 
represented with a scale of 1: 24,000, given that all the observer points are over 
100 metres the resultant distance to the horizon would be outside of the 6 
kilometre radius present at this scale.  Some viewsheds have been represented 
at the scale of 1: 50,000, a visual radius of 12 kilometres, depending on 
contributing factors, such as atmospheric conditions and contrast of light (as 
reviewed in the viewshed section of the Methodology chapter) the outer limits of 
this radius may not have been clearly visible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
 
Crogen Observer Points and Viewshed map title Elevation 
above sea 
level in 
metres 
Page 
number 
Fig. 161: Crogen Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis n/a 382 
Fig. 162: Crogen Viewshed Point 1, from Chirk observation point 1 195 383 
Fig. 163: Crogen Viewshed Point 2, from Chirk observation point 2 200 384 
Fig. 164: Crogen Viewshed Point 3, from Chirk observation point 3 193 385 
Fig. 165: Crogen Viewshed Point 4, from Chirk observation point 4 200 386 
Fig. 166: Crogen Viewshed Point 5, from Chirk observation point 5 145 387 
Fig. 167: Crogen Viewshed Point 6, from Adwy’r Beddau observation 
point 1 
137 388 
Fig. 168: Crogen Viewshed Point 7, from Adwy’r Beddau observation 
point 2 
110 389 
Fig. 169: Crogen Viewshed Point 8, from Gate of the Dead (oak tree) 
observation point 
105 390 
Fig. 170: Crogen Viewshed Point 9, from in field south of treeline 
observation point 
125 391 
Fig. 171: Crogen Viewshed Point 10, from field ridge observation point 140 392 
Fig. 172: Crogen Viewshed Point11, from depression in field observation 
point 
125 393 
Fig. 173: Crogen Viewshed Point 12, from edge of field observation point 146 394 
Fig. 174: Crogen Viewshed Point 13, from Offa’s Dyke near Chirk Castle 145 395 
Fig. 175: Crogen Viewshed Point 14, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 1 150 396 
Fig. 176: Crogen Viewshed Point 15, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 2 310 397 
Fig. 177: Crogen Viewshed Point 16, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 
2, scale 1:50,000 
310 398 
Fig. 178: Crogen Viewshed Point 17, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 3 140 399 
Fig. 179: Crogen Viewshed Point 18, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 
4, scale 1:24,000 
322 400 
Fig. 180: Crogen Viewshed Point 19, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 
4, scale 1:40,000 
322 401 
Fig.181: Crogen Viewshed Point 20, from Battle of Crogen supposed 
location observation point 
105 402 
Fig. 182: Crogen Viewshed Point 21, from Castell Y Waun observation 
point 
105 403 
Fig. 183: Crogen Viewshed Point 22, from Chirk Bank observation point 115 404 
Fig. 184: Crogen Viewshed Point 23, from Offa’s Dyke south on ridge 
observation point 
340 405 
Fig. 185: Crogen Viewshed Point 24, from Offa’s Dyke north observation 
point 1, scale 1:24,000 
180 406 
Fig. 186: Crogen Viewshed Point 25, from Offa’s Dyke north observation 
point 1, scale 1:50,000 
180 407 
Fig. 187: Crogen Viewshed Point 26, from Offa’s Dyke north observation 
point 2, scale 1:15,000 
155 408 
Fig. 188: Crogen Viewshed Point 27, from Offa’s Dyke north observation 
point 2, scale 1:50,000 
155 409 
Fig. 189: Crogen Viewshed Point 28, from Offa’s Dyke north observation 
point 0 
190 410 
Fig. 190: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points n/a 411 
Fig. 191: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points 
in field north of Adwy’r Beddau 
n/a 412 
Fig. 192: Crogen Environs combined viewshed from all Offa’s Dyke 
observation points 
n/a 413 
Fig. 193: Crogen Environs combined viewshed from all Adwy’r 
Beddau observation points 
n/a 414 
Table 39: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Battle of Crogen 
observation point.  
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Key Terrain 
As has already been demonstrated on multiple occasions, the predominant key 
terrain feature was the high ground, which like at the other sites considered 
above, was in possession of the Welsh.  For the Battle of Crogen this terrain 
encompasses the slopes north and south of the Ceiriog River, both rising to an 
elevation of 400 metres.  The other notable key terrain feature is the 200 metre 
wide gap in Offa’s Dyke.  The wagons and carts carrying Henry’s supplies 
would not have been able to cross the dyke, the gap in the dyke was essential 
to their continued advance into Wales (see Figure 110).  Offa’s Dyke provides a 
visual demarcation between England and Wales.  This is particularly relevant 
considering the battle took place on the boundary line.  The military importance 
of Offa’s Dyke will be echoed throughout the other military terrain features.  A 
large tree near the northern extremity of the gap in Offa’s Dyke has been 
labelled as the ‘Gate of the Dead’, due to its shape and proximity to the 
supposed location of the mass grave in the fosse of the dyke, where it 
terminates at the base of the northern slope (Lewis 1849, Mahler 1912: 20, 
Pennant 1778: 268, Powel 1589: 187, Nicholas 1872: 405).  The so-called ‘Gap 
of the Graves’ or Adwy’r Beddau may also be in reference to the actual gap in 
Offa’s Dyke, as this was the location where so many were slain in the battle.   
As this burial feature is now vanished, due to the diversion of water into the 
dyke, the only evidence can be found in early historical and antiquarian 
literature. 
 
Observations and Fields of Fire 
Offa’s Dyke supplied superlative points for observation, particularly from 
locations on the dyke at elevation (see Figures 176, 177, 179 and 180).  Welsh 
troops and lookouts posted at these locations would have been able to track the 
progress of the Anglo-Norman army through the Ceiriog river valley.  The 
degree of tree cover can be inferred by the fact that the Anglo-Normans were 
unable to perceive the Welsh lying in ambush, even though the viewsheds in 
some locations seem to suggest otherwise.  For example, the visibility from both 
Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank suggests that if these castles existed at the time 
of the battle, they would have afforded a degree of visibility of the hillsides 
flanking the gap in Offa’s Dyke (see Figures 182 and 183).  However, it is hinted 
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in the manuscripts that the Welsh force that attacked the Anglo-Normans at 
Crogen was small.  ‘And there came a few of the Welsh, unknown to their 
leaders, and fought manfully’ (BS: 167), their small number could have been 
easily disguised.  Irrespective of the actual number of the Welsh troops, it is 
certain that when Henry halted his troops at Offa’s Dyke, he was unaware of the 
Welsh lying in wait.  Once at the gap in Offa’s Dyke the Anglo-Norman army 
would have had visibility of the immediate landscape, particularly the level 
ground north of the river.  Although the quality of the visibility would have been 
diminished by the tree cover from the woods that Henry had ordered to be cut 
down.  Sections of the hillside to the south would have also been visible but 
none of the landscape to the north (see Figures 168,169 and 193). 
 
Figure 110: top – view to the south of Offa’s Dyke (photos by the author). 
As has been suggested in the 1165 Case Study Chapter, the Welsh 
could have been stationed on both the north and south hillsides near Offa’s 
Dyke, overlooking the Ceiriog Valley.  From this position they would have had a 
clear view of the Anglo-Normans as they advanced along the north bank of the 
Ceiriog River (see Figures 174-180 and 190).  Additionally, the viewshed 
analysis indicates that there would have been inter-visibility between the two 
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Welsh positions, potentially allowing them to signal for a coordinated attack (see 
Figures162-166 and 178). 
 
Cover and Concealment 
The undulating ridges within the north and south slopes would have provided 
the best cover from the Anglo-Norman army, particularly if they had lookouts 
posted at Castell y Waun or Chirk Bank (see Figures 182 and 183).  
Interestingly, these natural furrows correspond with Offa’s Dyke in places, 
suggesting that large portions of the Dyke would not have been visible to the 
Anglo-Normans.  The fosse of the dyke could also provide concealment, 
particularly if approaching from the east, in which case it would be impossible to 
see anyone positioned in the dyke.  Although the extent of the forest at Crogen 
is unknown, any tree cover would have provided additional concealment for the 
Welsh.  Clearly the Welsh had no difficulties locating the immense Anglo-
Norman army with or without tree cover. 
 
Obstacles 
The terrain obstacles for the Battle of Crogen are fairly straight forward. Offa’s 
Dyke and the Ceiriog River were the two main obstacles.  The gap in the dyke 
funnelled the Anglo-Norman troops between the river on the south and the 
steep slope to the north.  Tree cover was also an obstacle as it prevented the 
passage of Henry’s supply train.  Depending on the agility of the Welsh troops, 
the steepness of the slope may have required a cautious advance; this could 
also make for a difficult retreat.  Any Welsh troops advancing from the south 
would have had to cross the river in order to reach the Anglo-Norman army.  As 
there were no bridges, it would have been crossed on foot.  In its current 
situation the Ceiriog at this crossing point is shallow, between ankle and knee 
depth, and could easily be forded.  However, water levels fluctuate and it may 
have been impassable during the battle.  In the event that the river could not be 
forded, it is instead likely that the Welsh approached the Anglo-Norman army 
from the north slope only.       
 
 
 
329 
 
Avenues of Approach and Retreat 
The Anglo-Norman army marched north from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river 
valley, once at the entrance of the valley they turned west, commencing their 
advance into Wales.  The Welsh avenue of approach is less certain.  They were 
stationed near the Ceiriog valley in advance of the main body of the Welsh army 
at Corwen, in the same manner that the Welsh troops led by Cynan and Dafydd 
were stationed at Hen Blas.  Both were at a point of tactical advantage where a 
quick ambush could exact great damage to the Anglo-Norman force, weakening 
their numbers and making it difficult for them to continue their advance.  Given 
the visibility afforded from the slopes on either side of the valley and from 
positions on Offa’s Dyke in the same vicinities, it is likely that the Welsh 
(perhaps stationed on both sides of the valley), advanced downhill following the 
line of the dyke to where the Anglo-Normans were cutting down trees, 
ambushing them from both sides at the gap in the dyke.  
 Presumably the Welsh retreated back up the hillsides they had 
descended from and returned to join the main body of the Welsh army at 
Corwen.  They could also have cut a path of retreat west along the Ceiriog 
River, using the woods for cover and avoiding the steep ascent uphill.  
Following the ambush the Anglo-Normans did not retreat, after they had 
accessed the degree of damage they had sustained, they finished clearing the 
path through the woods and continued their advance into Wales.  Their avenue 
of approach into the Berwyn Mountains is discussed in detail in the 1165 Case 
Study chapter. 
 
Battle of Crogen Location and the Order of Battle 
The Anglo-Norman army entered the Ceiriog river valley in the summer of 1165 
intent on subduing the Welsh in totality.  Small bands of Welsh troops were 
stationed forward of the Welsh encampment at Corwen.  These bands were 
probably positioned at the three river valleys that allowed access to this 
mountainous region; these are from north to south: the Dee, Ceiriog and Tanat.  
Henry chose the route along the Ceiriog, calculating that the ruralness of the 
area would offer a degree of protection.  At Offa’s Dyke, the ancient border 
between England and Wales, Henry encountered the first major obstacle of the 
campaign.  His route of march through the gap in Offa’s Dyke, particularly 
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important for the supply wagons, was blocked by dense woodland.  Given the 
amount of resources and planning that went into this campaign, it is highly 
unlikely that Henry would not have meticulously prepared for and planned his 
route of march.  Therefore, this particular obstacle may have been anticipated.  
As stated above it is possible that this woodland blockade only encompassed 
the area of the gap in the dyke, the surrounding flood plains being cleared and 
used for agriculture, this suggests that the area to clear would have been 
relatively narrow.   
 
Figure 111: Proposed location for the Battle of Crogen, indicated by the red ‘explosion.’  The 
dotted red line indicates the area that would have been targeted for tree clearing by Henry’s 
forces. 
 The small Welsh contingent stationed nearby tracked the Anglo-Norman 
progress into the Ceiriog Valley from their flanking positions on the slopes north 
and south of the gap in the Dyke.  They were charged with leading an ambush 
to weaken the Anglo-Norman army.  Concealed from the Anglo-Normans in the 
furrows of the slopes and by the fosse of the dyke, they advanced unseen on 
the Anglo-Norman army below.  The Anglo-Norman army would have been 
distracted by their tree cutting duties as they sought to clear a way through the 
gap and any troops going through the cleared gap would have been funnelled 
through a relatively narrow area, separating them from the body of the army.  
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Given the small size of the Welsh force it is unlikely that they would have 
attacked the main body of the Anglo-Norman army as they waited to pass 
through the clearing.  Instead they would have focused their efforts on the 
troops that were passing through the clearing and on any section of the Anglo-
Norman army that had passed through the clearing in advance of the rest of 
Henry’s army (see Figure 111 and 112 below).  The duration of the battle is not 
clear but the manuscripts state that there were heavy losses on both sides.  The 
battle dead may have been buried in the fosse of the dyke to the north of the 
gap, from an efficiency stand point this would have been the logical choice for a 
mass grave.         
 Henry was familiar with Welsh tactics and their penchant for ambushes 
as experienced at the Battle of Coleshill.  He may have even expected an 
ambush, but given the size of his army he was confident that he could weather 
the attack.  In other words he took a calculated risk.  Following the ambush the 
Welsh band retreated back toward the main body of their army at Corwen, no 
doubt to alert their leaders of the Anglo-Norman route of approach over the 
Berwyns.  The path through the dyke was cleared and the Anglo-Normans 
continued their advance into Wales exploiting the relatively open and level 
upland route along the mountain ridges.  Near the present village of Llanarmon-
Dyffryn Ceiriog the Anglo-Norman army formed a camp, utilizing the defences 
of the Iron Age Hillfort, Cerrig Gwynion.  While making preparations for the final 
leg of their advance to where the Welsh army was stationed at Corwen, the 
weather conditions took a turn for the worse and Henry, with his supplies 
ruined, was forced to turn back to England in defeat.  The outcome of this 
campaign insured Welsh independence for the next century.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The dynamic-pattern analysis presented in this chapter has demonstrated that 
military terrain analysis supported by data from visibility analysis can define how 
the landscape, as a military artefact, was perceived and exploited by the 
combatants, presenting a unique archaeological signature that illuminates  
group behaviour and behavioural patterns for the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and 
the 1165 battle of Crogen. The application of this unique medieval conflict 
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archaeology methodology to this study has enabled the reconstruction and 
interpretation of conflict events relating to the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the 
1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.  By integrating these events within a broader 
archaeological landscape of conflict, distinct archaeological signatures relating 
to discrete battlefield events became evident.  This allowed for the dynamic-
pattern analysis of both campaigns leading to the reconstruction of an order of 
battle for each event.  This analysis has enriched the narrative for these 
important battles and campaigns that challenges previous interpretations and 
most importantly established a native Welsh dialogue that has long been absent 
from the Anglo-Norman Conquest of Wales.  Additionally, the application of 
military terrain analysis made it possible to dismiss previously suggested 
locations for the battle of Coleshill, by establishing where the battle was more 
likely to have taken place.  The military terrain analysis also resulted in a more 
precise location for the Battle of Crogen.   
 
Figure 112: Proposed location of Crogen battlefield (photo by the author). 
Behavioural patterns of conflict, particularly for Gwynedd, have also been 
highlighted.  The proximity of both Coleshill and Crogen to Wat’s and Offa’s 
Dykes, and the importance of the dykes in the battle is suggestive of 
remembered boundaries and might even indicate a traditional battlefield.  By 
choosing to place his encampment at the terminus of Wat’s Dyke, in the case of 
the 1157 Campaign, and ambushing Henry’s forces at Offa’s Dyke during the 
Battle of Crogen, Owain may have been embracing a more concrete 
interpretation of boundaries, in place of the more abstract and fluid definition 
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that applied to the pre-Norman, non-Vegetian era of Welsh warfare.  The 
importance and the exploitation of the physical landscape has also been 
revealed.  In both campaigns the Welsh used the natural slope of the terrain to 
their advantage which allowed for a more effective ambush.   
 The data presented in this study also indicates that Gwynedd had a 
unique warfare tradition when compared to other Welsh principalities and 
conflicts (as outlined in the Chronology chapter).  The willingness of the leaders 
of Gwynedd to engage in battle with their opponents (something that was rare in 
the Middle Ages) can be traced back to the Battle of Rhyd y Groes (in which the 
Welsh were led by Gruffudd ap Llywelyn of Gwynedd against Edward the 
Confessor), and is again echoed in the campaigns of Gruffudd ap Cynan, 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.  In the case of both the Battle of 
Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen, battle was forced on the Anglo-Normans by 
surprising them in an ambush. This aggressiveness undoubtedly contributed to 
the stability of Gwynedd (when not assailed by issues arising from partible 
inheritance) and ultimately assisted to their rise to power and their ability to 
withstand Anglo-Norman conquest efforts.  This organised aggression in 
response to the Anglo-Norman Conquest is indicative of Welsh alteration in 
attitudes towards warfare.  As has been reviewed in earlier chapters of this 
study, the Welsh were quick to adopt castle building technology.  Welsh built 
castles or the reuse of captured Anglo-Norman castles became more prevalent 
towards the middle of the twelfth century.  During this period it can be argued 
that Welsh perceptions of territory and spheres of rule were also adapting from 
the earlier pre-Norman fluid and abstract definition of territorial boundaries, to a 
more defined and concrete boundary.  This is evident in the use of castles to 
claim territory, which in turn led to a Vegetian system of defence, in which 
seeking refuge in the natural fortress of the Welsh mountains was no longer the 
viable option that it had once been.  This shift in behavioural patterns was 
displayed by Owain Gwynedd in both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns.    
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 Figure 113: Ewloe Castle Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis. 
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 Figure 114: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 1. 
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 Figure 115: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 2. 
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 Figure 116: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 3. 
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 Figure 117: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 4. 
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 Figure 118: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 5. 
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 Figure 119: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 6. 
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 Figure 120: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 7. 
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 Figure 121: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 8. 
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 Figure 122: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 9, supposed site of battle. 
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 Figure 123: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 10. 
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 Figure 124: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 11. 
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 Figure 125: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 12. 
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 Figure 126: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 13. 
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 Figure 127: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 14. 
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 Figure 128: Coleshill Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis. 
350 
 
 Figure 129: Coleshill Viewshed Point 1, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat. 
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 Figure 130: Coleshill Viewshed Point 2, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 1. 
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 Figure 131: Coleshill Viewshed Point 3, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 2. 
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 Figure 132: Coleshill Viewshed Point 4, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 3. 
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 Figure 133: Coleshill Viewshed Point 5, Wat’s Dyke near Hen Blas observation point 1. 
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 Figure 134: Coleshill Viewshed Point 6, Wat’s Dyke near Hen Blas observation point 2. 
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 Figure 135: Coleshill Viewshed Point 7, field 250 m west of Hen Blas observation point, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 136: Coleshill Viewshed Point 8, field 250 m west of Hen Blas observation point, scale1:40,000. 
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 Figure 137: Coleshill Viewshed Point 9, from Hen Blas observation point 1. 
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 Figure 138: Coleshill Viewshed Point 10, from Hen Blas observation point 2. 
360 
 
 Figure 139: Coleshill Viewshed Point 11, from Hen Blas observation point 3. 
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 Figure 140: Coleshill Viewshed Point 12, from Hen Blas observation point 4 (motte), scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 141: Coleshill Viewshed Point 13, from Hen Blas observation point 4 (motte), scale 1:40,000. 
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 Figure 142: Coleshill Viewshed Point 14, from Hen Blas observation point 5. 
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 Figure 143: Coleshill Viewshed Point 15, from Hen Blas observation point 6. 
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 Figure 144: Coleshill Viewshed Point 16, from tumulus (burial mound) near Hen Blas observation point. 
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 Figure 145: Coleshill Viewshed Point 17, from ditch near tumulus observation point. 
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 Figure 146: Coleshill Viewshed Point 18, from near Hen Blas observation point 1, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 147: Coleshill Viewshed Point 19, from near Hen Blas observation point 1, scale 1:40,000. 
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 Figure 148: Coleshill Viewshed Point 20, from near Hen Blas observation point 2, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 149: Coleshill Viewshed Point 21, from near Hen Blas observation point 2, scale 1:40,000. 
371 
 
 Figure 150: Coleshill Viewshed Point 22, from near ravine observation point, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 151: Coleshill Viewshed Point 23, from near ravine observation point, scale 1:40,000. 
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 Figure 152: Coleshill Viewshed Point 24, from ravine observation point 1. 
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 Figure 153: Coleshill Viewshed Point 25, from ravine observation point 2. 
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 Figure 154: Coleshill Viewshed Point 26, from ravine observation point 3, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 155: Coleshill Viewshed Point 27, from ravine observation point 3, scale 1:40,000. 
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 Figure 156: Coleshill Environs retreat area total visibility. 
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 Figure 157: Coleshill Environs Hen Blas Castle area total visibility. 
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 Figure 158: Coleshill Environs Hen Blas Castle area total visibility (without motte). 
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 Figure 159: Coleshill Environs northeast of Hen Blas area total visibility. 
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 Figure 160: Coleshill Environs total area visibility from all observation points in Coleshill region. 
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Note: the points of Offa’s Dyke North 0, 1 and 2 
starts from point 0 east of Chirk 3 and progress north.  
The point of Offa’s Dyke South on Ridge, is the most 
southern point of Offa’s Dyke shown on the map. 
Figure 161: Crogen Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis. 
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 Figure 162: Crogen Viewshed Point 1, from Chirk observation point 1. 
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 Figure 163: Crogen Viewshed Point 2, from Chirk observation point 2. 
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 Figure 164: Crogen Viewshed Point 3, from Chirk observation point 3. 
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 Figure 165: Crogen Viewshed Point 4, from Chirk observation point 4. 
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 Figure 166: Crogen Viewshed Point 5, from Chirk observation point 5. 
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 Figure 167: Crogen Viewshed Point 6, from Adwy’r Beddau observation point 1. 
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 Figure 168: Crogen Viewshed Point 7, from Adwy’r Beddau observation point 2. 
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 Figure 169: Crogen Viewshed Point 8, from Gate of the Dead (oak tree) observation point. 
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 Figure 170: Crogen Viewshed Point 9, from in field south of treeline observation point. 
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 Figure 171: Crogen Viewshed Point 10, from field ridge observation point. 
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 Figure 172: Crogen Viewshed Point11, from depression in field observation point. 
394 
 
 Figure 173: Crogen Viewshed Point 12, from edge of field observation point. 
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 Figure 174: Crogen Viewshed Point 13, from Offa’s Dyke near Chirk Castle. 
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 Figure 175: Crogen Viewshed Point 14, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 1. 
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 Figure 176: Crogen Viewshed Point 15, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 2, scale 1:24,000. 
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 Figure 177: Crogen Viewshed Point 16, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 2, scale 1:50,000. 
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 Figure 178: Crogen Viewshed Point 17, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 3. 
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 Figure 179: Crogen Viewshed Point 18, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 4, scale 1:24,000. 
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 Figure 180: Crogen Viewshed Point 19, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 4, scale 1:40,000. 
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 Figure 181: Crogen Viewshed Point 20, from Battle of Crogen supposed location observation point. 
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 Figure 182: Crogen Viewshed Point 21, from Castell Y Waun observation point. 
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 Figure 183: Crogen Viewshed Point 22, from Chirk Bank observation point. 
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 Figure 184: Crogen Viewshed Point 23, from Offa’s Dyke south on ridge observation point. 
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 Figure 185: Crogen Viewshed Point 24, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 1, scale 1:24,000. 
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 Figure 186: Crogen Viewshed Point 25, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 1, scale 1:50,000. 
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 Figure 187: Crogen Viewshed Point 26, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 2, scale 1:15,000. 
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 Figure 188: Crogen Viewshed Point 27, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 2, scale 1:50,000. 
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 Figure 189: Crogen Viewshed Point 28, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 0. 
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 Figure 190: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points. 
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 Figure 191: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points in field north of Adwy’r Beddau. 
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 Figure 192: Crogen Environs combined viewshed from all Offa’s Dyke observation points. 
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Figure 193: Crogen Environs combined viewshed from all Adwy’r Beddau observation points. 
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Chapter Eleven – Memory and Legacy of the 1157 and 1165 Campaigns 
and Heritage Management Considerations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapter is a discussion of the medieval and modern campaign 
legacies of 1157 and 1165. The outcomes of the Battle of Coleshill and the 
Battle of Crogen had powerful ramifications for future Anglo-Norman and Welsh 
relations and set Wales on the path to unification – a political strategy that 
preserved the independence of native Wales until 1282. The legacies of these 
campaigns also resonate within the modern social consciousness and identities 
of local communities.  The role of the heritage sector in battlefield preservation 
is important in ensuring the continued commemoration of these events, in terms 
of battlefield protection, public outreach, education and research.  
Unfortunately, the current parameters required for battlefield protection are 
limited and medieval conflicts tend to be overlooked.  The following discussion 
includes an analysis of the current state of battlefield heritage management in 
Britain and suggests improvements that could be made to more readily allow for 
the inclusion of medieval conflicts on historic battlefield protection registers.   
 
 
Campaign legacies and the Edwardian Conquest 
 
Following the Anglo-Norman failure of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign, 
Henry II abandoned his efforts in Wales, instead turning his attention to the 
conquest of Ireland in 1171 (Davies 1987: 53, 88).  Much of Wales, and 
Gwynedd in particular, had managed to secure their independence, reclaim 
their ancestral territories, and preserve native Welsh rule following the 
achievements of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign until the successful 
conquest of Edward I in 1277, which was finalized by the death of Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd in 1282 in a failed rebellion against Edward I at the Battle of Cilmeri 
(Davies 1987: 279).  The ensuing years of independence between the Battle of 
Crogen and the Edwardian Conquest were not hallmarked by peace.  The 
Welsh kingdoms, although briefly united under the common cause of preserving 
Welsh independence during the Berwyn Mountain Campaign, returned to their 
border conflicts with each other and the marcher barons.  Following the death of 
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Owain Gwynedd in 1170, Gwynedd became fragmented, divided amongst his 
sons.  This fragmentation and lack of central leadership shifted the focus of 
Welsh power to the south and the Lord Rhys (Rhys ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth; 
Brown 2004: 101).  However, the centre of power in Wales soon returned to 
Gwynedd with the rise of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (the Great) in 1199.  Although 
the conclusion of Owain’s and Henry’s campaigns did not herald the end of 
conflict, it did establish a precedent for native Wales uniting to counter the 
Anglo-Norman threat.  This was demonstrated under the leadership of both 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, both were rulers of a politically 
united Wales. 
 The concentrated and momentous efforts of Edward I that eventually led 
to the successful conquest of Wales are complex and beyond the scope of this 
research (see Chrimes 1969; Davies 1987; Stephenson 2010; Prestwich 2010).  
What follows instead is a brief consideration of how the legacy of the 1157 and 
1165 campaigns influenced Edward’s policy and campaign strategy in Wales 
and Flintshire in particular.  Like many Welsh rulers before him, Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd disregarded the suzerainty of the English monarchs.  As has been 
stated in several instances, this was probably due in part to a social difference 
in the nature of Welsh versus English clientship, although the continued 
tradition of disregard is suggestive of the intentional disobedience of the Welsh 
rulers as they sought to restore self-rule without interference from England.  In 
the summer of 1277, as retribution for Llywelyn’s failure to preform homage, 
Edward I invaded Wales via Flintshire and established his base near 
Basingwerk (Lloyd 1917: 17).  Llywelyn soon preformed homage, but not long 
afterwards fell into patterns of open conflict and revolt, similar to actions of 
Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd following the 1163 homage at 
Woodstock (Prestwich 2010).    
Edward used his base at Basingwerk both as a campaign headquarters 
and to oversee the construction of Flint Castle.  Included within Edward’s 
retainers were 320 woodsmen (Taylor 1974: 309).  While these woodsmen 
were probably hired to provide timber for the castle building activities, it is 
intriguing to speculate that they could have also been used in a military 
capacity.  Edward’s base at Basingwerk was fortified using wood, as it was 
meant to be only a temporary fortification until Flint Castle was completed 
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(Morris 1901: 130).  Undoubtedly the woodcutters also participated in the 
construction of the temporary fort.  Most intriguing however, is a reference in 
volume four of Annales Monastici (as referenced by Morris 1901: 130), stating 
that Edward was weary of the dangers presented by the dense forest that 
stretched from Chester to Basingwerk, he therefore ordered a large part of the 
forest to be cut down, creating a broad road to provide a safe avenue of 
advance into Wales (ibid).  Edward was probably aware of the dangers 
presented by woodlands, namely the Welsh ambush parties they concealed, 
which had disastrous consequences for his great-grandfather’s efforts both in 
1157 and 1165.  By removing the woods, Edward eliminated the cover and 
concealment that the Welsh had used to their tactical advantage during surprise 
attacks.  Edward’s tactical compensations, likely learned from the failings of 
Henry II’s campaigns, coupled with his unyielding campaign efforts and the 
untimely death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in battle, which left Wales leaderless, all 
contributed to the successful results of the Edwardian conquest.  The castle 
building campaign that followed the death of Llywelyn was conceived to secure 
Edward’s hold in North Wales; construction on most of these castles did not 
begin until after Llywelyn’s death (see Figure 194 below).  These Edwardian 
castles are an enduring testament to the conflicts that pervaded Wales for two 
centuries and they embody the legacies of those conflicts and the momentous 
efforts of both the Welsh and the Anglo-Normans in the contested control for 
Wales.   
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Figure 194: View of Caernarfon Castle, construction commenced in 1283 (photo by the author). 
 
 
Memory and Legacy of the 1157 and 1165 campaigns in popular culture 
 
Although the commemoration of the Battle of Coleshill or the Battle of Crogen is 
not presented on a large scale, such as the Battles of Towton (1461) or Naseby 
(1645), there does exists a localized tradition of commemoration, particularly for 
the Battle of Crogen (see Figure 196 below).  Unlike Crogen, the Battle of 
Coleshill is lacking in commemorative markers and material, this is due in part 
to its location not being previously known.  The only commemorative plaque 
associated with Coleshill, is the deteriorated signboard in Wepre Wood Park 
(Ewloe wood; see Figure 37, page 178).  As has been addressed in Chapter 
Six, the inaccurate naming and location of this plaque is the result of erroneous 
claims by antiquarians based on misguided historical research.  The more likely 
location, established by this research for the Battle of Coleshill is the region 
immediately adjacent to the extant remains of Hen Blas Castle.  The only 
information plaque at this location is a sign post stating that the Prince of 
Gwynedd, Dafydd ap Llywelyn was born at Hen Blas Castle in c. 1206 (see 
Figure 194 below). 
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Figure 195: monument proclaiming Hen Blas castle as the birthplace of Prince Dafydd ap 
Llywelyn, (photo by the author). 
 
Wrexham County Council along with the Welsh Government is 
responsible for a series of placards detailing the events of the Battle of Crogen 
near the site of the gap of the graves.  In 2009 the Wrexham Council unveiled a 
commemorative plaque that has been affixed to the Castle Mill Bridge over the 
Ceiriog close to where the Battle of Crogen is thought to have occurred.  
Additionally, The National Trust (stewards of Chirk Castle) promotes a ‘Battle of 
Crogen’ self-guided walk (The National Trust, Chirk Castle n.d.: online 
resource).  Most intriguing of all is a short film that was made in 2011 in which 
re-enactors depict the Battle of Crogen, this film was made for the Wrexham 
Histories Festival at Glyndŵr University (Ceiriog Pheasant (n.d).: online 
resource).  The tones of all of these commemorative articles convey pro-Welsh 
sentiments. 
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Figure 196: 1165 Campaign commemoration, top left: plaque on the Castle Mill Bridge, top 
right: information placard near the gap of the graves, centre: Oswestry placard, bottom: cast 
and crew from the Battle of Crogen film (BBC News 2011: online resource).  (Bottom image has 
been removed by the author of this theis for copyright reasons). 
 
On the English side of border the campaign commemoration adopts an 
entirely different tone, one that is overtly pro-English.  An information placard at 
Oswestry Castle states that ‘Henry II is said to have camped in Oswestry before 
defeating the Welsh Prince, Llewellyn’ (see Figure 196 above).  Clearly this 
statement is rife with inaccuracies, not only was it Owain not Llywelyn who was 
Henry’s opponent, but it was Henry, not Owain, who was defeated.  It is 
remarkable that such contention and bias exists to this day over events that 
transpired nearly 850 years ago.  The ability of past conflict – including the 
memorialized landscapes of conflict – to contribute to the conceptualization and 
creation modern identity is a powerful argument for the relevance and 
continuation of the study of the archaeology of conflict and the protection of 
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these important sites. The following section is a review of the role of the 
heritage management sector in the preservation of battlefields, highlighting 
areas that could benefit from further preservation guidelines and criteria. 
 
  
Battlefield management, a review 
 
The research presented in this study has shown that the archaeological 
analysis of medieval battlefields is possible, particularly when these battlefields 
are contextualized within a holistic conflict landscape.  Previous to this 
research, the archaeological consideration of medieval conflict was 
predominantly constricted to the War of the Roses c. 1455-1485, earlier 
medieval conflicts were neglected. These unique medieval battlefields are 
valuable resources that require protection so that their legacy is preserved for 
future generations.  The absence of standardization for battlefields and conflict 
landscape investigation, as critiqued by Foard (2009), Freeman (2001) and 
others in the Literature Review and Methodology chapters, is a theme that is 
echoed in the heritage management of battlefields.  Foard and Morris have 
stated that ‘as with battlefield investigation, we can look to the United States for 
experience in conservation management’ (2012: 158).   What follows is an 
overview and critique of the battlefield heritage management policies of Historic 
England (formerly English Heritage), Cadw and the National Park Service 
American Battlefield Protection Program.  Historic Scotland, which has its own 
battlefield register and preservation agenda, has not been included at length in 
this discussion as none of the events discussed in this research took place in 
Scotland.  Its inclusion is only insofar as to evidence the climate of battlefield 
protection in Britain.    
Currently, Historic England, Historic Scotland and Cadw lack research 
objectives within their preservation guidelines.  For example, there are no 
suitable parameters for the identification and documentation of battlefields 
which are not precisely locatable on a map, but are still of national, or in the 
case of the conflicts considered in this research, international importance.  
Battlefield preservation in Britain is currently focused on the protection of well-
known and well-documented (archaeologically or historically) battlefields.  
Additionally, while acknowledgement is given to the important social roles that 
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battlefields perform – in terms of their memorialization and presence in public 
consciousness and identity – there is little consideration given to public 
perspective and interpretation insofar as there are no established parameters 
for public outreach and education (Carman 2014: 93).  These issues are 
particularly troublesome for archaeological investigation, as without regulations 
for research methods and objectives, or for survey and excavation, there is no 
‘quality control’ for battlefield surveys.  In summary, the majority of heritage 
resources for historic battlefields in Britain are targeted at preservation and 
protection, not research and interpretation.  However, unlike Historic England, 
Historic Scotland and the charity the Battlefields Trust, which administers the 
UK Battlefield Resource Centre, has a research agendas attached to their 
objectives.  This includes the preservation, interpretation and presentation of 
battlefields as historical and educational resources (Battlefields Trust n.d.).  
However, as of yet no sustainable agenda for battlefield research and education 
has been implemented at a national level.  This makes the goal of conflict 
archaeology difficult, given that a structured conflict archaeology research 
methodology is required in order to study these sites.    
 
 
Historic England 
In 1995 Historic England was the first heritage body in Britain to establish 
guidelines for the preservation of historic battlefields.  The Register of Historic 
Battlefields includes a list of the 46 registered battlefields in England (current as 
of 2014) and the Designation Selection Guide for Battlefields (English Heritage 
2012) outlines the criteria for battlefield designation, selection and preservation 
in England.  While nomination to the register ensures preservation, the types of 
events eligible for nomination are typically those which were large-scale set-
piece battles in which troops were deployed in formal battle array.  Smaller 
scale engagements such as skirmishes or raids tend to be overlooked (ibid: 
2012: 3).  Only events determined to be of historical significance, insofar as 
they represent turning points in English history, can be considered for the 
register (ibid).  This in itself is a fairly subjective criterion and could possibly lead 
to less well known or equally important smaller scale engagements being 
overlooked.    
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Historic England in their Designation Selection Guide for Battlefields 
(2012) list several criteria, after historical significance has been established, that 
must be present for a historic battlefield to be selected for the register.  Most 
notably these include the secure identity of the battlefield location, topographic 
integrity and archaeological potential (English Heritage 2012: 5-6).  There are 
several inherent problems within these designations.  First is the lack of an 
established research agenda with which to identify conflicts and establish the 
battlefield boundaries which Historic England requires for protection nomination.  
Second, while topographic integrity conveys a sense of the original landscape 
setting of the battle, it does not necessarily impact battlefield study, which has 
been demonstrated by the conflict landscape reconstruction method in this 
research.  Third, the focus on the recovery of portable military material culture 
which Historic England claims has the potential ‘to create archaeological 
significance as it may allow deployments to be reconstructed’ (English Heritage 
2012: 6), underestimates the significance of the conflict landscape.  Fourth, 
‘While these criteria have proved effective in most respects, they do not 
necessarily extend to archaeological potential, because there need be no 
correlation between a battle’s political or military importance and the 
significance of its archaeological deposits.  ‘Some historically minor actions, for 
instance, may have high quality archaeological potential’ (Foard and Morris 
2012: 159).   
Unlike Historic England, Historic Scotland allows for archaeological and 
archaeological landscape potential to determine historical importance (Historic 
Scotland 2011: 5). The reconstruction of conflict landscapes and military terrain 
analysis undertaken in connection with specific conflict events has been shown, 
in this study, to be capable of battlefield reconstruction.  Due to site 
preservation the recovery of military material culture may not always be 
possible, particularly for smaller scale medieval conflicts.  By overlooking the 
value of the historic landscape, as a tool for battlefield reconstruction and a 
basis for understanding, many events are not valid for nomination to the 
Register of Historic Battlefields. Given these guidelines it is unsurprising that the 
majority of the battles of the Register are post-medieval in date.      
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Cadw 
In 2011 Cadw introduced a proposal for a register of Historic Battlefields in 
Wales.  The contents of this proposal were promising, particularly since they 
included ‘lesser’ engagements such as skirmishes and raids – which define 
much of medieval Welsh warfare.  Uniquely, as a means to include these more 
ephemeral, yet equally important conflict events, the proposed registered 
suggested two categories of battlefield sites for inclusion on the register, tier 1 
and tier 2 sites.  Tier 1 sites would include battlefields ‘whose boundaries and 
geographic extent can be defined on a map with confidence’, tier 2 sites are 
identified as ‘battlefields or parts of battlefields […] that can be confidently 
located to a specific area, but where the nature of the evidence is not so 
extensive’ (Cadw 2011: 9).  The initial survey of sites to nominate to the 
register, based on battle sites already listed on the Welsh historic environment 
record database Coflein, was completed in 2014.  According to correspondence 
with officials in RCAHMW and Cadw, these sites appear to have been surveyed 
using traditional archaeological survey methods, and were consequently 
determined inappropriate for listing on a register as they were thought not to 
have significant potential to yield portable military material culture.  Due to this 
the plan to establish a historic battlefield register in Wales – which would have 
included important preservation capacities – was scrapped (Cadw personal 
communication, April 2015).  This could have been avoided had the appropriate 
conflict archaeology methodologies, such as those outlined in this research 
been used instead of traditional archaeology survey methods which are 
ineffective in the identification and documentation of sites of conflict.  
 
 
The American Battlefield Protection Program 
While Foard and Morris suggest considering the American model of battlefield 
conservation management (2012: 158), this model evolved in a markedly 
different environment, and while it can be consulted, it would not be appropriate 
to impose similar heritage guidelines in Britain.   The most significant difference 
in battlefield protection in America compared to Britain is that it includes a 
federally mandated battlefield archaeology survey method, including the 
identification and excavation of battlefields.  Components of this method have 
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been outlined in the Methodology chapter, most notably KOCOA, a requirement 
for every federally funded battlefield project (ABPP 2007).  America is a nation 
that is proud of its military legacy to the extreme, it is ‘an integral part of the 
country’s history and has always been an important part of national identity’ 
(Loechl et al. 2009: 6).  Therefore, the management of America’s historic 
battlefields has been determined a matter of national importance, which in turn 
is administrated by the federal government which allocates three million dollars 
per year for the archaeological survey, interpretation, commemoration and 
education of America’s historic battlefields (ABPP n.d.).  This financial backing 
has enabled the adoption of an ambitious research agenda which seeks not 
only to protect and provide public interpretation for documented battlefields, but 
actively seeks the identification and archaeological survey of lesser known 
engagements (ibid).  The application of the set-piece research methodology by 
the American Battlefield Protection Program has proven successful and has 
encouraged the growth of conflict archaeology.   
 
  
Summary  
Historic England, Historic Scotland and Cadw all have similar battlefield 
designation, selection, and preservation criteria.  While both Historic England 
and Historic Scotland, require that an event must be of national importance in 
order to be included in their respective inventories, their definition of what 
constitutes national importance differs.  Historic Scotland states that a battlefield 
is ‘considered to be of national importance either for its association with key 
historical events or figures; or for the physical remains and/or archaeological 
potential it contains; or for its landscape context.  In addition, it must be possible 
to define the site on a modern map with a reasonable degree of accuracy’ 
(Historic Scotland 2011: 5).  Unfortunately, Historic England does not include 
the landscape context or archaeological potential in its definition of national 
importance. While these battlefield registers and their parameters establish a 
sustainable means of battlefield preservation, they are limited in terms of their 
research and educational objectives.  Compounding these issues are the 
different battlefield definitions, designations and preservation criteria of the main 
heritage networks in Britain.  While the conflict history of England, Wales and 
426 
 
Scotland are unique they were not isolated from their neighbours.  Given that 
border warfare, particularly the ongoing conflicts instigated by the Anglo-
Norman Conquest attempts of Wales and Scotland, defines many of the 
conflicts that took place in medieval Britain, a nationally universal battlefield 
research and preservation agenda is needed.  
A problem prevalent in each of the heritage guidelines considered above 
is in the oversight of the potential for theoretical explanations resulting from the 
interpretation of the material remains.  The current interpretive goal, such as 
that stated by Historic England, is to reconstruct battlefield actions and troop 
deployments.  This in itself is an admirable goal, however, it is limiting as it 
neglects to encourage research to surpass battle description, to identify 
adaptations in social behaviour and expressions of identity, past and present.  
This problem has been noted in the American sector as well, as ‘investigations 
have often been conducted as ancillary studies to the preservation, restoration, 
reconstruction, or interpretation of some military-related site.  Many of the 
investigations had little or no theoretical orientation or explanatory goal above 
that set by an architect or interpreter’ (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009: 1).  
While Scott, Babits and Haecker point out that theoretical objectives are 
becoming more prevalent in conflict research, it can be argued that they will not 
be universal until they are also recommended by the heritage sector.  The 
following Conclusion chapter contains a section on suggestions for future 
research which considers proposed heritage objectives in further detail. 
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Chapter Twelve – Suggestions for Future Research and Conclusions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The research presented in this study has added an archaeological context to 
the mid-twelfth-century conflicts between Owain Gwynedd and Henry II.  Prior 
to this these conflicts were poorly understood, particularly in terms of their role 
in Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the twelfth century.  This research 
has shown that the 1157 Coastal Campaign and 1165 Berwyn Mountain 
Campaign were watershed events, the outcomes of which set the tone for 
Anglo-Norman and Welsh interactions up until the Edwardian conquest at the 
close of the thirteenth century.  The following discussion highlights the 
contributions of this research to the understanding of the conflict landscape of 
mid-twelfth-century Gwynedd and to medieval conflict archaeology in terms of 
methodological developments.  This discussion is preceded by suggestions for 
possible avenues of continuing research, these are important considerations as 
they provide a way forward that not only furthers the research presented in this 
study, it also encourages the archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts 
in the British Isles and continued advancement for the field of conflict 
archaeology.  
 
 
Avenues for future research 
 
The conflict landscape research presented in this thesis is complete.  However, 
there are multiple avenues for continuing research, particularly for the 1157 and 
1165 campaigns, as well as comparative studies from other campaigns and 
other locations of Anglo-Norman conquest, such as Ireland and Scotland.  The 
following section presents an outline for future research. 
 
 
Remote sensing and excavation 
This research has demonstrated that portable military material culture is not 
necessary in order to assess and document events of medieval conflict, or 
reconstruct historic landscapes of conflict.  This does not mean that portable 
military material culture has no role in medieval battlefield reconstruction; when 
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available it is a very effective medium for sequencing battle actions and spatially 
reconstructing troop positions and movements.  Therefore, given the 
opportunity for future research, a comprehensive remote sensing survey and 
excavation, predominantly using metal detector survey, would be undertaken at 
both the Hen Blas location for the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and the 1165 Battle of 
Crogen.  Furthermore, the encampments associated with the 1165 Berwyn 
Mountain campaign – Cerrig Gwynion, Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y Castell – 
would also be investigated using remote sensing and excavation in order to 
improve understanding of medieval military encampments. 
 Given that many of the sites to be investigated archaeologically are 
disturbed either by modern development or by cultural activity predating their 
medieval use, remote sensing methods such as LiDAR or electrical resistivity 
would not yield useful data.  Nonetheless these are invaluable tools that have 
the potential to contribute to the understanding of other medieval battlefields in 
Britain.  Additionally, apart from Hen Blas Castle, Wat’s Dyke and Offa’s Dyke, 
all of which have already been subjected to intensive survey, there are no built 
features associated with the actual armed engagements of Coleshill or Crogen.  
Given this, metal detector surveying provides the best way forward as a means 
of remote sensing prior to site excavation.  Should such a survey and 
excavation take place in the future, it would be important to include a 
preservation and heritage agenda. 
 
 
Heritage management and public outreach 
The current publicity and propaganda surrounding these medieval conflicts, 
particularly the Battle of Crogen, demonstrates that the enduring legacy of these 
events has the ability to contribute to the conceptualization and creation of 
modern identities.  Given this, any future research agendas would have to 
include the establishment of sustainable parameters for heritage management, 
such as connecting with the local community to cultivate interest and encourage 
heritage stewardship.    Educational objectives for cultural heritage 
management would be included within this strategy.  These would include 
collaborating with local museums to establish suitable collections management, 
exhibits and displays of battlefield material culture, as well as working alongside 
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Cadw and local museums to develop guidance material for educators, 
particularly at the primary and secondary school levels.   
 Given that Cadw has abandoned their proposed establishment of a 
register for battlefields in Wales, due to the inability to identify these conflicts 
archaeologically, it is hoped that the research presented in this thesis and the 
results from any future research and excavations could be used as a pilot study 
for Cadw, should they decide to re-evaluate historic battlefields.  It would also 
be hoped that any military material culture resulting from excavation would 
contribute to the understanding and establishment of a material culture 
signature, and possibly artefact distribution pattern, for medieval conflicts, 
something that is currently lacking (Carman 2014: 45). 
 Promising avenues for the field of conflict archaeology include 
establishing a medium that would encourage the heritage community, cultural 
resource management firms and those in the academic sector to work together 
to improve the guidelines for battlefield recognition and protection.  Perhaps this 
could be accomplished by establishing a consortium or round-table discussion 
group that would include individuals from all of these vocations.  It would also 
be important that people in these fields of study from other geographic regions 
within the UK and the world be included, since as has been noted earlier, one of 
the shortcomings of conflict archaeology is its nationalist insularism (Carman 
2014).  Such a consortium could also collaborate on standardized battlefield 
methodologies; the absence of such a system has proven a challenge for 
identifying and documenting battlefields in Great Britain (Foard 2009: 144).  The 
adoption of a foundational methodology, that could be adapted depending on 
the conflict, would greatly enhance conflict archaeology investigation in Britain.  
The abandonment of the Welsh Battlefield Register, due to insufficient 
surveying parameters, is indicative of the urgency with which such a 
standardized system for investigating conflicts is needed.  The methodology 
presented in this research would be well suited to such a purpose.   
 
 
Comparative studies 
Other avenues of future work particular to the research presented in this thesis, 
apart from the suggested survey and excavation outlined above, include a 
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comparative study of other medieval conflicts in Wales, to determine tactical 
and behavioural attitudes to earlier and later conflicts.  For instance, it would be 
interesting to compare the campaigns of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn’s, such as the 
battle of Battle of Rhyd y Groes (c. 1039) against the English and the 
campaigns of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd against Edward I, at the close of the 
thirteenth century, to the mid-twelfth-century campaigns considered in this 
thesis.  The study of these conflicts, from a conflict landscape perspective, 
presents a unique opportunity to access the evolution of tactical and political 
patterns of Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman conquest.   Also, as 
previously mentioned, it would be intriguing to compare the conquest of Ireland, 
to that of Wales under the leadership of Henry II; it would also be interesting to 
compare similar conflicts in connection with the Anglo-Norman conquest efforts 
in Scotland.  Such a comparative study would contribute to the understanding of 
the archaeological signature of medieval Welsh conflicts, by contextualizing 
them within a wider sphere of Norman Conquest. 
It would also be interesting to systematically investigate the landscape 
setting where Welsh battles took place to determine whether any preferential 
patterns exist.  It has already been established that the Welsh, particularly 
during the eleventh century, preferred battlegrounds that bordered rivers.  The 
selection of a particular landscape for battle could be indicative of a warfare 
ritual, a concept introduced by Carman and Carman (2001: 276).  Furthermore, 
the idea of a traditional battlefield as considered by Higham (2013) has already 
been presented in earlier chapters (see page 96).  In connection with the 1150 
and 1157 Battles of Coleshill, it would be intriguing to conduct a survey of other 
medieval Welsh battle sites to determine if there exists repetition at other 
locations. 
  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Through the addition of an archaeological dimension to both the particular 
campaign case studies and the wider archaeological landscapes of conflict in 
which these campaigns took place, this research has established a precedent 
that legitimizes and encourages the study of medieval conflict archaeology.  
Contextualizing the individual conflict events of the Battle of Coleshill and the 
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Battle of Crogen within a broader conflict landscape setting resulted not only in 
a dynamic battlefield pattern analysis, but highlighted important attributes of 
social change triggered by Coleshill and Crogen.  This has promising 
ramifications for the future of archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts 
in Wales, considering that prior to this work no conflicts in Wales had been 
analysed via a conflict archaeology agenda.  Furthermore, the conflict 
archaeology methodology, built upon traditional battlefield archaeology method 
and further developed by the unique addition of a cultural conflict landscape 
consideration and reverse KOCOA military terrain analysis, has shown to be an 
effective means for archaeologically assessing medieval conflicts.  This 
research represents the first instance for the application of this method to any 
medieval conflict; given the successful results, this method stands to make 
significant contributions to future medieval conflict archaeology investigations.   
  This study has yielded notable contributions that have expanded the 
understanding not only for the conflicts of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II, but it 
has also identified and contextualized ongoing trends of Welsh and Anglo-
Norman conflict, and the role of the cultural and physical landscapes in these 
conflicts.  By placing the campaign case studies within the wider context of 
medieval warfare, and addressing inaccuracies and biases in the historical 
record and assessing the veracity of historical accounts, it was revealed that the 
Welsh and Anglo-Normans engaged in armed conflict on an equal tactical and 
technological basis.  The Welsh supremacy in the field during the Battle of 
Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen was accomplished via the shrewd exploitation 
of the physical landscape and the manipulation of the cultural conflict 
landscape.  The resistance efforts of Gwynedd to the conquest attempts of 
Henry II were further improved by the Welsh adoption of the Vegetian style of 
warfare, which notably included the building and besieging of castles, in 
response to the Anglo-Norman threat.  In doing so the Welsh changed their 
social-political viewpoint of terrain and territory from the non-Vegetian, fluid, 
changeable and abstract, to those of a sedentary Vegetian society, with fixed 
and definite borders.  This shift in attitude to territorial tenure can be argued to 
have facilitated the political and territorial unification of Wales under Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth in the early thirteenth century. 
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 The culmination of this research has resulted in the important addition of 
a native Welsh narrative to the archaeological record.  As stated in the opening 
chapters, one of the challenges facing medieval Welsh archaeology is the 
absence of Welsh agency from our understanding of the medieval period.  This 
short-coming was a direct result of the obscure state of the Welsh 
archaeological record during the eleventh and twelfth centuries and from the 
Anglo-Norman biases of scholars past and present.  Landscape and agency – 
historical archaeological theoretical frameworks – had encountered difficulty in 
their development, due to the fragmentary nature of the existing evidence.  
Compounding matters was the lack of a suitable methodology with which to 
surmount these challenges.  The conflict archaeology approach to medieval 
Welsh conflicts piloted here, particularly in terms of the methodology, has 
provided a means to successfully address and resolve many of these 
challenges. 
The avenues for future research discussed above, along with the results 
presented in this thesis, have provided a sustainable way forward that 
encourages the archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts in Wales and 
Britain.  This research has shown that the implementation of a conflict 
archaeology agenda for the investigation of the Anglo-Norman conquest of 
Wales can greatly enhance and contribute to our understanding of this 
important era of medieval British history.  The study of conflict archaeology 
deepens our awareness of the human propensity to solve problems with 
violence and the lasting effect that violence has on the formation of social 
systems and group identity.  It is the sincere hope of the author that the 
continued archaeological study of conflict and its ramifications in the past can 
discourage its use and lead to conflict resolution in the future. 
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Appendix One, Enlarged Maps and Viewshed Diagrams 
 
The following is a selection of enlarged maps and viewshed diagrams, these 
are indicated in the list of figures on page 6.
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Figure 1: Study Area Boundaries 
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Figure 2: Core Area Boundaries 
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Figure 38: The Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments from the 1157 Coastal Campaign (A = Welsh, B = Anglo-Normans). 
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Figure 39: Basingwerk encampment area. 
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Figure 40: Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester. 
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Figure 41: Anglo-Norman possible turn-off points into the woods 
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Figure 42: The two possible locations for the wooded battle, upper = Coleshill, lower = Ewloe 
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Figure 44: repositioning of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces following the Battle of Coleshill. Yellow = Welsh, Red = Anglo-Norman.  There lines are not meant to 
represent the direction of travel and are not representative of the actual route of advance. 
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Figure 45: Vicinity of Welsh raids on Rhuddlan. 
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Figure 46: Detail of assault on Anglesey (the Battle of Moelfre) included the churches that were pillaged by the Anglo-Normans. 
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Figure 47: Map detailing the approximate bounds of territory that Owain had conquered prior to the 1157 Campaign and was obliged to relinquish as part of the 
peace terms agreed upon with Henry. 
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Figure 69: viewshed from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk. 
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Figure 70: Viewshed from the coastal Roman road adjacent to Hawarden Castle. 
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Figure 71: Viewshed from the Roman road south of Bryn y Cwn Motte. 
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Figure 72: Viewshed from the Roman road north of Bryn y Cwn Motte 
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Figure 73: Viewshed from the Roman Road near Coleshill. 
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Figure 75: 1165 Campaign, map of Welsh and Anglo-Norman Encampments, A = Welsh, B= Anglo-Norman 
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Figure 76: Map of Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley. 
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Figure 77: Map of the supposed location of the Battle of Crogen.  The blue dashed line indicates the approximate extent of Offa’s Dyke, the solid blue line indicates 
the approximate course of the Ceiriog River. Note: The location of the Battle of Crogen is based on a national grid reference provided by the Clwyd Powys 
Archaeological Trust, it is an approximation only. 
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Figure 84: Map showing the vicinity of the Welsh encampment near Corwen. X= location of Corwen. 
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Figure 94: Viewshed from Caer Drewyn which is indicated with a red arrow. 
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Figure 95: Viewshed from Pen Y Bryn Y Castell which is indicated with a red arrow. 
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Figure 96: Map detailing possible avenues of approach into Wales from Oswestry. Yellow: Dee river valley, red: Ceiriog river valley, black: Tanat river valley. 
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Figure 97: Possible routes of approach into the Berwyn Mountains and to the Ffordd y Saeson from Crogen.  The line of Offa’s Dyke is indicated by the dotted line 
on the eastern edge of the map, the approximate route of Ffordd y Saeson is represented by the solid pink line and St Garmon’s Church, which may have been 
pillaged by the Anglo-Normans when encamped at Cerrig Gwynion is indicated by the red lightning bolt. 
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Figure 99: Viewshed from the Ffordd y Saeson demonstrating the continuous vantage points in the direction of Corwen which is indicated with the pink dotted line, 
the points from which the viewshed were calculated are underlined. 
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Figure 108: Possible battle locations A and B for the Battle of Coleshill near Hen Blas. 
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Figure 109:  Battlefield elements and observer points for the Battle of Crogen. 
Key: dotted blue line = coarse of  Offa’s Dyke 
large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach 
small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenues of approach (2 possibilities). 
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Figure 111: Proposed location for the Battle of Crogen, indicated by the red ‘explosion.’  The dotted red line indicates the area that would have been targeted for tree 
clearing by Henry’s forces. 
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Appendix Two – National Grid References 
  
The following table contains a list of British National Grid reference numbers for 
all sites discussed by this study, including visibility observation points. 
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National Grid Reference Site Name Site Type 
SH7878 Aberconwy Battle site 
SH4435061420 Abermenai Battle site 
SH434485 Bron-Yr-Erw Battle site 
SH4646 Bryn Derwin Battle site 
SJ21577437 Bryn Dychwelwch Battle site 
SJ17494483 Coed y Gadfa 
Battle site, place-
name 
SH9030 Coed Yspwys Battle site 
SH3080 Coedaneu Battle site 
SJ23587348 Coleshill (1150) Battle site 
SJ2373 Coleshill (1157) Battle site 
SJ256379 Crogen Battle site 
SH605980 Gwaeterw Battle site 
SJ042385 Llynor Battle site 
SJ1160 Maes Maen Cymro Battle site 
SH5572 Menai Bridge Battle site 
SH6578 Menai Straits Battle site 
SH5186 Moelfre Battle site 
SJ21206725 Pant-Y-Terfyn Battle site 
SH51197890 Rhos-Y-Gad Battle site 
SH6050 Snowdonia Battle site 
SJ2040 Wadiece Battle site 
SJ2040 Wich Battle site 
SJ1960277495 Basingwerk Encampment 
SJ087444 Caer Drewyn 
Encampment / 
Hillfort 
SJ0560743871 Castell Edeirnion 
Encampment / Llys 
/ Castle 
SJ152341 Cerrig Gwynion 
Encampment / 
Hillfort 
SJ078430 Pen y Bryn y Castell Encampment 
SH65647266 Abergwyngregyn  Castle 
SH6163879305 Aberlleiniog Castle 
SJ41885953 Alford Castle Castle 
SJ1977 Basingwerk Castle Castle 
SJ53805922 Beeston Castle Castle 
SJ341200 Belan Bank Castle 
SH7852971908 Bryn Castell Castle 
SJ2384671430 Bryn Y Cwn Motte Castle 
SJ30675717 Caergwrle Castle Castle 
SH4822163031 Caernarfon Twt Hill Castle 
SH9301035031 Castel Gronw Castle 
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National Grid Reference Site Name Site Type 
SH31352857 Castell Abersoch Castle 
SH6149701609 Castell Cynfal Castle 
SH58833715 Castell Gwain Goch Castle 
SH6676908547 Castell y Bere Castle 
SJ2912637565 Castell Y Waun Castle 
SJ0560743871 Castle Edeirnion Castle 
SJ46784414 Castle Hill Castle 
SJ40486573 Chester Castle 
SJ29033702 Chirk Bank Castle 
SJ327648 Connahs Hey Mound Castle 
SH4999237733 Criccieth Castle Castle 
SH7317419536 Cymer Castell Castle 
SH7822079450 Degannwy Castle Castle 
SJ0515765771 Denbigh Castle Castle 
SH859889817 Dolbadarn Castle Castle 
SH5066043071 Dolbenmaen Castle Castle 
SH7218152338 Dolwyddelan Castle Castle 
SH89100263 Domen Fawr  Castle 
SH87426883 Domen Pentre Isaf Castle 
SJ361608 Dunham Massey Castle 
SJ0600079895 Dyserth Castle Castle 
SJ40313467 Ellesmere Castle Castle 
SJ32724865 Erddig Castle Castle 
SJ2883167516 Ewloe Castle Castle 
SH87005225 Foel Las Castle 
SJ51387754 Frodsham Castle Castle 
SH5809531245 Harlech Castle Castle 
SJ31976537 Hawarden Motte Castle 
SJ22167345 Hen Blas / Coleshill Castle 
SJ2404918799 Hen Domen Castle 
SJ59402940 Hodnet Castle Castle 
SJ18577630 Holywell Castle 
SH62107915 Llangoed Castle 
SJ434508 Malpas Castle Castle 
SJ2352764313 Mold Castle Castle 
SJ47034096 Mount Cop Castle Castle 
SJ29032981 Oswestry Castle 
SH9382536840 Pen Ucha'r Llan Castle 
SJ0723283309 Prestatyn Castle 
SJ37535870 Pullford Castle Castle 
SJ3945222156 Ruyton Castle 
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National Grid Reference Site Name Site Type 
SJ434508 Shocklach Castle Castle 
SJ34967045 Shotwick Castle Castle 
SJ40061537 Shrawardine Castle Castle 
SJ49441281 Shrewsbury Castle Castle 
SJ2053025875 Sycharth Castle Castle 
SH5968803613 Talybont Castle Castle 
SH94767764 The Mount, The Peel Castle 
SH7248852165 Tomen Castell Castle 
SJ1486825372 
Tomen Cefn 
Glaniwrch Castle 
SJ10472625 Tomen Cefncoch  Castle 
SH45433768 Tomen Fawr Castle 
SH9504037223 Tomen Gastell Castle 
SH9280536091 Tomen y Bala Castle 
SJ19325615 Tomen Y Faerdre Castle 
SJ14872397 Tomen Y Maerdy Castle 
SJ17695161 Tomen Y Rhodwydd Castle 
SJ12672111 Tomen Yr Allt Castle 
SJ31266597 Trueman's Hill  Castle 
SJ02647766 Twt Hill Rhuddlan Castle 
SH34653828 Ty Newydd Castle Castle 
SJ25276328 Tyddyn Castle Castle 
SH62616600 Ty'n Twr Motte Castle 
SJ799838 Ullenwood Castle Castle 
SJ32563109 Whittington Castle 
SJ24887290 
Cae Mount, place-
name 
Possible Castle 
Place-name 
SH56956554 Castell Llanddeiniolen Possible Castle 
SH3318990831 Castell Rhonyn Possible Castle 
SJ22856835 Castell Rhosesmor Possible Castle 
SJ226685 
Castell, Halkyn, place-
name 
Possible Castle 
Place-name 
SJ53387341 Castle Cob Possible Castle 
SJ24637289 Chester Street Mound Possible Castle 
SJ1356942982 Hendom Possible Castle 
SJ0128244586 Maesmor Hall Mound Possible Castle 
SH37663520 Pen Y Mont Possible Castle 
SH6210779147 
Shore Castle at 
Lleiniog Possible Castle 
SH30664057 Tomen Nevin Possible Castle 
SJ258531 Bron Heulog Hillfort 
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National Grid Reference Site Name Site Type 
SJ33125370 
Bryn Alyn Promontory 
Fort Hillfort 
SJ30545328 Bryn Y Gaer Hillfort 
SH96824792 Caer Caradog Hillfort 
SH985520 Caer Ddunod Hillfort 
SJ087444 Caer Drewyn Hillfort 
SJ258531 Caer Estyn Hillfort 
SJ00054130 Caer Euni  Hillfort 
SH93607672 Castell Cawr Hillfort 
SJ222430 Castell Dinas Bran Hillfort / Castle 
SJ122544 Craig Adwy Wynt Hillfort 
SJ05502680 Craig Rhiwarth Hillfort 
SJ02453660 Craig yr Ychain Hillfort 
SJ049491 Dinas Melin Y Wig Hillfort 
SH968757 Dinorben Hillfort 
SJ202416 Graig Y Gadd Hillfort 
SJ36884336 
Gwernhaylord Banks 
Promontory Fort Hillfort 
SJ163601 
Llanbedr Dyffryn 
Clwyd Hillfort 
SJ1452066030 Moel Arthur Hillfort 
SJ163601 Moel Fenlli Hillfort 
SJ19006990 Moel Ffagnallt Hillfort 
SJ0961045670 Moel Fodig Hillfort 
SJ09507080 Moel y Gaer Bodfari Hillfort 
SJ1669746370 Moel Y Gaer Cefn Hillfort 
SJ14906175 Moel y Gaer Llanbedr Hillfort 
SJ21116903 
Moel Y Gaer 
Rhosesmor Hillfort 
SJ250427 Pen y Gaer Hillfort 
SJ09335701 Pen y Gwer Hillfort 
SJ128676 Pen-y-Cloddiau Hillfort 
SH91547637 Pen-y-Corddyn Hillfort 
SJ35825585 Roft Promontory Fort Hillfort 
SJ08315459 
Tan-y-llan Promontory 
Fort Hillfort 
SJ29684482 Y Garden Hillfort 
SJ19842412 Yr Allt  Hillfort 
SJ0602443023 Caer Crwyn Roman Fort 
SJ184783 Coedmawr Roman Fort 
SJ4027654387 Holt Roman Fort Roman Fort 
SJ44877708 Ince Roman Fort 
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National Grid Reference Site Name Site Type 
SH35456892 Aberffraw Llys Llys 
SH58602365 Ael y Bryn Llys (poss.) Llys 
SH65007200 Arllechwedd Llys Llys 
SH93102630 
Bwlch y Paul (early 
med.) Llys 
SJ0560743871 Castell Edeirnion Motte of Llys 
SH7578236868 Castell Prysor Motte of Llys 
SH7578236868 Castell Prysor Motte of Llys 
SJ0060137000 Crogan Castle Mount Motte of Llys 
SH6501013855 Llys Bradwen Llys 
SJ2752769583 Llysfain (early med.) Llys 
SH30654041 Nefyn Llys (poss.) Llys 
SJ35725623 Roft  Motte of Llys 
SH6970600256 Tomen Las Motte of Llys 
SH7054538677 Tomen Y Mur Motte of Llys 
SJ1518679513 Whitford Wood Palace Llys 
SH5807372052 Bangor Cathedral Church 
SJ1960277495 Basingwerk Abbey Church 
SJ0241926549 Pennant Melangell Church 
SH39908556 St Mary's Church 
SH50648290 St Mary's Cross Church 
SH41986546 St Peter's Church 
SH44358535 St Tyfrydog Church 
SJ1239326025 St Dogfan Church 
SJ15833280 St Garmon's Church 
SJ2914137633 St Mary's Church 
SJ0343537075 St Trillo Church Church 
SJ13426257 Cae Palmant Road 
SJ11556531 Cae Tan Y Palmant Road 
SJ04647877 Ffordd Y Ffrainc Road 
SJ11983708 Fordd Y Saeson Road 
SJ204650 Gwernaffield Road Road 
SJ26550755 Hope Roman Road Road 
SJ1880660540 
Llanferres Rectory 
Lane Road 
SJ0666 
Pen Palmant Cae 
Palmant Road 
SJ051513 Pen Y Palmant Road 
SH7822879456 
Road to Degannwy 
Castle Road 
SJ34176576 Roman Road East Road 
SJ417603 Roman Road Chester Road 
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SJ18627715 Roman Road Central Road 
SH86617278 Roman Road West Road 
SJ24007316 Roman Road Road 
SJ22367500 Roman Road Road 
SJ20007720 Roman Road Road 
SJ19637760 Roman Road Road 
SJ2897068996 Roman Road Road 
SJ27187124 Roman Road Road 
SJ25637182 Roman Road Road 
SJ25447193 Roman Road Road 
SJ25007227 Roman Road Road 
SJ25637182 Roman Road Road 
SJ20477675 Roman Road Road 
SJ18627715 Roman Road Road 
SJ17287704 Roman Road Road 
SJ15007664 Roman Road Road 
SJ11187565 Roman Road Road 
SJ11067564 Roman Road Road 
SJ10967561 Roman Road Road 
SJ10897561 Roman Road Road 
SJ1078275576 Roman Road Road 
SJ10007545 Roman Road Road 
SJ09537534 Roman Road Road 
SJ08977528 Roman Road Road 
SJ08757525 Roman Road Road 
SJ07197500 Roman Road Road 
SJ06627485 Roman Road Road 
SJ06167474 Roman Road Road 
SJ06017471 Roman Road Road 
SJ04697443 Roman Road Road 
SJ03437389 Roman Road Road 
SJ01677394 Roman Road Road 
SJ00357393 Roman Road Road 
SJ00007382 Roman Road Road 
SH99687393 Roman Road Road 
SH99317394 Roman Road Road 
SH99207394 Roman Road Road 
SH99087393 Roman Road Road 
SH98197398 Roman Road Road 
SH97107425 Roman Road Road 
SH96007428 Roman Road Road 
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SH95007439 Roman Road Road 
SH94277446 Roman Road Road 
SH94147447 Roman Road Road 
SH93677452 Roman Road Road 
SH93327456 Roman Road Road 
SH93327456 Roman Road Road 
SH92797460 Roman Road Road 
SH92547463 Roman Road Road 
SH92167463 Roman Road Road 
SH92137432 Roman Road Road 
SH91047415 Roman Road Road 
SH90987413 Roman Road Road 
SH90007409 Roman Road Road 
SH88737392 Roman Road Road 
SH88597387 Roman Road Road 
SH88387383 Roman Road Road 
SH87887359 Roman Road Road 
SH87607341 Roman Road Road 
SH86957297 Roman Road Road 
SH86887294 Roman Road Road 
SH86617278 Roman Road Road 
SJ0263042540 Roman Road Road 
SJ0109042060 Roman Road Road 
SH98513991 Roman Road Road 
SH98083967 Roman Road Road 
SH97163934 Roman Road Road 
SH90893421 Roman Road Road 
SH90213341 Roman Road Road 
SH88963253 Roman Road Road 
SH87933153 Roman Road Road 
SH87123146 Roman Road Road 
SH85903286 Roman Road Road 
SH82183356 Roman Road Road 
SH80493461 Roman Road Road 
SH79933525 Roman Road Road 
SH79263584 Roman Road Road 
SH77993535 Roman Road Road 
SH78463625 Roman Road Road 
SH77333668 Roman Road Road 
SH76943701 Roman Road Road 
SH76403696 Roman Road Road 
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SH76303626 Roman Road Road 
SH75753652 Roman Road Road 
SH75563668 Roman Road Road 
SH74493701 Roman Road Road 
SH74283681 Roman Road Road 
SH73833740 Roman Road Road 
SH73013790 Roman Road Road 
SH72173784 Roman Road Road 
SH71453787 Roman Road Road 
SH70493884 Roman Road Road 
SH69703912 Roman Road Road 
SH81173393 Roman Road Road 
SH79373571 Roman Road Road 
SH69523971 Roman Road Road 
SH68544075 Roman Road Road 
SH66114133 Roman Road Road 
SH65404129 Roman Road Road 
SH61674172 Roman Road Road 
SH63514397 Roman Road Road 
SH52553973 Roman Road Road 
SH60464596 Roman Road Road 
SH59334676 Roman Road Road 
SH57874835 Roman Road Road 
SH56625166 Roman Road Road 
SH55845466 Roman Road Road 
SH53315808 Roman Road Road 
SH52575914 Roman Road Road 
SH48034496 Roman Road Road 
SH47045321 Roman Road Road 
SH47645813 Roman Road Road 
SH72075813 Roman Road Road 
SH68085641 Roman Road Road 
SH65925580 Roman Road Road 
SH61695740 Roman Road Road 
SH59365906 Roman Road Road 
SH56666117 Roman Road Road 
SH56256789 Roman Road Road 
SH57606750 Roman Road Road 
SH49086265 Roman Road Road 
SH49886300 Roman Road Road 
SH66987351 Roman Road Road 
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SH52636347 Roman Road Road 
SH52006339 Roman Road Road 
SH47485363 Roman Road Road 
SH52286429 Roman Road Road 
SH53636546 Roman Road Road 
SH57606750 Roman Road Road 
SH64147186 Roman Road Road 
SH66987351 Roman Road Road 
SH69437236 Roman Road Road 
SH69737228 Roman Road Road 
SH70387205 Roman Road Road 
SH70727201 Roman Road Road 
SH71127191 Roman Road Road 
SH71577174 Roman Road Road 
SH71987155 Roman Road Road 
SH72687165 Roman Road Road 
SH73687165 Roman Road Road 
SH74627209 Roman Road Road 
SH75897199 Roman Road Road 
SH77187185 Roman Road Road 
SJ348638 
Pavement Hay, place-
name Road Place-name 
SJ17713396 
Pen Y Rhewl, place-
name Road Place-name 
SJ18373289 Pensarn, place-name Road Place-name 
SJ2151042160 Llangollen Bridge Bridge 
SJ1877034270 
Pont Rhyd y Gad 
Bridge Bridge 
SJ0879 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ09177975 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ09247973 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ09587956 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ10047932 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ10007933 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ09917939 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ10397902 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ10617889 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ10797875 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ1160677955 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ12637737 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ12497739 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ13047702 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
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SJ13297668 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ13547641 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ14727564 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ14587577 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ15267500 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ15307467 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2558 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25625795 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26725773 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ27195752 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ27465727 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ27635704 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2777656842 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2781556786 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ27895665 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28465539 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28455542 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28525522 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28735489 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28765485 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28795463 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28915420 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29005378 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29075324 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29075324 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29165210 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2922051770 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29255157 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2928051180 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ3008146292 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2600021909 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ270187 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28211550 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25233543 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2650137729 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2684738476 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2706239029 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2744039669 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28274084 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28274084 Offa's Dyke Dyke 
SJ19147686 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
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SJ1976 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ18937614 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ19337568 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ19457500 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ19737467 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ19987432 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ20167394 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ20337388 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ23207000 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ23256890 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24296701 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ2396067430 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24246708 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24336697 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24406688 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24556664 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ24956613 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25006607 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25046604 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25426560 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25446556 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25616539 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25646500 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25776476 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ25846459 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26036451 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26156395 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26266378 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26656329 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ26876283 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28036223 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28466205 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28556195 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28616193 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ28676188 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29496113 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29556102 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ29726084 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30006047 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30036044 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30056038 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
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SJ30345973 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30725917 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ308590 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30925885 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30975869 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31025852 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31055839 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31125820 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31155807 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31095767 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31245678 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32025500 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32505500 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ33305340 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ3333053070 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ3330452794 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ33305256 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ33145183 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ33005120 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32855062 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32705000 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32684939 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32784923 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32244685 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32774884 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32674862 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32564837 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32524782 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32284720 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32244685 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ32174570 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ313456 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ31254442 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30984341 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30704225 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
SJ30544176 Wat's Dyke Dyke 
  
1157 Campaign 
Viewshed Points   
SH6163879295 
Castell Aberlleiniog 
Motte viewshed point 
SH6168979293 
Castell Aberlleiniog 
towards sea viewshed point 
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SH3553368626 Aberffraw Dunes viewshed point 
SH5124181787 
Near Viking 
Settlement viewshed point 
SH5301181032 Red Warf Bay viewshed point 
SH4989586325 Hen Chapel viewshed point 
SH4967686132 
Romano-British 
Settlement viewshed point 
SH4959287129 Beach near Moelfre viewshed point 
SJ2165374258 Retreat 1 viewshed point 
SJ2158974158 Retreat 2 viewshed point 
SJ2124573858 Retreat 3 viewshed point 
SJ2256473766 Near Hen Blas viewshed point 
SJ2250073845 Near Hen Blas viewshed point 
SJ2239673695 Burial Mound viewshed point 
SJ2242973659 Ditch by tumulus viewshed point 
SJ2257773771 towards ravine viewshed point 
SJ2260573754 in ravine 1 viewshed point 
SJ2265273811 in ravine 2 viewshed point 
SJ2275573743 in ravine 3 viewshed point 
SJ2112573152 Wat's Dyke 1 viewshed point 
SJ2120273157 Wat's Dyke 2 viewshed point 
SJ2208673392 Hen Blas 1 viewshed point 
SJ2220473401 Hen Blas 2 viewshed point 
SJ2215073437 Hen Blas 3 viewshed point 
SJ2215073461 Hen Blas 4 motte viewshed point 
SJ2218173450 Hen Blas 5 viewshed point 
SJ2220573466 Hen Blas 6 viewshed point 
SJ2189773465 
Hen Blas wheatfield 
footpath viewshed point 
SJ2951268339 Ewloe 1 viewshed point 
SJ2954968085 Ewloe 2 viewshed point 
SJ2959068338 Ewloe 3 viewshed point 
SJ2949367961 Ewloe 4 viewshed point 
SJ2956068233 Ewloe 5 viewshed point 
SJ2937968102 Ewloe 6 viewshed point 
SJ2945668029 Ewloe 7 viewshed point 
SJ2907467775 Ewloe 8 viewshed point 
SJ2893267632 
Ewloe 9 Supposed site 
of battle viewshed point 
SJ2887967596 Ewloe 10 viewshed point 
SJ2882267532 Ewloe 11 viewshed point 
SJ2883167506 Ewloe 12 viewshed point 
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SJ2879767488 Ewloe 13 viewshed point 
SJ3251365175 
Connahs Hey Mound 
1 viewshed point 
SJ3270465054 
Connahs Hey Mound 
2 viewshed point 
SJ3252265169 
Connahs Hey Mound 
3 on motte viewshed point 
SJ3160265672 Hawarden 1 viewshed point 
SJ3185565348 Hawarden 2 viewshed point 
SJ3186965297 Hawarden 3 viewshed point 
SJ3195065285 Hawarden 4 viewshed point 
SJ3181965313 Hawarden 5 viewshed point 
  
1165 Campaign 
Viewshed Points   
SJ2660737920 
Offas Dyke Chirk 
Castle viewshed point 
SJ2662637900 
Edge of field Chirk 
Castle viewshed point 
SJ2673737776 
Middle of field on ridge 
Chirk Castle viewshed point 
SJ2665637721 
South Treeline field 
Chirk Castle viewshed point 
SJ2670937698 
In dip of field Chirk 
Castle viewshed point 
SJ2649237707 
Base of hill ravine by 
oak viewshed point 
SJ2656737860 Offas Dyke Burial 1 viewshed point 
SJ2650137724 Offas Dyke Burial 2 viewshed point 
SJ2623537372 Offas Dyke 1 viewshed point 
SJ2568936434 Offas Dyke 2 viewshed point 
SJ2634037407 Offas Dyke 3 viewshed point 
SJ2555536423 Offas Dyke 4 viewshed point 
SJ1530236107 
Fordd Y Saeson near 
cairn viewshed point 
SJ1449836188 
Fordd Y Saeson on 
road towards west 1 viewshed point 
SJ1444736188 
Fordd Y Saeson on 
road towards west 2 viewshed point 
SJ1466336120 
Fordd Y Saeson on 
road towards west 3 viewshed point 
SJ1478336106 
Fordd Y Saeson at 
boundary stone viewshed point 
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SJ1499936379 
Fordd Y Saeson South 
on road viewshed point 
SJ1176237034 
Fordd Y Saeson in 
road towards Corwen viewshed point 
SJ0770643160 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
area 1 viewshed point 
SJ0780243166 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
area 2 viewshed point 
SJ0797543147 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
area 3 viewshed point 
SJ0802243159 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
area 4 viewshed point 
SJ0802242996 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
encampment 1 viewshed point 
SJ0829242986 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
encampment 2 viewshed point 
SJ0849642928 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
encampment 3 viewshed point 
SJ0809142748 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
encampment 4 viewshed point 
SJ0791142750 
Pen Y Bryn Y Castell 
encampment 5 viewshed point 
SJ0865844481 Caer Drewyn 1 viewshed point 
SJ0887344484 Caer Drewyn 2 viewshed point 
SJ0880944302 Caer Drewyn 3 viewshed point 
SJ2232743037 Dinas Bran 1 viewshed point 
SJ2232243074 Dinas Bran 2 viewshed point 
SJ2224843079 Dinas Bran 3 viewshed point 
SJ2221243056 Dinas Bran 4 viewshed point 
SJ2222443005 Dinas Bran 5 viewshed point 
SJ2675938107 Chirk 1 viewshed point 
SJ2680538017 Chirk 2 viewshed point 
SJ2663938480 Chirk 3 viewshed point 
SJ2658138633 Chirk 4 viewshed point 
SJ2676037820 Chirk 5 viewshed point 
SJ1763044382 Coed Y Gadfa viewshed point 
SJ0112837599 Crogan Castle 1 viewshed point 
SJ0135537664 Crogan Castle 2 viewshed point 
SJ1879934253 
Pont Ryd Y Gad 
Bridge 1 viewshed point 
SJ1861334245 
Pont Ryd Y Gad 
Bridge 2 viewshed point 
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Appendix Three – Medieval Rulers of Gwynedd 1066-1282,  
(after Lloyd 1912: 765-769): 
 
 Bleddyn ap Cynfyn (1063-1075) 
  -Usurper from Powys, receives Gwynedd from the English. 
 
 Trahaearn ap Caradog (1075-1081) 
-Usurper from Powys. 
 
 Gruffudd ap Cynan (1081-1137) 
-From the original Aberffraw dynasty of Gwynedd. 
 
 Owain Gwynedd (ap Gruffudd) (1137-1170) 
 
 Maelgwyn ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1173) Anglesey 
 
 Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1195) in the east. 
 
 Rhodri ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1190) in the west. 
 
 Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great) (1195-1240) 
 
 Dafydd ap Llywelyn (1240-1246) 
 
 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Llywelyn the Last) (1246-1282) 
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Appendix Four – Third Party Copyright Permissions: 
 
The following is a list of permission for the use of images not created by the 
author that appear in this thesis.  Images for which third party copyright 
permission could not be obtained have been blacked out. 
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